NationStates Jolt Archive

Me and a freind really debated the practical nature of Socialism (my part) and Capitalism (his part) for a long time until we finally realized that the conflict of the debate was not in its practicallity--we fundementally disagreed on the premise of society. My freind called for a system based on freedom, and, he argues, Capitalism is the key to that. I brought up this argument: http://forums2.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=363685. When we finsihed that debate he said that libertarianism called for a 'natural order' which was the ideal. I know this argument is wrong, and I'm sure I can come up with a counter argument, but I would like some help. So my socialist freinds, any ideas?

Me and a freind really debated the practical nature of Socialism (my part) and Capitalism (his part) for a long time until we finally realized that the conflict of the debate was not in its practicallity--we fundementally disagreed on the premise of society. My freind called for a system based on freedom, and, he argues, Capitalism is the key to that. I brought up this argument: http://forums2.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=363685. When we finsihed that debate he said that libertarianism called for a 'natural order' which was the ideal. I know this argument is wrong, and I'm sure I can come up with a counter argument, but I would like some help. So my socialist freinds, any ideas?

I've always thought that the most moral system would let all those who worked hardest rise to the top. In capitalism, whoever is born into a rich family, can basically ride that to the top. In socialism, everyone's basically teh same, so no one rises on top. I think what would be most moral would to have a universal school system, and no government funded welfare. which is sort of a mix between capitalism and socialism.

I've always thought that the most moral system would let all those who worked hardest rise to the top. In capitalism, whoever is born into a rich family, can basically ride that to the top. In socialism, everyone's basically teh same, so no one rises on top. I think what would be most moral would to have a universal school system, and no government funded welfare. which is sort of a mix between capitalism and socialism.

Yeah, but why is economic progress the end of all ends? Isn't the objective to make everyone as well off as we can? And shouldn't we, therefore, make at least some attempt to redistribute income?

I think that socialism is the most moral.

Why?

1. Look at Paris Hilton. She couldn't survive a week in the world most of us live in. She's been spoiled by her parents. Under socialism, she would be just like you or I.

2. Look at Belinda Stronach. She was the CEO of Magna Parts International, which is owned by her father. She quit that job to run for leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, and lost the leadership. She almost didn't win her seat.

3. Look at Eugene Upper. He was a homeless man who died in a bus shelter. He died. While the two above were enjoying designer shoes, he died.

Think twice before you support capitalism.

I think that socialism is the most moral.

Why?

1. Look at Paris Hilton. She couldn't survive a week in the world most of us live in. She's been spoiled by her parents. Under socialism, she would be just like you or I.

2. Look at Belinda Stronach. She was the CEO of Magna Parts International, which is owned by her father. She quit that job to run for leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, and lost the leadership. She almost didn't win her seat.

3. Look at Eugene Upper. He was a homeless man who died in a bus shelter. He died. While the two above were enjoying designer shoes, he died.

Think twice before you support capitalism.

My freind would argue that while these are defindently problems, you cannot justify 'stealing' (taxing) people to get it.

Well, so a person's life is not worth taxing people for it?

Well, so a person's life is not worth taxing people for it?

Are you suggesting that the homeless man would not have died if we had higher taxes?

Libertarianism is technically total freedom... but then again, you can argue that the Libertarian ideal of privatized police forces, etc. could lead to inner conflict amongst competing companies. He could easily argue back about government lackeys.

You're screwed either way. Neither is absolutely more moral than the other. Both sides have their major flaws.

Are you suggesting that the homeless man would not have died if we had higher taxes?

depending largely on how the taxes were used, yes, but I also depends on what you mean by 'died'. Everyone dies eventually; this begs question about existentialism and relativity of life and blah blah blah but I'm more concerned about how he suffered (we assume) before he died.

Are you suggesting that the homeless man would not have died if we had higher taxes?

Yes. The money that went into designer clothes could have gone into programs to get Eugene Upper off the streets and possibly have saved his life.

It sounds more like you're arguing Socialism against Anarchy. If a government has no right to interfere with people’s freedoms then it has no right to legislate laws. The purpose of a government is to impose order, hopefully for the good of the general society. Maybe your friend would rather live in anarchy?

Capitalism is a system driven by the distribution of capital and the pursuit of monetary gain, not the endless pursuit of “freedom”.

It sounds more like you're arguing Socialism against Anarchy. If a government has no right to interfere with people’s freedoms then it has no right to legislate laws. The purpose of a government is to impose order, hopefully for the good of the general society. Maybe your friend would rather live in anarchy?

Capitalism is a system driven by the distribution of capital and the pursuit of monetary gain, not the endless pursuit of “freedom”.

He has a system divised that has to do with consent, based largely on the assumption that the only gov't programs that would survive is one that will have the support from the vast, vast majority of people--ie, police, military, infastructure, ect.

Yes. The money that went into designer clothes could have gone into programs to get Eugene Upper off the streets and possibly have saved his life.

He is homeless for a reason. Why should we all have to support a completely non-productive member of society?

Wealth is not a zero-sum game. Paris Hilton's wealth does not prevent you from gaining any.

He has a system divised that has to do with consent, based largely on the assumption that the only gov't programs that would survive is one that will have the support from the vast, vast majority of people--ie, police, military, infastructure, ect.

So he’s basically arguing that a free society should have nothing to do with helping the disadvantaged and any government-afforded aid is tax-theft?

He is homeless for a reason. Why should we all have to support a completely non-productive member of society?

Wealth is not a zero-sum game. Paris Hilton's wealth does not prevent you from gaining any.

Does pre-determination mean anything to you?

Personally, I think existentialism (in the all-encompassing moral sense) is misguided -- a bunch of self-rationalizing garbage written down by 1920s crackpots.

So he’s basically arguing that a free society should have nothing to do with helping the disadvantaged and any government-afforded aid is tax-theft?

If the society is truly free, then no one would force you to help anyone. You don't think anyone gives to charity?

If the society is truly free, then no one would force you to help anyone. You don't think anyone gives to charity?

A "truly" free society would be an Anarchy. But in a society that strives for a ballance between social order and personal freedom you'd rather have a system that doesn't try to do anything to help the disadvantaged?

If you want to get practical -- independent charity isn't capable of holding up an effective social saftey network.

Secondly, allowing charity is a neutral moral stance for a government to take, are you trying to argue otherwise?

He is homeless for a reason. Why should we all have to support a completely non-productive member of society?

Wealth is not a zero-sum game. Paris Hilton's wealth does not prevent you from gaining any.

The thing is, Eugene Upper could have been a productive member of society if he had the opportunity. Instead, he had no opportunity, and he died.

Existentialism garbage? It has its flaws, but I think the message (that we are responsible for our actions) is very important.

To properly answer this question we need a good, clear understanding of what "morality" really is. Dictionary.com defines morality as "The relation of conformity or nonconformity to the moral standard or rule." History has shown us that the moral standard or rule is hardly consistent between cultures and never universal. There is no universal moral standard, so how can we possibly expect all people to live within the bounds of a single moral code and how can we possibly judge an idea objectively based only on the morals of a select group? The answer is that we cannot reasonablly judge an idea based on its morality in a universal sense. We can say that within a specific moral code Capitalism is consistent while within another Socialism is consistent, and in some both work. What we cannot say is that either is univerally good or bad. To sum up, relativism is a necessary piece of any discussion of morals or ideologies. Too often the simple fact that not everyone thinks the same way about the same things is overlooked.

The thing is, Eugene Upper could have been a productive member of society if he had the opportunity. Instead, he had no opportunity, and he died.

Sure he did

Do you think he would have chosen life on the streets? Life on the streets is rough. No one would choose it unless they absolutely had to. If he had an opportunity, he would have taken it.

Do you think he would have chosen life on the streets? Life on the streets is rough. No one would choose it unless they absolutely had to. If he had an opportunity, he would have taken it.

Not true. Have you ever talked to homeless people?

A reason libertarianism doesn't work is because it attempts to have both political and economic freedom. It sounds amazing, but remember, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.

Liberty and Equality are tied together. In free market societies, the rich take political power, and destroy the balance of political power that Democracy (sweet, sweet Democracy) guarantees. Poor people are disabled by the free market to have less political freedom.

That is my argument against Libertarianism. I classify this and Stalinism as Impractical Centrist ideas. Democracy is pissed and crapped on in a Libertarian ("Democratic" Capitalist) society, as the rich end up being the powerful. Socialist is pissed and crapped on in a Stalinist (Authoritarian "Socialist") society, as the dictator/oligarchs take power and wealth from the average citizen.

Either you get dictatorship capitalism, a plutocracy of the rich, or you get democratic socialism, a Scandinavian type society. Make a choice...

P.S. The US and other countries run a fine line between the two, though the US swings towards plutocracy every day...

I have read several books on the subject. One of them is by Jack Layton, a former Toronto city councillor who is very involved with homeless people. The other was by a man who spent a year with the homeless people in Tent City, a squatters' area in Toronto.

It is very difficult being a homeless person. You have to fight for everything.

I have read several books on the subject. One of them is by Jack Layton, a former Toronto city councillor who is very involved with homeless people. The other was by a man who spent a year with the homeless people in Tent City, a squatters' area in Toronto.

It is very difficult being a homeless person. You have to fight for everything.

I really have a hard time understanding how people become homeless. It's not difficult to find work, and there are dozens of people I could crash with. You really got to screw up or be a complete loon to end up on the street.

I saw an HBO special about homelessness and it really pissed me off. There was this 40 year biologist that ended up on the street with his family a month after losing his job. That is inexcusable.

If the society is truly free, then no one would force you to help anyone. You don't think anyone gives to charity?

If the society was truly "free" nobody would need to be helped.

If the society was truly "free" nobody would need to be helped.

What? How is that? Free to succeed, free to fail.

Fascism is a hybrid of the two, and superior to both. Anarchism is the ultimate deffeincy. The most idealistic, idiotic, form of government ran by cynics.

Just because you have a job doesn't guarantee you a house. There are plenty of working homeless people. These are the ones in shelters with alarm clocks by their beds. They work minimum wage jobs because that's all they can find.

Just because you have a job doesn't guarantee you a house. There are plenty of working homeless people. These are the ones in shelters with alarm clocks by their beds. They work minimum wage jobs because that's all they can find.

That really sucks for them. I made over min wage when I was 16. I'm sure they have a few regrets.

Sure, they have regrets. Don't we all?

Maybe if teenagers wouldn't take so many of these grunt jobs, then homeless people could.

By the way, I am a teenager.

Discussing the morality of capitalism and socialism is fairly pointless, since first you have to agree with your opponent on the defenition of capitalism, then socialism, and then agree on a common morality. Once you have done that (which should only take a few billion years), the discussion is pretty much over since your defenition of morality will cover it.

Better to discuss "Does capitalism or socialism distribute wealth in a way beneficial to society, and if so, which one does it best".

Sure, they have regrets. Don't we all?

Maybe if teenagers wouldn't take so many of these grunt jobs, then homeless people could.

By the way, I am a teenager.


You're right, I shouldn't work because it might stop other people from finding jobs.

Maybe I shouldn't eat either because other people might not be able to find food.

Maybe for the same reason I shouldn't own a house.

You're right, I shouldn't work because it might stop other people from finding jobs.

Maybe I shouldn't eat either because other people might not be able to find food.

Maybe for the same reason I shouldn't own a house.

No, there is a difference between a teenager having a job and an adult.

The adult can work because otherwise, he or she would starve. A teenager does not need to feed themselves. Their parents will feed them. Their parents will give them shelter. Adult's parents won't do that.

No, there is a difference between a teenager having a job and an adult.

The adult can work because otherwise, he or she would starve. A teenager does not need to feed themselves. Their parents will feed them. Their parents will give them shelter. Adult's parents won't do that.

Still does not change the argument. If teens can make over min wage, what is these people's problem?

Still does not change the argument. If teens can make over min wage, what is these people's problem?

Did you make enough that you could, theoretically, move out and still support yourself?

Did you make enough that you could, theoretically, move out and still support yourself?

Yes - considering that I do now, on a measly uni stipend.

Edit/Add - It's called roomates

Okay, why do you think that homeless people are homeless?

Okay, why do you think that homeless people are homeless? Usually because they made a mistake. Running away from home, or being fired in a slump, or enrolling in Julliard. Then they're stuck.

After all, would you hire a homeless person? No, strike that. Would you hire a bum off the streets?

Usually because they made a mistake. Running away from home, or being fired in a slump, or enrolling in Julliard. Then they're stuck.

After all, would you hire a homeless person? No, strike that. Would you hire a bum off the streets?

Indeed, that's the problem. They cannot get off the streets. We need to put mechanisms in place that will get them off the street.

These would include an expansion of the public sector to provide jobs for them, life skills training to help them survive here, and public housing.

I can believe that some homeless people are, in fact, quite lazy, but I seriously doubt that's the case for all of them. The wealth distribution simply isn't justifiable. Do you really think a billionaire works 10,000 times or even 100 times harder than a minimum wage worker? You can't without believing rich people are some sort of gods.

The fact that the unemployment rate in the US is 5% also speaks rather poorly of capitalism. Are we to believe that many people simply prefer poverty to working? If working conditions are as good as proponents of capitalism make them out to be, then it makes no sense for people to choose the worse conditions of poverty.

I can believe that some homeless people are, in fact, quite lazy, but I seriously doubt that's the case for all of them. The wealth distribution simply isn't justifiable. Do you really think a billionaire works ... 100 times harder than a minimum wage worker?
Yes. Min wage jobs are mindless.


The fact that the unemployment rate in the US is 5% also speaks rather poorly of capitalism. Are we to believe that many people simply prefer poverty to working?

Job churn. 5% is about on target.

Lettila, maybe. But the underemployment in for the USSR or North Korea speaks even worse for a 'communist'* economy.

And the employment rate isn't that much better in the actually socialist countries like Sweden wither.

*the '...' means "I know very well they aren't communist but I have to call the system they use something".

It is not the morality of the systems that we must argue, it is the functionality and how close to the ideal that they come. Extreme socialism's (communism) ideal is that everyone would do the same amount of work and gain the same amount of profit from that work. However, in functionality, more often the ruling elite would gain power and wealth from exploitation of the masses. Capitailism's ideal is that everyone would do the amount of work they wished and would gain profit in relation to that work. In practice, those that do the least amount of work often gains the most amount of profit due to either quirks of the system or the personalbility of the person. Neither has nor will ever reach the ideal. It's just which is further from it?

It is not the morality of the systems that we must argue, it is the functionality and how close to the ideal that they come. Extreme socialism's (communism) ideal is that everyone would do the same amount of work and gain the same amount of profit from that work. However, in functionality, more often the ruling elite would gain power and wealth from exploitation of the masses. Capitailism's ideal is that everyone would do the amount of work they wished and would gain profit in relation to that work. In practice, those that do the least amount of work often gains the most amount of profit due to either quirks of the system or the personalbility of the person. Neither has nor will ever reach the ideal. It's just which is further from it? Communism isn't the same thing as extreme socialism, there is a qualitative difference between them. Communism calls for public ownership of the means of production, socialism doesn't. Nor does Communism want to pay everyone the same amount of money for the same amount of work.

"From each according to their ability, to each according to their need" means that the same amount of work can give a different amount of pay.

But I do agree that neither Capitalism not Communism can ever be "moral" or "perfect".

The USSR was far closer to the US economically than to communism. It had clear social classes and money, things completely absent in genuine communism. In fact, it's arguable whether it would even qualify as socialist since it didn't really have worker ownership of the means of production.

Yes. Min wage jobs are mindless.

So's modelling. But Paris Hilton makes tons of money at it. She never has to worry about starvation.

Homeless people are lazy? It takes a lot of work to be a homeless person. The very bench you sleep on needs defending. Survival is hard work.

Just ask Eugene Upper.

I read your argument about the wealthy man and I agree. The problem certainly is Capitalism, and it would be easily averted had the government been socialist.

Communism isn't the same thing as extreme socialism, there is a qualitative difference between them. Communism calls for public ownership of the means of production, socialism doesn't. Nor does Communism want to pay everyone the same amount of money for the same amount of work.

"From each according to their ability, to each according to their need" means that the same amount of work can give a different amount of pay.

But I do agree that neither Capitalism not Communism can ever be "moral" or "perfect".

Then I mistake what socialism is. Perhaps a link would help me here. Asto teh second bit, I must disagree only in practice. The idea is that everyone has the same basic needs and that they do the same general amount of work (or if differing amounts, that similar amounts give similar pay).

Socialism and Communism have similar goals: making things "fair". But their methods are very different. Socialist countries (of which there are plenty) try to redistribute wealth through taxation and subsidies. Communist countries (of which there are zero) redistribute the factors of production themselves.

*shudder* I hate using the word "fair" when talking economics. I hate it.

I think that socialism is the most moral.

Why?

1. Look at Paris Hilton. She couldn't survive a week in the world most of us live in. She's been spoiled by her parents. Under socialism, she would be just like you or I.
What does that have to do with morality?

2. Look at Belinda Stronach. She was the CEO of Magna Parts International, which is owned by her father. She quit that job to run for leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, and lost the leadership. She almost didn't win her seat.
What does that have to do with morality?

3. Look at Eugene Upper. He was a homeless man who died in a bus shelter. He died. While the two above were enjoying designer shoes, he died.
What does that have to do with morality?

Think before you post.

The USSR was far closer to the US economically than to communism. It had clear social classes and money, things completely absent in genuine communism. In fact, it's arguable whether it would even qualify as socialist since it didn't really have worker ownership of the means of production.
USSR = communist. Deny it all you like. Whine all you like. Won't change that fact that you so detest.

What does it have to do with morality?

It's immoral for someone to die so someone else can wear designer shoes.

USSR = communist. Deny it all you like. Whine all you like. Won't change that fact that you so detest.

Are you the dumbass from "The Anarchist Thread" on the old boards who kept on trying to bring up the "scotsman" argument?

Me and a freind really debated the practical nature of Socialism (my part) and Capitalism (his part) for a long time until we finally realized that the conflict of the debate was not in its practicallity--we fundementally disagreed on the premise of society. My freind called for a system based on freedom, and, he argues, Capitalism is the key to that. I brought up this argument: http://forums2.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=363685. When we finsihed that debate he said that libertarianism called for a 'natural order' which was the ideal. I know this argument is wrong, and I'm sure I can come up with a counter argument, but I would like some help. So my socialist freinds, any ideas?

Okay, the first step in your chain of reasoning is to ask "Why is freedom worthwhile?". This might seem like an absurd question, but for any right-thinking Libertarian, they have a ready answer: a society in which freedom is maximized is the one that best provides for the general welfare. This was the basic chain of reasoning by John Stuart Mill (the intellectual godfather of political libertarians. . .except for those wacked-out Randians).

Now, you just need to ask "Does Capitalism or Socialism do a better job of providing for the general welfare?" Clearly, there are problems on both sides. On the one hand, every time people have tried to implement full-blown socialism in society, they've ended up getting a despotic regime that talks the socialist talk instead. On the other hand, every time pure unrestricted capitalism is implemented, you get wage-slaves working for a quarter and hour for 14 hour-days, six days a week to support a few people living in the greatest opulence.

Nevertheless, political libertarianism argues just that: society is actually best, and the welfare of said society best served, when we allow those kind of things to take place without government intervention. This is absurd, especially when compared to the massive improvements made in America post-New Deal or England post-Austerity. Therefore, the first attack you need to make is historical: every time people have actually tried unrestricted capitalism, they've gotten a few people's luxury at the expense of everyone else's misery. Under no system of morality would this be considered the best system of government.

The second argument you need to make is Marx's dialectic argument: Simply put, Marx argued that the very act by the rich of squeezing greater and greater profit out of the people would in itself bring about economic collapse (specifically, he pointed out that the whole point of increasing efficiency was to decrease costs, like worker's wages, while increasing the volume of goods produced. Put together, you have far too little money chasing far too many goods--the recipe for a deflationary crash). Such a crash generates friction in society: people still have to survive, and they usually do it by taking from the people who have what they need. Were the collapse deep enough (which Marx predicted that eventually it would be), that friction would boil over into full-blown revolt. So you could argue that any economic system that a) brings about the conditions for it's own demise, b) leads to higher crime, and c) leads to an overthrow of society is inherently unjust.

The third argument is to question the very nature of his "natural order". He seems to suggest that any society left to it's own devices without government interference would somehow turn into a macro version of The Smurfs: Pink Edition, where people would all work together harmoniously and sing songs. In reality, the state of nature is one where the only protection you have against someone clubbing you in the head and taking what's yours is a) the threat of retaliation (which is not that big of a threat if you club right and hard enough), b) whatever club you have or have paid others to wield for you, and c) someone else's rationality. This is, needless to say, not a society very conducive towards protecting "the general welfare." It's a society conducive towards protecting the individual who believes in the "me first and only" principle, and egoism is that most unethical of theories.

To properly answer this question we need a good, clear understanding of what "morality" really is. Dictionary.com defines morality as "The relation of conformity or nonconformity to the moral standard or rule." History has shown us that the moral standard or rule is hardly consistent between cultures and never universal. There is no universal moral standard, so how can we possibly expect all people to live within the bounds of a single moral code and how can we possibly judge an idea objectively based only on the morals of a select group? The answer is that we cannot reasonablly judge an idea based on its morality in a universal sense. We can say that within a specific moral code Capitalism is consistent while within another Socialism is consistent, and in some both work. What we cannot say is that either is univerally good or bad. To sum up, relativism is a necessary piece of any discussion of morals or ideologies. Too often the simple fact that not everyone thinks the same way about the same things is overlooked.

And since when did the fact that two cultures have differing standards of morality make two different actions equally morally acceptable? You confuse is and ought, OE: Just because someone does something doesn't mean they ought to have done it, and the fact that society might or might not have accepted such actions has no bearing on whether they ought to have accepted such actions.

So's modelling. But Paris Hilton makes tons of money at it. She never has to worry about starvation.

Homeless people are lazy? It takes a lot of work to be a homeless person. The very bench you sleep on needs defending. Survival is hard work.

Just ask Eugene Upper.

But she creates much more wealth than the idiot behind the fryer.

I will if I see him.

USSR = communist. Deny it all you like. Whine all you like. Won't change that fact that you so detest.

Good to see you back

But she creates much more wealth than the idiot behind the fryer.
So? Is wealth worth destroying a society?
I will if I see him.
That's the point. He's dead.

So? Is wealth worth destroying a society?

That's the point. He's dead.


What? Her job in no way inhibits your ability to find meaningfull work. So what if she is rich? How does that affect you?

Everyone dies

What? Her job in no way inhibits your ability to find meaningfull work. So what if she is rich? How does that affect you?

Everyone dies

It undercuts one of the central premises of economic libertarian thought: if you work hard, you will be rewarded by better benefits. Paris Hilton does not work hard. Hell, she does less than hardly works. As far as I know, her only notable contribution to society was that she was able to, with the help of her boyfriend and a video camera, single-handedly take the nation's conscience off the debacle in Iraq for a few weeks. And yet she is still rewarded with more money than 99% of the people that do work hard will ever see.

As I recall, this was one of the prime arguments against socialism: why would you work hard if you aren't rewarded for it. Turnabout is fairplay, I guess.

What? Her job in no way inhibits your ability to find meaningfull work. So what if she is rich? How does that affect you?

Everyone dies

Well, her wealth doesn't affect me, per se, because we live in different countries. However, it does affect Joe Average-Homeless.

Hilton Hotels creates a profit. The more tax money it spends, the less is available for Paris's shoes, clothes, etc.

Joe Average-Homeless depends on the tax money to survive. He can't afford to live without it.

With fewer taxes, then Joe Average-Homeless gets less money, and Paris gets more shoes. Fair?

Everybody dies, yes. But in their 40's? Freezing to death?

What does it have to do with morality?

It's immoral for someone to die so someone else can wear designer shoes.
That's not the case of what is happening.

Now show how what you said has anything to do with morality.

Are you the dumbass from "The Anarchist Thread" on the old boards who kept on trying to bring up the "scotsman" argument?
No, I'm the one who was always correct on that and kicked the shit outta Letila and the other oxymorons.

Get used to it.

Good to see you back
Thank you. I've been a little busy holding down 3 jobs...well 3 job titles...well 1 job title and having to do 2 other jobs where I work (which will soon be 1 other come Monday). I've been doing my job and the bookkeeping since late March, and I added de facto Executive Director to the list on Sept 1. Monday I lose the bookkeeper stuff when the previous bookkeeper returns.

To properly answer this question we need a good, clear understanding of what "morality" really is. Dictionary.com defines morality as "The relation of conformity or nonconformity to the moral standard or rule." History has shown us that the moral standard or rule is hardly consistent between cultures and never universal. There is no universal moral standard, so how can we possibly expect all people to live within the bounds of a single moral code and how can we possibly judge an idea objectively based only on the morals of a select group? The answer is that we cannot reasonablly judge an idea based on its morality in a universal sense. We can say that within a specific moral code Capitalism is consistent while within another Socialism is consistent, and in some both work. What we cannot say is that either is univerally good or bad. To sum up, relativism is a necessary piece of any discussion of morals or ideologies. Too often the simple fact that not everyone thinks the same way about the same things is overlooked.

Great. But morality isn't relative.

Great. But morality isn't relative.
Actually, he could build a solid argument that it is. Morality tends to very between different cultures and time periods.

Actually, he could build a solid argument that it is. Morality tends to very between different cultures and time periods.

Who told you this? Your high school sociology teacher? Just because the Chumbawumba Tribe in the Amazon Rain Forest thinks murder is acceptable, or that fathers should impregnate daughters doesn't prove anything. Morality tends to be incredibly close, along all cultural and chronological frames.

Morality, as an abstract, cannot be defined from this kind of anecdotal evidence. It's absolute. Some things are right. Some things are wrong. Deal with it.

Who told you this? Your high school sociology teacher? Just because the Chumbawumba Tribe in the Amazon Rain Forest thinks murder is acceptable, or that fathers should impregnate daughters doesn't prove anything. Actually, it does. The aztecs believed ritualistic human sacrifice was good. Europeans believed murder was wrong unless it was a person of differing ethnicity. Currently, it is believed murder is wrong unless at war or in self defense. However, these are all differing traits of the idea that murder is wrong. Differing morality, savvy?

Morality tends to be incredibly close, along all cultural and chronological frames. Hardly. The basic traits of morality may have to do with evolutionary instincts to advance the species on a whole (don't murder, help others, etc.) but even these are interpreted very differently across time and cultures. There is not a single moral stance that has differed in society. Example: Infanticide. We currently believe that killing infants is wrong. In roman times, if a person did not want their child, it was more or less acceptible to drown the child in a river or leave them out to die as a newborn. Differing morality right there.

Morality, as an abstract, cannot be defined from this kind of anecdotal evidence. It's absolute. Some things are right. Some things are wrong. Deal with it. And what is right and wrong is constantly in change. Deal with it.

Do you think he would have chosen life on the streets? Life on the streets is rough. No one would choose it unless they absolutely had to. If he had an opportunity, he would have taken it.

many homeless people choose the life, and then there are the homeless people that live like that cause they are addicted to drugs or alcholics. Any money you give these people they will just waist it buying these.

What does that have to do with morality?


What does that have to do with morality?


What does that have to do with morality?

Think before you post.

Paris Hilton wouldn't be a slut.

It undercuts one of the central premises of economic libertarian thought: if you work hard, you will be rewarded by better benefits. Paris Hilton does not work hard. Hell, she does less than hardly works. As far as I know, her only notable contribution to society was that she was able to, with the help of her boyfriend and a video camera, single-handedly take the nation's conscience off the debacle in Iraq for a few weeks. And yet she is still rewarded with more money than 99% of the people that do work hard will ever see.

As I recall, this was one of the prime arguments against socialism: why would you work hard if you aren't rewarded for it. Turnabout is fairplay, I guess.

It is her father's right to give to her. Would you try to prevent this? How would that be moral?

Well, her wealth doesn't affect me, per se, because we live in different countries. However, it does affect Joe Average-Homeless.

Hilton Hotels creates a profit. The more tax money it spends, the less is available for Paris's shoes, clothes, etc.

Joe Average-Homeless depends on the tax money to survive. He can't afford to live without it.

With fewer taxes, then Joe Average-Homeless gets less money, and Paris gets more shoes. Fair?

Everybody dies, yes. But in their 40's? Freezing to death?

It creates a profit. And with those profits it creates even more profits, along with more jobs. If the Hilton's did not exist, there would not suddenly be more money available to the poor. That's not how it works.

Joe Average homeless shouldn't rely on others to survive. That is pathetic.

She gets more shoes. She spends more money. Where does that money go? Into the system. If not for her, the shoe maker would be out of a job.

Freezing to death? Move to Florida.

Yeah, but why is economic progress the end of all ends?
if economic progress isn't the end of all ends, then why are you concerned with the economic status of all people? if our economic progress isn't what matters, then why try to improve the economic status of the population as a whole.


Isn't the objective to make everyone as well off as we can? And shouldn't we, therefore, make at least some attempt to redistribute income?

no, and no.

Paris Hilton wouldn't be a slut.
What does *that* have to do with morality?

Homeless people are lazy? It takes a lot of work to be a homeless person. The very bench you sleep on needs defending. Survival is hard work.

Just ask Eugene Upper.
or you could ask me. i was homeless as a teen, and i can tell you that it actually doesn't take much work to be homeless. it takes tons and tons of work to STOP being homeless, to go from homeless to non-homeless, but the process of remaining homeless is extremely easy. it mostly consists of sitting around.

Actually, it does. The aztecs believed ritualistic human sacrifice was good. Europeans believed murder was wrong unless it was a person of differing ethnicity. Currently, it is believed murder is wrong unless at war or in self defense. However, these are all differing traits of the idea that murder is wrong. Differing morality, savvy?

First, Europeans never believed murder was okay if the person wasn't European. They just made choices against what they knew to be right. We've seen it from WWII to Rwanda to everywhere in between: people do a lot of really crazy stuff. That doesn't make it right. It doesn't even mean people think it's right while they're doing it.

Second, the Aztecs point is exactly the kind of anecdotal evidence that is completely invalid. So the Aztecs had human sacrifice. It's a pathetically barbaric practice that is wicked and evil. But stupid, evil societies are not the norm. Morality doesn't differ, it's whether or not people follow it that does.

Hardly. The basic traits of morality may have to do with evolutionary instincts to advance the species on a whole (don't murder, help others, etc.) but even these are interpreted very differently across time and cultures. There is not a single moral stance that has differed in society. Example: Infanticide. We currently believe that killing infants is wrong. In roman times, if a person did not want their child, it was more or less acceptible to drown the child in a river or leave them out to die as a newborn. Differing morality right there.
Again with the anecdotal evidence. You don't think you could honestly talk to a Roman and show them that killing babies is a bad thing? Because it is a bad thing. Wow. For every small example you choose, I can show you a dozen societies that shockingly think killing babies is a bad thing.

The basic traits of morality have nothing to do with evolutionary instincts to advance the species. Who told you this? If this is the case, then morality does not exist at all.

Again with the anecdotal evidence. You don't think you could honestly talk to a Roman and show them that killing babies is a bad thing? Because it is a bad thing. Wow. For every small example you choose, I can show you a dozen societies that shockingly think killing babies is a bad thing.

in many cultures it was a common practice to allow babies to die of exposure or to kill them outright for a variety of reasons. deformed children have been subjected to that practice across dozens of cultures. female babies were quite often allowed to die or were killed by parents because female offspring were less valuable than male offspring and would divert resources needed to raise male offspring. for every society that finds baby-killing shocking, you will find another that found it acceptable or even commendable under the right circumstances.


The basic traits of morality have nothing to do with evolutionary instincts to advance the species. Who told you this? If this is the case, then morality does not exist at all.
nobody "told" me that fact, it is simply obvious from studying biology, psychology, and human history. you are correct that morality doesn't exist in any objective sense; it is a creation of human minds and human societies, and is not an empirical or objective reality on its own.

[M]orality doesn't exist in any objective sense; it is a creation of human minds and human societies, and is not an empirical or objective reality on its own.

Just think about the implications of that idea. It almost makes me weep. It should make you weep.

many homeless people choose the life, and then there are the homeless people that live like that cause they are addicted to drugs or alcholics. Any money you give these people they will just waist it buying these.

Drugs and alcohol are a way to avoid the realities of life on the streets. It isn't easy living as a homeless person.

It isn't easy to get out either. That's why we need programs to help them off the streets.

Besides, Nicole Ritchie is a crack addict. She's not on the streets. So you can't class people into "homeless--alcoholic and crack addict" and "non-homeless--productive member of society."

Just think about the implications of that idea. It almost makes me weep. It should make you weep.
why? i find nothing sad about that in the slightest. in fact, to me it is one of the most wonderful, fascinating, and beautiful realities of life.

why? i find nothing sad about that in the slightest. in fact, to me it is one of the most wonderful, fascinating, and beautiful realities of life.

What you just said justifies slavery, murder, rape, violence, and incest. That's why it's sad.

What you just said justifies slavery, murder, rape, violence, and incest. That's why it's sad.
actually, what i said doesn't justify any of that, and in many ways makes it much more difficult to justify them than objective morality would. what is sad is that you don't seem to understand that...how can i clear up the matter for you?

actually, what i said doesn't justify any of that, and in many ways makes it much more difficult to justify them than objective morality would. what is sad is that you don't seem to understand that...how can i clear up the matter for you?

If morality doesn't exist, as you wrote above, then how do you say something (like Pete Rose betting on baseball as an example) is wrong?

I mean, no one in their right mind could ever argue that Pete Rose was right. What he did was reprehensible, far worse than anything we've talked about so far. So how do you justify that one?

If morality doesn't exist, as you wrote above, then how do you say something (like Pete Rose betting on baseball as an example) is wrong?

I mean, no one in their right mind could ever argue that Pete Rose was right. What he did was reprehensible, far worse than anything we've talked about so far. So how do you justify that one?

How is betting on baseball worse then people dying? To me, betting on a sport is nothing compared to what you were talking about. All that is at stake with betting is money, and money really doesn't exist. People do. (Excluding philosiphies that say we don't)

All that is at stake with betting is money, and money really doesn't exist. People do. (Excluding philosiphies that say we don't)

Ah, nihilism, the one philosophy that can make easily many people so very uncomfortable.

And since when did the fact that two cultures have differing standards of morality make two different actions equally morally acceptable? You confuse is and ought, OE: Just because someone does something doesn't mean they ought to have done it, and the fact that society might or might not have accepted such actions has no bearing on whether they ought to have accepted such actions.

You believe in objective reality and morality? It seems to be that what you think a person ought to do is often not the same as what I, or others think that person ought to do. Who is correct, and how can we tell, objectively, if a certain course of action is what we ought to do or if it is only what we think we ought to do. Is and ought are the same in the mind, "Reality is what you can get away with."

Great. But morality isn't relative.

I must ask you for proof of that statement. I think you'll find that when you view the concept of univeral reality and even more so, objective morality reasonably you will find that even the flimsiest purdens of proof show it to be at best unclear and at worst untrue.

Ah, nihilism, the one philosophy that can make easily many people so very uncomfortable.

No no no, not nihilism, solipsism. Some Nihilisist hold that we do exist and that there is merely no truth. They're the conservative faction of the Nihilists.

How is betting on baseball worse then people dying? To me, betting on a sport is nothing compared to what you were talking about. All that is at stake with betting is money, and money really doesn't exist. People do. (Excluding philosiphies that say we don't)

Not to mention that, but he didn't bet that he would lose then have his team intentionally lose games, he just bet on Baseball. MLB's puritanical rules against players and staff betting on games is as silly as it is unreasonable. Players should be allowed to bet on games they aren't in or bet that they will win since neither allow them to cheat to make money.

paris hilton's father doesn't give her much but her name anymore, you think she does all that modelling for free or something?

The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings; the inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries.

Just reading this thread, it comes to the forefront.

However it sounds awful like a lot of you want the national socialism of nazi germany, where the system wasn't one of "absolute welfare" but a system where there was an orchestrated effort to have reward be based on input.

You needed to earn your place in society, but evil capitalists weren't allowed to run rampant....

Fascism is in Italy was another alternative, although hampered by Mussolini's ridiculous ideal of terra forming land so they could be self sufficient of food, the corporatism was a more rightist system than Hitler's Germany.

The 2 systems were both far more practical than the models of today, but have been hampered historically by the polical ideology attached to them, which didn't need to exist for their economic systems to be functionable.

why? i find nothing sad about that in the slightest. in fact, to me it is one of the most wonderful, fascinating, and beautiful realities of life.

Is that true?

How is betting on baseball worse then people dying? To me, betting on a sport is nothing compared to what you were talking about. All that is at stake with betting is money, and money really doesn't exist. People do. (Excluding philosiphies that say we don't)

Don't you remember Lincoln's last words? And I thought Osama hated America, and now I meet you.

paris hilton's father doesn't give her much but her name anymore, you think she does all that modelling for free or something?

Her name is actually pretty powerful. Do you think "The Simple Life" would have gotten as much publicity as it did without her?

She shouldn't be made out to somehow be some sort of martyr for the evils of capitalism just because she has her father's name.

She is who she is, it's not like her father actively pushes her, the media and public gobbling it up, is neither his nor her fault.

She is who she is, it's not like her father actively pushes her, the media and public gobbling it up, is neither his nor her fault.(italics Temme's)

That's the thing. She chooses to be out of touch with reality. I mean, she doesn't even know what a soup kitchen is. She's chosen to be that way.

That's the thing. She chooses to be out of touch with reality. I mean, she doesn't even know what a soup kitchen is. She's chosen to be that way.

And?

She's rich and stupid and sells her body to the clothing industry?

I never accused her of being cerebrally gifted, but saying "her daddy supports her" is just not true.

it seems to me that socialism has already been tried in Russia and failed. Some may argue that it was because it was well instituted in Russia but socialism can only be instituted well except in a perfect world with no corruption or greed. Capitalism, on the other hand, is not perfect either but it seems that in socialism most people except for the powerful were not very well off while in capitalism the majority of the people are well off with only a small percent of the people as really poor. no system is really perfect but they would only be perfect if we lived in a utopis and we all know that utopia is latin for no place. So until we find this no place than i would go for capitalism that at least gives a majority of the people a chance to live a good life.

Libertarianism is technically total freedom... but then again, you can argue that the Libertarian ideal of privatized police forces, etc. could lead to inner conflict amongst competing companies. He could easily argue back about government lackeys.

You're screwed either way. Neither is absolutely more moral than the other. Both sides have their major flaws.

There is a larger underlying problem to the general question.

Libertarians believe government has no business legislating morality (personal freedoms) or meddling in business (economic freedoms). That's why they're called libertarians, they're for total personal liberty. This, is rugged individualism. They are the social darwinists.
Socialists believe government shouldn't be legislating morality, but the little guy needs protection from the greedier sect of society. This is why the methods of production would be owned (theoretically in common, and it would be that way assuming the government didn't become corrupt, but at the end of the day, it would really be owned) by the government.

The problem is you're trying to argue statistics and theory which are based on different moralities. He believes freedoms should be what the government (or lack thereof) concerns itself with, you believe that it should be equality.

You two are standing on opposite sides of the fence. You'll never get the other to agree because you don't have the common ground. To obtain equality, you must sacrifice some freedoms. To obtain economic freedom, you must sacrifice equality.

Equality is only for equals

Equality is only for equals

True enough. Remember, however, that there is a big difference between being the same and being equal.

The main thing I see about communism is that we havent truley seen it work. Just about all the communist states in history have been oppresed by the United States, at least after WWII. Russia, for example, was thrown into the Cold War and Vietnam and Korea were both invaded. Cuba was blockaded and still has an embargo. China, on the other hand, hasnt had any major conflict and is working just fine today as a communist state. In fact, it is a major world power.

True enough. Remember, however, that there is a big difference between being the same and being equal.

Not really. For two things to be equal means that they are the same.

1=1

57=57

etc.

Now, there is indeed a very big difference between being equal and having equal rights, which I think is what you were referring to. :)

Not really. For two things to be equal means that they are the same.

1=1

57=57

etc.

Now, there is indeed a very big difference between being equal and having equal rights, which I think is what you were referring to. :)

1/2=.5

1/infinity=0

More specifically, infinity=infinity. Two immesurables, though not necessarily the same, can both be infinite and therefore, equal.

What I refer to is what I consider the hidden discrimination.

The more obvious discrimination is, of course, treating someone different based on their race. The hidden discrimination is in pretending that race is irrelevant. Race is very relevant. Ignoring someone's differences (in my opinion) is a form of discrimination. Equality does not equate to similarity.

True enough. Remember, however, that there is a big difference between being the same and being equal.

People can never be the same, but for government intervention, circumstance can be.

If i murder someone and am put on trial, I should be treated in the exact same way by the government (my due process) as you would be if you committed the same crime.

However.

If I earned $1,000,000 in a year, to be forced to live on the same amount as you if you earned $25,000 is not equality.

As the circumstance of our financial situation is not the same, and hence to be forced into some twisted version "of equality" when the circumstances do not call for equality is immoral.

This is what things like Equal protection under the law means, it does not mean the modern liberal "equality for all".

It is the means, not the ends that determine "equality" from one's government.

Socialism is about creating a lot of rules and entitlements so the lazy working class white trash can be accomodated. Why should I be proletarianised just i the name of social inclusion?

Capitalism is better.

damn. I go drinking for six hours and everything goes to hell.

If morality doesn't exist, as you wrote above, then how do you say something (like Pete Rose betting on baseball as an example) is wrong?

I mean, no one in their right mind could ever argue that Pete Rose was right. What he did was reprehensible, far worse than anything we've talked about so far. So how do you justify that one?
first of all, i love baseball a great deal, but i am capable of remembering that it's just a game. what Pete Rose did is, in the grand scheme of things, totally petty and irrelevant.

that said, let's move on to the real issue:

i never said that morality doesn't exist, but that it doesn't exist as an objective quality or standard. morality is a system of belief/behavior constructed by each individual human, a system which groups of human contract to share for their common benefit when they wish to live in concert. for instance, i have many moral conflicts with American society and American law, but i believe that i must compromise some of my moral values (the little ones) in order to live harmoniously with the people around me. i do not claim that American morality is objectively WRONG, it simply conflicts with my personal moral code. likewise, i am not WRONG for not aligning in full with American morality, i simply differ. there is no RIGHT moral system and WRONG moral system, merely different values, priorities, and belief structures.

i don't "justify" any acts, moral or otherwise, because that's pointless if we are speaking in an objective sense. what Rose did goes against the morality of the society he has chosen to be a part of, so now he must reap the consequences of his actions. none of that has anything to do with an objective standard of morality. we rule that something is wrong when it is harmful to our society, and what he did is harmful to our society, so we judge it to be morally wrong by our agreed-upon standards. that doesn't require there being any objective standard of morality.

Is that true?
yes.

What you just said justifies slavery, murder, rape, violence, and incest. That's why it's sad.
No, it doesn't, actually. Morality is subjective, but utilitzes objective data. This is what contractarianism is all about.

No, I'm the one who was always correct on that

Correct on the "scotsman" argument, or other ideas in tAT?

and kicked the shit outta Letila and the other oxymorons.

Um, yes, Letila's arguments are often not as well constructed as they could be, but he was definitely not alone in the thread on that side of the arguments.

Get used to it.

Was this comment supposed to be humorous or something more dogmatic?

No, I'm the one who was always correct on that
Correct on the "scotsman" argument, or other ideas in tAT?
All of it.


and kicked the shit outta Letila and the other oxymorons.
Um, yes, Letila's arguments are often not as well constructed as they could be, but he was definitely not alone in the thread on that side of the arguments.
1. Letila is a she, IIRC.
2. I mentioned "the other oxymorons".


Get used to it.
Was this comment supposed to be humorous or something more dogmatic?
Statement of fact.

1. Letila is a she, IIRC.

are you sure? i am pretty sure that he told me he was male during a discussion in the past, because his name made me assume he was female and that bothered him.

So each individual/society sets right and wrong. Does that mean right and wrong can change as an individual/society sees fit?

So each individual/society sets right and wrong. Does that mean right and wrong can change as an individual/society sees fit?
yes. the moral qualities of right and wrong are determined subjectively.

now, what is "right" or "wrong" based on pure practicality won't change based on opinion, but most people don't define moral "right" and "wrong" based purely on empirical practicality.

are you sure? i am pretty sure that he told me he was male during a discussion in the past, because his name made me assume he was female and that bothered him.

I am almost positive that he is a he.

yes. the moral qualities of right and wrong are determined subjectively.

now, what is "right" or "wrong" based on pure practicality won't change based on opinion, but most people don't define moral "right" and "wrong" based purely on empirical practicality.

So someone decides that it's all right to break into your house and steal your jewels. Is that wrong? What about by his standards?

So someone decides that it's all right to break into your house and steal your jewels. Is that wrong? What about by his standards?
by my standards, taking something that does not belong to you is wrong. i cannot speak to what the thief's standards are, but i would assume that he believes he is justified (and therefore "right") in his actions. the society i have chosen to live in judges that the act of theft is wrong, and therefore that the person who commits that act is in the wrong and deserving of some penalty.

by my standards, taking something that does not belong to you is wrong. i cannot speak to what the thief's standards are, but i would assume that he believes he is justified (and therefore "right") in his actions. the society i have chosen to live in judges that the act of theft is wrong, and therefore that the person who commits that act is in the wrong and deserving of some penalty.

What if two standards collide? The thief above is one example.

Another example is the war in Iraq. According to Saddam Hussein, gassing people is okay. According to George Bush, it's not, and we should go bomb their lights out. According to me, gassing people is wrong, but Iraq was a sovereign nation, and the US has no business in there. Who's right?

are you sure? i am pretty sure that he told me he was male during a discussion in the past, because his name made me assume he was female and that bothered him.

I'm a he.

What if two standards collide? The thief above is one example.

the moral code of the society wins, in that case. the thief is free to believe that he was in the right, but society will impose whatever penalty it sees fit. if the thief wanted to steal without facing prosecution then he should have sought out a society that would not collide with his beliefs.


Another example is the war in Iraq. According to Saddam Hussein, gassing people is okay. According to George Bush, it's not, and we should go bomb their lights out. According to me, gassing people is wrong, but Iraq was a sovereign nation, and the US has no business in there. Who's right?
everyone in that situation is "right." there is no objective quality of "right," remember?

everyone in that situation is "right." there is no objective quality of "right," remember?

But there is a conflict. Even if you take me out (because I can't do anything) who wins the conflict of right/wrong? Bush or Hussein?

But there is a conflict. Even if you take me out (because I can't do anything) who wins the conflict of right/wrong? Bush or Hussein?
are you asking me who's will is going to triumph? i guess Bush's will is going to dominate, since Hussein is in prison and America invaded Iraq (contrary to your will). but that doesn't mean that Bush is any more "right" than he was in the beginning; Hussein is just as "right," as are you, because there is no objective measure of right-ness. some would say that might makes right, and therefore that Bush is now more right because he forced the situation to fit with his concept of morality, but that still doesn't stop you from feeling that your position is "right" and his is "wrong." to you, he is just as wrong now as he was before the conflict, or perhaps a bit more so because he has acted upon his "wrong" opinion.

are you asking me who's will is going to triumph? i guess Bush's will is going to dominate, since Hussein is in prison and America invaded Iraq (contrary to your will). but that doesn't mean that Bush is any more "right" than he was in the beginning; Hussein is just as "right," as are you, because there is no objective measure of right-ness. some would say that might makes right, and therefore that Bush is now more right because he forced the situation to fit with his concept of morality, but that still doesn't stop you from feeling that your position is "right" and his is "wrong." to you, he is just as wrong now as he was before the conflict, or perhaps a bit more so because he has acted upon his "wrong" opinion.

How can two conflicting views on "right" and "wrong" co-exist?

How can two conflicting views on "right" and "wrong" co-exist?
why wouldn't they? i'm willing to bet that you and i hold conflicting views of "right" and "wrong" at this very moment, yet neither of us is bursting into flames or winking out of existence.

why wouldn't they? i'm willing to bet that you and i hold conflicting views of "right" and "wrong" at this very moment, yet neither of us is bursting into flames or winking out of existence.

Sooner or later, they'll come into conflict. Most likely through debate. If there is no right or wrong, how can you win a debate?

Sooner or later, they'll come into conflict. Most likely through debate. If there is no right or wrong, how can you win a debate?
well, i wish it didn't sound so corny, but i think that the only way to "win" a debate is for everyone to enjoy themselves and learn something. however, the usual standards for winning a debate are based upon who presents the better case, or on who is more convincing, not upon who's side of the argument is actually "right." when a debate is formally judged, it is not the positions themselves which are ruled to have "won" or "lost," but rather the way those issues were argued. in other words, if i present a better case for torturing kittens than you can present for not torturing kittens then i will have won the debate, whether or not torturing kittens is actually a good idea.

my general goal in debate is to test my own views by having other people poke at them, and to test the views of other people in exchange. i also seek to eliminate false premises that people may hold, because i don't think they should build their views on false information. but i don't especially care if they end up agreeing with me at the end of the day. since there is no objective right or wrong, i am not in any position to tell them they should believe my way. the only time i can tell them they are wrong is if they use false information in their arguments; for instance, i cannot tell somebody they are wrong for believing that kitten-torturing is right, if that is merely their opinion on the subject, but if they say kitten-torturing is right because the world is flat then i can tell them they are wrong because the world is not flat.

well, i wish it didn't sound so corny, but i think that the only way to "win" a debate is for everyone to enjoy themselves and learn something. however, the usual standards for winning a debate are based upon who presents the better case, or on who is more convincing, not upon who's side of the argument is actually "right." when a debate is formally judged, it is not the positions themselves which are ruled to have "won" or "lost," but rather the way those issues were argued. in other words, if i present a better case for torturing kittens than you can present for not torturing kittens then i will have won the debate, whether or not torturing kittens is actually a good idea.

But how can you have any objectivity at all, then?

But how can you have any objectivity at all, then?
what do you mean?

what do you mean?

Here's what I mean: two people have a debate on an issue. One of these people is right, but loses the debate according to your standards above. So even though this person is objectively right, this is negated by your definition. My question was how you can keep objectivity at all, then.

Here's what I mean: two people have a debate on an issue. One of these people is right, but loses the debate according to your standards above. So even though this person is objectively right, this is negated by your definition. My question was how you can keep objectivity at all, then.
according to my position, there IS no objective "right," so the only way either person could be "wrong" is if they used false information or false facts to support their position, or if their reasoning was not solid.

Odd how while people will question the existance of right and wrong, no one here would argue that reality is subjective.

Odd how while people will question the existance of right and wrong, no one here would argue that reality is subjective.
why would that be odd to you? the two things are not connected.

...

why would that be odd to you? the two things are not connected.

To people who argue that morality is objective, it would certainly qualify as a fact of reality to them. Doesn't reality include whether or not morality exists?

why would that be odd to you? the two things are not connected.

To people who argue that morality is objective, it would certainly qualify as a fact of reality to them. Doesn't reality include whether or not morality exists?
ahh, i see what you were saying. i just cannot wrap my head fully around the idea that anybody honestly believes morality is objective. it's hard for me to see things from the perspective of somebody with that view, though i can usually manage it for the purpose of discussion.

but put it this way: most people wouldn't even try to argue that tastes are objectively right or wrong. i may think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor ever, and you may think it's gross, and nobody is going to try to tell either of us that we are WRONG in our opinions. to me, all morality is like that, and when somebody tells me there is an objective Right or Wrong it sounds to me like they are trying to claim that chocolate is objectively better tasting than vanilla or strawberry...it just sounds so odd that i have a hard time seeing where they get their idea.

Here are my thoughts on the whole issue:

First you have to establish what morality is.
Many people look to religion as an example of morality. Pope John Paul II specifies that Capitalism is the most ethical economic system because it gives people the most freedom is more likely to be a more effective system. He also points out the tendency for socialist and extreme socialist systems to be atheist nations. I am neither catholic, nor religious, but I believe there is merit to what the pope says. Religion is not morality, nor is morality absolute. However, most sane people agree on a basic standard of morals even if they disagree on specific issues. Truth and prosperity are good. Lying, cheating, stealing, and causing unjust harm to others are bad. No sane person would support abortion if they felt they were actually murdering another person. The issue is not whether murder is good or bad, it is whether murder is actually occuring. I cannot tell you whether or not Hitler felt he was acting morally or not, but such extreme examples can be discounted because these people are basically insane or have what can be called an "erroneous conscious."

The factor of intent, as well as outcome is also important to consider when dealing with issues of morality. An action that has good intentions but a negative outcome is considered unfortunate, but not immoral. An action that has negative intentions and a positive outcome, may be considered fortunate, but it certainly is not moral.

It is also worth noting that morality is a human affair, just as economic systems are systems created and perpetuated by humans. The morality of these systems is dictated largely by the people, not the system. A nation with a capitalist system can be just as evil as it can be good. A nation with a socialist system can be just as evil as it can be good. Thus, neither system can be regarded as inherently good or bad.

However, all things considered I believe a capitalist economic system is more likely to be moral than a socialist system. It allows the most freedom for its citizens, the most prosperity, and the most room to be moral. A few socialist reforms never hurt to restrain capitalism and prevent its perversion, but free market societies have the highest capacity to be moral. Socialist systems curb individual freedoms, are less likely to generate the level of prosperity of a capitalist system, and degrade the connection between personal accomplishment and success as a society. It is only moral that people are justly compensated to the extent of their labor. A system that actually penalizes personal achievment and betterment, through redistribution of wealth is not moral. Also a society that forces "morality" on its citizens cannot really be moral because it eliminates the whole role of intent. The people of a society must intend to do good, and not do good as a consequence of their government's actions. A capitalist society gives its citizens greater room to be moral, thus it is more likely to actually be moral.

Further, examples of idiots like Paris Hilton, and poor people starving in the streets are not really an issue in this comparison. You cannot tell me that idiots from important families do not get special favors in socialist countries, nor you can you tell me that socialist countries do not have homeless populations.

You believe in objective reality and morality? It seems to be that what you think a person ought to do is often not the same as what I, or others think that person ought to do. Who is correct, and how can we tell, objectively, if a certain course of action is what we ought to do or if it is only what we think we ought to do. Is and ought are the same in the mind, "Reality is what you can get away with."

Of course I believe in an objective reality. How can I not if I'm at this very moment talking with a person who in some sense shares a common conceptual schema with me (which would be a prerequisite for any kind of intelligible discourse)? I have only three options to answer that question:

1) We both share a common frame of reference from which we develop a common conceptual scheme.

2) You don't exist, and I'm simply imagining you.

3) You do exist, we don't share the same common reality, and the reason we are able to talk is only because incidentally, we through completely different processes arrived at similar or identical common notions about the world.

If you follow Sherlock Holmes' maxim: "If you eliminate the impossible, whatever else remains, however improbable, must be the truth", then you'll have a hard time accepting any other option except the first. The second strain the concept of my imagining you and the concept of probability beyond the breaking point.

ahh, i see what you were saying. i just cannot wrap my head fully around the idea that anybody honestly believes morality is objective. it's hard for me to see things from the perspective of somebody with that view, though i can usually manage it for the purpose of discussion.

but put it this way: most people wouldn't even try to argue that tastes are objectively right or wrong. i may think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor ever, and you may think it's gross, and nobody is going to try to tell either of us that we are WRONG in our opinions. to me, all morality is like that, and when somebody tells me there is an objective Right or Wrong it sounds to me like they are trying to claim that chocolate is objectively better tasting than vanilla or strawberry...it just sounds so odd that i have a hard time seeing where they get their idea.

That's because you're making a category mistake, Bottle: liking an ice cream flavor is a long, long way from morality.

Let me put it to you this way, B. You state that you like chocolate ice cream. I myself like chocolate chip. You infer from that fact that we simply have differing conceptions of ice cream. In that case I agree. But what you overlook from that example is multifold:

A) If we are both capable of talking about and comparing differing flavors of ice cream, it stands to reason that we both share a common conceptual scheme, which in turn evolves from a common understanding about a common world (otherwise, I wouldn't say that chocolate chip ice cream is better than chocolate; I'd ask what the hell is chocolate).

B) We both have similar senses. Although our discrimination might be different, we clearly must both be able to taste in order to disagree about which ice cream tastes better.

C) We both can reason. How do I know this? Well, I infer it from the fact that something as complex as "like" involves a rational thought process that derives new insight from existing physical data.

What is the significance of this, you might ask? Well, if we both have a common understanding of sensation, and we both have a faculty of reason, then we have ample grounds for a metaphysics of morals, and since we both have common means of generating this metaphysic, it further stands to reason that said morality should also be common. You may feel pain at a different threshold than I do, but that doesn't mean that it's okay to inflict pain on you or me just for the fun of it. You might be more emotionally resiliant than I am, but that doesn't mean that for either of us it's okay to be taken advantage of. In short, it simply doesn't follow that difference in sensory discrimination (which is what differing tastes in ice cream amounts too) provides an adequate basis for saying that in one case, it's moral to do something, but in another it's not.

That's because you're making a category mistake, Bottle: liking an ice cream flavor is a long, long way from morality.

Let me put it to you this way, B. You state that you like chocolate ice cream. I myself like chocolate chip. You infer from that fact that we simply have differing conceptions of ice cream. In that case I agree. But what you overlook from that example is multifold:

A) If we are both capable of talking about and comparing differing flavors of ice cream, it stands to reason that we both share a common conceptual scheme, which in turn evolves from a common understanding about a common world (otherwise, I wouldn't say that chocolate chip ice cream is better than chocolate; I'd ask what the hell is chocolate).

B) We both have similar senses. Although our discrimination might be different, we clearly must both be able to taste in order to disagree about which ice cream tastes better.

C) We both can reason. How do I know this? Well, I infer it from the fact that something as complex as "like" involves a rational thought process that derives new insight from existing physical data.

What is the significance of this, you might ask? Well, if we both have a common understanding of sensation, and we both have a faculty of reason, then we have ample grounds for a metaphysics of morals, and since we both have common means of generating this metaphysic, it further stands to reason that said morality should also be common. You may feel pain at a different threshold than I do, but that doesn't mean that it's okay to inflict pain on you or me just for the fun of it. You might be more emotionally resiliant than I am, but that doesn't mean that for either of us it's okay to be taken advantage of. In short, it simply doesn't follow that difference in sensory discrimination (which is what differing tastes in ice cream amounts too) provides an adequate basis for saying that in one case, it's moral to do something, but in another it's not.
i don't see how any of what you have said shows that preference in ice cream flavors can be subjective but moral judgments cannot. you seem to be trying to argue with the assumption of moral objectivism, which makes your arguments impossible in my frame of reference. of course, i think we have had this exact discussion before, and it all came to naught, so i don't really think we should retread all that again.

i don't see how any of what you have said shows that preference in ice cream flavors can be subjective but moral judgments cannot. you seem to be trying to argue with the assumption of moral objectivism, which makes your arguments impossible in my frame of reference. of course, i think we have had this exact discussion before, and it all came to naught, so i don't really think we should retread all that again.

1) It shows that we both have common understanding of the world, common faculties, and react to both extremely similarly. It's not hard then to take the next step that what we ought to do in the world with our faculties ought to be the same.

2) You've already admitted that a frame of reference can be wrong, Bottle, if it doesn't accord with an external reality. So I fail to see what your point is.

3) Yes, we've hashed this out before, but so what? If as you say a perspective can be wrong if it doesn't accord with Truth, then we as reasoning beings have an obligation to seek it out and mold our understanding of the world to it. The fact that we've failed in the past doesn't make it any less important for us to try now.

4) It almost seems like you are retiring from the field, B. Why? I can only suppose that it means you really don't want to learn about the world, if what you learn disagrees with your preexisting notions. While naturally I can't force you to keep the argument going, however, don't you think this is uncannily similar a response to those Christian fundie quacks you and I both have common cause against, because they refuse to use their reason?

Since libertarianism is the only political theory (in favor of a government) that doesn't believe in positive rights, it is also the only political theory that does not favor slavery.
Slavery is defined as making someone do something for you against their will (i.e., force). Taxation means just this; with all the income taxes, state and federal, one works about three hours a day for someone else. Some people might approve of this, but others don't. Those who don't approve might be a minority, and one might argue that it can rightfully be overrun by the majority. Well let me tell you; you can't vote rights away. Then what are these rights?
First, the right not to be subject to force, i.e., one has the right not to be battered or murdered. This is quite trivial, and I think most people believe this is a proper right. Second, let me introduce to you the Principle of Self-Ownership. This means you own yourself, and along with that, your bodily and mental talents. Most people choose to rent their time to use their talents for which they get money; also called a job. Now, if I work 9 hours a day, and am taxed (forced of) 33% of my salary, this means that someone else, those to whom the money goes, owns a third of me. This is called slavery. The consequence, then, is that every person has a right from theft. Fraud is a form of theft, so naturally one has a right from fraud as well.

The issue of inheritance has also been touched. It might seem unfair, but again, if the person from whom the money is passed on to had acquired his money in a just way (i.e., any other way than theft), it's his to do with as he choose, including passing it on to his children, or anyone else. Of course, if he never willed his money (in some way), then we have a problem what to do with the money, as it wouldn't belong to anyone anymore (and there would be no laws regarding inheritance under a libertarian government). The solution is however not that the government would collect the money and distribute it to "the needy".

Moreover, of course there's an objective reality. Objective reality is in fact a tautology; reality is sufficient. However, whether we are able to perceive reality as it really actually "looks" is a different matter, but that there's a reality is self-certain.

Slavery is defined as making someone do something for you against their will (i.e., force). Taxation means just this; with all the income taxes, state and federal, one works about three hours a day for someone else.

Asserting that taxation is slavery is totally extreme, and ignores the concept of the Social Contract. People may not like paying taxes, but few would argue that taxation is a bad thing. Taxation is necessary and consensual. Under the Social Contract, the government's authority is derived from the people. People understand that it is in their best interest to pay taxes and thus do so. It is in the people's best interest to maintain roads, a police force, a military, a fire department, in other words, a government. If people honestly feel like they are being exploited, they revolt against the government. The fact is, taxation is necessary for government, and people agree to this because they understand that anarchy would not benefit them.

It always makes me proud that I can post a thread that eventually becomes to long for me to read in the amount of time I have.

Asserting that taxation is slavery is totally extreme, and ignores the concept of the Social Contract. People may not like paying taxes, but few would argue that taxation is a bad thing. Taxation is necessary and consensual. Under the Social Contract, the government's authority is derived from the people. People understand that it is in their best interest to pay taxes and thus do so. It is in the people's best interest to maintain roads, a police force, a military, a fire department, in other words, a government. If people honestly feel like they are being exploited, they revolt against the government. The fact is, taxation is necessary for government, and people agree to this because they understand that anarchy would not benefit them.

http://img63.photobucket.com/albums/v193/eddy_the_great/data.jpg
Total BS. When did we sign the social contract? When did we agree to pay for the American empire's nuclear weapons and invasions? Maybe you don't mind the suffering caused by an inherently violent and anti-human organization, but I do mind.

http://img63.photobucket.com/albums/v193/eddy_the_great/data.jpg
Total BS. When did we sign the social contract? When did we agree to pay for the American empire's nuclear weapons and invasions? Maybe you don't mind the suffering caused by an inherently violent and anti-human organization, but I do mind.

In theory (and this works terribly in practice) you have 'signed' a social contract by both staying in the country of your residence and, if you vote, by voting.

In theory (and this works terribly in practice) you have 'signed' a social contract by both staying in the country of your residence and, if you vote, by voting.

But I don't vote and I don't necessarily have the money to move to another country. Even if I did, they might be xenophobic and not tolerate me, leaving me no better off. Obviously, the social contract doesn't make any sense.

Honestly the diatribe on both sides has gotten insane. The basis of the question "is socialism (more) moral (than capitalism)" to me lies in a simple question: does your country give you an advantage in life.

All right folks, if you live in the United States, does living there give you an advantage if you were born in the "average" country? Damn straight it does. You are richer than the average people. You are better fed. You have opportunities which the vast majority of people can never even dream of, most of which you take for granted. Simply by living in the US, you get so much stuff that it is probably impossible to list.

That's right, I think the United States is a great country, possibly the greatest on Earth.

But guess what? All that stuff didn't come by accident. You are not 100% entitled to all the benefits of being a US citizen just because you happened to get born here. The country helps you, you help the country, by paying taxes.

The taxes you pay on income, gas, items, that is the price you must pay for being in an infinately better country than most people on Earth. That is the price you pay.

So please none of this "taxing is slavery" absolute bullshit. You should pay much more than you do for all the benefits you pull down just because you happen to live there.

Capitalism is about competition. Through unlimited competition the best solution to everything arises, in a sort of socio-economic Darwinism. Socialism is about the government intervening into that competitive world and helping out people who otherwise would fall by the wayside. Now some people believe that, through capitalism, there will not be anyone who ever falls behind because everyone will make so much money (which I find a naive dream), so with the "right" capitalism there would be no need for socialist programs. But, quite frankly, capitalism has never been able to provide enough to everyone, so I see no reason why the government shouldn't try and help those who the economic system can't.

Some absolutely tiny amount of your tax dollars go to programs which aid people but will not aid you (yes your taxes go to Social Security, Medicare, etc., but you get all that back and more). Why begrudge such a small amount when it can do so much good?

In theory (and this works terribly in practice) you have 'signed' a social contract by both staying in the country of your residence and, if you vote, by voting.

But I don't vote and I don't necessarily have the money to move to another country. Even if I did, they might be xenophobic and not tolerate me, leaving me no better off. Obviously, the social contract doesn't make any sense.

The Social Contract is based on hundreds of years of political philosophy. It is a credible argument despite its flaws. You can choose to abstain from American society if you like, but then the U.S. Government doesn't owe you shit. I assume by refuting my assertions about the Social Contract you are arguing against taxation. If you don't pay taxes and live within the United States as a sort of rogue person, you are not obligated to enjoy any of the benefits provided by American society, and are in effect, a parasite on this society. Well, this society probably doesn't like parasites much and its members do condone the government coming to your home and arresting you. Don't say this violates your rights, because you have none, except those stipulated in the unwritten agreement known as the Social Contract. Unless you support anarchy, it doesn't make sense to argue against taxation.

On a seperate issue, you don't have to vote, but if you don't vote don't complain about not being represented by the government. Your whole America is an evil nuclear empire rant is simply unfounded. You may disagree with issues of American policy, but please spare us the drama. My advice is you educate yourself before spouting of a bunch of ignorant nonsense.

Of course I believe in an objective reality. How can I not if I'm at this very moment talking with a person who in some sense shares a common conceptual schema with me (which would be a prerequisite for any kind of intelligible discourse)? I have only three options to answer that question:

1) We both share a common frame of reference from which we develop a common conceptual scheme.

2) You don't exist, and I'm simply imagining you.

3) You do exist, we don't share the same common reality, and the reason we are able to talk is only because incidentally, we through completely different processes arrived at similar or identical common notions about the world.

If you follow Sherlock Holmes' maxim: "If you eliminate the impossible, whatever else remains, however improbable, must be the truth", then you'll have a hard time accepting any other option except the first. The second strain the concept of my imagining you and the concept of probability beyond the breaking point.

How then do you explain the differences in perception that you and I have? If our ideas about the world are products of similar aparatus presented with similar sense data, then how is it possible that two people could come up with radically different explanations of the world? The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that our perception of the universe is not, as many think it to be, a passive process. Our brains edit the data recieved by our senses as they are processed to make them more palatable to our consciousness and to create consistencies with our preconceptions. To use a maxim, as you have, "What the thinker thinks, the prover proves." Essentially what this means is that once the mind has convinced itself of a specific reality it alters all evidence to match that reality rather than accepting it as it is. A good example of this is seeing a person from afar. From the tiny amount of information that you get looking at the person you might guess that it is someone you know after which point your brain will begin censoring all information that does not support the theory that the person is who you think it is. It is only in the face of extreme evidence to the contrary (a close view of the person's face, for instance) that we abandon these first-glance paradigms. Our brains are always trying to steamline the way we think and work, and in the process objectivity is often lost and unfiltered reality is almost always destroyed. When you add the fact that neither of us can reasonably claim to have a grasp on objective reality to the fact that each of us carries his world around in his head, you've got a strong case against any individual claiming to understand objective reality, and especially objective morality, which is an abstract concept at best. Morality cannot be percieved, so even if we are to trust our senses completely morals remain in the realm of the unknown. It is my position that objective morality is not just unkonwn, but unknowable, and insofar as we can guess at it we must respect the thoughts of others since they are as likely to be correct as we are. Hence, Relativism. Each person is living in a different world, so we should act like it.

The Social Contract is based on hundreds of years of political philosophy. It is a credible argument despite its flaws. You can choose to abstain from American society if you like, but then the U.S. Government doesn't owe you shit. I assume by refuting my assertions about the Social Contract you are arguing against taxation. If you don't pay taxes and live within the United States as a sort of rogue person, you are not obligated to enjoy any of the benefits provided by American society, and are in effect, a parasite on this society. Well, this society probably doesn't like parasites much and its members do condone the government coming to your home and arresting you. Don't say this violates your rights, because you have none, except those stipulated in the unwritten agreement known as the Social Contract. Unless you support anarchy, it doesn't make sense to argue against taxation.

On a seperate issue, you don't have to vote, but if you don't vote don't complain about not being represented by the government. Your whole America is an evil nuclear empire rant is simply unfounded. You may disagree with issues of American policy, but please spare us the drama. My advice is you educate yourself before spouting of a bunch of ignorant nonsense.

The social contract is a tyrannical breach of personal freedom. However, that breach is entirely inevitable and should not be condemned in an absolutist manner. The social contract is one of the most benign forms of tyranny and does not often result in the death of the tyrannized, certainly not as often as other forms of tyranny (robbery, assault) do. If we accept the concept of ownership, which is itself a form of tyranny, then the social contract is a perfectly reasonable way for a collection of people who own a piece of land to protect themselves. If we do not accept the concept of ownership then we open the door to far more and greater tyrannies. The social contract is essentially the lesser of two evils, not perfect, but not terrible.

The social contract is a tyrannical breach of personal freedom. However, that breach is entirely inevitable and should not be condemned in an absolutist manner. The social contract is one of the most benign forms of tyranny and does not often result in the death of the tyrannized, certainly not as often as other forms of tyranny (robbery, assault) do. If we accept the concept of ownership, which is itself a form of tyranny, then the social contract is a perfectly reasonable way for a collection of people who own a piece of land to protect themselves. If we do not accept the concept of ownership then we open the door to far more and greater tyrannies. The social contract is essentially the lesser of two evils, not perfect, but not terrible.

The fact is, people must make small concessions to their personal freedoms to function as a society. You could rebel against this, or label it as tyranny, but it is the most beneficial arrangement to the individual as well as society. The alternative is called "nature." This is basically a constant state of warfare among all men. It is in each person's best interest to succumb to a mild form of "tyranny" in order to achieve what is called, civilization.

Since libertarianism is the only political theory (in favor of a government) that doesn't believe in positive rights, it is also the only political theory that does not favor slavery.
Slavery is defined as making someone do something for you against their will (i.e., force). Taxation means just this; with all the income taxes, state and federal, one works about three hours a day for someone else. Some people might approve of this, but others don't. Those who don't approve might be a minority, and one might argue that it can rightfully be overrun by the majority. Well let me tell you; you can't vote rights away. Then what are these rights?
First, the right not to be subject to force, i.e., one has the right not to be battered or murdered. This is quite trivial, and I think most people believe this is a proper right. Second, let me introduce to you the Principle of Self-Ownership. This means you own yourself, and along with that, your bodily and mental talents. Most people choose to rent their time to use their talents for which they get money; also called a job. Now, if I work 9 hours a day, and am taxed (forced of) 33% of my salary, this means that someone else, those to whom the money goes, owns a third of me. This is called slavery. The consequence, then, is that every person has a right from theft. Fraud is a form of theft, so naturally one has a right from fraud as well.

The issue of inheritance has also been touched. It might seem unfair, but again, if the person from whom the money is passed on to had acquired his money in a just way (i.e., any other way than theft), it's his to do with as he choose, including passing it on to his children, or anyone else. Of course, if he never willed his money (in some way), then we have a problem what to do with the money, as it wouldn't belong to anyone anymore (and there would be no laws regarding inheritance under a libertarian government). The solution is however not that the government would collect the money and distribute it to "the needy".


The one problem with your theory is that under your definition of slavery, specifically that slavery is "making someone do something for you against their will", then someone is equally a slave under a pure capitalist system, because some of the time, I'm working to support my boss' profit margin, and not my own welfare.


How then do you explain the differences in perception that you and I have? If our ideas about the world are products of similar aparatus presented with similar sense data, then how is it possible that two people could come up with radically different explanations of the world? The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that our perception of the universe is not, as many think it to be, a passive process. Our brains edit the data recieved by our senses as they are processed to make them more palatable to our consciousness and to create consistencies with our preconceptions. To use a maxim, as you have, "What the thinker thinks, the prover proves." Essentially what this means is that once the mind has convinced itself of a specific reality it alters all evidence to match that reality rather than accepting it as it is. A good example of this is seeing a person from afar. From the tiny amount of information that you get looking at the person you might guess that it is someone you know after which point your brain will begin censoring all information that does not support the theory that the person is who you think it is. It is only in the face of extreme evidence to the contrary (a close view of the person's face, for instance) that we abandon these first-glance paradigms. Our brains are always trying to steamline the way we think and work, and in the process objectivity is often lost and unfiltered reality is almost always destroyed. When you add the fact that neither of us can reasonably claim to have a grasp on objective reality to the fact that each of us carries his world around in his head, you've got a strong case against any individual claiming to understand objective reality, and especially objective morality, which is an abstract concept at best. Morality cannot be percieved, so even if we are to trust our senses completely morals remain in the realm of the unknown. It is my position that objective morality is not just unkonwn, but unknowable, and insofar as we can guess at it we must respect the thoughts of others since they are as likely to be correct as we are. Hence, Relativism. Each person is living in a different world, so we should act like it.

1) You're making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one. Even supposing as you do that we can never know the objective universe in and of itself, it still does not follow that there is no such objective universe out there.

2) You can explain radically differing explanations about the world in terms of observable phenomena about that universe. To the untrained and unaided eye, the Aristotelian conception of final causes looks as systematic and useful in explaining physics as does Newtonian systems. Why then do we nevertheless say with certainty that Newton's system is better? I'll give you a hint, it isn't because we've been socially trained to think so: it's because once we developed more sophisticated observation equipment, we found Newton's system to have better explanatory power.

In point of fact, your own example vindicates this: from a distance, one person can indeed look like another, but that isn't because personal identity is itself a relative concept. It's just because we didn't see that set individual with enough clarity to distinguish him from another.

3) You're perverting Kant here, and it would be better if you didn't. We don't "edit the data recieved by our senses as they are processed to make them more palatable to our consciousness and to create consistencies with our preconceptions." If we did that, I'd still believe that if I hide my eyes behind my baby bottle so as to block out the view of others, then no one else would see me either. Instead, we edit our preconceptions about the world to better accord with the physical world that impinges upon us.

4) The very fact that we can understand what each other is saying and react rationally to it is strong evidence that we have similar conceptions about the world, and as I mentioned above, the simplest, most elegant way of describing why that is the case is to say that we are both impacted by the same physical events occuring in the same physical world.

1) You're making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one. Even supposing as you do that we can never know the objective universe in and of itself, it still does not follow that there is no such objective universe out there.

I have never claimed to be making a metaphysical point. Because each person is effectively living in a different universe I think it is reasonable to say that we should practice some tolerance and relativism in our dealings with people who think the world is, or ought to be a different way from the way we think it is or ought to be.

2) You can explain radically differing explanations about the world in terms of observable phenomena about that universe. To the untrained and unaided eye, the Aristotelian conception of final causes looks as systematic and useful in explaining physics as does Newtonian systems. Why then do we nevertheless say with certainty that Newton's system is better? I'll give you a hint, it isn't because we've been socially trained to think so: it's because once we developed more sophisticated observation equipment, we found Newton's system to have better explanatory power.

True, to a point. We cannot ever create a system of observation sophisticated enough to accurately observe the entire universe and catalog it, so while Newtons system may more accurately represent the objective universe than Aristotle's it is not more "correct," since both are imperfect. Newton merely had fewer errors (if we can even say that since more recent investigations seem to suggest that he was wrong on many accounts).

In point of fact, your own example vindicates this: from a distance, one person can indeed look like another, but that isn't because personal identity is itself a relative concept. It's just because we didn't see that set individual with enough clarity to distinguish him from another.

The problem of limitted information is one that haunts all moral and ethical dilemmas. How can we know that we made the right choice if we don't know all the consequences of our actions, and even worse, how can we know which choice is right ahead of time if we cannot guess at the consequences of our actions. The answer is that we can guess at some of the consequences and we try our best to pick the right option, but some of the time our incomplete information leads us to the wrong conclusions. A person cannot claim to know anything entirely until he knows everything.

3) You're perverting Kant here, and it would be better if you didn't. We don't "edit the data recieved by our senses as they are processed to make them more palatable to our consciousness and to create consistencies with our preconceptions." If we did that, I'd still believe that if I hide my eyes behind my baby bottle so as to block out the view of others, then no one else would see me either. Instead, we edit our preconceptions about the world to better accord with the physical world that impinges upon us.

You underestimate the power of paradigms. As an infant your mind is relatively flexible and paradigms are formed and shed rapidly as neural pathways are created. Our brains really do edit the information our senses recieve, I have seen a number of demonstrations of it, and while I have none handy, suffice it to say that they exist. If Kant wrote on this subject I don't know about it, but I wouldn't be surprised. The majority of my knowledge on this subject is the result of my reading Robert Anton Wilson, personal experience, and a social science teacher with a fascination with psychology. Anyway, back to my point, as the brain ages and growth slows the formation of paradigms is slower as is their shedding. It is remarkably difficult to convince a person that the world is a certain way, no matter how sure you are or how much evidence you have if they have a rigid paradigm regarding your specific points. As we age the purden of proof necessary for us to abandon our paradigms rises, so as an infant the purden of proof is very low, it only takes months before a child learns that objects are constant even outside the field of vision. Experiential evidence is the strongest evidence for destroying paradigms, and is the primary (maybe exclusive) manner of evidence that an infant processes, so it's not surprising that they realize that you're still there even when you're covered up quickly.

On some level you are correct, when enough evidence contradicts our preconceptions of the universe we change our mind to fit the evidence, but it takes more evidence than you might think to change a person's mind and more often than not they continue on with their life without ever knowing that what they saw was not what actually was. A good example of this is a video I once saw in which images of playing cards were displayed for a second each and the viewers were asked to write the number and suit of the cards down. The vast majority of viewers wrote wrong answers because they were presented with black hearts and red clubs. If the video had not gone back and shown the cards for longer and told the audience what they were seeing there was very little chance that any of them would ever have been the wiser and they would have continued with their lives with incorrect models of the world, even if only in that minor area.

4) The very fact that we can understand what each other is saying and react rationally to it is strong evidence that we have similar conceptions about the world, and as I mentioned above, the simplest, most elegant way of describing why that is the case is to say that we are both impacted by the same physical events occuring in the same physical world.

You are correct, you and I can understand what they other is saying, but if we brought in a person who speaks only Swahili there is little chance that either of us would be able to understand anything he said or that he would be able to understand us, despite his occupying space in the same objective universe as the two of us. What's more, even within the same language there are often disputes over the meanings of words. A debate happening elsewhere on this forum about the "true" meaning of "homosexual" posts the argument that it is the products of it's roots and means, "fear of the same," against the argument that it means what "common people" assume it to mean, which is "fear or contempt of or for homosexuals." Both sides claim to know the "true" meaning of the word when neither can present any objective evidence to support their claim. The reason for this is primarily that language, as a construct of the human mind and not an observed phenomena is subject to personal interpretation. A problem that many people have difficulty understanding is that the world "morality" and morality out in the objective world are not the same thing. "Morality" is just our vocalization of the abstraction that is morality. Plato and Aristotle believed that all objects had both a physical and an ideal or essential existence. What this means is that a chair is both a collection of atoms and a unified whole, organized by a non-corporeal "chairness." When we see a chair we observe the reflection of light off its surface and our mind interprets that light as signals, representitive of the physical being of the chair and further interprets the composite image of the physical chair to create a mental object based on the thinkers preconceptions about "chairness." Whether "chairness" exists in the objective world or not it exists, conceptually, within the minds of all people and is used to define chairs as such, depite, or in addition to their inherent nature as chairs. In the same way there exists an ideal of morality in the minds of all people who have heard the word and call it that as well as a morality that exists independently of humanity (or maybe not, who knows). Because each person lives in a universe based only on their personal experiences and their ideas on the essential nature of existence we cannot assume that any one person is correct or that any one person is wrong. Until we can be sure of our convictions how is it reasonable and fair to say that what one person does is morally reprehensible when it seems morally acceptable to them? How can we say that we are right and they are wrong when we are as caught up in our own world as they are in theirs? I hold that we cannot, in the absence of evidence interpreted the same by both parties make any judgment about the accurateness of either conception.

I have never claimed to be making a metaphysical point. Because each person is effectively living in a different universe I think it is reasonable to say that we should practice some tolerance and relativism in our dealings with people who think the world is, or ought to be a different way from the way we think it is or ought to be.

1) Yes, you did. The claim "There is no such thing is as an objective universe" is a quintessentially metaphysical argument. The problem is that you have provided no evidence to justify this claim. What you've provided is a skeptical claim that we cannot totally be sure that the world is the way we perceive it. That is an epistemological claim. The problem is that even if we take your argument to be true, it does not follow that just because we don't have certainty about the world that said world does not exist.

2) Relativism and tolerance are not the same thing, and you don't need to be one to practice the other. I, for example, don't think it ethical to have sex outside the context of a loving relationship (not necessarily marriage). But on the other hand, that does not automatically compel me to proclaim the imminent damnation of everyone who acts contrary to this doctrine, nor do I support attempts to legislate it. Why? Because I recognize the distinction between legal and moral, and know when to apply each.

Nevertheless, the converse is also true: just because I think it wrong to engage in casual sex, while others might disagree, in no way leads to the conclusion that both of us are simultaneously, equally correct in our moral assessments. One of us is wrong, the other right, and which is which can be determined through understanding of the world and rational analysis.


True, to a point. We cannot ever create a system of observation sophisticated enough to accurately observe the entire universe and catalog it, so while Newtons system may more accurately represent the objective universe than Aristotle's it is not more "correct," since both are imperfect. Newton merely had fewer errors (if we can even say that since more recent investigations seem to suggest that he was wrong on many accounts).


Wait. . .what? Something that explains the physical world with perfect accuracy in all but the most high-speed of situations (and by high speed situations, I mean speeds approaching the speed of light) is no better than a system which only explains the physical world as seen through the unaided eye because neither are completely, 100% accurate? That's ridiculous.

The very fact that Newton's system has fewer errors is precisely why we call it more "correct." If you want to think otherwise, you need to invent your own term.


The problem of limitted information is one that haunts all moral and ethical dilemmas. How can we know that we made the right choice if we don't know all the consequences of our actions, and even worse, how can we know which choice is right ahead of time if we cannot guess at the consequences of our actions. The answer is that we can guess at some of the consequences and we try our best to pick the right option, but some of the time our incomplete information leads us to the wrong conclusions. A person cannot claim to know anything entirely until he knows everything.


And from this follows. . .what? Even if we were to accept your analysis (which is quite excessive: irrespective of whether we can or cannot know the future, we can make an educated guess, and that is perfectly valid for the consequentialist), it still does not follow that we have no grounding for morality. A deontologist would simply ask you what the intention of your action was: if it was to bring about positive change, then it is certainly more moral than if you desired otherwise, irrespective of the outcome.


You underestimate the power of paradigms. As an infant your mind is relatively flexible and paradigms are formed and shed rapidly as neural pathways are created. Our brains really do edit the information our senses recieve, I have seen a number of demonstrations of it, and while I have none handy, suffice it to say that they exist. If Kant wrote on this subject I don't know about it, but I wouldn't be surprised. The majority of my knowledge on this subject is the result of my reading Robert Anton Wilson, personal experience, and a social science teacher with a fascination with psychology. Anyway, back to my point, as the brain ages and growth slows the formation of paradigms is slower as is their shedding. It is remarkably difficult to convince a person that the world is a certain way, no matter how sure you are or how much evidence you have if they have a rigid paradigm regarding your specific points. As we age the purden of proof necessary for us to abandon our paradigms rises, so as an infant the purden of proof is very low, it only takes months before a child learns that objects are constant even outside the field of vision. Experiential evidence is the strongest evidence for destroying paradigms, and is the primary (maybe exclusive) manner of evidence that an infant processes, so it's not surprising that they realize that you're still there even when you're covered up quickly.


1) That's not what you said. You didn't say "Our brains really do edit the information our senses recieve", you said that we mentally construct the world independent of such information. The difference is quite significant: one suggests a common metaphysical universe that actively impinges upon us. The other suggest a mind-dependent reality. Only in the latter is a moral relativist scheme even possible.

2) Again, your information doesn't fit the argument you want to raise. Whether people at any age choose to believe or disbelieve the way the world is is completely irrelevant, because it simply does not follow from the fact that two people can conceive the same thing differently that they are both conceiving of it correctly, whether metaphysical, epistemological, or moral. In point of fact, you seem to be saying something along the lines of "Because I can perceive the wind as being hot, and you can perceive it as being cold, then the wind can be both cold and hot at the same time", which is a logical contradiction--something cannot both be something and their opposite at the same time..


On some level you are correct, when enough evidence contradicts our preconceptions of the universe we change our mind to fit the evidence, but it takes more evidence than you might think to change a person's mind and more often than not they continue on with their life without ever knowing that what they saw was not what actually was. A good example of this is a video I once saw in which images of playing cards were displayed for a second each and the viewers were asked to write the number and suit of the cards down. The vast majority of viewers wrote wrong answers because they were presented with black hearts and red clubs. If the video had not gone back and shown the cards for longer and told the audience what they were seeing there was very little chance that any of them would ever have been the wiser and they would have continued with their lives with incorrect models of the world, even if only in that minor area.


That proves only that when you show people something vaguely familiar for not enough time to really perceive it well, then they will fill in the blanks using previously-acquired knowledge. That doesn't even prove that we cannot know the way the world is, let alone that the mind-independent world doesn't exist.


You are correct, you and I can understand what they other is saying, but if we brought in a person who speaks only Swahili there is little chance that either of us would be able to understand anything he said or that he would be able to understand us, despite his occupying space in the same objective universe as the two of us. What's more, even within the same language there are often disputes over the meanings of words. A debate happening elsewhere on this forum about the "true" meaning of "homosexual" posts the argument that it is the products of it's roots and means, "fear of the same," against the argument that it means what "common people" assume it to mean, which is "fear or contempt of or for homosexuals." Both sides claim to know the "true" meaning of the word when neither can present any objective evidence to support their claim. The reason for this is primarily that language, as a construct of the human mind and not an observed phenomena is subject to personal interpretation. A problem that many people have difficulty understanding is that the world "morality" and morality out in the objective world are not the same thing. "Morality" is just our vocalization of the abstraction that is morality. Plato and Aristotle believed that all objects had both a physical and an ideal or essential existence. What this means is that a chair is both a collection of atoms and a unified whole, organized by a non-corporeal "chairness." When we see a chair we observe the reflection of light off its surface and our mind interprets that light as signals, representitive of the physical being of the chair and further interprets the composite image of the physical chair to create a mental object based on the thinkers preconceptions about "chairness." Whether "chairness" exists in the objective world or not it exists, conceptually, within the minds of all people and is used to define chairs as such, depite, or in addition to their inherent nature as chairs. In the same way there exists an ideal of morality in the minds of all people who have heard the word and call it that as well as a morality that exists independently of humanity (or maybe not, who knows). Because each person lives in a universe based only on their personal experiences and their ideas on the essential nature of existence we cannot assume that any one person is correct or that any one person is wrong. Until we can be sure of our convictions how is it reasonable and fair to say that what one person does is morally reprehensible when it seems morally acceptable to them? How can we say that we are right and they are wrong when we are as caught up in our own world as they are in theirs? I hold that we cannot, in the absence of evidence interpreted the same by both parties make any judgment about the accurateness of either conception.

1) Oy vey. Where to begin? Okay, first of all, the Swahili example proves very little. So I don't know what a person is necessarily talking about when I speak to a person who only knows Swahili--that still doesn't even prove that we have differing conceptual schemes, much less that there is no mind-independent world. In point of fact, I can be fairly sure that, language aside, the Swahili linguist thinks about the world in much the same way I do. If, for example, I point to a chair and say "chair", he'll generally get my drift. He's not going to think I'm talking about some undifferentiated chair part, he's not going to think I'm naming the position of the chair, he's not going to think I'm naming some nonessential property thereof like color or temperature. Instead, he's going to mentally translate it into the Swahili equivalent of "When he says 'chair', he means what I call a '[Swahili equivalent of] chair.' If he did have one of those kind of views of the world, it would have been impossible for either of us to see the other as rational at all.

2) Just because two people might add something different to the same word does not mean that they have differing conceptual schemes. It means only that when they use the same word to refer to the same object in the same independent world, they add differing connotations to it. One connotation can be backed up by biological/philological/empirical evaluation. The other cannot. Ergo, one is most assuredly right and the other is most assuredly wrong. Again, you are confusing the fact that we actively construct some elements of our understanding of the world for the fact that there is no such thing but mind-dependent construction.

3) Actually no, Plato believed that the physical was only an illusion--the ideal was the only reality. But to argue something besides semantics, now you are perverting Platonic and Aristotelian logic--both were hard-core realists. Both would say that you can indeed assign rightness or wrongness to a person's conceptual schema, based on how well said schema matches up with the form of the physical part you're looking at. If you assign the term "chair" to a wheelbarrow, then yes, Virginia, there is a wrong, and you are partaking of it. Why? Because a wheelbarrow doesn't partake of the form of a chair, there are no tokens of wheelbarrow that match type chair, etc. However you want to put it, a wheelbarrow is not a chair, and if you say it is, then you are wrong, and you are misusing the term, because you are referring to the wrong object when you use it.

1/2=.5

1/infinity=0

More specifically, infinity=infinity. Two immesurables, though not necessarily the same, can both be infinite and therefore, equal.

If two things both have the property of being infinite then they are equal. This is fascinating. :)

So...

A: Human stupidity is infinite.

B: God is infinite.

Therefore..

C: God is equal to human stupidity.

I'm sure Bottle will appreciate this equation. ;)

What I refer to is what I consider the hidden discrimination.

The more obvious discrimination is, of course, treating someone different based on their race. The hidden discrimination is in pretending that race is irrelevant. Race is very relevant. Ignoring someone's differences (in my opinion) is a form of discrimination. Equality does not equate to similarity.

Hmmm? I don't remember saying anything about race.

1) Yes, you did. The claim "There is no such thing is as an objective universe" is a quintessentially metaphysical argument. The problem is that you have provided no evidence to justify this claim. What you've provided is a skeptical claim that we cannot totally be sure that the world is the way we perceive it. That is an epistemological claim. The problem is that even if we take your argument to be true, it does not follow that just because we don't have certainty about the world that said world does not exist.

I don't remember if I said that, but I'll trust you. My intent was to say, "The existence of an objective universe is unknowable, therefor any statement about the objective universe is speculative at best." I agree with your analysis of the statement, it was a mistake to say it.

2) Relativism and tolerance are not the same thing, and you don't need to be one to practice the other. I, for example, don't think it ethical to have sex outside the context of a loving relationship (not necessarily marriage). But on the other hand, that does not automatically compel me to proclaim the imminent damnation of everyone who acts contrary to this doctrine, nor do I support attempts to legislate it. Why? Because I recognize the distinction between legal and moral, and know when to apply each.

Relativism and tolerance are different, but relativism leads almost inexorably to tolerance for others' ideas. You reckognize the distinction between legal and moral, but it seems not the difference between percieved and actual morality. We can all agree that the law is a certain way because we created it. The law, as a product of the human mind, can be fully mapped within a person's consciousness. Morality, (assuming there is an objective morality) is not a construct of the human mind and cannot be perfectly or entirely mapped within the mind of any human. With that in mind you cannot say that you know for sure that something is moral, you can only say that it appears moral within the model you have in your head.

Nevertheless, the converse is also true: just because I think it wrong to engage in casual sex, while others might disagree, in no way leads to the conclusion that both of us are simultaneously, equally correct in our moral assessments. One of us is wrong, the other right, and which is which can be determined through understanding of the world and rational analysis.

It is not necessarily true that one of you is correct and the other incorrect. It is possible that you are both correct or both incorrect. I also highly contest the idea that rational analysis can shed any light onto who is correct and who is not in the matter of moral arguments.

Wait. . .what? Something that explains the physical world with perfect accuracy in all but the most high-speed of situations (and by high speed situations, I mean speeds approaching the speed of light) is no better than a system which only explains the physical world as seen through the unaided eye because neither are completely, 100% accurate? That's ridiculous.

The very fact that Newton's system has fewer errors is precisely why we call it more "correct." If you want to think otherwise, you need to invent your own term.

Newton was not only wrong at very high speeds, his conception of gravity as a force has been thrown into question and nearly abandoned as well as his ideas on the nature of light (not only mass traveling at near the speed of light) and the subatomic universe.

Newtons system is better at predicting the changes in the universe based on a given set of circumstances, yes, but it is not "correct" which is an absolute statement of accuracy. You cannot be more or less correct in the same way that you cannot be more or less preagnent or more or less dead. Newton was more accurate in his overall conception of the unvierse, and correct in some places where Aristotle had been wrong, but he was not "more correct."

And from this follows. . .what? Even if we were to accept your analysis (which is quite excessive: irrespective of whether we can or cannot know the future, we can make an educated guess, and that is perfectly valid for the consequentialist), it still does not follow that we have no grounding for morality. A deontologist would simply ask you what the intention of your action was: if it was to bring about positive change, then it is certainly more moral than if you desired otherwise, irrespective of the outcome.

My point is that the imperfect nature of our understanding of the universe makes knowing whether an action was moral or immoral difficult and often impossible, if not simply meaningless. If we are to say that the only necessity for an action to be moral is a good, or moral intention, then it could be argued that Hitler was moral because his intentions may have seemed "good" to him. If you change the meanings of the words a little to mean that the intention must be for something good within an objective (and at least partially unknown) morality then we are essentially back to only action and consequences since foreknowledge is necessary for an action of have meaningul intentions.

I have to argue again that moral is not a graduated scale, but an absolute statement of being. Either an action is moral or immoral, never more or less moral. An action might be more likely to be moral if good intentions led to it, (and I would again contest that because what seems to be a good idea to one person based on their individual moral conceptions might seem atrocious to another) but that does not change the fact that in the end it is either moral or immoral.

1) That's not what you said. You didn't say "Our brains really do edit the information our senses recieve", you said that we mentally construct the world independent of such information. The difference is quite significant: one suggests a common metaphysical universe that actively impinges upon us. The other suggest a mind-dependent reality. Only in the latter is a moral relativist scheme even possible.

Here I must disagree with your assessment of my statements as well as your analysis of their implications. I have said throughout this debate that the brain edits the information it receives via the senses, actively fitting them into the brain's preconceptions. We construct mental models of the universe in our brains which we use to navigate through the physical world. Without an existential universe there is no meaning to anything, solipsism reigns. Moral relativism would be silly in a universe that existend entirely in the mind of a single individual because that individual would, in essense, be the objective universe. The only moral arguments that could be made in that case would be between the individual aspects of the imagined universe.

To simplify, the universe would exist without us, and while there is a physical aspect to our being it is not meaningful unless accompanied by the model of the universe we carry in our heads and which we use to make predictions about the future and to make decisions about the proper courses of actions we should take.

2) Again, your information doesn't fit the argument you want to raise. Whether people at any age choose to believe or disbelieve the way the world is is completely irrelevant, because it simply does not follow from the fact that two people can conceive the same thing differently that they are both conceiving of it correctly, whether metaphysical, epistemological, or moral. In point of fact, you seem to be saying something along the lines of "Because I can perceive the wind as being hot, and you can perceive it as being cold, then the wind can be both cold and hot at the same time", which is a logical contradiction--something cannot both be something and their opposite at the same time..

Try this:

Take two bowls of water, large enough that you can complete submerge your hands in them. Heat one of the bowls of water to 10 or 15 degress warmer than room temperature and cool the other to 10 or 15 degress below room temperature. Put one hand in each bowl and leave it there for a minute. Take both hands out of the water and into the air. One will feel cold while the other feels hot. The observer is a necessary part of the observation.

Two people can have different conceptions of the universe and both be accurate because the observer, in some part, affects the observed. What's more the problem of sensory accuracy can be used to discredit any statement of the objective universe, so while neither observer may be correct in their assessment of a situation they are on equal footing in terms of potential accuracy.

[QUOTE=Xenophobialand]That proves only that when you show people something vaguely familiar for not enough time to really perceive it well, then they will fill in the blanks using previously-acquired knowledge. That doesn't even prove that we cannot know the way the world is, let alone that the mind-independent world doesn't exist.

The card example is not the strongest, but there are more examples of the same effect on a larger scale. As I said, it takes overwhelming evidence to convince a person of something they have believed to be untrue. The vast majority of people who became acculturated before the beginning of the Civil Rights movement were unable, even to their deaths to accept that skin color was not an acceptable measure of a person. Many people have not even given up that idea yet since they were raised by parents who maintained that idea, despite the fact that the majority of those around them told them that they were wrong, and dillusional.

What it proves is that people easily and often jump to the conclusion that they know the world the way it is when they are decieving themselves. I say again, I have not made any claim to the non-existence of a mind-independent world and do not intend to.

1) Oy vey. Where to begin? Okay, first of all, the Swahili example proves very little. So I don't know what a person is necessarily talking about when I speak to a person who only knows Swahili--that still doesn't even prove that we have differing conceptual schemes, much less that there is no mind-independent world. In point of fact, I can be fairly sure that, language aside, the Swahili linguist thinks about the world in much the same way I do. If, for example, I point to a chair and say "chair", he'll generally get my drift. He's not going to think I'm talking about some undifferentiated chair part, he's not going to think I'm naming the position of the chair, he's not going to think I'm naming some nonessential property thereof like color or temperature. Instead, he's going to mentally translate it into the Swahili equivalent of "When he says 'chair', he means what I call a '[Swahili equivalent of] chair.' If he did have one of those kind of views of the world, it would have been impossible for either of us to see the other as rational at all.

We are creatures of language and symbol. We percieve and map the world using the symbols passed down to us by our parents. This entire conversation we are having, while representitive of ideas, is composed of nothing but word/symbols which we both accept as having a certain meaning. Words, like laws, are a construct of the human mind and not inherent, objective aspects of the physical universe. When you say "chair" and point to a "chair" it is possible that the Swahili speaker will understand your meaning and translate "chair" into the Swahili equivilent, but it is also possible that he will translate it to mean something different, but equally reasonable, like "sit," or "wood." It is only after many experiences with the word "chair" and chairs that a person associates the word with its intended meaning. I think it important to note that for hundreds of years European explores thought that the natives in the lands they explored were stupid, inhuman, and irrational because they could not speak the languages of the Europeans and because they did not share the same cultural customs and social conceptions of existence. There is a tribe in the South Pacific that practices "land diving" or jumping off of a wooden structure from as high as 90 feet with only vines as a brake. Most Westerners who learn of land diving call it "crazy," they file it in their world-model under "crazy things people do," but for a man in that culture there is no honor greater than diving from the top of the tower, they call it their equivilent of "brave," and file it in their world-model under "a show of true bravery and honor." Each is observing the same existential action and using the same set of language calls it something entirely different. Land diving exists in the world-model of the tribe in an entirely different, but no less accurate, way than it does in the world-model of most Westerns.

To return briefly to humans as creatures of word and symbol I would like to say that while we move through an unnamed, physical universe, we behave as though we are passing through a universe of named, catagorized, and understood objects. When you see a chair as you walk into a room, do you think, "there's the product of a carpenter's labor," (which is, of course, just more words) or do you think, "there's a chair?" The model of the universe that we use to navigate through the physical universe is based on a code of words and symbols which is more efficient than a system which records everything exactly how it is and allows for no associative learning or understanding. The only reason we know that a chair and a stool are used for the same things is because we use similar symbols for them in our world-models, even though their structure is only vaguely similar.

2) Just because two people might add something different to the same word does not mean that they have differing conceptual schemes. It means only that when they use the same word to refer to the same object in the same independent world, they add differing connotations to it. One connotation can be backed up by biological/philological/empirical evaluation. The other cannot. Ergo, one is most assuredly right and the other is most assuredly wrong. Again, you are confusing the fact that we actively construct some elements of our understanding of the world for the fact that there is no such thing but mind-dependent construction.

I'm not sure what you're refering to here, but I'll answer it as best I can. If two people call one thing two different names it is safe to assume that their ideas of that thing differ in some way, even if it is as limitted as their naming. Two people may associate different words with the same non-verbal concept, but since both are merely the naming aspect of a system of symbols there is no meaning to the difference. Neither is existentially correct or incorrect since both are entirely individual to the people who use them, as I am arguing is morality. No ammount of empirical or other evidence will convince a person that the word they use for something is wrong because the word has no inherent meaning and only becomes meaningful when used.

3) Actually no, Plato believed that the physical was only an illusion--the ideal was the only reality. But to argue something besides semantics, now you are perverting Platonic and Aristotelian logic--both were hard-core realists. Both would say that you can indeed assign rightness or wrongness to a person's conceptual schema, based on how well said schema matches up with the form of the physical part you're looking at. If you assign the term "chair" to a wheelbarrow, then yes, Virginia, there is a wrong, and you are partaking of it. Why? Because a wheelbarrow doesn't partake of the form of a chair, there are no tokens of wheelbarrow that match type chair, etc. However you want to put it, a wheelbarrow is not a chair, and if you say it is, then you are wrong, and you are misusing the term, because you are referring to the wrong object when you use it.

Plato believed that what was then known as the physical world was merely a shadow, representitive of the ideal world. Even if the physical exists only as a shaow it exists, the semantic argument isn't very strong. How you can argue that Plato believed only in the ideal then call him a "hard-core realist" in the next sentence is beyond me. The "real" is no more meaningful a concept than the ideal or the physical, all are aspects of the universe. A "realist" is merely someone who is unwilling to allow for the possibility that their theory of existence is in some way inaccurate. Any attempt at an explanation of the universe is an attempt to say what is real.

Plato and Aristotle believed that you could define a conception as either correct or incorrect based on observations of the existential universe, but they ignored the fact that their experiences with that universe are tempered by their own system of symbols. We see the universe as it is and percieve it as fits into our conceptions using our symbols. The use of logic to analyze ideas was a good step towards understanding the universe because it allowed for the discovery of inconsistencies within a given theory, but it gets us no closer to understanding. All the Socratics had their own ideas about the way the world was, but in light of their flawed systems of observation none of them can be said to have been entirely accurate.

If I sit in a wheelbarrow does it become a chair? Is "chairness" inherent in the universe or is it dependent on human's use of it as a symbolic representitive of a physical phenomena for meaning? If there is an inherent "chairness" is it based on the word "chair" or is it independent of the word and instead dependent on an abstraction? If it is dependent on the word then are not people who speak other languages necessarily ignorant of chairness, and if it is not dependent on the word then how do we know that an object can not be both wheelbarrow and chair? I believe we cannot distinguish between a wheelbarrow and a chair on the basis of language, nor on the basis of form, not usage, so we are left asking ourselves, what is a chair?

I think Our Earth gets the world record for longest post.

I think Our Earth gets the world record for longest post.

It's not even my longest. :D

The whole conversation is 11 pages single spaced at size 12.

Plato and Aristotle believed that you could define a conception as either correct or incorrect based on observations of the existential universe, but they ignored the fact that their experiences with that universe are tempered by their own system of symbols.

you're starting to sound like Nietschze, don't drive yourself insane too ;)

Plato and Aristotle understood that they weren't 100% right (Aristotle probably moreso than Plato understood he couldn't define everything), their views echo that while we may not be able to define the "absolute" at a given time (Aristotle especially), that doesn't prevent someone from "getting it right" sooner or later, and that the absolute (even though it may be beyond our comprehension at a given point in time) still would exist, and the more evidence you have towards it, the closer you come to reaching it.

Pythagaros' theorem is a product (that is an absolute) of Aristotle's further expansion on Plato's base idea.

you're starting to sound like Nietschze, don't drive yourself insane too ;)

Plato and Aristotle understood that they weren't 100% right (Aristotle probably moreso than Plato understood he couldn't define everything), their views echo that while we may not be able to define the "absolute" at a given time (Aristotle especially), that doesn't prevent someone from "getting it right" sooner or later, and that the absolute (even though it may be beyond our comprehension at a given point in time) still would exist, and the more evidence you have towards it, the closer you come to reaching it.

Pythagaros' theorem is a product (that is an absolute) of Aristotle's further expansion on Plato's base idea.

I'll try to avoid insanity, but nobody ever goes there on purpose.

You cannot create a model of the universe that is accurate in every way as well as being inside the universe because of Von Neummans catastophe of the infinite regress because the model would necessarily contain itself which would further include itself, and so on. We can become more and more accurate, but there will always be a point to which we cannot come, the only thing as complex as the universe is the universe and no model or idea can match that complexity, by definition.

Pythagaros' theorem is essentially just an observation of the properties of triangles. It is universally true of a defined subset of all triangles, which is a defined set of all polygons, which is a defined set of all figures, which is a defined set of all objects, and it goes on for so long as to become meaningless. Pythagaros noticed that with certain conditions and foreknowledge a consistent outcome could be expected. With time and luck we will find more such consistencies, but never will we be able to predict everything, nor have all the foreknowledge necessary to make a prediction based on even a perfect universal model.

Me and a freind really debated the practical nature of Socialism (my part) and Capitalism (his part) for a long time until we finally realized that the conflict of the debate was not in its practicallity--we fundementally disagreed on the premise of society. My freind called for a system based on freedom, and, he argues, Capitalism is the key to that. I brought up this argument: http://forums2.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=363685. When we finsihed that debate he said that libertarianism called for a 'natural order' which was the ideal. I know this argument is wrong, and I'm sure I can come up with a counter argument, but I would like some help. So my socialist freinds, any ideas?

Libertarianism is the flip side to Communism. Both are equally untenable. Libertarians, I honestly believe, are simply deluded fools at best and at worst people with no social conscience.

Libertarianism essentially calls for no social order. Civilization is the result of people realizing that community is necessary - including communal living. A Libertarian society would create a "society" in which segregation, inequality, and inaccessibility to certain basic needs would reign.

Libertarianism, like Communism, has an unrealistic view of human nature. Communism presumed that people, once they were used to living together and sharing resources, would embrace it as the natural state. However, Libertarianism assumes that people are naturally motivated to attain higher standards of living and will treat each other fundamentally well if left to their own devices. This is simply, demonstrably, not so. Libertarianism denies the other systemic barriers that prevent people from achieving an equal starting point. That's what socialism (and liberalism, and progressivism) is: wanting everyone to have as equal a STARTING point as possible; the belief that some basic needs - such as access to health care, education, police services, and a minimum standard of living - are universal rights.

Now, I confess to what might be called a more socialist point of view in many respects, but I don't believe that capitalism is the problem - it's how this country has implemented it. Take for example, the deluded view that Republicans are pro-free market. They have demonstrated time and again that they are not free market proponents, but rather pro-big business, which is NOT the same thing. Ask anyone who's had to deal with Comcast, AT&T, Verizon, or any other large corporation in a dispute over ANYTHING. That's what happens when you get monopolies. Ask anyone who's been paying attention to the FCC lately.

I don't remember if I said that, but I'll trust you. My intent was to say, "The existence of an objective universe is unknowable, therefor any statement about the objective universe is speculative at best." I agree with your analysis of the statement, it was a mistake to say it.

Okay, so we're clear that we're talking about epistemological matters, and not metaphysics. Good.


Relativism and tolerance are different, but relativism leads almost inexorably to tolerance for others' ideas. You reckognize the distinction between legal and moral, but it seems not the difference between percieved and actual morality. We can all agree that the law is a certain way because we created it. The law, as a product of the human mind, can be fully mapped within a person's consciousness. Morality, (assuming there is an objective morality) is not a construct of the human mind and cannot be perfectly or entirely mapped within the mind of any human. With that in mind you cannot say that you know for sure that something is moral, you can only say that it appears moral within the model you have in your head.


1) That's the problem: in a relativistic framework, you have to accept other people's conceptions of morality unconditionally. From a pragmatic, not to mention moral standpoint, this is an absurdity. I am in no way obligated to think that Hitler's morality was of equal value to mine, nor should I.

2) Actually, no, the law cannot be mapped within the context of a person's consciousness. There are no 1 to 1 relationships with respect to brain states (neural firings) and mental states (conceptions of justice). After all, I can have the same conception of red as you, and yet still manifest in a markedly different neural firing. Alternatively, an octopus clearly demonstrates pain behavior if you poke and prod it, just like we would, but we demonstrate that form of pain physically as C-fiber firings, while octopi don't have C-fibers. Do you really want to infer from that that octopi don't feel pain?

3) To a very limited extent, you are correct. I cannot be sure that there might be some piece of reasoning or empirical datum that I have not uncovered that might change my moral thinking. But it does not follow from that that moral paralysis is the only acceptable alternative. Nor still does it follow that morality is definitively a social construct: you've already conceded that you cannot prove that there isn't a world, and therefore it's entirely possible that in what Kant called the noumenal world (the world as it is independent of our experience) an objective moral code exists and is embedded into the fabric of reality.


It is not necessarily true that one of you is correct and the other incorrect. It is possible that you are both correct or both incorrect. I also highly contest the idea that rational analysis can shed any light onto who is correct and who is not in the matter of moral arguments.


Of course rational analysis can shed light on moral argumentation. The whole process of most moral doctrines is to evaluate how you might respond were you to experience the same thing as someone else and make assumptions upon whether you would think it ethical to have it done to you. I'm not seeing how that process fails to shed light on moral deliberation.


Newton was not only wrong at very high speeds, his conception of gravity as a force has been thrown into question and nearly abandoned as well as his ideas on the nature of light (not only mass traveling at near the speed of light) and the subatomic universe.

Newtons system is better at predicting the changes in the universe based on a given set of circumstances, yes, but it is not "correct" which is an absolute statement of accuracy. You cannot be more or less correct in the same way that you cannot be more or less preagnent or more or less dead. Newton was more accurate in his overall conception of the unvierse, and correct in some places where Aristotle had been wrong, but he was not "more correct."


By this standard, we can't even know for certain that we exist (we could always be merely a part of Berkeley's idealistic system). As such, I'd have to say that you have placed an artificially high bar what it means to be "correct".


My point is that the imperfect nature of our understanding of the universe makes knowing whether an action was moral or immoral difficult and often impossible, if not simply meaningless. If we are to say that the only necessity for an action to be moral is a good, or moral intention, then it could be argued that Hitler was moral because his intentions may have seemed "good" to him. If you change the meanings of the words a little to mean that the intention must be for something good within an objective (and at least partially unknown) morality then we are essentially back to only action and consequences since foreknowledge is necessary for an action of have meaningul intentions.


1) And my point is that it does not follow from the fact that, even supposing absolute morality to be extremely difficult, even impossible to fully know, that said morality is therefore meaningless or doesn't exist. It is still eminently useful under those circumstances in a pragmatic context--far more so than a relativistic standard. Moreover, to the extent that we can back it up with consistent empirical observations and rational thoughts, the greater efficacy it would seem to have. In short, a moral code that is effective in all cases to date should not be thrown out just because it might be possible that a future case might prove it lacking, or because there is the extremely remote chance that I'm simply a brain in a vat.

2) You misunderstand me. I didn't say that the standard of morality is good intentions. I said the only thing that could be called universally, unconditionally morally good is a good intention, because irrespective of the consequence, the goodness of the intent is still present (if I said otherwise, I apologize for misspeaking). Nevertheless, there are objective criteria for determining whether you in fact have a good intent:

A) Would you will that such an intent be made into a universal law?
B) Does it treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not as a means to an end?
C) Would a society in hypothetical perfectly just society adopt this as one of their laws?

Clearly, Hitler's criteria of exterminating the Jews does not meet any of the three a priori criteria for good intent. Ergo, his intent was impure.


I have to argue again that moral is not a graduated scale, but an absolute statement of being. Either an action is moral or immoral, never more or less moral. An action might be more likely to be moral if good intentions led to it, (and I would again contest that because what seems to be a good idea to one person based on their individual moral conceptions might seem atrocious to another) but that does not change the fact that in the end it is either moral or immoral.


1) To some extent, you are right. I would generally agree that morality is a bivalent system that allows only for right and wrong with no intermediary. That being said, you would be foolish not to admit that in some instances, multiple choices might pass the Categorical Imperatives, or all choices might fail. Therefore, we could easily say, even within a bivalent system, that it may come to a choice of which choice best fits that criteria.

2) Again here, you make a false inference. We've already established that we were talking about epistemology, and not metaphysics. Metaphysically, I've made a good and as yet unrefuted case for why we should think that we are each acted upon by the same external world--namely, that if we weren't, then it would be the height of absurdity to assume that we could hold a rational discussion and understand what we each are referring to. As we are in fact capable of such discussion and co-reference, the argument seems to stand.

The problem with your logic is that, supposing that there is in fact such an external world, and that it does impact us all the same way (or at least, very similarly), then it stands to reason that we will construct our responses to that universe similarly as well (this is borne out by the fact that we can each refer to the same object in language and understand each other). If that is the case, then the same moral law about how we should act with respect to that external world seems highly likely to apply equally as well. The idea that one man's morality is another man's atrocity is absurd: one is clearly wrong, rationalize his actions though he may try.


Here I must disagree with your assessment of my statements as well as your analysis of their implications. I have said throughout this debate that the brain edits the information it receives via the senses, actively fitting them into the brain's preconceptions. We construct mental models of the universe in our brains which we use to navigate through the physical world. Without an existential universe there is no meaning to anything, solipsism reigns. Moral relativism would be silly in a universe that existend entirely in the mind of a single individual because that individual would, in essense, be the objective universe. The only moral arguments that could be made in that case would be between the individual aspects of the imagined universe.


No, I think you actually hit the nail on the head with my criticism of your position. You seemed to be arguing for an anti-realist position based purely on a mind-dependent universe. My response was two-fold: first that you were wrong to assume anti-realism based on your argument, and secondly that moral relativism isn't coherent in any universe except the solipsist one: it's perfectly justifiable to grant someone else the right to engage in torture if in fact they don't exist and aren't going to hurt anyone.


To simplify, the universe would exist without us, and while there is a physical aspect to our being it is not meaningful unless accompanied by the model of the universe we carry in our heads and which we use to make predictions about the future and to make decisions about the proper courses of actions we should take.


. . .And yet it still does not follow that because we each have slightly differing webs of understanding about the universe, that our webs would each be true, or that by acting on that those webs of understanding, we are each acting morally. I can easily mentally envision someone who honestly sees themselves as. . .say, Magneto, without correspondingly having to attribute either the status of truth to that idea, or to attribute the status of morality to their attempts to blow up the Federal Reserve to make way for mutantkind. I can just as easily say his web of understanding is woefully inadequate and that he was acting immorally. As such, the logical connection you are trying to make simply isn't there.


The card example is not the strongest, but there are more examples of the same effect on a larger scale. As I said, it takes overwhelming evidence to convince a person of something they have believed to be untrue. The vast majority of people who became acculturated before the beginning of the Civil Rights movement were unable, even to their deaths to accept that skin color was not an acceptable measure of a person. Many people have not even given up that idea yet since they were raised by parents who maintained that idea, despite the fact that the majority of those around them told them that they were wrong, and dillusional.

What it proves is that people easily and often jump to the conclusion that they know the world the way it is when they are decieving themselves. I say again, I have not made any claim to the non-existence of a mind-independent world and do not intend to.


. . .And so I have to beg the question: what does this prove, then? The fact that people are still bigots is factually correct, but how is it pertinent? It's far easier to say that they've simply let irrational tradition override rational thought and empirical observation in their decision-making process, and are therefore wrong, than it is to say that they are equally correct because their universe is constructed differently.

You seem to want to both have your cake and eat it too, OE: you seem to imply that people like Hitler and bigots are wrong in their understanding of the world, and yet, if you are a relativist, how can you make this claim? If everyone's moral judgment is as good as another, then bigotry and genocidal tendencies are just as legitemate as altruism. If that seems counterintuitive (as it should be), then you might need to change your metaphysics of morals.


We are creatures of language and symbol. We percieve and map the world using the symbols passed down to us by our parents. This entire conversation we are having, while representitive of ideas, is composed of nothing but word/symbols which we both accept as having a certain meaning. Words, like laws, are a construct of the human mind and not inherent, objective aspects of the physical universe. When you say "chair" and point to a "chair" it is possible that the Swahili speaker will understand your meaning and translate "chair" into the Swahili equivilent, but it is also possible that he will translate it to mean something different, but equally reasonable, like "sit," or "wood." It is only after many experiences with the word "chair" and chairs that a person associates the word with its intended meaning. I think it important to note that for hundreds of years European explores thought that the natives in the lands they explored were stupid, inhuman, and irrational because they could not speak the languages of the Europeans and because they did not share the same cultural customs and social conceptions of existence. There is a tribe in the South Pacific that practices "land diving" or jumping off of a wooden structure from as high as 90 feet with only vines as a brake. Most Westerners who learn of land diving call it "crazy," they file it in their world-model under "crazy things people do," but for a man in that culture there is no honor greater than diving from the top of the tower, they call it their equivilent of "brave," and file it in their world-model under "a show of true bravery and honor." Each is observing the same existential action and using the same set of language calls it something entirely different. Land diving exists in the world-model of the tribe in an entirely different, but no less accurate, way than it does in the world-model of most Westerns.


1) And yet, the Swahili speaker still under your counterexamples has a very similar conceptual scheme to ours. It might take a few different examples to work out the kinks (if, for example, he points at a tree and uses the same word as he uses for what I thought was chair, I'll readjust my understanding of Swahili), but it doesn't mean that translation is impossible, or that our conceptual schemes are that radically different.

2) The land-diving example does you no better. Irrespective of whether I call it crazy or brave, the very fact that I can understand the motives behind it and determine which of the two terms the native would pick out is proof positive of the degree to which our minds co-refer to the same objects.


To return briefly to humans as creatures of word and symbol I would like to say that while we move through an unnamed, physical universe, we behave as though we are passing through a universe of named, catagorized, and understood objects. When you see a chair as you walk into a room, do you think, "there's the product of a carpenter's labor," (which is, of course, just more words) or do you think, "there's a chair?" The model of the universe that we use to navigate through the physical universe is based on a code of words and symbols which is more efficient than a system which records everything exactly how it is and allows for no associative learning or understanding. The only reason we know that a chair and a stool are used for the same things is because we use similar symbols for them in our world-models, even though their structure is only vaguely similar.


I think I'm talking past you here. You seem to be giving me examples in which one person might think one thing about a physical object, and another person might think another. The problem is that this is not the standard of proof you need to argue for any kind of relativistic understanding of the world. If you were truly going to say that each person constructs a completely different, completely holistic understanding of the universe, or maybe better that each culture (you seem to switch back and forth), does so, then you'd also have to argue that the idea that we can translate our understanding of the world into their understanding would be almost logically impossible: the idea that we could each come up, completely independently, with an almost identical schema for how the universe is, is so astronomically far out there as to be impossible. The problem, however, is that you can't argue such a position, because we do in fact find it quite easy to translate our ideas and understand one another, a fact which highly indicates a common frame of reference. If that's the case, then it stands to reason that however you construct your morality, whether on a priori or a posteriori grounds, it will be applicable to everyone, because we all share the same relationship to the world and each other.


I'm not sure what you're refering to here, but I'll answer it as best I can. If two people call one thing two different names it is safe to assume that their ideas of that thing differ in some way, even if it is as limitted as their naming. Two people may associate different words with the same non-verbal concept, but since both are merely the naming aspect of a system of symbols there is no meaning to the difference. Neither is existentially correct or incorrect since both are entirely individual to the people who use them, as I am arguing is morality. No ammount of empirical or other evidence will convince a person that the word they use for something is wrong because the word has no inherent meaning and only becomes meaningful when used.


So you're saying that people need a language to pick out their terms, and they might pick different languages? That's trivially correct, and it does nothing for your cause. In order for you to say what you need to say, you'd need to say that in no circumstances can, for example "Schnie ist wiest" (I realize I just mangled that horribly) is a completely different claim from, for example "Snow is white." The problem is that, again, you can't make that claim. "Schnie ist weist" is translatable, because it picks out the same co-refering terms, as "Snow is white." So long as they talk about the same thing, than the whole point of truth or falsity is irrelevent.


Plato believed that what was then known as the physical world was merely a shadow, representitive of the ideal world. Even if the physical exists only as a shaow it exists, the semantic argument isn't very strong. How you can argue that Plato believed only in the ideal then call him a "hard-core realist" in the next sentence is beyond me. The "real" is no more meaningful a concept than the ideal or the physical, all are aspects of the universe. A "realist" is merely someone who is unwilling to allow for the possibility that their theory of existence is in some way inaccurate. Any attempt at an explanation of the universe is an attempt to say what is real.


The Form of the Good was real, wasn't it? Everyone was affected by the Form of the Good in the same way, weren't they? If so, then he was a realist. He might have been a dualist, but dualists can be realists too.

And no, a realist is not one who fits your definition. A realist is simply one who believes in a mind-independent world that exists external to him--irrespective of whether he can perceive it or comprehend it or not.


Plato and Aristotle believed that you could define a conception as either correct or incorrect based on observations of the existential universe, but they ignored the fact that their experiences with that universe are tempered by their own system of symbols. We see the universe as it is and percieve it as fits into our conceptions using our symbols. The use of logic to analyze ideas was a good step towards understanding the universe because it allowed for the discovery of inconsistencies within a given theory, but it gets us no closer to understanding. All the Socratics had their own ideas about the way the world was, but in light of their flawed systems of observation none of them can be said to have been entirely accurate.


1) If you're only point is that Plato is vulnerable to skepticism, then so? Every philosophy to date is vulnerable to skepticism of one kind or another.

2) Actually, Plato disagreed with the whole notion of truth equating with experiential data. If you don't believe me, read the Theaetetus.


If I sit in a wheelbarrow does it become a chair? Is "chairness" inherent in the universe or is it dependent on human's use of it as a symbolic representitive of a physical phenomena for meaning? If there is an inherent "chairness" is it based on the word "chair" or is it independent of the word and instead dependent on an abstraction? If it is dependent on the word then are not people who speak other languages necessarily ignorant of chairness, and if it is not dependent on the word then how do we know that an object can not be both wheelbarrow and chair? I believe we cannot distinguish between a wheelbarrow and a chair on the basis of language, nor on the basis of form, not usage, so we are left asking ourselves, what is a chair?

1) No, it becomes a wheelbarrow you're using to sit in. The Form doesn't change, irrespective of what you use it for.

2) It's based on the abstract (albeit more real) Form of chair, which you then conveniently use the term "chair" to pick out because it's handy. A wheelbarrow doesn't share the same Form (it has its own: wheelbarrowness). We know this because we all have access to the Forms in our minds, through the fact that our immortal souls were once acquainted with them, in Plato's account. We all know the difference between a chair and wheelbarrow because our souls intuit it, and we gradually relearn it through rational analysis.

Okay, so we're clear that we're talking about epistemological matters, and not metaphysics. Good.

Yes, I have never wished to make any claims about metaphysics because I believe them to be unknowable.

1) That's the problem: in a relativistic framework, you have to accept other people's conceptions of morality unconditionally. From a pragmatic, not to mention moral standpoint, this is an absurdity. I am in no way obligated to think that Hitler's morality was of equal value to mine, nor should I.

This is a fairly complicated issue, but you don't have to accept other systems of morality as of equal value, merely that they are as likely to be valid. That is to say that it is reasonable for your world-view to include the idea that other systems of morality are less valuable than your own because you set the meaning of value and the morals can be assessed objectively within that system, but you cannot say that another system of morality is necessarily less valid because that is a statement of metaphysics and not a statement about perceptions and value (a contruct, not an inherent aspect of the universe). So Hitler's morals are of less value to you than yours, but they are equally likely to be valid.

2) Actually, no, the law cannot be mapped within the context of a person's consciousness. There are no 1 to 1 relationships with respect to brain states (neural firings) and mental states (conceptions of justice). After all, I can have the same conception of red as you, and yet still manifest in a markedly different neural firing. Alternatively, an octopus clearly demonstrates pain behavior if you poke and prod it, just like we would, but we demonstrate that form of pain physically as C-fiber firings, while octopi don't have C-fibers. Do you really want to infer from that that octopi don't feel pain?

Law does not need to be mapped because it is a construct and not an inherency. We create conceptual maps of the universe based on our sense-data, but for human-created concepts such as the law we don't need sense-data to create a map. From there I've totally lost you in meaning both as a stand alone and as part of this debate.

3) To a very limited extent, you are correct. I cannot be sure that there might be some piece of reasoning or empirical datum that I have not uncovered that might change my moral thinking. But it does not follow from that that moral paralysis is the only acceptable alternative. Nor still does it follow that morality is definitively a social construct: you've already conceded that you cannot prove that there isn't a world, and therefore it's entirely possible that in what Kant called the noumenal world (the world as it is independent of our experience) an objective moral code exists and is embedded into the fabric of reality.

What objective, empirical evidence to you use to support your system of morals? I hold that while there may be an objective moral code it is unknowable and that everything that humans use for moral guidance is the product of the human mind and not a map formed through the analysis of sense-data. I have not said that moral paralysis is the only viable option given the idea of individualized morals but I believe that acting without considering the effects of subjectivity is more dangerous than potentially acting in a limited immoral way.

Of course rational analysis can shed light on moral argumentation. The whole process of most moral doctrines is to evaluate how you might respond were you to experience the same thing as someone else and make assumptions upon whether you would think it ethical to have it done to you. I'm not seeing how that process fails to shed light on moral deliberation.

The "Golden Rules" as you seem to be describing only tells you whether your actions are moral within your individual set of beliefs, it can tell you nothing about the relation between those beliefs and the objective moral code that may or may not exist independent of humanity. Rational analysis can shed light on the adherence of an action to a given set of morals, but cannot in any way demonstrate the accuracy of the moral code used for the judgments.

By this standard, we can't even know for certain that we exist (we could always be merely a part of Berkeley's idealistic system). As such, I'd have to say that you have placed an artificially high bar what it means to be "correct".

It is possible that we are nothing more than aspects of an idealistic system. Speculation on that matter is mostly meaningless because we cannot demonstrate it one way or the other. I have not set a high bar for correctness, I have set a high purden of proof for acceptance as correct. In other words it takes more evidence of the world being a certain way for me to believe it than it takes for most people. Most people form a world-view based on nothing more than the lessons of their parents and the teaching of their local schools. I find that trust difficult at best and seek answers further from rational analysis of the data I have. Unfortunately I find myself with very little data to apply to the cause.

1) And my point is that it does not follow from the fact that, even supposing absolute morality to be extremely difficult, even impossible to fully know, that said morality is therefore meaningless or doesn't exist. It is still eminently useful under those circumstances in a pragmatic context--far more so than a relativistic standard. Moreover, to the extent that we can back it up with consistent empirical observations and rational thoughts, the greater efficacy it would seem to have. In short, a moral code that is effective in all cases to date should not be thrown out just because it might be possible that a future case might prove it lacking, or because there is the extremely remote chance that I'm simply a brain in a vat.

Please understand that I am not denying the existence of a universal moral standard, only that we can know and apply it. We have absolutely know empirical evidence to apply to the cause of testing our moral systems as compared to the objective moral system so it is silly to say that we are more accurate or that we are correct when we have no means of measurement. I must challenge you again to present any empirical evidence to support your moral beliefs. What determines effectiveness of a moral system? It keeps the organism biologically alive? That's not a very good standard because it immediately eliminates all morals human societies have created and returns us to the same level as other animals. What keeps the organism happy isn't a very good standard either because then we get hedonism and social collapse. So what is necessary for a moral system to be "effective."

Was just reminded of this and thought it was kind of funny:
-----
We are all aware that the senses can be deceived, the eyes fooled. But how can we be sure our senses are not being deceived at any particular time, or even all the time? Might I just be a brain in a tank somewhere, tricked all my life into believing in the events of this world by some insane computer? And does my life gain or lose meaning based on my reaction to such solipsism?

Project PYRRHO, Specimen 46, Vat 7
Activity Recorded M.Y. 2302.22467
TERMINATION OF SPECIMEN ADVISED
-----

2) You misunderstand me. I didn't say that the standard of morality is good intentions. I said the only thing that could be called universally, unconditionally morally good is a good intention, because irrespective of the consequence, the goodness of the intent is still present (if I said otherwise, I apologize for misspeaking). Nevertheless, there are objective criteria for determining whether you in fact have a good intent:

A) Would you will that such an intent be made into a universal law?
B) Does it treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not as a means to an end?
C) Would a society in hypothetical perfectly just society adopt this as one of their laws?

Clearly, Hitler's criteria of exterminating the Jews does not meet any of the three a priori criteria for good intent. Ergo, his intent was impure.

Well, I think that your first criteria is reasonable, but the other two are not. The necessity of treating rational beings as ends rather than means is an aspect of your morality and is not supported by every moral system, nor is there any evidence for it in the existential world. The third is unreasonable because it assumes that there is a universal standard of justice. I think it is clear that there is not when you consider, for instance, people who eat meat and consider it perfectly acceptable as opposed to vegitarians who feel it unjust to kill any animal (but who have no problem with killing plants). Justice is a measure of conherence with a system of rules such as laws or morals, it cannot be used to measure the righteousness of the system it itself is a part of.

I would further argue that from Hitler's point of view your criteria could be met. Hitler not only wanted the non-existence of Jews to be a universal law, he took steps to enforce the law. Hitler could easily have argued that Jews were neither human nor rational and could therefor justify using and even killing them. If the non-existence of Jews became a universal law then "justice" would be served if the law was enforced as Hitler attemted. Now from your or my point of view none of the three criteria could be met, but it was not our action and not our intention, so we cannot judge it using our system of morals.

1) To some extent, you are right. I would generally agree that morality is a bivalent system that allows only for right and wrong with no intermediary. That being said, you would be foolish not to admit that in some instances, multiple choices might pass the Categorical Imperatives, or all choices might fail. Therefore, we could easily say, even within a bivalent system, that it may come to a choice of which choice best fits that criteria.

Multiple choices might pass inspection as "good" or as "bad" but that does not mean that there would be other catagories for them to fall into. I agree that one might be forced to choose the "lesser of two evils," but that is merely an unfortunate result of circumstance. The morality or immorality of an action is not judged based on circumstance. However, immoral actions, and illegal actions, are often accepted as necessary by those who do them and by those who sit in judgment over them, and therefor go unpunished. For instance, murders in self-defense are not prosecuted in the same way as murders of passion or premeditated murder despite the fact that all three are murders.

2) Again here, you make a false inference. We've already established that we were talking about epistemology, and not metaphysics. Metaphysically, I've made a good and as yet unrefuted case for why we should think that we are each acted upon by the same external world--namely, that if we weren't, then it would be the height of absurdity to assume that we could hold a rational discussion and understand what we each are referring to. As we are in fact capable of such discussion and co-reference, the argument seems to stand.

I deny that the fact that we can understand each other (and I think it important to note that our understanding is limited to our mastery of the symbols of communication as well as the similarity of our two symbol sets) means that we are necessary acting from the same world-model. It is extremely important that we distinguish between the objective, physical universe in which our bodies reside, and the subjective, symbol-based universe in which our minds reside and from which we make our decisions and judgments about the world. That we use such similar symbol systems seems to suggest that we are both aspects of the same physical universe, but the differences in our symbol systems and in our arrangement of those symbols into a model of the universe suggests that human understanding is heavily influenced by the chance encounters of our lives and by the subjective organization our minds impose on the information we gather.

The problem with your logic is that, supposing that there is in fact such an external world, and that it does impact us all the same way (or at least, very similarly), then it stands to reason that we will construct our responses to that universe similarly as well (this is borne out by the fact that we can each refer to the same object in language and understand each other). If that is the case, then the same moral law about how we should act with respect to that external world seems highly likely to apply equally as well. The idea that one man's morality is another man's atrocity is absurd: one is clearly wrong, rationalize his actions though he may try.

I think it important to stress the fact that we are not all affected in the same way by our experience, though we are mostly similar in our world-view there are important differences. Have you ever wondered why nearly everyone can identify a chair the same way, but nearly no one identifies morality in the same way? I think that the reason is that the chair has a physical existence which we observe in a concrete way, through sight and feel, while morality exists only, or primarily within our minds and that any morality that exists independent of humanity is of a non-observable nature.
I hold that the reason we see such variance in the morals that have arisen on this planet is because our connection with objective morality is limited at best, nonexistent at worst.

No, I think you actually hit the nail on the head with my criticism of your position. You seemed to be arguing for an anti-realist position based purely on a mind-dependent universe. My response was two-fold: first that you were wrong to assume anti-realism based on your argument, and secondly that moral relativism isn't coherent in any universe except the solipsist one: it's perfectly justifiable to grant someone else the right to engage in torture if in fact they don't exist and aren't going to hurt anyone.

It was never my intent to argue for non-realism, if you read it that way I apologize for my lack of clarity. I believe that moral relativism is consistent and coherent even in an objectivist reality, though I agree that in solipsism ignoring immorality is reasonable since no one is getting hurt, to a point. There is no distinction to be made between a solipsist existence and an objectivist existence from within. They appear functionally identical with the single "mind" of solipsism playing the role of objective universe, so both individual morals and universal morals can still exist in solipsism and ignoring immorality because bad again.

. . .And yet it still does not follow that because we each have slightly differing webs of understanding about the universe, that our webs would each be true, or that by acting on that those webs of understanding, we are each acting morally. I can easily mentally envision someone who honestly sees themselves as. . .say, Magneto, without correspondingly having to attribute either the status of truth to that idea, or to attribute the status of morality to their attempts to blow up the Federal Reserve to make way for mutantkind. I can just as easily say his web of understanding is woefully inadequate and that he was acting immorally. As such, the logical connection you are trying to make simply isn't there.

Not both true, but both equally likely to be true. I have no reason to trust my senses and organization above yours or vice versa. Again, we are each equally likely to be acting morally when we carry out the actions determined for us by our judgments from within our individual world-models since our connection to objective morality is weak. I don't understand the significance of your being able to envision a perosn who believes he is Magneto, but I'll say this, you can say that by attempting to blow up the Federal Reserve, the person who believes he is Magneto is acting in a way inconsistent with your morality, and so, from your point of view immoral, but you cannot say that his actions are universally immoral because it is as likely that his morals match objective morality and yours do not.

. . .And so I have to beg the question: what does this prove, then? The fact that people are still bigots is factually correct, but how is it pertinent? It's far easier to say that they've simply let irrational tradition override rational thought and empirical observation in their decision-making process, and are therefore wrong, than it is to say that they are equally correct because their universe is constructed differently.

The point is that there existed a moral tradition different from the one we now hold which was replaced by ours without the advent of any new evidence. The change took place primarily because society as a conherent whole decided that it was going to change. The majority of people made the transistion smoothly, (over the generation gap, not individuals) but others stayed in the old tradition. We have no reason to believe that social morals will not change again, and we have no reason to believe that current social morals are a more accurate representation of universal morals. Not equally correct, equally moral, because their universe is constructed differently. Each person acts on the morals he carries within him, not on morals that exist outside him, though his internal morals may be engineered to mirror universal morals as best as possible. Corruptions of universal morality are inevitable, but we cannot tell where they have occurred, so the classic racist is as likely to carry an accurate representation of universal morals as you or I.

You seem to want to both have your cake and eat it too, OE: you seem to imply that people like Hitler and bigots are wrong in their understanding of the world, and yet, if you are a relativist, how can you make this claim? If everyone's moral judgment is as good as another, then bigotry and genocidal tendencies are just as legitemate as altruism. If that seems counterintuitive (as it should be), then you might need to change your metaphysics of morals.

Hitler and bigots appear to be incorrect in my estimation of the universe, but I cannot say with certainty that they are incorrect because I cannot be so sure of my own beliefs. I do not have the blind faith necessary to suppose that I am infallible in my conceptions of the universe, but I am put in the position of either trusting in my senses and organizations to lead me to a reasonable approximation of the world around me or I can sink into solipsism, depression, and eventual suicide. I think you'll agree that trusting myself is a better choice. Everyone's moral judgment is as legitemate and as likely to be correct as everyone else's, but morality is difficult at best to justify if it is only used to apply to a single individual. Social movements, religions, they are all an attempt to spread a single morality over a wide area, and in many cases they are successful. Universalizing religions, such as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, are all attempts as disseminating a single world-view onto everyone. From a moral reletivist perspective this might seem a bad thing, but really it isn't. There is nothing wrong with wanting other people to believe as you do, it's when the need to convert people to your set of beliefs causes you to abandon important tenets of your belief (killing and threatening people till they agree with you when you are preaching peace and tolerance) that it becomes a problem. Internal consistency is the only thing necessary for a philosophy to maintain its position among the "as likely to be true" conceptions of the world.

1) And yet, the Swahili speaker still under your counterexamples has a very similar conceptual scheme to ours. It might take a few different examples to work out the kinks (if, for example, he points at a tree and uses the same word as he uses for what I thought was chair, I'll readjust my understanding of Swahili), but it doesn't mean that translation is impossible, or that our conceptual schemes are that radically different.

The symbol system is the difference between you and a Swahili speaker, and eventually one or the other can be trained to understand the other's system so that communication becomes possible, but the fact that you started out with different systems is important. A person can be converted from one religion to another, but the fact that they did not come to the religion on their own, and had to be convinced of it suggests that the evidence of the truth of that religion is not universal. The same is true of language, that different people speak different languages suggests that the symbols we use are individual to each of us. For the effective functioning of a society it is important that all its members be able to communicate, so from birth humans are trained to use the symbols of their parents and of their society rather than being allowed to create their own symbols. The only reason you and I can communicate without one of us needing to change the other is that we were both born into the same symbolic society.

2) The land-diving example does you no better. Irrespective of whether I call it crazy or brave, the very fact that I can understand the motives behind it and determine which of the two terms the native would pick out is proof positive of the degree to which our minds co-refer to the same objects.

It does matter what you call it. Land diving isn't just called crazy or brave, it is crazy or brave in the minds of different people because their perception of the same existential events are based on their symbol system and on their world-view. The fact that you can, eventually, understand the motives behind the actions is a testament to the ability of humans to learn from other humans, but understanding has multiple levels. You might understand that the natives call it bravery, but to you it still is crazy, or you might understand that to the natives it is bravery while still believing that it is crazy, in which case you will have to acknowledge that one event can be identified by two symbols, or you might understand that to the natives it is bravery and you yourself begin to believe that it is bravery, in which case they will have convinced you that their original conception of the event was correct. If you convinced them that you were correct they might stop diving because it is crazy. In any case, all parties observe the same physical phenomena but it is something different within the world-models of each observer. There is no inherent crazyness of bravery of land-diving, or if there is it is unknown and unknowable, but to every observe it occupies a spot within their world-model as a concrete thing.

I think I'm talking past you here. You seem to be giving me examples in which one person might think one thing about a physical object, and another person might think another. The problem is that this is not the standard of proof you need to argue for any kind of relativistic understanding of the world. If you were truly going to say that each person constructs a completely different, completely holistic understanding of the universe, or maybe better that each culture (you seem to switch back and forth), does so, then you'd also have to argue that the idea that we can translate our understanding of the world into their understanding would be almost logically impossible: the idea that we could each come up, completely independently, with an almost identical schema for how the universe is, is so astronomically far out there as to be impossible. The problem, however, is that you can't argue such a position, because we do in fact find it quite easy to translate our ideas and understand one another, a fact which highly indicates a common frame of reference. If that's the case, then it stands to reason that however you construct your morality, whether on a priori or a posteriori grounds, it will be applicable to everyone, because we all share the same relationship to the world and each other.

First let me clarify the individuals/cultures issue. Each individual has the ability to create their own symbol system and world-model which they can live by, but the majority of humans are never given that opportunity. They are indoctrinated from a young age to use the symbol system of their culture and to believe in the world-model that culture believes in. People tend to grow up to be mostly the same as their parents because that's what society needs them to do, though they have the ability, if raised without a world-model being force fed to them or if they are able to escape the dogmatic beliefs of their culture later in life, to create their own world-models and symbol systems. James Joyce, in Finnegans Wake, is said to have seemingly invented a new language in parts of the book. The reason for this perception is that Joyce was able to seperate himself from the symbol system of the culture he was raised in and create his own symbols to represent the existential world.

Because our experiences are much the same as the experiences of others on the other side of the world translation of our symbols into their symbols and the reverse is generally possible, but in some cases there exist symbols which are untranslatable. Some words have no equivilents in other languages, and many conceptions (especially of the supernatural, the moral, and the divine) are nearly or entirely impossible to explain in languages other than those used in their origin. For instance, try to find a comprehensive description of the Hindu God Brahma/n in English. The concept of Brahma and Brahman, while inately understood by anyone who has heard it explained in Hindi, is extremely difficult to understand when explained in English because there are no English symbols (words) to describe the concepts described in Hindi.

In answer to your idea about each person coming up with their own individual reality, I refer you back to what I said about socialization for the purpose of cohesive social function. A society could not function if each individual spoke its own language and had its own morality and religion, so it indoctrinates its young to use the same symbols as the other members of its social group. Even within large social groups smaller sections can be seen as cohesive wholes. For instance, all native English speakers are part of the same symbolic social group, but there are many dialects, some of which are very different. A Posh accent is almost indecipherable to a person from Texas, and vice versa, despite the fact that they both speak "English." Each person has his own manner of speaking, and his own word-symbols he uses frequently. In essense each person (and each sub-culture) individualizes their language to some degree to provide a distinguishable border and difference between Texans and Londoners.

I'll say it again; I hold that the reason we have such similar conceptions of the physical world is that it is emminently observable by using the senses without significant interferance, and the reason there is so much variety in the moral conceptions people come up with is that morality is inherently non-observable.

So you're saying that people need a language to pick out their terms, and they might pick different languages? That's trivially correct, and it does nothing for your cause. In order for you to say what you need to say, you'd need to say that in no circumstances can, for example "Schnie ist wiest" (I realize I just mangled that horribly) is a completely different claim from, for example "Snow is white." The problem is that, again, you can't make that claim. "Schnie ist weist" is translatable, because it picks out the same co-refering terms, as "Snow is white." So long as they talk about the same thing, than the whole point of truth or falsity is irrelevent.

The statement, "Snow is white" is translatable because it refers to a specific natural phenomena, but the statement "God is one" is not translatable into every language because the concept "God" is different in many symbol systems. So while some aspects of reality can be traslated from symbol system to symbol system, those aspects of reality which are not observable can often not be translated, and can never be translated perfectly.

The Form of the Good was real, wasn't it? Everyone was affected by the Form of the Good in the same way, weren't they? If so, then he was a realist. He might have been a dualist, but dualists can be realists too.

And no, a realist is not one who fits your definition. A realist is simply one who believes in a mind-independent world that exists external to him--irrespective of whether he can perceive it or comprehend it or not.

I don't know if the Form of Good was or is real. I know that Plato believed it was, but that is hardly a perfect measure of reality. What's more I do not at all believe that the Form of Good affected everyone in the same way, though Plato may have believed they were.

I'm not going to argue over the meaning of a symbol, it's just silly.

1) If you're only point is that Plato is vulnerable to skepticism, then so? Every philosophy to date is vulnerable to skepticism of one kind or another.

My point is exactly that, that all philosohpies are vulnerable to skepticism and embracing any with the blind faith of the ultra-religious is foolish.

2) Actually, Plato disagreed with the whole notion of truth equating with experiential data. If you don't believe me, read the Theaetetus.[/quote]

Well... ok... I didn't say anything about that.

1) No, it becomes a wheelbarrow you're using to sit in. The Form doesn't change, irrespective of what you use it for.

Please define "chair" for me then, in a way that a wheelbarrow cannot possibly be a chair while not limiting "chairness" beyond the limits we put on it in our expierience in the real world?

2) It's based on the abstract (albeit more real) Form of chair, which you then conveniently use the term "chair" to pick out because it's handy. A wheelbarrow doesn't share the same Form (it has its own: wheelbarrowness). We know this because we all have access to the Forms in our minds, through the fact that our immortal souls were once acquainted with them, in Plato's account. We all know the difference between a chair and wheelbarrow because our souls intuit it, and we gradually relearn it through rational analysis.

So this "Form of Chair" exists independently from humans (without the human symbols, of course)? If so then I think we have a problem, because my understanding of the Form of Chair seems to be different from yours despite the fact that we are both observing the same natural phenomena. Describe for me the ways in which the Form of Wheelbarrow violates the Form of Chair. Absolutist statements about the nature of objects are absurd since a single object can possess multiple forms. A wheelbarrow can possess both the Form of Wheelbarrow and the Form of Chair.

A person who has never seen a chair or a wheelbarrow and knows nothing of the uses of either would have difficulty in guessing at the difference basd only on the form that their "souls intuit." After seeing a person sitting in a chair an alien, or even a human who has no experience with wheelbarrows might sit in the wheelbarrow thinking it was another chair. I believe that there is no inherent distinction between chair and wheelbarrow and that they only appear different to us because we associate them with a certain function within our symbol system. Can you in any way argue that you could not use a wheelbarrow for the same purpose as a chair?

What objective, empirical evidence to you use to support your system of morals? I hold that while there may be an objective moral code it is unknowable and that everything that humans use for moral guidance is the product of the human mind and not a map formed through the analysis of sense-data. I have not said that moral paralysis is the only viable option given the idea of individualized morals but I believe that acting without considering the effects of subjectivity is more dangerous than potentially acting in a limited immoral way.

It could always be Divinely Revealed to Charlton Heston on a big mountain.

It could always be Divinely Revealed to Charlton Heston on a big mountain.

I saw it happen, but I just don't trust my eyes. :)

I don't understand the significance of your being able to envision a perosn who believes he is Magneto, but I'll say this, you can say that by attempting to blow up the Federal Reserve, the person who believes he is Magneto is acting in a way inconsistent with your morality, and so, from your point of view immoral, but you cannot say that his actions are universally immoral because it is as likely that his morals match objective morality and yours do not.

This relies on the assumption that there is no universal "immoral" in a given case.

As opposed to my "immoral" may not be universally correct, which is a valid argument, my example before with pythagoras was that he managed to find the universal in a system (mathematical), demonstrating that finding universals is at least possible, even if not possible in all cases (other than maybe dumb luck falling in the right place) due to perception restraints. Take gravity though, as you mentioned before about Newton, the question then goes onto "did Einstein finally perceive gravity universally correct, or is there still errors in his perception".

Through Plato and Aristotle (and later contemparies Augustine/Aquinas et al) we have been driven by the desire to find answers to questions, even questions such as 'chairness' (although post modernism has stunted that, but thats a different story) and though we may never find those answers, or it may take us thousands/millions of years (maybe even requiring further evolution of the human brain), it doesn't necessarily write off the possibility that the answer is out there.

This relies on the assumption that there is no universal "immoral" in a given case.

As opposed to my "immoral" may not be universally correct, which is a valid argument, my example before with pythagoras was that he managed to find the universal in a system (mathematical), demonstrating that finding universals is at least possible, even if not possible in all cases (other than maybe dumb luck falling in the right place) due to perception restraints. Take gravity though, as you mentioned before about Newton, the question then goes onto "did Einstein finally perceive gravity universally correct, or is there still errors in his perception".

Through Plato and Aristotle (and later contemparies Augustine/Aquinas et al) we have been driven by the desire to find answers to questions, even questions such as 'chairness' (although post modernism has stunted that, but thats a different story) and though we may never find those answers, or it may take us thousands/millions of years (maybe even requiring further evolution of the human brain), it doesn't necessarily write off the possibility that the answer is out there.

I agree with you. I'm generally a futurist and believe that given enough time humanity will discover everything that can be discovered, I just believe that there is some in the universe that is truly unknowable.

Have you read, or do you know, anything about the future evolution of the human brain as predicted by Timothy Leary and others?

I agree with you. I'm generally a futurist and believe that given enough time humanity will discover everything that can be discovered, I just believe that there is some in the universe that is truly unknowable.

yeah morality is a tough one, it would probably require you to have omniscience per se so that you know every single factor intrinsically.

I don't think Magneto made too great an example, i'm suprised more people never realised, Magneto is the "Zionist" leader of the mutants, one who thinks there is no action too far to establish a nation/protection of his people (only in his case, his people are mutants, not jews, but he borrows on his jewish past to fuel his "Mutantist" drive). But this perception only drives the argument that he makes a bad example, Apocalypse perhaps would be a better example for an argument of universally incorrect morals.

Have you read, or do you know, anything about the future evolution of the human brain as predicted by Timothy Leary and others?

Not Leary's, I've read some, not a great deal though.

I suppose I shouldn't use the word evolution, as I'm told evolution requires an alteration in the dna code and amino acid system (ie you are no longer human), whereas what I'm referring to is probably best described as beneficial adaptation.

yeah morality is a tough one, it would probably require you to have omniscience per se so that you know every single factor intrinsically.

I don't think Magneto made too great an example, i'm suprised more people never realised, Magneto is the "Zionist" leader of the mutants, one who thinks there is no action too far to establish a nation/protection of his people (only in his case, his people are mutants, not jews, but he borrows on his jewish past to fuel his "Mutantist" drive). But this perception only drives the argument that he makes a bad example, Apocalypse perhaps?

My knowledge of the X-men series is severly limited so I couldn't really carry on a conversation using it as metaphor.

Not Leary's, I've read some, not a great deal though.

I suppose I shouldn't use the word evolution, as I'm told evolution requires an alteration in the dna code and amino acid system (ie you are no longer human), whereas what I'm referring to is probably best described as beneficial adaptation.

I strongly, strongly, recommend that you pick up any non-fiction Robert Anton Wilson has written. I think you will find it fascinating if not life changing. He deals a lot with Leary's Eight Circuit model of the human brain which includes 4 "antique" circuits which govern the actions of most humans and 4 "futuristic" circuits which will guide human action in the future as they begin to become present in more and more people. If I was to name a title I'd say Prometheus Rising is probably the best single book to read on the subject, but if you're like me you won't be able to stop there.

Also, pick up a copy of Illuminatus! and Schrodinger's Cat, also by RAWilson and read them after reading Prometheus Rising, they'll be the best novels you've ever read.

bump to prevent thread death.

Communism has been seen as the utopian goal of human society for thousands of years, including by Jesus. The one argument people always mention is that communism is so impractical it cannot exist in real life. I usually tell them to go look at an ant hive. The most successful species on Earth are also completely and utterly, communist. So you can looks at it in one of two ways, either one days ants will become smart enough to take over or one day humans will become smart enough to become communist. :)

Communism has been seen as the utopian goal of human society for thousands of years, including by Jesus. The one argument people always mention is that communism is so impractical it cannot exist in real life. I usually tell them to go look at an ant hive. The most successful species on Earth are also completely and utterly, communist. So you can looks at it in one of two ways, either one days ants will become smart enough to take over or one day humans will become smart enough to become communist.

There was nothing communist about God or Jesus, their system was probably more national socialism than anything else, which is a slightly right of centre policy, where it is realistic work effort that rewards you rather than the intrinsic profit making of capitalism. The society is one where each person starts on the same foot and is rewarded for their real actions rather than along some profit margin.

And national socialism did work, a little too well :p

There was nothing communist about God or Jesus, their system was probably more national socialism than anything else, which is a slightly right of centre policy, where it is realistic work effort that rewards you rather than the intrinsic profit making of capitalism. The society is one where each person starts on the same foot and is rewarded for their real actions rather than along some profit margin.

And national socialism did work, a little too well :p

I have always thought of National Socialist policies more akin to those of the post-war labor government - you know mixed economy with direct government controls on labor.

The only difference was the National Socialists got rid of the vote and were a little more enthused by anti-semitism. Apart from than, not much to choose between them. (You know Atlee would have got round to camps eventually, he'd already decided to keep national service and tell everyone where they could work, he was also quite keen on locking up homosexuals too.)

Communism has been seen as the utopian goal of human society for thousands of years, including by Jesus. The one argument people always mention is that communism is so impractical it cannot exist in real life. I usually tell them to go look at an ant hive. The most successful species on Earth are also completely and utterly, communist. So you can looks at it in one of two ways, either one days ants will become smart enough to take over or one day humans will become smart enough to become communist. :)

Your knowledge of ants seems to be a little flawed. Ants are unthinking, and as such are the equivilent of mental slaves in human terms. Ants are entirely autonomic and have no similarities in terms of brain function to humans. Ants will never become intelligent because it will never be benificial to their survive and humans will never become like ants because it would require devolution of our higher brain functions. What's more, ants aren't even remotely communistic in their "social" organizations, if they can be called that. A hive acts more like a single organism than an autonomous collective or any other communist organization. Ants, like bees, use a collectiving thinking, market-like system to determine group action. If anything, ants are the most capitalistic of animals aside from humans.

Your knowledge of ants seems to be a little flawed. Ants are unthinking, and as such are the equivilent of mental slaves in human terms. Ants are entirely autonomic and have no similarities in terms of brain function to humans. Ants will never become intelligent because it will never be benificial to their survive and humans will never become like ants because it would require devolution of our higher brain functions. What's more, ants aren't even remotely communistic in their "social" organizations, if they can be called that. A hive acts more like a single organism than an autonomous collective or any other communist organization. Ants, like bees, use a collectiving thinking, market-like system to determine group action. If anything, ants are the most capitalistic of animals aside from humans.
unthinkingness isn't the key difference, though. even ants are simply selfless or altruistic by nature, because they still function as 100% selfish creatures. the reason they "cooperate" is because they are genetically designed in such a way that the hive structure is the best path for each individual, selfishly speaking.

i'll try to give a basic explanation, feel free to ignore it if you are bored by science...

human beings receive equal amounts of genetic information from their parents, with each parent giving us half of their genetic material. we are 50% related to each of our siblings, and 50% related to any children we produce.

ants, however, work very differently. male ants have only half as much genetic material as female ants, and when they make offspring they pass on 100% of their own genetic material. all ants in a colony are female ants (males do not remain in the colony), so they all got 100% of their father's DNA and 50% of their mother's. the Queen is the mother of all workers in teh colony, and she will mate one time per season (so all the ants in the colony will have the same father), and this means that each worker ant is actually 75% related to all her sisters. however, each worker would only be 50% related to any offspring she produced, because she would only get to pass on 50% of her genetic material to those offspring. this means that if she wants to get her genes into the next generation it is actually a better idea for her to stay in the colony and help rear sisters than it would be for her to mate individually and produce her own young.

Queens and males are special cases that have some weird stuff going on, so i won't bore you with that part, but i hope this clears up why ants seem to be selfless and communal...they actually are being just as selfish and individualistic as every other successful organism on Earth.

I have a question concerning Socialism..

Is there enough resources for everybody in the world to be distributed equally?

I have a question concerning Socialism..

Is there enough resources for everybody in the world to be distributed equally?
not really. the optimal carrying capacity for the Earth is 2 billion population, based on a European standard of living for everyone and sustainable use of natural resources. to support all humans currently on this planet with a modest European standard of living would be completely impossible, and to try would decimate natural resources.

Heh. good answer. :)

I don't see the link between the amount of resources and equal sharing.
If you have 10 items to distribute equaly to 10 people, you give 1 to each.
If you have 100 items, you give 10 to each.
The amount does not make it possible or impossible to distribute equaly.

Note: socialism isn't about distributing equaly anyway, but more about having equal rights.

I'd rather live in an intresting world that has a lot of bad stuff going on than a boring, completely homogonised world where we all act the same.

Imagine (the song) sends a shiver up my spine.

I'd rather live in an intresting world that has a lot of bad stuff going on than a boring, completely homogonised world where we all act the same.

Imagine (the song) sends a shiver up my spine.You make a good point, but I'd rather take over your nation on NS comfortably installed behind my computer while smoking a big fatty, than actually moving my ass to war, jumping into the mud and everything.

There is no "morally-superior" system. Any system can be exploited and manipulated for personal gain. The concept of communism is the brotherhood ideal that will never work (because of selfish human nature), and the idea of a pure capitalism that does not help the unfortunate is morally bankrupt.

The system that works will always be a mix of the two.

And those who say that the tramp on the street shouldn't be helped by the government because it is his own fault:

1. How do you know how he got there?
2. If he did make a mistake that put him in that position, does that mean we should condemn him? Have you never made a mistake?

That's the trouble with this place. I've just come back from a period of volunteer work in Africa, and the difference is there, they all look after each other, because they all (well, most of them) live in poverty. Yet in the West, no one has any sympathy for the poor because there's so few of them, people assume it's their fault.

One of the first things someone said to me when I told them where I had been was, "That's real poverty, there's no real poverty in Britain." Er, yes there is, it's just different, that's all. People in Africa earn very little, but their living costs are also much lower, so they get by (I don't believe, btw, that they should merely be able to "get by") - but the living costs in the UK are much much higher, so you don't have to have an weekly salary of only $5 to be poor. The difference is that poor people in Britain are more likely to get free education and free healthcare. That's the minimum anyone should get off the state.

Greetings

When people become happy with what they have,it don´t matter to them what it is called Capitalism or Socialism.And if they practise meditation they really don´t care.Ciao

not really. the optimal carrying capacity for the Earth is 2 billion population, based on a European standard of living for everyone and sustainable use of natural resources. to support all humans currently on this planet with a modest European standard of living would be completely impossible, and to try would decimate natural resources.

Asking the question, "can everything be divided equally?" is really non-sensible. We have 1000 people, can this pizza be divided equally? Um, yes.

I would argue that if the entire planet had a European standard of living, we would probably find alternative resources faster. Are you saying it is impossible for third world countries to ever reach the current standard of living in developed countries?

Are you saying it is impossible for third world countries to ever reach the current standard of living in developed countries?

No. It's a zero-sum equation. Third-world countries COULD have a large middle class and an average standard of living equivelant to one of today's developed countries, but only if there was some slack given somewhere else along the line (for them to get richer, someone else has to get poorer - environmentally, financially, or some other form).

not really. the optimal carrying capacity for the Earth is 2 billion population, based on a European standard of living for everyone and sustainable use of natural resources. to support all humans currently on this planet with a modest European standard of living would be completely impossible, and to try would decimate natural resources.

Well this is a bit of a problem, because for carrying capacity to be an accurate estimate of the ideal population we need to know at what level of opulance people need to live. At the level of American opulance we have far too many people for the Earth to support if everyone used as much reasources as the average American, but at the poverty level (that is the minimum resource use that keeps a person alive) the Earth could support as many as 30 billion people. For sustainable use, 2 billion is a good number, but keeping populations from growing is no easy task.

*sigh*

I fear that this post-modern virus is terminal, nevertheless, I'll do what I can to purge it.

Alright, allow me if you will to ever-so-briefly synthesize our collective arguments, if for no other reason than because our posts are getting so unwieldy. Now, you make the claim that Morality is a relative notion, based purely in commonly constructed conceptual inferences (pardon the alliteration). Now, just going off the top of my head, there are three possible justifications you can use to back this up:

1) Metaphysical anti-realism. If the world is completely mind-dependent, then it follows that whatever we derive from that world will also be completely mind-dependent. Morality is something we derive from the world. Ergo, morality is mind-dependent. Following further, as every person in such a schema literally creates their own world, then it follows that everyone's morality is a "best", because it best fits whatever ideal happens to be espoused by the mind that created it.

The problem, however, is recognized on both sides of the debate: no argument presented has been able to establish that a mind-independent world doesn't exist. As such, both sides have abandoned this possibility.

2) Solipsism. This is a somewhat more radical variant of anti-realism, holding that you are the only person whom exists, and all reality is merely a construction of the mind. In such a world, it follows that morality would be mind-dependent, and therefore whatever the mind said was moral likely would be.

While this is a valid possibility, it does not seem to be adopted by either side of the debate. OE's continued use of social constructions (which inherently imply an other person), and my metaphysical realism, seem to rule out this being a seriously-defended possibility.

3) An Extreme Kantian view. In this view, while there might or might not be an external world, there certainly are multiple individuals. However, because of skeptical considerations about what we can know about the world, all we can say for certain is that we have (ideally) a coherence theory of how the world works, one that is causally derived partly from external phenomena (which might or might not be real), and partly through our own mental construction of that world. The upshot, however, is that because it is possible that a theory of the world can be at once both coherent and untrue, and because each person conceives of the world on his own, then it is possible that there are multiple versions of how the world works, and supposing all of them to be equally coherent, then they are all equally likely to be true.

This seems, in a nutshell, to be the position you are arguing, OE. Therefore, if I am to succeed, I need to prove several different points

1) I need to either prove or at least provide strong evidence for the existence of an independent world.
2) I need to either prove or provide strong evidence for why the argument you present does not hold to the standard that you yourself espoused, one that says "internal consistency is the only thing necessary for a philosophy to maintain its position among the "as likely to be true" conceptions of the world." More simply, if I can point out inconsistencies within your argument, then your own idea does not meet your own standard.

Okay, then, to begin:

Problem #1 with Extreme Kantian viewpoint: Independent world exists based on inferential data.

Now, how do I guess that an independent universe must exist? A two-step argument:

1a) The universe must be constructed in such a way as to allow minds. This might seem trite, but actually it is quite significant. If we were to say, for example, that the universe is such that it allows minds to exist as their own first cause, then we can just as easily postulate morality as it's own first cause as well, and that is detrimental to the relativist viewpoint that you espouse, because it is entirely dependent upon construing morality as a mind-dependent phenomena (something we write into our experience of the world ourselves, and not something that exists independently). So, the only alternative is to assume that a universe exists that in itself has causal agency.

Now, what the hell did I just say? Well, basically I said that we have two ways of viewing the universe. On the one hand, a universe supports and causes the conditions by which minds come about. In the other, minds cause themselves. The reason why the former is better than the latter is because, for the purposes of this argument, if we were to assume that minds were self-causing, we could just as easily conceive of morality as being self-causing as well. But the relativist doesn't want to conceive of morality as self-causing, because relativist theory as described by OE depends on morality being caused purely by mental construction. If we didn't simply decide what was moral or ethical, then we would be forced to assume that it was (or at least could be) external to us, which is contrary to the spirit of relativism.

As a result, even from the relativists own presuppositions, we are forced to conclude that there must be some universe out there, even if we don't necessarily know what that universe is actually like. That brings me to the second half of Problem 1:

1b) We all get common inferences from this world. How do I know this? Well, because we all seem to have a common conceptual schema for understanding the universe that we see, and this common conceptual schema seems to match closely with our perceptions. An example might help.

Let's say that I was an anthropologist trying to talk to a group of heretofore unknown native people in some remote jungle. Trying to get a sense of how they speak, I point at a rabbit and say "Rabbit." They follow my line of sight, get a bead on the rabbit, and say "Gavagai". Then the Rabbit hops elsewhere. Trying to be sure, I point at the rabbit again and say "Gavagai?", at which point they confirm by saying "Gavagai." As such, most rational people would say that I now know a relation between our languages: Rabbit=Gavagai.

Oh, but wait, there is a problem to this account, because if true, it wreaks havoc with the relativist conception as espoused by you, OE. You see, if it were true that our understanding of a lingual term is based purely on a construction of a coherent theory of understanding built purely in our minds, then it would highly likely that each of us would construct not just our own unique language, but our own unique conceptual schema as well: a world in which objects are named not by their status as objects, but by their positioning within a series of motions (thus, a rabbit at rest might be "Gavagai", whereas a rabbit moving in a very precise manner might be "Gavagaa", a rabbit sitting on it's haunches might be "Gavagab", etc.) for example. In short, if it were true that we all constructed our own world-view, then we would have what Quine calls the "Indeterminacy of Language", or in more base language, it would be impossible for anyone to translate what anyone else is saying, because each person would be trying to coalesce two incompatible understandings of how the world is and how to name objects in it.

But the problem is, we do translate what each other is saying, and we do it all the time. When I ask my friend to pass the ketchup, I don't need to concern myself that in his different world-view, ketchup is a term used only to describe the bottle filled with tomato-based product at only a single instance in space-time, and never to be used again. I simply ask him, and he does it. This is strong, indeed probably conclusive evidence that we do in fact use the same conceptual schema. How then do we explain it? The only option that seems plausible is that we each get it from a common understanding of the same external world.

Objection 1: But we do have differing conceptual schemas, darnit! How else do you explain why land-diving is crazy to us and bravery to someone in Java?

Because differing social conventions and differing understanding of reality are two very different things, OE, and I suspect that this mistake is based on a confusion between two different functions of the verb 'to be.' When I say, for example, that "All unmarried men are bachelors," I make what is effectively the claim of definition: "Unmarried men=bachelors." However, when I say that "Land-diving is crazy," I am not making the claim that "Land-Diving=crazy." What I am making is a relational claim: that all people who do land-dive act in such a way as to fulfill an instance of what could be classified as crazy.

Now, what does that prove, anyway? Well, what it proves is that you can use the same word to talk both about identities (i.e. definitions), and relations (i.e. linking two independent and well-defined ideas together). Now, what you are doing is confusing the two. It should be fairly obvious that two people can disagree on which term between 'crazy' and 'bravery' best links with 'land-diving', and moreover, this doesn't affect any kind of metaphysical underpinning, because at all points in the debate we all agree what the terms 'crazy,' 'bravery,' and 'land-diving' refer to. However, with a definition, under no circumstances could a person plausibly argue that an unmarried man is not the same thing as a bachelor without disagreeing about what the terms 'unmarried man' and 'bachelor' refer to. That's the distinction. Unfortunately, every instance you have brought up, OE, is an instance where we disagree about relational terms, not defining terms. In all cases, we have a common understanding of what the terms mean, and how they refer to real objects, actions, or ideas in the real world.

This is what I meant when I said that you haven't provided an instance wherein "Schnie ist weist" =/= "Snow is white.", and why you would have to if you seriously want to challenge the idea that we commonly refer to ideas and objects in the world. The problem, however, is that you really can't, because to say so just isn't empirically justified.

Objection 2: You could have the same conceptual schema derived from two different mental constructions purely by coincidence.

True, but it would be stretching the laws of probability to the breaking point and beyond just to presume it between you and I, let alone the common conceptual schema that seems to exist between billions of people. The only serious way to explain how a common conceptual framework, which empirically seems to exist, is to assume that some external mechanism is commonly causing all of us to believe it.

Problem #2: Reason is a part of the system. In your arguments against my point, you've asked again and again for empirical justification for the fact that a) a mind-independent world exists, and b) morality exists. In point of fact, you've gone so far as to try to deny me the ability to use rational analysis as part of my system. The problem, however, is inconsistency on your part: rational analysis, that very faculty you seek to deny me, is the very thing used to construct the web of understanding in your schema. When you look for "internal consistency" within your own coherence theory of the world, you aren't using empirical observation of it to define this relationship (there's nothing inherent in an empirical experience that says that something can't be both pink and white simultaneously, or 6' tall and 5' tall at the same time, etc.), you're using reason and a priori logic to determine whether they fit with all of your other experiences. So that being the case, how can you at once use them in your system, and then deny me the right to use the very same things to justify an external world or an external morality? That leads me to Problem 3:

Problem 3: Logically, Extreme Kantian view falls apart. Why? Well, you continuously ask me to provide absolute, unconditional proof that there is an external morality or world before you will believe it, and absent that evidence, it is your conclusion that you are forced to accept the possibility that you are wrong in how you've conceived the world, and therefore you are hesitant to apply that moral theory based on that possibly-flawed epistemology. I usually reply that such evidence is impossible, at least a posteriori, possibly a priori as well. This is usually the part where you do a little victory jig.

But consider, however, the fact that your standard was "internal consistency." At this point, I have to ask, is your own system all that internally consistent? I would have to conclude that it is not, because the same skeptical considerations that lead you to reject the certainty of your understanding with respect to the external world, or possibly the external world completely, are the very same skeptical considerations that would lead you to reject the existence of other minds and everything else external to you. In short, rigorously applied, your own standard would collapse your theory into the solipsism you denigrate. On the other hand, any pragmatic stop measure used to halt the spread of skepticism in your thinking at the existence of other minds could also be used to drive out skepticism about the external world and our understanding of it. In short, you seem to want it both ways: you want on the one hand to use skepticism to prevent me from arguing for knowledge of the external world, but you don't want to accept the solipsism that develops from any rigorous application of your very own skepticism.

My position, on the other hand (call it the Soft Kantian view), doesn't have that problem. The real world exists, although it is possible that we don't understand it in the way it really is. Nevertheless, despite the fact that we might not conceptualize it correctly, we all conceptualize it in basically the same way, with our skirmishing merely over the details. This common conception allows us to infer common faculties and common responses. Common faculties and common responses are sufficient to ground a moral code that applies to all people. As such, I'd have to say that my system really is better than yours, even by your own standard.

Now, I've probably just blown everyone's minds and broken at least two keyboards, so I'll merely make a few points where I think you went very wrong, OE.


The "Golden Rules" as you seem to be describing only tells you whether your actions are moral within your individual set of beliefs, it can tell you nothing about the relation between those beliefs and the objective moral code that may or may not exist independent of humanity. Rational analysis can shed light on the adherence of an action to a given set of morals, but cannot in any way demonstrate the accuracy of the moral code used for the judgments.


Partly correct. The "Golden Rule" tells me whether actions are moral or not for everyone that shares my conception of reality. To give an example, if it were true that your conception of reality has a reversal of the pain/pleasure qualia (what feels pleasurable to me feels painful to you in inverse proportion), then it would indeed be immoral for me to act in such a way as to bring you pleasure, because in fact I would be deliberately harming you. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out above, strong evidence exists that few if any people have this inversed qualia function of pain and pleasure in the same action as another. People might disagree about exactly how much pain or pleasure they get from any given act, but it would be absurd to suggest that someone might actually automatically suffer from every act that brings me pleasure.

Well, I think that your first criteria is reasonable, but the other two are not. The necessity of treating rational beings as ends rather than means is an aspect of your morality and is not supported by every moral system, nor is there any evidence for it in the existential world. The third is unreasonable because it assumes that there is a universal standard of justice. I think it is clear that there is not when you consider, for instance, people who eat meat and consider it perfectly acceptable as opposed to vegitarians who feel it unjust to kill any animal (but who have no problem with killing plants). Justice is a measure of conherence with a system of rules such as laws or morals, it cannot be used to measure the righteousness of the system it itself is a part of.

I would further argue that from Hitler's point of view your criteria could be met. Hitler not only wanted the non-existence of Jews to be a universal law, he took steps to enforce the law. Hitler could easily have argued that Jews were neither human nor rational and could therefor justify using and even killing them. If the non-existence of Jews became a universal law then "justice" would be served if the law was enforced as Hitler attemted. Now from your or my point of view none of the three criteria could be met, but it was not our action and not our intention, so we cannot judge it using our system of morals.


Okay, you're just begging the question. Yes, it's based on a universal standard of means and ends, but that's exactly what I'm arguing exists. Additionally, no, no, no, no. Hitler's view could never be correlated with the universal laws that I described, because they all work concurrently. In a perfectly just hypothetical society, they would only create those rules that you would will be made into a universal law, and those laws would only be those that treat people as ends in and of themselves. Does genocide treat people as an end in itself? Not just no, but hell no. Were the Jews people? Our understanding of the term people suggests that they definitely fit the description. All the evidence that we got from the world suggested that they fit that definition. It was only a few people acting irrationally and refusing to accept what was right in front of their faces that disagreed, and both of us would be hard-pressed to conclude that their web of understanding was coherent: "All things that fit this definition are people. . .except them, because. . .uh. . .because we said so, and they're evil, and they want to take Germany away from you!" Yes, very coherent, that view.


I think it important to stress the fact that we are not all affected in the same way by our experience, though we are mostly similar in our world-view there are important differences. Have you ever wondered why nearly everyone can identify a chair the same way, but nearly no one identifies morality in the same way? I think that the reason is that the chair has a physical existence which we observe in a concrete way, through sight and feel, while morality exists only, or primarily within our minds and that any morality that exists independent of humanity is of a non-observable nature.
I hold that the reason we see such variance in the morals that have arisen on this planet is because our connection with objective morality is limited at best, nonexistent at worst.

Actually, I think it's just because morality is abstract, while a chair is concrete. Nevertheless, just because something is abstract doesn't mean it doesn't exist. The concept of 'chair' is abstract, but no one would suggest that it doesn't exist and that therefore you can't have one in your head.



I don't understand the significance of your being able to envision a perosn who believes he is Magneto, but I'll say this, you can say that by attempting to blow up the Federal Reserve, the person who believes he is Magneto is acting in a way inconsistent with your morality, and so, from your point of view immoral, but you cannot say that his actions are universally immoral because it is as likely that his morals match objective morality and yours do not.

The significance was that you were suggesting that any theory is valid so long as it is coherent. I'm suggesting that it's intuitively ridiculous. A loony could come up with a coherent system of understanding, and yet still be a loony. We can tell if he's a loony if his web of understanding differs markedly from the web of understanding that most stable, rational, and well-adjusted individuals come up with: if it does, then he's eccentric. If it doesn't, then he's irrational.


The point is that there existed a moral tradition different from the one we now hold which was replaced by ours without the advent of any new evidence. The change took place primarily because society as a conherent whole decided that it was going to change. The majority of people made the transistion smoothly, (over the generation gap, not individuals) but others stayed in the old tradition. We have no reason to believe that social morals will not change again, and we have no reason to believe that current social morals are a more accurate representation of universal morals. Not equally correct, equally moral, because their universe is constructed differently. Each person acts on the morals he carries within him, not on morals that exist outside him, though his internal morals may be engineered to mirror universal morals as best as possible. Corruptions of universal morality are inevitable, but we cannot tell where they have occurred, so the classic racist is as likely to carry an accurate representation of universal morals as you or I.


Again, absolutely not. We always had a universal morality: the Golden Rule. History is measured, however, not by the change from one system of morality to the next, but by the gradual extinction of outdated, irrational reasons why the Golden Rule should not apply to one group of people or another.



Because our experiences are much the same as the experiences of others on the other side of the world translation of our symbols into their symbols and the reverse is generally possible, but in some cases there exist symbols which are untranslatable. Some words have no equivilents in other languages, and many conceptions (especially of the supernatural, the moral, and the divine) are nearly or entirely impossible to explain in languages other than those used in their origin. For instance, try to find a comprehensive description of the Hindu God Brahma/n in English. The concept of Brahma and Brahman, while inately understood by anyone who has heard it explained in Hindi, is extremely difficult to understand when explained in English because there are no English symbols (words) to describe the concepts described in Hindi.


So long as we can still share the same conceptual understanding, then Gavagai/Brahma is just as good as Rabbit/Brahma. You're confusing the translateability of words for the compatibility of conceptual webs.


In answer to your idea about each person coming up with their own individual reality, I refer you back to what I said about socialization for the purpose of cohesive social function. A society could not function if each individual spoke its own language and had its own morality and religion, so it indoctrinates its young to use the same symbols as the other members of its social group. Even within large social groups smaller sections can be seen as cohesive wholes. For instance, all native English speakers are part of the same symbolic social group, but there are many dialects, some of which are very different. A Posh accent is almost indecipherable to a person from Texas, and vice versa, despite the fact that they both speak "English." Each person has his own manner of speaking, and his own word-symbols he uses frequently. In essense each person (and each sub-culture) individualizes their language to some degree to provide a distinguishable border and difference between Texans and Londoners.


If you take your claim seriously, socialization would be impossible. If my web of understanding is radically different and fundamentally incompatible with yours, then it doesn't matter which culture you come from, because same or different, everything you say will be absolute gibberish to me.


The statement, "Snow is white" is translatable because it refers to a specific natural phenomena, but the statement "God is one" is not translatable into every language because the concept "God" is different in many symbol systems. So while some aspects of reality can be traslated from symbol system to symbol system, those aspects of reality which are not observable can often not be translated, and can never be translated perfectly.


Your whole theory depends on a skeptical premise that we can't know what natural phenomena is really like, and that we each construct our worldview in our own unique way, so it's irrelevant besides. You contradict your own theory here. Twice.


Please define "chair" for me then, in a way that a wheelbarrow cannot possibly be a chair while not limiting "chairness" beyond the limits we put on it in our expierience in the real world?

So this "Form of Chair" exists independently from humans (without the human symbols, of course)? If so then I think we have a problem, because my understanding of the Form of Chair seems to be different from yours despite the fact that we are both observing the same natural phenomena. Describe for me the ways in which the Form of Wheelbarrow violates the Form of Chair. Absolutist statements about the nature of objects are absurd since a single object can possess multiple forms. A wheelbarrow can possess both the Form of Wheelbarrow and the Form of Chair.

A person who has never seen a chair or a wheelbarrow and knows nothing of the uses of either would have difficulty in guessing at the difference basd only on the form that their "souls intuit." After seeing a person sitting in a chair an alien, or even a human who has no experience with wheelbarrows might sit in the wheelbarrow thinking it was another chair. I believe that there is no inherent distinction between chair and wheelbarrow and that they only appear different to us because we associate them with a certain function within our symbol system. Can you in any way argue that you could not use a wheelbarrow for the same purpose as a chair?

1) Well, I've never seen a Pegasus either, and I don't know anything about it's uses, but I still have a concept of one, don't I? If that's the case, then where did it come from? According to Plato, my soul intuited it from my pre-existing understanding of the Form of Pegasusness. Even if no Pegasus ever did or ever will exist, the Form of it still does.

2) If you're looking for definitions, you've come to the wrong place if you're looking at Plato. He would say the reason why two chairs, even one's radically different chairs, are still chairs is because they partake of the same metaphysical Form. A wheelbarrow is a wheelbarrow not because it has a different function (you can sit in either), or because it has a different structure (you could make a chair that superficially looks like a wheelbarrow), but because of the Form it partakes in. Wheelbarrows have their own Forms, and they are different from Chairs. It's not the definition that seperates them in our minds; it's a prior understanding of a pre-existing and more real ontological seperation between the two that our reason tells us must be there.

3) How could you possibly ask me to give an empirical understanding of a Platonic Form, dude? That's like asking me to hand you a super-string: each is simply an ontological posit predicted by rational means (on the one hand, logical deduction, and on the other mathematical analysis).

You might want to sit down for this, but: not every thinker in Western Philosophy was an empiricist. Plato was one of their number.

I agree that these posts are getting out of control, but I can't think of a better way to do things.

*sigh*

I fear that this post-modern virus is terminal, nevertheless, I'll do what I can to purge it.

Alright, allow me if you will to ever-so-briefly synthesize our collective arguments, if for no other reason than because our posts are getting so unwieldy. Now, you make the claim that Morality is a relative notion, based purely in commonly constructed conceptual inferences (pardon the alliteration). Now, just going off the top of my head, there are three possible justifications you can use to back this up:

I don't think your characterization of my positions is quite accurate. Each person has the ability to create a system of symbols to represent the players in their world-model, which mirrors the existential universe to a greater or lesser degree, including the creation of individual morals (whether for practical purposes [no murder, no procreation outside of wedlock {not all animals follow this, humans do because they nurture their young, all species who nurture their young have life-partnerships, others do not} for social stability and the like] or for personal stability [there is a God who cares about me] or for an escape from death [God will give me life after death]). The majority of people are never given the opportunity to exercise this ability. One of the goals of a society is to pass the conception of the world that it holds onto future generations through a process called socialization or acculturation. In essense what this means is that we raise our children to be like us because social coherence through a shared world-view is good for group survival. Acculturation is never entirely successful and most individuals have minor differences in their world-view, but for the most part everyone thinks the same way about the world, at the very least similar enough that
communication is possible.

So to sum up, there exists an objective, physical universe which humans are part of, but our connection to that universe is limited by our sensory acuteness and by the symbol systems and paradigm based filters. Given a lifetime of experience any human mind could form its own symbol system and be a functional organism, but the process is slow and ineffecient. For the good of the species, and specifically for the good of individual cultures, societies indoctrinate their young into the world-view of that culture, which takes significantly less time. So any two people in the same society are likely to have very similar world-views and symbol systems while two people in different societies are likely to have very different world-views and symbols systems, though there are some consistencies. It is my position that we can all agree on the consistencies, "the sky is blue," and the like, but when it comes to our disagreements we have no evidence to suggest that any one person, or culture, is closer to the truth than any other.

1) Metaphysical anti-realism. If the world is completely mind-Adependent, then it follows that whatever we derive from that world will also be completely mind-dependent. Morality is something we derive from the world. Ergo, morality is mind-dependent. Following further, as every person in such a schema literally creates their own world, then it follows that everyone's morality is a "best", because it best fits whatever ideal happens to be espoused by the mind that created it.

I don't disagree with your analysis, except that I have not said that the world is mind-dependent, only that our interactions with it are. We do not make our decisions based on the way the world is, we make our decisions based on the way we think the world is. There is no better example of this than what we call dillusional people. The world-model they carry in their head is significantly different from the one we carry in our heads. The only reason we can be so convinced that they're crazy and not us is because so many people agree with us and not them. A person with psychotic dillusions might act as though people were chasing him everywhere he went when it is plain to see that there is no one there because his world (the one inside his head, where he actually lives, though it is not where his physical body resides) is not an accurate representation of the physical universe.

The problem, however, is recognized on both sides of the debate: no argument presented has been able to establish that a mind-independent world doesn't exist. As such, both sides have abandoned this possibility.

Agreed.

2) Solipsism. This is a somewhat more radical variant of anti-realism, holding that you are the only person whom exists, and all reality is merely a construction of the mind. In such a world, it follows that morality would be mind-dependent, and therefore whatever the mind said was moral likely would be.

Solipsism is somewhat like Agnosticism in that it does not say, necessary, that there is no universe and that self-consciousness is the only given, but that it is impossible to know beyond a doubt whether there exists a universe outside of the self. In the face of significant evidence to the contrary (if it is to be believed) I think this viewpoint is hyper-rationalist to the point of absurdity. Even if it is true it in no way affects the way we live our lives.

While this is a valid possibility, it does not seem to be adopted by either side of the debate. OE's continued use of social constructions (which inherently imply an other person), and my metaphysical realism, seem to rule out this being a seriously-defended possibility.

Agreed.

3) An Extreme Kantian view. In this view, while there might or might not be an external world, there certainly are multiple individuals. However, because of skeptical considerations about what we can know about the world, all we can say for certain is that we have (ideally) a coherence theory of how the world works, one that is causally derived partly from external phenomena (which might or might not be real), and partly through our own mental construction of that world. The upshot, however, is that because it is possible that a theory of the world can be at once both coherent and untrue, and because each person conceives of the world on his own, then it is possible that there are multiple versions of how the world works, and supposing all of them to be equally coherent, then they are all equally likely to be true.

This seems, in a nutshell, to be the position you are arguing, OE. Therefore, if I am to succeed, I need to prove several different points

I large part, yes, this is what I'm arguing. I suppose there's not much for me to do here besides link you back to what I wrote at the beginning of this post.

1) I need to either prove or at least provide strong evidence for the existence of an independent world.
2) I need to either prove or provide strong evidence for why the argument you present does not hold to the standard that you yourself espoused, one that says "internal consistency is the only thing necessary for a philosophy to maintain its position among the "as likely to be true" conceptions of the world." More simply, if I can point out inconsistencies within your argument, then your own idea does not meet your own standard.

1) No, I am not disputing the existance of an independent world, only that our current and individual perceptions of it should be treated as entirely accurate.
2) Certainly, if you can find an inconsistency then my position should be either adapted or abandoned.

Okay, then, to begin:

Problem #1 with Extreme Kantian viewpoint: Independent world exists based on inferential data.

Now, how do I guess that an independent universe must exist? A two-step argument:

1a) The universe must be constructed in such a way as to allow minds. This might seem trite, but actually it is quite significant. If we were to say, for example, that the universe is such that it allows minds to exist as their own first cause, then we can just as easily postulate morality as it's own first cause as well, and that is detrimental to the relativist viewpoint that you espouse, because it is entirely dependent upon construing morality as a mind-dependent phenomena (something we write into our experience of the world ourselves, and not something that exists independently). So, the only alternative is to assume that a universe exists that in itself has causal agency.

Now here we run into a couple of problems. First, we have not established a universe which allows a mind to be its own cause. The question of universal, linear causality is a tough one with no strong evidence supporting either position yet discovered (by virtue of the fact that so much of the universe and its workings are unknown to us). If we postulate a universe that allows for the formation of new causal chains, that is to say a universe which allows for free will, then certain other conceptions need to be thrown out. The concept of Aristotelian linear logic is thrown into question when a given state does not necessary lead to another given state despite internal consistency of laws. In other words allowing for free will means that the universe is, on some level, chaotic, and simple linear logic fails us. On the other hand, if we do not allow for free will, linear logic applies and the universe acts as a massive Turing Engine with any given state leading inexorably to another state based on the internal laws of the system. In that case questions of morality become meaningless because all "decisions" are really just links is a predetermined causal chain. For the sake of argument (and because it is patently silly to argue in favor of universal causality) let us say that humans have free will. With that posit it can be assumed that every mind has some basis for its decision making process, otherwise all decisions would be essentially random or no decisions would be made at all. Each person creates, or inherits, a system of rules by which decisions can be made. "If A then do B" is a simple example of a moral contruction. If you percieve the universe (or your small part of it) to be in a specific state then follow a given course of action to achieve the "good" results desired. If nothing else the subjectivity of the concept of "good" suggests that any moral code dependent on the search for good and the escape from evil is inherently subjective. Social and moral evolution is primarily based on the defects and mutations each individual adds to the system of morality they inherit from their parents as well as some dramatic shifts by individuals able to construct their own world-views, either from birth or as the result of extreme events in their life. The three largest religions in the world (religions presenting a world-view, symbol system, and moral code all at once) are the result of the epiphanies of three, otherwise ordinary men. Little is known about the life of Joshua of Nazareth before he became Jesus of Nazareth after living for 30 years with the world-view of a Jewish carpenter, but after that dramatic mind-change Jesus came out the other side with a remarkable new symbol system of world-view, though he kept much of the morality of his previous view. Mohammed was a humble camel driver before he became the head prophet of the world second largest and fastest growing religion. Mohammed, like Jesus, presented people with a new and different symbol system and world-view, positing a single, omnipotent diety against the local dieties of the area. Before the Buddha was the Buddha he was a prince, an unusual man, but regular in his biology and world-view for the time and area. The story says that he was raised his whole life without ever seeing poverty or death (in essense he had the world-view of a small child) until one day he journeyed into the city (he had previously been kept in the palace) and saw that the life of the average person was filled with poverty and death, at which point his mind "quantum jumped" and created an entirely new system of beliefs at which point he immediately abandoned the life of opulance he had been acustomed to and set off to seek enlightenment and the escape from existential suffering. "All life is suffering" says Buddha, come with me and we will escape it. "All life is love" says Jesus, trust in me and you will live forever. Their views could not be more dissimilar, but the way in which they came to these conclusions is much the same as are the effects.

Also, if we allow mind to be its own self-cause it does not necessarily mean that morality can be its own self-cause, and even if we allow morality self-causality it does not necessary mean that it would be knowable if it existed in an objective, mind-independent way.

Now, what the hell did I just say? Well, basically I said that we have two ways of viewing the universe. On the one hand, a universe supports and causes the conditions by which minds come about. In the other, minds cause themselves. The reason why the former is better than the latter is because, for the purposes of this argument, if we were to assume that minds were self-causing, we could just as easily conceive of morality as being self-causing as well. But the relativist doesn't want to conceive of morality as self-causing, because relativist theory as described by OE depends on morality being caused purely by mental construction. If we didn't simply decide what was moral or ethical, then we would be forced to assume that it was (or at least could be) external to us, which is contrary to the spirit of relativism.

Not entirely true. Relativism says not that morality cannot exist objectively, but that we cannot know what that objective morality was if it did exist. I personally believe that morality is a construct of the human mind and nothing more, but that is not a weight bearing column in my argument. Following logically, if 99% of all people believe the same things about what we can call the physical universe, that is to say, we all agree that there is a chair in a room when we see it, what we call it irrespective, but no more than 40% or so of people (and most of those only believe by virtue of acculturation, not by personal revelation) agree on the subject of morality, and even within that 40% there is much dissent, can we not postulate that objective morality, if it exists, is still unknown to humanity as a whole? What is more, no two prophets of new systems of morality have come up with the same system independently, which suggests that even among those who are not subject to acculturization there is not agreement on the nature of reality, so it is not a matter of culture overriding personal observation.

As a result, even from the relativists own presuppositions, we are forced to conclude that there must be some universe out there, even if we don't necessarily know what that universe is actually like. That brings me to the second half of Problem 1:

I agree that there must be a universe of some sort out there (in theory, solipsists would have us believe differently) but hold that we do not know what it is like, and in some aspects, cannot know what it is like.

1b) We all get common inferences from this world. How do I know this? Well, because we all seem to have a common conceptual schema for understanding the universe that we see, and this common conceptual schema seems to match closely with our perceptions. An example might help.

To address this, our similar conceptual schemas are significantly the result of us being raised in similar cultural environments. Your or my conception of the universe is very different from the average person in other parts of the world and in other cultures. I must also reiterate my point about the similarities in conceptions about the physical world, but not the spiritual world, that is to say, we agree that the world is a certain way and that the objects within it behave a certain way, but in the same situation we would make different choices based on our individual or cultural morality.

Let's say that I was an anthropologist trying to talk to a group of heretofore unknown native people in some remote jungle. Trying to get a sense of how they speak, I point at a rabbit and say "Rabbit." They follow my line of sight, get a bead on the rabbit, and say "Gavagai". Then the Rabbit hops elsewhere. Trying to be sure, I point at the rabbit again and say "Gavagai?", at which point they confirm by saying "Gavagai." As such, most rational people would say that I now know a relation between our languages: Rabbit=Gavagai.

Right, you can determine a corrolation between your symbol for the physical phenomena of a rabbit with the symbol used by the unkown natives, but when you say "God" and can't point to anything, you have a problem. On top of that, even once you have become fluent in their language, or they in yours you are likely to have difficulties explaining the concept of God, and even if you do find the right words to make your concept understood you are unlikely to agree on the nature or existence of God at all.

Oh, but wait, there is a problem to this account, because if true, it wreaks havoc with the relativist conception as espoused by you, OE. You see, if it were true that our understanding of a lingual term is based purely on a construction of a coherent theory of understanding built purely in our minds, then it would highly likely that each of us would construct not just our own unique language, but our own unique conceptual schema as well: a world in which objects are named not by their status as objects, but by their positioning within a series of motions (thus, a rabbit at rest might be "Gavagai", whereas a rabbit moving in a very precise manner might be "Gavagaa", a rabbit sitting on it's haunches might be "Gavagab", etc.) for example. In short, if it were true that we all constructed our own world-view, then we would have what Quine calls the "Indeterminacy of Language", or in more base language, it would be impossible for anyone to translate what anyone else is saying, because each person would be trying to coalesce two incompatible understandings of how the world is and how to name objects in it.

It doesn't wreak havoc on anything, especially not in the ways you have described here. When you translate from one language to another you are never, or almost never (the only time you can is, for instance, translating from one branch of the Romance family to another) translate perfectly because the conceptual schema are slightly different based on individual experience and social beliefs. I feel as though I am repeating myself when I say that it is nearly as difficult to translate the language used to describe simple physical phenomena as it is to translate the language of metaphysics and morality. Especially in these areas, and often even in concrete areas of understanding translations are lacking in the nuances understood by native speakers.

The translation of words is not necessarily one-to-one as you seem to suggest here. It might be necessary to chart many words with seemingly the same single-word translation, though with further experience it may be possible to add other words to make the translations more clear. For instance, if you say "rabbit" and point to a rabbit and the native understands "rabbit at rest" and says "Gavagai" then you have established not that all rabbits are "Gavagai" but that perhaps that particular rabbit is named that, or perhaps that is the name for the species of rabbit, or "rabbit at rest" or maybe it is a one-to-one translation and it just means rabbit. The Inuit people of Alaska have over a hundred different words for snow, while we only have one. The Inuit have far greater experience with snow than we do, so it is not surprising that they are able to reckognize and catagorize more varieties than we are, but this does not mean that with proper translation it would be impossible to understand the nuances of the different means for "snow." Each occurance of "snow" would simply have to be qualified with other words like "falling" or "melting." The construction and grammar of the language are the primary hindrance here, not the conceptions behind them.

It is impossible for two individuals who speak different languages to communicate without a translator or a large amount of time to familiarize one person with the other's symbols. I cannot converse in French, but I could learn French, that is I could learn the symbol systems used by French people so that when I went to communicate with them I could present them with symbols they are familiar with. At the same time I might need to learn British English if I was to travel there because they use the same word-symbols to mean different things than we do here.

But the problem is, we do translate what each other is saying, and we do it all the time. When I ask my friend to pass the ketchup, I don't need to concern myself that in his different world-view, ketchup is a term used only to describe the bottle filled with tomato-based product at only a single instance in space-time, and never to be used again. I simply ask him, and he does it. This is strong, indeed probably conclusive evidence that we do in fact use the same conceptual schema. How then do we explain it? The only option that seems plausible is that we each get it from a common understanding of the same external world.

Using the word "ketchup" to refer only to a bottle of tomato-paste for a single instant in time would be ineffecient and absurd. Language is intended for communication. It is possible that your friend does have a slightly different idea of what "ketchup" means than you do, but the differences are so slight that you can function despite them. Just because two people's ideas are formed by experiences within the same spacial reality does not mean that their views of that reality will be the same. A good example of this is the pictures which can be viewed one way or another, like the one which is either two faces or a goblet. It is possible for a person to see one or the other, but not both at the same time. Shifting from one to the other is changing one's mind and world-view to represent the picture with a different symbol. It is also possible that when you present the picture to two different people they will each view it in a different way, despite the fact that they are observing the same physical phenomena. Common understanding is based, primarily, on common paradigm-based filters. The reason that two people might see the same thing first when they look at the picture is that they filter it through similar paradigms. The reason that your friend doesn't try to pass you only the ketchup and not the bottle when you asked only for the ketchup is that you both have the same paradigm that understands your meaning despite your lack of precise language.

Objection 1: But we do have differing conceptual schemas, darnit! How else do you explain why land-diving is crazy to us and bravery to someone in Java?

Because differing social conventions and differing understanding of reality are two very different things, OE, and I suspect that this mistake is based on a confusion between two different functions of the verb 'to be.' When I say, for example, that "All unmarried men are bachelors," I make what is effectively the claim of definition: "Unmarried men=bachelors." However, when I say that "Land-diving is crazy," I am not making the claim that "Land-Diving=crazy." What I am making is a relational claim: that all people who do land-dive act in such a way as to fulfill an instance of what could be classified as crazy.

In your conceptual schema relating to land-diving, given no background information, so just observing the event, it is characteristic of a person you would describe as crazy, but for a participant, it is characteristic of a person they would describe as brave. My point, through this whole discussion, has been that different social conventions are the basis of differening moralities and that neither is based on adherence to observed facets of objective reality. Changing the words of the statements brings them into equivilence, so "Land divers (not diving) are crazy" is ontologically equivilent to "Unmarried men are bachelors."

And here we hit on one of the most important points in this entire discussion, classification. Humans recieve sense-data from various sources. They compare the data to previously recieved data and catagorize (or classify) what they observe based on past encounters or second-hand learning. In other words, we create prejudices about every object or concept we come across in our lives based on its similarities in form or presentation to other objects or concepts we have encountered in the past, either through physical observation, or through the symbols of our language (being told by someone else about something). All prejudices are the mind attempting to assign classification to the observed world beyond what the sense-data alone can tell us. Land-divers are classified as crazy because in our experience jumping from high places is crazy. Land-diving fits into our overall conceptual universe as something that only crazy people do, while fitting into a different place in the conceptions of people who different prejudices, fueled by different experieneces. Rather than dealing with the world as it is humans seek to classify and catagorize everything based on preexisting ideas of reality. This is the process by which we edit the sense-data that we recieve. Once we have concrete ideas about the functioning of the world we change the data we recieve to fit into one of the catagories we have created to store and understand our conceptual world. The problem is that by editting the data to fit the catagories we often ignore important parts of what we are observing. Most racists, for example, see skin of a certain color and automatically catagorize that person into "Black," or "White," or "Asian," or whatever, and they make certain assumptions about that person based on their previous information (accurate or not) about people of that race. The problem with this system of catagorizing for understanding is that it is often inaccurate. For instance, if we saw three chairs with backs we might make the generalization, "all chairs have backs," but further experience might lead us to a challenge. Either "all chairs have backs" is true and stools and ergonomic chairs aren't really chairs or our prejudice is invalid. Too often people are unable to abandon their prejudices and accept that some chairs don't have backs, or that some young Black men don't want to steal anything from you. The same is true of social judgments. The doctrines of a society, imprinted on a child from birth, are very difficult to undo, even with overwhelming evidence against the truth of those doctrines. No society of completely free thinkers could maintain a single world-view or general social cohesion for very long. Cultures tend to rigidly indoctrinate their young so that they will continue to be productive members of society (within the strict confines of social thought) including reproducing and indoctrinating more members for the society. Free thinkers have always been persecuted as heretics or "crazy" because the society doesn't want to give up the old world-view despite its obvious (to anyone on the outside) flaws. Look at Copernicus who was forced to retract his statements about the nature of our solar system on penalty of death, or Jesus who was killed, essentially, for "rabble rousing" and going against the socially acceptable set of beliefs.

Now, what does that prove, anyway? Well, what it proves is that you can use the same word to talk both about identities (i.e. definitions), and relations (i.e. linking two independent and well-defined ideas together). Now, what you are doing is confusing the two. It should be fairly obvious that two people can disagree on which term between 'crazy' and 'bravery' best links with 'land-diving', and moreover, this doesn't affect any kind of metaphysical underpinning, because at all points in the debate we all agree what the terms 'crazy,' 'bravery,' and 'land-diving' refer to. However, with a definition, under no circumstances could a person plausibly argue that an unmarried man is not the same thing as a bachelor without disagreeing about what the terms 'unmarried man' and 'bachelor' refer to. That's the distinction. Unfortunately, every instance you have brought up, OE, is an instance where we disagree about relational terms, not defining terms. In all cases, we have a common understanding of what the terms mean, and how they refer to real objects, actions, or ideas in the real world.

Referant, or relational definitions are just a way of defining one word or concept while using another. When we say "Land-diving is crazy" we mean "Land-divers are crazy" but without using those words.

I do not think there is a common understanding of how the words relate to real objects, actions, or ideas, or everyone who partakes in this common understanding would necessarily use the same words for the same things. I believe that the person who calls Land-divers crazy must necessary have a different understanding of land-diving from the diver who calls it bravery. They may agree on the mechanics of the action, "stand on the tower the jump off," but they do not agree on the meaning of the event, nor the meaning of its descriptors. Unless we define "crazy" as "what appears crazy to the speaker" (which we really should, because that's how people use it) and "brave" and "what appears brave to the speaker" then the diver and the observer have different ideas of what "crazy" and "brave" mean. You can reasonably say, "From my socially constructed world-view land-divers appear crazy" or "Land-diving is incompatible with my world-view of soundness of mind" but to say that land-diving and land-divers are objectively "crazy" or "brave" is to ignore the nature of our symbol system. Language is not equivilent to reality, it is merely representitive of reality. Land-diving and land-divers are neither brave nor crazy in objective terms, they are merely people doing something, but within the language systems of their human observers they appear as either crazy or brave. To simplify, our symbols are not inherent in the objects they describe. Water does not include "water" it is merely represented by "water" within our world-models. I'm trying to find the right words to say, "We use words (symbols) to map the physical universe of our observations so that we can understand what we sense."

end of part 1 (the post was 20% too long)

This is what I meant when I said that you haven't provided an instance wherein "Schnie ist weist" =/= "Snow is white.", and why you would have to if you seriously want to challenge the idea that we commonly refer to ideas and objects in the world. The problem, however, is that you really can't, because to say so just isn't empirically justified.

"Schnie ist weist" is clearly different from "Snow is white" in that they are both symbols and not idential. The concepts the represent could be identical, but very likely are not. To each person "snow" and "white" mean a different thing, and I'm not talking about translations, I'm talking within a single language. Some people hear "snow" and think "fallen snow on the ground" some think "falling snow in the air" and some think "all snow, falling or fallen." So "Schnie ist weist" differs from "Snow is white" in the each person has their own individual idea of what "snow" is. We can understand what a person means because the differences in understanding of the physical universe are limited enough that communication is possible, but when speaking in terms of morality and other non-observable phenomena communication becomes much more difficult.

Objection 2: You could have the same conceptual schema derived from two different mental constructions purely by coincidence.

True, but it would be stretching the laws of probability to the breaking point and beyond just to presume it between you and I, let alone the common conceptual schema that seems to exist between billions of people. The only serious way to explain how a common conceptual framework, which empirically seems to exist, is to assume that some external mechanism is commonly causing all of us to believe it.

You are right that it would be highly unlikely for two people to come up with the same conceptual and symbol systems completely independent from each other, which is why it has never happened. Different people have come up with different ideas about the universe and different symbols for expressing them in different parts of the world, and cultures have maintained those ideas through socialization. The only reason that any two people have the same (similar, really, since no two people are identical) world-view or use similar language to explain their ideas is that they were both raised within a society that professed that world-view and used those symbols.

The same existential universe is influencing all people, but perspective and individual paradigms and symbol systems significantly affect the way in which we move through the world.

Problem #2: Reason is a part of the system. In your arguments against my point, you've asked again and again for empirical justification for the fact that a) a mind-independent world exists, and b) morality exists. In point of fact, you've gone so far as to try to deny me the ability to use rational analysis as part of my system. The problem, however, is inconsistency on your part: rational analysis, that very faculty you seek to deny me, is the very thing used to construct the web of understanding in your schema. When you look for "internal consistency" within your own coherence theory of the world, you aren't using empirical observation of it to define this relationship (there's nothing inherent in an empirical experience that says that something can't be both pink and white simultaneously, or 6' tall and 5' tall at the same time, etc.), you're using reason and a priori logic to determine whether they fit with all of your other experiences. So that being the case, how can you at once use them in your system, and then deny me the right to use the very same things to justify an external world or an external morality? That leads me to Problem 3:

I don't think I ever did ask for evidence of a mind-independent universe, I asked for evidence, repeatedly as you noted, because you have not provided any, of the existence of non-observable phenomena such as objective morality. You cannot reason that there must be objective morality because all the evidence we have suggests that there is no objective morality and that it is primarily if not entirely a construct of the human mind. I have never in any way attempted to deny you the use of rational, logical means of justifying your arguments, I have merely disagreed with your findings. You have not at all convinced me through your logic that there must exist an objective morality, nor that the differences in people's world-views can be "logiced away" and I have refuted, in what I feel to be perfectly logical ways, your claim that our communication requires identical conceptions and (you make a leap here that I don't understand) that our communication necessitates an objective base for human reality, despite the wide variety of human morality.

I say again that you have not used logic to justify your belief in an existential morality and have consistently mistated me in your arguments again my supposed anti-realism. I am in no way denying the existence of an objective universe in which all humans reside, I am denying the existance of, or potential knowledge of objectivity without any empirical evidence to support your claims or circumstantion evidence to use rationally to validate your argument.

Problem 3: Logically, Extreme Kantian view falls apart. Why? Well, you continuously ask me to provide absolute, unconditional proof that there is an external morality or world before you will believe it, and absent that evidence, it is your conclusion that you are forced to accept the possibility that you are wrong in how you've conceived the world, and therefore you are hesitant to apply that moral theory based on that possibly-flawed epistemology. I usually reply that such evidence is impossible, at least a posteriori, possibly a priori as well. This is usually the part where you do a little victory jig.

My point is that after being unable to provide any absolute proof (which is impossible for anything) of the existence of objective morality you have been unable to provide any evidence for its existence but have continued to demand that it must exist despite the significant evidence that it does not.

I freely accept that I may be wrong in my conceptions of the world, and am on some level hesitant to apply my morals, especially when dealing with others because of that uncertainty, but my hesitancy does not collapse into solipsism or nihilism because I reckognize that each human must, on some level, trust the wisdom of hiself and his culture to guide him to the right conclusions.

I challenge you to present you case, using any means you feel necessary, that there exists an objective morality independent of humans and the human mind.

But consider, however, the fact that your standard was "internal consistency." At this point, I have to ask, is your own system all that internally consistent? I would have to conclude that it is not, because the same skeptical considerations that lead you to reject the certainty of your understanding with respect to the external world, or possibly the external world completely, are the very same skeptical considerations that would lead you to reject the existence of other minds and everything else external to you. In short, rigorously applied, your own standard would collapse your theory into the solipsism you denigrate. On the other hand, any pragmatic stop measure used to halt the spread of skepticism in your thinking at the existence of other minds could also be used to drive out skepticism about the external world and our understanding of it. In short, you seem to want it both ways: you want on the one hand to use skepticism to prevent me from arguing for knowledge of the external world, but you don't want to accept the solipsism that develops from any rigorous application of your very own skepticism.

That is an unecessary extremification of the skeptic's philosophy. Taking skepticism to an illogical extreme leads to solipsism which is interally consistent, if meaningless. You are right, any brake on skepticism brings us back toward the realm of absolute certainty about our world, but I think it is obvious that absolute certainty is impossible. Our senses and catagorizing symbol systems have a certain degree of accuracy in their interpretation of the universe and to say that they are entirely untrustworthy is as silly as saying that they are entirely trustworthy. We can agree that the existence of a physical world is likely and that whether or not it exists we can act as though it does. Believing that there is an objective, observable universe as the basis of the models in our brains we can make this conclusion: Consistencies within the independently germinated world-views of different people represent likely "truths" about the universe, while inconsistencies represent either "unknowables" or places where one view is correct and the other incorrect. It is also possible that inconsistencies represent knowable but unknown aspects of reality. The vastly similar understanding of empirical phenomena, such as chairs, is an example of a consistency across world-views that leads us to believe that chairs really are there. The complete lack of coherence of moral beliefs suggests that some of the people are wrong, there is no objective morality, or everyone is wrong. So either some people are right about morality and some are wrong, despite living in the same objective universe and being socialized in different cultures, but using essentially the same methods, or everyone is wrong, or everyone is right (or it is meaningless). The idea that one society would have somehow gotten it right even though they had no observable evidence to support their ideas seems unlikely so we are left with either, everyone is wrong (and there is an objective morality) or everyone is right (or there is no objective reality and the statement of right or wrong becomes meaningless since it was a measure of coherence with the objective standard). My position is that there is no objective reality so the question of human coherence with the objective becomes meaningless. It seems that your position is that there is objective reality which means either that you believe that one group has gotten it right and everyone else is wrong despite the odds against it, or everyone is wrong. Since I'm pretty sure you don't believe in the latter I can only assume that you hold, against logic and reason, that some people have a grasp on objective morality. I can't say you're wrong to believe that, but I can say you're illogical and unreasonable if you do.

My position, on the other hand (call it the Soft Kantian view), doesn't have that problem. The real world exists, although it is possible that we don't understand it in the way it really is. Nevertheless, despite the fact that we might not conceptualize it correctly, we all conceptualize it in basically the same way, with our skirmishing merely over the details. This common conception allows us to infer common faculties and common responses. Common faculties and common responses are sufficient to ground a moral code that applies to all people. As such, I'd have to say that my system really is better than yours, even by your own standard.

Where does the moral code come from? Are we getting our morals from our understanding of chairs and tables? Because if we aren't then I can't understand how our common understanding of such mundane things as that can excuse our widely differing ideas on morality across the globe. We argue over the details of exists, but we fight wars over morality. You and I look in a room and see basically the same thing, with slight differences we could argue over (though neither is going to get anywhere), but we wouldn't fight a war over those differences. How can you explain the differences in morality (and the ensuing conflicts) in different cultures if morality is based on common faculties and common responses?

Now, I've probably just blown everyone's minds and broken at least two keyboards, so I'll merely make a few points where I think you went very wrong, OE.

Partly correct. The "Golden Rule" tells me whether actions are moral or not for everyone that shares my conception of reality. To give an example, if it were true that your conception of reality has a reversal of the pain/pleasure qualia (what feels pleasurable to me feels painful to you in inverse proportion), then it would indeed be immoral for me to act in such a way as to bring you pleasure, because in fact I would be deliberately harming you. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out above, strong evidence exists that few if any people have this inversed qualia function of pain and pleasure in the same action as another. People might disagree about exactly how much pain or pleasure they get from any given act, but it would be absurd to suggest that someone might actually automatically suffer from every act that brings me pleasure.

So by using the golden rule you would do something that was "good" within your set of morals to a person who did not share those morals, meaning that it could be "evil" in their eyes? I guess that answers my question about moral conflicts.

The pain/pleasure spectrum is only a single facet of conventional morality, unless we're hedonists it can hardly be used as the only measure of an actions morality. You are right, it would be absurd to presuppose someone who was the exact antithesis of another, but to think that because no two people with exactly opposing pain/pleasure conceptions exists that all people have the same reactions to the same stimuli is equally absurd. Two people can have some similar and some different reactions to the same set of stimuli without breaking any laws of our fundamental understanding of human sensory response.

Okay, you're just begging the question. Yes, it's based on a universal standard of means and ends, but that's exactly what I'm arguing exists. Additionally, no, no, no, no. Hitler's view could never be correlated with the universal laws that I described, because they all work concurrently. In a perfectly just hypothetical society, they would only create those rules that you would will be made into a universal law, and those laws would only be those that treat people as ends in and of themselves. Does genocide treat people as an end in itself? Not just no, but hell no. Were the Jews people? Our understanding of the term people suggests that they definitely fit the description. All the evidence that we got from the world suggested that they fit that definition. It was only a few people acting irrationally and refusing to accept what was right in front of their faces that disagreed, and both of us would be hard-pressed to conclude that their web of understanding was coherent: "All things that fit this definition are people. . .except them, because. . .uh. . .because we said so, and they're evil, and they want to take Germany away from you!" Yes, very coherent, that view.

If you're arguing that the system exists you cannot presuppose that it does as part of your argument, it's circular and fallacious. Ok, you've lost me as to how an ideally just society needs to follow your rule of treating people as ends only. Along with being unsupported I think the idea is absurd. We need other people to survive. Without other people around we could not live, so in that sense we are using them as a means to an end, this is not to say that we don't appreciate it, and recipricate as means to their ends, but it still happens.

I'm not arguing that Hitler was rational, or that his viewpoint is entirely valid, I'm merely arguing that it is possible, however absurd his suppositions seem to us that he was "right" and we are "wrong." I don't think this is true, but we have no way to demonstrate that it isn't true except to say that he set different requirements for humanity than we did and we feel ours to be more valid.

Actually, I think it's just because morality is abstract, while a chair is concrete. Nevertheless, just because something is abstract doesn't mean it doesn't exist. The concept of 'chair' is abstract, but no one would suggest that it doesn't exist and that therefore you can't have one in your head.

Morality isn't abstract at all, it is a rigid set of rules dictating desired behavior. The only reason we can call morality abstract is because no one has represented it in a concrete way that everyone can agree on. Many people have tried, look at religious laws and codes, look at even secular laws, many of which dictate behavior not based on social necessity, but based on arbitrary moral judgments. Conrete morality exists around us but not everyone agrees on it because it is not representitive of a concept observed in the existential universe. I believe that anything which could be called "abstract" exists only in the human mind. Morality, as well as the "form" of a chair exist only in our minds. The chair exists, and actions dictated by the code of conduct called morality exist, but the chair is no different from anything else, existentially, it is only in the way that we understand it that it is different, and the actions are no different than any other except that they are in accordance with the arbitrary rules of morality.

Two good definitions for concept from Dictionary.com:
1.A general idea derived or inferred from specific instances or occurrences.
2.Something formed in the mind; a thought or notion.

When thinking about the concept of a chair using the first definition the concept of a chair exists in our minds because of our experience with chairs while using the second definition the concept is formed in the mind and not derivitive only of the physical existence of the chair. In other words our concept of a chair exists in part as the result of our experiences with chairs and in part as the result of the creative functions of our minds. The same is essentially true of morality except that the first definition becomes a little hazy. There are no specific instances or occurrences that lead us to our concept of morality except conversations we have had on the subject (attempted representations of non-existential ideas using symbols designed to describe existential ideas). The second definition, however, seems much easier to accept, that morality is formed in the mind.

The significance was that you were suggesting that any theory is valid so long as it is coherent. I'm suggesting that it's intuitively ridiculous. A loony could come up with a coherent system of understanding, and yet still be a loony. We can tell if he's a loony if his web of understanding differs markedly from the web of understanding that most stable, rational, and well-adjusted individuals come up with: if it does, then he's eccentric. If it doesn't, then he's irrational.

I maintain that the only necessity for plausibility is internal consistency. You are right to think that the chances of a person being right go down as more people agree against him, but the chance is never zero unless the conception invalidates itself by necessitating true impossibilities. It is possible, unlikely, but possible, that someone we have locked up in a mental institution knows the way the world really is and we're all equally dillusional. It's not very likely, but as long as the mental patient's ideas are internally consistent, and of course consistent with how he percieves the universe then he could be correct. Stability, apparent rationality, and in particular the idea of being "well-adjusted" are almost always used as measures of conformity to the surrounding culture. Going back to the inovators, they are persecuted as unstable, irrational, and poorly-adjusted because their world-views differ greatly from the majority of people around them, but that doesn't mean that they're wrong.

Again, absolutely not. We always had a universal morality: the Golden Rule. History is measured, however, not by the change from one system of morality to the next, but by the gradual extinction of outdated, irrational reasons why the Golden Rule should not apply to one group of people or another.

Until everyone feels exactly the same about everything the golden rule will be ineffective at maintaining peace, even if it means that everyone is following his own moral code perfectly. People's different beliefs cause problems when you're applying the golden rule, for instance, if you would want someone to prevent you from jumping from the land-diving tower you might prevent the divers from jumping, but they want to do it, they don't want you to stop them. An action might seem "good" to the person who is doing it, but "evil" to the person it is being done to. Such lack of understanding, or lack of application of this understanding is the fatal flaw of the golden rule. I say again, until everyone feels the same about everything the golden rule will be ineffective. I will say this, however, within a group of like-thinking people the golden rule is a very effective guide for behavior.

So long as we can still share the same conceptual understanding, then Gavagai/Brahma is just as good as Rabbit/Brahma. You're confusing the translateability of words for the compatibility of conceptual webs.

By any chance did you go look up Brahma? The words aren't translatable because the concepts are entirely incompatable with each other. There are no words in English to properly describe Brahma, and no words in Hindi to properly describe God, not because we haven't made words, but because the language is tied directly to the understanding of the existential phenomena it represents. The conceptual webs cannot be translated or understood by people on the other side of the language barrier because they are entirely foreign.

If you take your claim seriously, socialization would be impossible. If my web of understanding is radically different and fundamentally incompatible with yours, then it doesn't matter which culture you come from, because same or different, everything you say will be absolute gibberish to me.

Urgh. Each person has the ability to create an entirely different set of symbols and world-views. The vast majority of people never create their own world-view or symbols. Socialization is the process by which a single person's world-view and symbol system are transfered to others as a means of social cohesion. In other words, by raising our young to be like us we allow communication and other social functions. To someone who speaks only English, French does sound like gibberish, except with some reckognizable symbols because both French and English come from the same lingual tradition, in part. English and Chinese, on the other hand, each sound like gibberish to speakers of the other because they share no roots except that impressive capabilities of the human autitory functions.

So again, our webs of understanding are not radically different because we were raised in similar cultures, that is why we can communicate instead of hearing only gibberish.

Your whole theory depends on a skeptical premise that we can't know what natural phenomena is really like, and that we each construct our worldview in our own unique way, so it's irrelevant besides. You contradict your own theory here. Twice.

My theory is not at all dependent on that premise nor is it contradictory even once. There is a certain degree of uncertainty in any observation, but not absolute uncertainty, and consistently reoccuring evidence, especially when confirmed by others is relatively trustworthy, just not perfectly trustworthy.

1) Well, I've never seen a Pegasus either, and I don't know anything about it's uses, but I still have a concept of one, don't I? If that's the case, then where did it come from? According to Plato, my soul intuited it from my pre-existing understanding of the Form of Pegasusness. Even if no Pegasus ever did or ever will exist, the Form of it still does.

First, I imagine you do have some idea of the potential uses of a pegasus, in the same way that you have some idea of the potential uses of a horse and any flying machine. Your soul did not in any way intuit the form of a pegasus, it was explained to you either in a didactic way or through a story (false reality). The form of pegasus is just another word for human understanding of pegusi, which, being the construct of a human mind, is not an entirely meaningful concept. If you are to argue that the form of pegasus exists at all you would have to argue that it was created at the same time as the person who first envisioned a pegasus had that strike of imagination. In other words, it could be said that only the form of pegasus exists in the minds of everyone who has heard of the idea, despite the fact that none exist in the physical universe.

2) If you're looking for definitions, you've come to the wrong place if you're looking at Plato. He would say the reason why two chairs, even one's radically different chairs, are still chairs is because they partake of the same metaphysical Form. A wheelbarrow is a wheelbarrow not because it has a different function (you can sit in either), or because it has a different structure (you could make a chair that superficially looks like a wheelbarrow), but because of the Form it partakes in. Wheelbarrows have their own Forms, and they are different from Chairs. It's not the definition that seperates them in our minds; it's a prior understanding of a pre-existing and more real ontological seperation between the two that our reason tells us must be there.

If there is no functional or structural difference between a chair and a wheelbarrow, if they are interchangable in every situation, then there will be no difference in their form, which represents human understanding of the conceptual model of chairs and wheelbarrows. Form is not inherent in an object, it is projected human understanding.

3) How could you possibly ask me to give an empirical understanding of a Platonic Form, dude? That's like asking me to hand you a super-string: each is simply an ontological posit predicted by rational means (on the one hand, logical deduction, and on the other mathematical analysis).

It's entirely illogical though, that's the whole point. Form does not exist outside the human mind. There is no essential being. Form is just another word for the catagories we filter the observed word into. Everything we observe and catagorize as a chair has the form of chair. There is no other standard, and no functional or structural basis for form. Unless you can provide a logical process by which we come to the form of a chair, or any other form, then I am forced to believe that it exists only because we need to for understanding.

You might want to sit down for this, but: not every thinker in Western Philosophy was an empiricist. Plato was one of their number.

Glad to save I've been sitting this whole time or I'd be pretty tired. I don't see the significance in the fact that not all western philosophers were empiricists, but I'll leave it alone and be done with this post.

end of part 2 w00t. Officially my longest post here, 17 pages single spaced including quotes, about 11 without quotes.

Capitalism is essentially amoral, as it considers people to be nothing but a form of capital, nothing but a number on a page.

Socialism is essentially moral, because it considers the good of everyone more important than the good of a minority, and is willing to sacrafice efficiency and international influence so that the maximum number of people at home can live happy, comfortable lives.

Capitalism: Money > People
Socialism: People > Money

No. It's a zero-sum equation. Third-world countries COULD have a large middle class and an average standard of living equivelant to one of today's developed countries, but only if there was some slack given somewhere else along the line (for them to get richer, someone else has to get poorer - environmentally, financially, or some other form).

That's crap.

Capitalism is essentially amoral, as it considers people to be nothing but a form of capital, nothing but a number on a page.

Socialism is essentially moral, because it considers the good of everyone more important than the good of a minority, and is willing to sacrafice efficiency and international influence so that the maximum number of people at home can live happy, comfortable lives.

Capitalism: Money > People
Socialism: People > Money

Valuing people as capital is still a form of morality, though it differs from Judeo-Christian morality greatly. Morality, as I have argued extensively above, is not an absolute, so calling either Capitalism or Socialism moral and the other immoral, or amoral, is ignorant. Neither system is necessary moral or immoral, it all depends on your perspective.

Your inequalities aren't very accurate.

Capitalism: Consumer > All
Socialism: Society > All

Money isn't necessary for either Capitalism or Socialism, the primary difference is the control of (not the existance of, as some people would have us believe) capital. In Capitalism capital is privately owned and controlled and personal interest and competition drive the market to create maximum effeciency. In socialism capital is collectively own and controlled and "group intrest," a loosely defined synonym of collected individual interests, is the driving force for maximum effeciency. The problem is that Capitalism actually manages to create maximum effeciency if it is porperly supported by a government to prevent an excess of negative externalities and to subsidise those products which produce a positive externality, while Socialism's planned economy is at bast as effecient and effective, but probably less so. No planning authority can consistently match the power of the market for balance and overall effeciency.

That's crap.

It's partially correct, though. If we don't produce more, for third world countries to develope, first world countries will have to suffer. The fact is that by increasing the effeciency of third world markets we can increase production so that the first world will not have to suffer, and will likely even profit from the increased trade. The challenge is getting anyone to invest enough money to get the third world countries on their way to developement.

Capitalism is essentially amoral, as it considers people to be nothing but a form of capital, nothing but a number on a page.

Socialism is essentially moral, because it considers the good of everyone more important than the good of a minority, and is willing to sacrafice efficiency and international influence so that the maximum number of people at home can live happy, comfortable lives.

Capitalism: Money > People
Socialism: People > MoneyI don't agree. I think efficiency is not scraped in socialism because everyone work.
I think capitalism = oligarchy (where the ruling class doesn't work) and socialism = democracy (where everyone work).

It's partially correct, though. If we don't produce more, for third world countries to develope, first world countries will have to suffer. The fact is that by increasing the effeciency of third world markets we can increase production so that the first world will not have to suffer, and will likely even profit from the increased trade. The challenge is getting anyone to invest enough money to get the third world countries on their way to developement.
Money invested is not enough. They need labor laws, minimum wages, ban on child labor, social education and everything.
Because if they don't have it, the money you invest there will make them work for you until their death and you will be the only one benefiting from it.

Money invested is not enough. They need labor laws, minimum wages, ban on child labor and everything.
Because if they don't have it, the money you invest there will stay here.

We want the money to stay there, but you're right, there is more needed than just an inflow of money. A certain level of socialization is needed to allow third world societies to function in the same way as first world societies. Laws and customs need to be changed, but it's a slow process which we can largely not affect, but as is we aren't doing what we can to allow for the transformation from third to first world, and the first step we can take is to infuse enough money into the system to get the economy moving.

Capitalism: Consumer > All
I don't agree.
Investors > all is more accurate.
In a corporation, you have 3 entities. The workers, the consumers and the investors.
In capitalism, the investors have the power.
For instance, Microsoft doesn't care about its consumers. It's policy is to lock them so they HAVE to buy their products, no matter if they are inferior. The obvious goal is to please the investors, not the consumers.

We want the money to stay there, but you're right, there is more needed than just an inflow of money. A certain level of socialization is needed to allow third world societies to function in the same way as first world societies. Laws and customs need to be changed, but it's a slow process which we can largely not affect, but as is we aren't doing what we can to allow for the transformation from third to first world, and the first step we can take is to infuse enough money into the system to get the economy moving.
I think the problem is that when you invest money there, you get ownership of something there as a return. This ownership gets you dividends. Those dividends are back to you. In the long run, they loose. Capitalism does just bring them another kind of colonization (but actually the de-colonization never happened).

The true goal of Anarchism is to have natural order, where people follow morals and laws out of choice and not out of enforcement (Read V: For vendetta by Alan Moore). Capitalism is redundant; work for yourself, forget the rest of the world. Look where it's got us. The world gets slowly (more rapidly as the days go by) poisoned to death by all the pollution that we create. Alot of this pollution could be halted if we werent forced to buy petrolleum based cars, if governments forced corporations to control themselves, etc. Why dont we do all this? Cos everyone at the top wants money for themselves, and the people with this money mostly got so much by cutting corners like that.

Capitalism doesnt mean that the hardest working rises to the top. It means that the richest person has the most power. You can get rich from a variety of ways - inheritance, luck, crime; only a few people are rich because they worked for it. If you begin poor you have practically no chance of becoming rich; disadvantages cripple your progess.

Capitalism has NO moral structure. It is the pursuit of money for the sake of money (Why does ANYONE need to be a billionaire? You can live off 2 million for the rest of your life quite comfortably), so there are no inherent moral systems. Socialism is equality for all, no disadvantages and no advantages.
And we could help the entire 3rd world if we wanted. Hell - Bill Gates could do it singlehandedly (yes, he's superhuman now...). But the few at the top get alot of money for exploiting people who work without benefits, security, or even a 1 dollar wage.

Oh, and get real. The consumer has NO power over the process of capitalism. You buy what they let you buy.

I don't agree.
Investors > all is more accurate.
In a corporation, you have 3 entities. The workers, the consumers and the investors.
In capitalism, the investors have the power.
For instance, Microsoft doesn't care about its consumers. It's policy is to lock them so they HAVE to buy their products, no matter if they are inferior. The obvious goal is to please the investors, not the consumers.

The investors have the direct power, but they are nothing but slaves to the consumers who are, in turn, also the workers. It's a cyclical system in which no party can be said to hold all the power. In the end the primary virtue of Capitalism is that it puts the consumer first in that it is always seeking better and cheaper products. In other words, the person who can provide the best deal is going to get the most business and make the most profit, so the consumer wins from the work of the companies.

Microsoft is an example of where the government needs to step in. Monopolies are not a part of ideal Capitalism. They distort the market in unhealthy ways and destroy the competitiveness that leads to the best products at the best prices. In the case of monopolies like Microsoft the investors have taken extra power, but with proper regulation that need not ever happen.

I think the problem is that when you invest money there, you get ownership of something there as a return. This ownership gets you dividends. Those dividends are back to you. In the long run, they loose. Capitalism does just bring them another kind of colonization (but actually the de-colonization never happened).

The money needs to be invested in infrastructure. A person can own a road, but as long as they aren't collecting tolls for its use it hardly matters. We need to give them money really, instead of investing it expecting a profitable return.

The investors have the direct power, but they are nothing but slaves to the consumers who are, in turn, also the workers. It's a cyclical system in which no party can be said to hold all the power. In the end the primary virtue of Capitalism is that it puts the consumer first in that it is always seeking better and cheaper products. In other words, the person who can provide the best deal is going to get the most business and make the most profit, so the consumer wins from the work of the companies.

Microsoft is an example of where the government needs to step in. Monopolies are not a part of ideal Capitalism. They distort the market in unhealthy ways and destroy the competitiveness that leads to the best products at the best prices. In the case of monopolies like Microsoft the investors have taken extra power, but with proper regulation that need not ever happen.Well I agree with that. Anywhere there is a monopoly the state should intervene. The problem is that some corporations have more power than the state so the state can't intervene at all (Microsoft, but also Hallibutron, Citibank and many others). In a sense they are the government and should be called the government, instead of the puppets in suit which are
presented to us as the government. LEt's ace it. They have more assets than the government and they have more propaganda power. Don't you find it weird that some consumers are defending the right of the corporations? Does a corporation have rights? A self-serving corporation does not have rights, it is not human at all. It should be here to serve people. But look at the state of affairs today. Corporations are introduced in school. They are now allowed to propagate their propaganda to pupils in mandatory class. Isn't that weird? what should be done about it?

The money needs to be invested in infrastructure. A person can own a road, but as long as they aren't collecting tolls for its use it hardly matters. We need to give them money really, instead of investing it expecting a profitable return.
100% agreed (if not 200%).

Well I agree with that. Anywhere there is a monopoly the state should intervene. The problem is that some corporations have more power than the state so the state can't intervene at all (Microsoft, but also Hallibutron, Citibank and many others). In a sense they are the government and should be called the government, instead of the puppets in suit which are
presented to us as the government. LEt's ace it. They have more assets than the government and they have more propaganda power. Don't you find it weird that some consumers are defending the right of the corporations? Does a corporation have rights? A self-serving corporation does not have rights, it is not human at all. It should be here to serve people. But look at the state of affairs today. Corporations are introduced in school. They are now allowed to propagate their propaganda to pupils in mandatory class. Isn't that weird? what should be done about it?

Most of the power corporations weild is though their manipulation of legislators. Pharmacudical companies have just about every politician in their pocket so nothing is being done about absurd drug prices. The federal budget is still greater than any single corporation and the military gives it a lot more power than private organizations, but because politicians need private investment to maintain their positions it doesn't matter.

I agree that corporations should not be treated as though they have rights. Each individual member of a corporation has rights, but the collective is not a new entity. Corporations should not be allowed to donate money to political parties or campaigns because there can be no free speech argument since a non-entity cannot speak. The argument is that corporations are really just large groups of people entrusting their money to small groups of people with the intent that the small group use the money to make more money. So from that standpoint it is reasonable to think that a corporation would want to donate to political parties and campaigns because the return is greater than the cost. The problem is primarily the way in which the money is moved around. If every member of a corportation wanted to give their individual portions of a normal donation to a party that wouldn't be a problem, but each individual does not make that choice, so corporations are essentially taking the free speach of their investors. Something needs to get done, but it is hard to get legislators to drop soft money and massive corporate donations much less to legislate against it.

I also agree that it is absurd that a company should be allowed to advertise in any way in manditory schools. If a private school or a college wants corporate sponsorship that's fine, but public schools should be entirely independent of the corporate world, in my opinion.

Do you think he would have chosen life on the streets? Life on the streets is rough. No one would choose it unless they absolutely had to. If he had an opportunity, he would have taken it.

That might be true, but you don't know that.

The one problem with your theory is that under your definition of slavery, specifically that slavery is "making someone do something for you against their will", then someone is equally a slave under a pure capitalist system, because some of the time, I'm working to support my boss' profit margin, and not my own welfare.


You work off the clock?

I generally recomend against that.

You work off the clock?

I generally recomend against that.
"making someone do something for you against their will", what does "off the clock" have to to with that?

No. It's a zero-sum equation. Third-world countries COULD have a large middle class and an average standard of living equivelant to one of today's developed countries, but only if there was some slack given somewhere else along the line (for them to get richer, someone else has to get poorer - environmentally, financially, or some other form).

Why do you believe this?

Yes, I understand that the world has finite resources, but that does mean wealth is zero-sum.

Capitalism is essentially amoral, as it considers people to be nothing but a form of capital, nothing but a number on a page.

Socialism is essentially moral, because it considers the good of everyone more important than the good of a minority, and is willing to sacrafice efficiency and international influence so that the maximum number of people at home can live happy, comfortable lives.


More correctly, it considers the welfare of the collective group superior to that of the individuals.


Capitalism: Money > People
Socialism: People > Money


Non sequitor - What good is money if there aren't any people?

More correctly, it considers the welfare of the collective group superior to that of the individuals.

Non sequitor - What good is money if there aren't any people?

Systems, whether organizational or social, possess no "morality" in and of themselves. Only individuals have moral codes, standards and behaviors. Virtually any organization or social system can be "moral" if the individuals who comprise them have moral standards.

Money invested is not enough. They need labor laws, minimum wages, ban on child labor, social education and everything.
Because if they don't have it, the money you invest there will make them work for you until their death and you will be the only one benefiting from it.

Bullshit. If you they're getting paid, they're benefiting. If you take away their right to work, they don't.

Why do you believe this?

Yes, I understand that the world has finite resources, but that does mean wealth is zero-sum.

If everyone were to have a comfortable, middle-class, European lifestyle, the Earth could only support about 2 billion of us. That (or a statement close enough to it) is what was in post described. Wealth was not being described as zero-sum, resources necessary to support a given lifestyle were.

The true goal of Anarchism is to have natural order, where people follow morals and laws out of choice and not out of enforcement (Read V: For vendetta by Alan Moore). Capitalism is redundant; work for yourself, forget the rest of the world. Look where it's got us. Yes, look where it's got us. Capitalism is the most efficient distributor of goods and services ever known to mankind. It works. Mind citing a time socialism worked? Mind citing a time Anarchism worked?

The world gets slowly (more rapidly as the days go by) poisoned to death by all the pollution that we create. Alot of this pollution could be halted if we werent forced to buy petrolleum based cars, if governments forced corporations to control themselves, etc. Why dont we do all this? Cos everyone at the top wants money for themselves, and the people with this money mostly got so much by cutting corners like that. You sound a bit jaded. We're taking baby steps, but we're getting there. Don't trust the government. Trust the engineers. Trust the scientists. They're pretty knowledeble people, and it's them that really change things like environmental concerns. Government, which is more handy than you give it credit for being, still plays a secondary role.

Capitalism doesnt mean that the hardest working rises to the top. It means that the richest person has the most power. You can get rich from a variety of ways - inheritance, luck, crime; only a few people are rich because they worked for it. If you begin poor you have practically no chance of becoming rich; disadvantages cripple your progess. Wrong. Almost all people are rich because they worked for it. Aristocracy has been on the decline for hundreds of years. I don't understand this resentment against rich people. The vast majority of them earned their wealth, plain and simple.

Capitalism has NO moral structure. It is the pursuit of money for the sake of money (Why does ANYONE need to be a billionaire? You can live off 2 million for the rest of your life quite comfortably), so there are no inherent moral systems. Capitalism does have a moral structure: better, faster, stronger. As for philanthropy, capitalism might have no moral structure to you, but you'll at least agree that people do have moral structures. The Bill and Miranda Gates foundation, as an example, gives out millions.

Socialism is equality for all, no disadvantages and no advantages.
And we could help the entire 3rd world if we wanted. Hell - Bill Gates could do it singlehandedly (yes, he's superhuman now...). But the few at the top get alot of money for exploiting people who work without benefits, security, or even a 1 dollar wage. Socialism has some problems, though. As an economic model, it's turned out to be pretty crappy, there's no denying that. And equality for all? What do you mean? Everyone's equal under the law in capitalist societies, the USA as an example. You know where people aren't equal? Communist China. North Korea. The Old Soviet Union.

You have this idea that people at the top are copies of mean Mr. Potter who's going to read the newspaper, find the deposit, and foreclose Baily Savings and Lown. Kenneth Lay aside, they do some hard work. Bill Gates, for example, wrote some pretty darn good software. He foresaw the personal computer, made his stuff cheaper than others, and made incredible business decisions. He played the game, and he won.

Oh, and get real. The consumer has NO power over the process of capitalism. You buy what they let you buy.Ever watch those shows covering the stock market? I do. They throw a lot of numbers at you really fast, with price indexes, unemployment rates, capital gains, federal interest rates, trade deficits, the value of our currency, oil prices, inflation, real estate, home ownership, whatever. One of the really, really important ones is consumer spending. The economic success of the U.S. is due in large part to our big middle class and its propensity to spend and consume. That's why consumer confidence is important. That's why consumer spending is important.

If everyone were to have a comfortable, middle-class, European lifestyle, the Earth could only support about 2 billion of us. That (or a statement close enough to it) is what was in post described. Wealth was not being described as zero-sum, resources necessary to support a given lifestyle were.

I'm highly skeptical of the claim that only 2 billion have that high a standard of living. I wonder where this information comes from. I can imagine how one might arrive at that conclusion, but I'm sure that with enough hard work and ingenuity a population of 10 billion or more could live quite comfortably. Granted, there's a lot that would need to be done, but a couple of little things could go a long way.

I'm highly skeptical of the claim that only 2 billion have that high a standard of living. I wonder where this information comes from. I can imagine how one might arrive at that conclusion, but I'm sure that with enough hard work and ingenuity a population of 10 billion or more could live quite comfortably. Granted, there's a lot that would need to be done, but a couple of little things could go a long way.
i will try to find the disk where i have stored a review paper i co-authored on this subject. the biological reality is that if we want to maintain a European standard of living for all people and be at equilibrium with resources then the maximum human population that can live on this planet is something like 2.09 billion people. equilibrium refers to the state where we are not consuming increasing or unstable amounts of resources, a state where our level of consumption could be maintained indefinitely without exhausting any resources.

we could support a population of 10 billion with a European standard of living, to be sure, but only for approximately 5 years before the resources became critically depleted, ecosystems ceased functioning, and a rapid decline would begin. carrying capacity is about establishing the population that can be maintained with a certain level of comfort indefinitely, and the human carrying capacity for the planet Earth hovers around 2 billion.

A time socialism worked:

Western Europe, most of the late 20th/early 21st century.

Oh, with socialism you also get condoms which help slow the birth rate in Africa and shit cos of negative population growth like we have in Europe now, and hopefully women could get abortions and stuff, yay.

Oh, with socialism you also get condoms which help slow the birth rate in Africa and shit cos of negative population growth like we have in Europe now, and hopefully women could get abortions and stuff, yay.
um, you can get condoms in capitalism, too...as a matter of fact, the most vocally capitalist nation in the world was also the first to make contraception widely available for little to no cost.

True, but I was just pointing out that socialism is sustainable because of the condom thing - I wasn't implying that capitalism didn't have condoms.

Tsk. Tsk.

And now, now we see where the communists went. On the internet. Let's review, shall we?

Countries where Full Socialism Worked: Um... hrm... *sratches head* No, all I'm getting is Gulags, Cultural Revolutions, Tanzania, and the magical collapsing economy of Sweden.

Countries where Full Capitalism Worked: United States of America, Singapore, Thatcher's Britain.

Please note, the only way to properly judge a society is by its economic strength, not by the way it treats its citizens. But even using the Humanitarian scale, Pre-Deng China, the USSR, and Tanzania come below every Capitalist State.

But hey! At least the President of Socialist Tanzania, when he quit, admitted he failed.

bump so the thread doesn't die before Xeno has a chance to reply.

Me and a freind really debated the practical nature of Socialism (my part) and Capitalism (his part) for a long time until we finally realized that the conflict of the debate was not in its practicallity--we fundementally disagreed on the premise of society. My freind called for a system based on freedom

You fould your own flaw - you are arguing against freedom.

You work off the clock?

I generally recomend against that.

Whether you work off a clock or by salary you're still working part of the time for the profit margin of your boss.

Whether you work off a clock or by salary you're still working part of the time for the profit margin of your boss.

Only if the boss is also the owner. Or, if you own stock, you are the owner.

A time socialism worked:

Western Europe, most of the late 20th/early 21st century.



They aren't socialist

No. It's a zero-sum equation. Third-world countries COULD have a large middle class and an average standard of living equivelant to one of today's developed countries, but only if there was some slack given somewhere else along the line (for them to get richer, someone else has to get poorer - environmentally, financially, or some other form).

It most certainly is not. There is no set amount of wealth; it can be created.

It most certainly is not. There is no set amount of wealth; it can be created.
wrong. there is a finite amount of resources on the planet Earth, and if we wish to maintain a stable carrying capacity (meaning that we are consuming resources in balance with them being created, and therefore not on course to exhaust all resources permanently) then we cannot simply "make more wealth" to support all the people who need improved standard of life. to give a modest European standard of living to all people on this planet right now would cause permanent and irreversible damage to the world's resources and ecosystems in under 10 years (and that's being very, very generous with the estimates). if you want to be able to continue that standard of living for all people then the human population of the earth needs to be reduced to about 30% of what we have now.

wrong. there is a finite amount of resources on the planet Earth, and if we wish to maintain a stable carrying capacity (meaning that we are consuming resources in balance with them being created, and therefore not on course to exhaust all resources permanently) then we cannot simply "make more wealth" to support all the people who need improved standard of life. to give a modest European standard of living to all people on this planet right now would cause permanent and irreversible damage to the world's resources and ecosystems in under 10 years (and that's being very, very generous with the estimates). if you want to be able to continue that standard of living for all people then the human population of the earth needs to be reduced to about 30% of what we have now.

Ah, open-mindedness in abundance. Nobody said it will just happen straight away. It will take a very long time, but the most effective development projects are actually the cheapest. And their basis is education.

You don't create wealth by spending money. You create it through education. Then people can make their own way.

Ah, open-mindedness in abundance. Nobody said it will just happen straight away. It will take a very long time, but the most effective development projects are actually the cheapest. And their basis is education.

You don't create wealth by spending money. You create it through education. Then people can make their own way.

you do realise that wealth isn't about dollars? it's about resources, whether they be manufacturing, environmental, etc

There simply aren't enough resources to support everyone (without us all existing like the average chinese or russian). People will be making their own way into a finite amount, that will end up becoming an abyss. It's simply not viable to improve the standard of living for everyone to west european standards.

It's not that it couldn't happen, it's that it can't be allowed to happen.

Ah, open-mindedness in abundance. Nobody said it will just happen straight away. It will take a very long time, but the most effective development projects are actually the cheapest. And their basis is education.

You don't create wealth by spending money. You create it through education. Then people can make their own way.
no matter how much you educate people, the physical limitations of our planet will remain. the only way education can directly help solve this problem is through increased family planning; education is directly linked to smaller family size, and thus is a good means of acheiving voluntary population control.

no matter how much you educate people, the physical limitations of our planet will remain. the only way education can directly help solve this problem is through increased family planning; education is directly linked to smaller family size, and thus is a good means of acheiving voluntary population control.

Something which automatically happens in developed countries. And how do you think people will make that decision if they're not educated about it?

And we don't have a shortage of resources - we have a poor distribution of them. Food, fuel, water. The critical element this century is going to be water, but not because there isn't enough - it's because there isn't the technical expertise to efficiently manage it.

Something which automatically happens in developed countries. And how do you think people will make that decision if they're not educated about it?

that's what i said.


And we don't have a shortage of resources - we have a poor distribution of them. Food, fuel, water. The critical element this century is going to be water, but not because there isn't enough - it's because there isn't the technical expertise to efficiently manage it.
a common misconception. as i have already stated, the only way we could support our current human population with a European standard of living would be if we exhausted resources and permanetly damaged ecosystems; by consuming everything the planet has, we could do it, but those resources would then be gone and would have been over-used to the point where they cannot regenerate, and we'd be shit out of luck. if you want to be able to maintain the European standard for all humans indefinitely, then we have to reduce the human population to about 2 billion. it is physically not possible to sustain 6 billion+ humans with that lifestyle on this planet for more than about 15 years.

And for every person on earth to have an American lifestyle, we would need 8 planet Earths. It's just not sustainable. With other countries catching up with the US in terms of wealth, such as China, more equality will be forced onto the west, mostly the US, because supply won't be able to keep up with demand.

a common misconception. as i have already stated, the only way we could support our current human population with a European standard of living would be if we exhausted resources and permanetly damaged ecosystems; by consuming everything the planet has, we could do it, but those resources would then be gone and would have been over-used to the point where they cannot regenerate, and we'd be shit out of luck. if you want to be able to maintain the European standard for all humans indefinitely, then we have to reduce the human population to about 2 billion. it is physically not possible to sustain 6 billion+ humans on this planet for more than about 15 years.

Not true. Yes, the way we use resources is damaging the planet (and has already done so, irrevocably in many cases), but I'm not suggesting we carry on that way. We're perfectly capable of doing the same for everyone with less raw materials, if we choose to (the problem there being politicians). And there are masses of land with raw materials available, which have not been exploited yet and can be managed sustainably (but probably won't, because of corruption).

And what do you mean by the European standard of living? Again, I'm not suggesting that we should use up masses of raw materials to provide physical resources for people. Educating people is the only way to start, not throwing money and raw materials at a problem (something many well-respected NGOs have yet to learn).

Having just returned from a development programme in Tanzania, I can honestly say that this type of work makes a massive difference to communities' self-esteem, and their belief that they can improve things for themselves. And as they don't have money to spend anyway, if you show them that it's possible to carry out this work with no money, then they might actually carry it on themselves, if you show them how. And you need to start with helping them understand the things that are holding them back - in this case, HIV, gender inequality, and lack of child rights (as well as the environment).

Yes, the planet has physical limitations, and the correct response to that is education. Just as we can help people in the developing world overcome their obstacles, so we can learn from them, and the way they use minimal resources to survive.

Okay, this argument is not very linear, but then it is rushed and I'm sure you've got some point to make about it. Anyway, my main points were that education is the only way to improve standards of living in the developing world, and we manage our resources very inefficiently and will be fucked if we don't sort ourselves out, but sorting ourselves out is possible.

And for every person on earth to have an American lifestyle, we would need 8 planet Earths. It's just not sustainable. With other countries catching up with the US in terms of wealth, such as China, more equality will be forced onto the west, mostly the US, because supply won't be able to keep up with demand.

Yes but the Americans use their resources more inefficiently still than everyone else.

Not true. Yes, the way we use resources is damaging the planet (and has already done so, irrevocably in many cases), but I'm not suggesting we carry on that way. We're perfectly capable of doing the same for everyone with less raw materials, if we choose to (the problem there being politicians). And there are masses of land with raw materials available, which have not been exploited yet and can be managed sustainably (but probably won't, because of corruption).

i'm sorry, but this planet simply cannot support our current number of human beings with what you or i would consider a "comfortable" lifestyle. it doesn't matter how we use the resources, they simply cannot be extended to provide that much without permanently damaging the planet. i have a minor concentration in ecology specifically because i was so bothered by that realization when a professor explained it to me, and i studied for a couple of years hoping to figure out that it wasn't true. unfortunately, it's the truth...our planet has limits, and we are past them.


And what do you mean by the European standard of living? Again, I'm not suggesting that we should use up masses of raw materials to provide physical resources for people. Educating people is the only way to start, not throwing money and raw materials at a problem (something many well-respected NGOs have yet to learn).

by "European" standard, it is meant that people be provided with what Europeans would consider the basics of a good life; ample but not excessive food, enough water for basic needs without being wasteful, personal items enough for comfort but without being over the top. the European standard is used, because Americans tend to be way way way over the top...Americans produce far more waste and consume far more than the average European, and unnecessarily so.


Having just returned from a development programme in Tanzania, I can honestly say that this type of work makes a massive difference to communities' self-esteem, and their belief that they can improve things for themselves. And as they don't have money to spend anyway, if you show them that it's possible to carry out this work with no money, then they might actually carry it on themselves, if you show them how. And you need to start with helping them understand the things that are holding them back - in this case, HIV, gender inequality, and lack of child rights (as well as the environment).

again, it has nothing to do with money, it's about resources. money is irrelevant to what i am talking about.


Yes, the planet has physical limitations, and the correct response to that is education. Just as we can help people in the developing world overcome their obstacles, so we can learn from them, and the way they use minimal resources to survive.

like i have said, education is certainly crucial, but if we educate everybody and yet do not reduce the population then we still will NEVER be able to support all the humans on this planet with a European standard of living. it physically cannot be done. educating them to limit family size and so forth can reduce the population to the point where it IS possible for us to do that, but the education isn't what the ultimate solution is...it's the population control. i am all for educating people, 110%, but i also recognize that the Earth has limits that no amount of education can do away with.


Okay, this argument is not very linear, but then it is rushed and I'm sure you've got some point to make about it. Anyway, my main points were that education is the only way to improve standards of living in the developing world, and we manage our resources very inefficiently and will be fucked if we don't sort ourselves out, but sorting ourselves out is possible.
education is NOT the only way to improve standards of living in the developing world, though it is certainly a main method (and i personally believe it is the best method). resource management can certainly help a great deal, but it can only take us so far...we still will have to face the fact that even perfect management of resources will only cover about a third of our needs.

Well, we're not going to agree, Bottle, so let's not bother taking up thread space.

Bottle, I think you should try to step outside the box and consider how innovation and technology may make it possible to do much much more with much much less. Standard of living is hard to measure, but going by what I (an American) consider comfortable, I'm confident that it's possible for most or all of the world's population to reach that mark. It might not be quite the same, but it would still be comfortable.

It would be feasible to use renewable energy sources to meet 10 or more times the current demand within a decade with enough initial investment.

Advancements in nanotechnology promise to reduce to resource requirements. For one, massive structures built with carbon nano-tubes can be made with far less resources than ones and built with steel and concrete, and such technology would allow for ridiculously huge constructions, like giant sky cities with closed ecosytems. Also, nano versions of modern products could be many times smaller that what exists today, and the manufacturing process could be virtually 100% efficient in terms of resource consumption. I really think nanotechnology can do for resources what computers have done for information. Well, not literally, but you get the idea.

I can't say much for agriculture, but I don't think it's much of a stretch to go from producing enough food to uncomfortably sustain our current population and producing enough to comforably do so. Granted, that's probably still a far cry from achieving the eating habits of the average American, but we don't really need that.


Don't get the idea that I'm all optimistic about the future, though. Doing all this requires a great deal of wealth, and there are many obstacles in the way, which are pretty much all manifestations of government and it's parasites. Is it not ridiculous that the US government pays farmers not to grow food? I think there's a good chance we'll see (some of us anyway) serious depopulation before my crazy sci-fi world gets spinning. Still, we should demand economic freedom for ourselves and others, do what we can to educate our fellow humans, and show a great deal of respect for the planet that keeps us alive. Our fate rests in our hands.


PS. Wealth is neither money nor resources. It is measured by what can be done with it. It is in that sense that it equals the standard of living, and that total wealth can be increased through technology.

wrong. there is a finite amount of resources on the planet Earth, and if we wish to maintain a stable carrying capacity (meaning that we are consuming resources in balance with them being created, and therefore not on course to exhaust all resources permanently) then we cannot simply "make more wealth" to support all the people who need improved standard of life. to give a modest European standard of living to all people on this planet right now would cause permanent and irreversible damage to the world's resources and ecosystems in under 10 years (and that's being very, very generous with the estimates). if you want to be able to continue that standard of living for all people then the human population of the earth needs to be reduced to about 30% of what we have now.


No - for the same reasons that the stone age didn't end because we ran out of rocks.

We will find ways to become more efficient and find alternative sources.

Doomsday prophets like that have been around for years. And are always wrong.

Bottle, I think you should try to step outside the box and consider how innovation and technology may make it possible to do much much more with much much less. Standard of living is hard to measure, but going by what I (an American) consider comfortable, I'm confident that it's possible for most or all of the world's population to reach that mark. It might not be quite the same, but it would still be comfortable.

It would be feasible to use renewable energy sources to meet 10 or more times the current demand within a decade with enough initial investment.

Advancements in nanotechnology promise to reduce to resource requirements. For one, massive structures built with carbon nano-tubes can be made with far less resources than ones and built with steel and concrete, and such technology would allow for ridiculously huge constructions, like giant sky cities with closed ecosytems. Also, nano versions of modern products could be many times smaller that what exists today, and the manufacturing process could be virtually 100% efficient in terms of resource consumption. I really think nanotechnology can do for resources what computers have done for information. Well, not literally, but you get the idea.

I can't say much for agriculture, but I don't think it's much of a stretch to go from producing enough food to uncomfortably sustain our current population and producing enough to comforably do so. Granted, that's probably still a far cry from achieving the eating habits of the average American, but we don't really need that.


Don't get the idea that I'm all optimistic about the future, though. Doing all this requires a great deal of wealth, and there are many obstacles in the way, which are pretty much all manifestations of government and it's parasites. Is it not ridiculous that the US government pays farmers not to grow food? I think there's a good chance we'll see (some of us anyway) serious depopulation before my crazy sci-fi world gets spinning. Still, we should demand economic freedom for ourselves and others, do what we can to educate our fellow humans, and show a great deal of respect for the planet that keeps us alive. Our fate rests in our hands.


PS. Wealth is neither money nor resources. It is measured by what can be done with it. It is in that sense that it equals the standard of living, and that total wealth can be increased through technology.
i am not discounting advances in technology, i am simply stating the obvious facts about the resources on this planet. to provide sufficient calories, nutrients, and water to sustain human life, there are certain levels of biological stability that simply can't be changed by any technology. perhaps a thousand years from now we will figure out how to do that, but nothing in our current scientific sphere gives us any chance of developing such capabilities within the next several centuries. we can improve a great deal with technology, and that is factored in to analyses of carrying capacity, but there are some limitations that none of our technology can overcome.

what is funny to me is that you assume i haven't "stepped out of the box" to consider these options, despite the fact that i specifically stated i have spent years studying this field, and my own admission that i didn't want to believe in this limitation originally. i spent a great deal of time trying to establish that it IS possible to support our population, if everything is used properly and efficiently, and i consider all the avenues you propose and more. unfortunately, there are some laws of matter and energy that stand in our way, and certain requirements of the human body that science is unable to do away with.

now, we certainly can redistribute materials in such a way that most people on this planet get a radical improvement in quality of life. technology certainly can compensate for many current problems in acquiring, transporting, and distributing food, as well as solving a lot of the ecosystem degredation issues we are facing. but it can only go so far, and if we want to sustain "comfortable" lifestyles for all people then we will have to realize that this planet cannot support an infinite number of people. anybody who claims otherwise needs to review the concept of conservation of energy in closed systems, and conservation of mass.

No - for the same reasons that the stone age didn't end because we ran out of rocks.

We will find ways to become more efficient and find alternative sources.

Doomsday prophets like that have been around for years. And are always wrong.
what do doomsday prophets have to do with anything? i don't think the world is going to end, and i haven't been saying "we're all going to die" or any such nonsense. all i am pointing out is the obvious fact that the finite resources of this planet can only support a finite number of humans.

what do doomsday prophets have to do with anything? i don't think the world is going to end, and i haven't been saying "we're all going to die" or any such nonsense. all i am pointing out is the obvious fact that the finite resources of this planet can only support a finite number of humans.

I don't deny that we would be in trouble if everyone instantly began to live like Americans. It is, however, a slow process. As resources become scarcer, we will use them more efficiently and find others (nuclear, solar, geothermal, etc). And we aren't going to run out of concrete, iron and the like.

There are a plethora of alternatives that certainly won't take 1000s or even 100s of years to develop.

I would love it if gas got so expensive that people moved back into cities and out of the burbs.

Hence, many predict that World War 3 would be a battle for fresh water. Or at least resources.

How nutritious is people btw? There's alot of them in India and China. :D