Eutrusca
27-09-2004, 18:45
( From the New York Times )
Saddam, the Bomb and Me
By MAHDI OBEIDI
Published: September 26, 2004
While the final report from Charles A. Duelfer, the top American
inspector of Iraq's covert weapons programs, won't be released for a
few weeks, the portions that have already been made public touch on
many of the experiences I had while working as the head of Saddam
Hussein's nuclear centrifuge program. Now that I am living in the
United States, I hope to answer some of the most important questions
that remain.
What was really going in Iraq before the American invasion last year?
Iraq's nuclear weapons program was on the threshold of success before
the 1991 invasion of Kuwait - there is no doubt in my mind that we
could have produced dozens of nuclear weapons within a few years -
but was stopped in its tracks by United Nations weapons inspectors
after the Persian Gulf war and was never restarted. During the
1990's, the inspectors discovered all of the laboratories, machines
and materials we had used in the nuclear program, and all were
destroyed or otherwise incapacitated.
By 1998, when Saddam Hussein evicted the weapons inspectors from
Iraq, all that was left was the dangerous knowledge of hundreds of
scientists and the blueprints and prototype parts for the centrifuge,
which I had buried under a tree in my garden.
In addition to the inspections, the sanctions that were put in place
by the United Nations after the gulf war made reconstituting the
program impossible. During the 1980's, we had relied heavily on the
international black market for equipment and technology; the
sanctions closed that avenue.
Another factor in the mothballing of the program was that Saddam
Hussein was profiting handsomely from the United Nations oil-for-food
program, building palaces around the country with the money he
skimmed. I think he didn't want to risk losing this revenue stream by
trying to restart a secret weapons program.
Over the course of the 1990's, most of the scientists from the
nuclear program switched to working on civilian projects or in
conventional-weapons production, and the idea of building a nuclear
bomb became a vague dream from another era.
So, how could the West have made such a mistaken assessment of the
nuclear program before the invasion last year? Even to those of us
who knew better, it's fairly easy to see how observers got the wrong
impression. First, there was Saddam Hussein's history. He had
demonstrated his desire for nuclear weapons since the late 1970's,
when Iraqi scientists began making progress on a nuclear reactor. He
had used chemical weapons against his own people and against Iran
during the 1980's. After the 1991 war, he had tried to hide his
programs in weapons of mass destruction for as long as possible (he
even kept my identity secret from weapons inspectors until 1995). It
would have been hard not to suspect him of trying to develop such
weapons again.
The Western intelligence services and policy makers, however,
overlooked some obvious clues. One was the defection and death of
Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, who was in charge of the
unconventional weapons programs in the 1980's.
As my boss, Mr. Kamel was a brutal taskmaster who forced us to work
under impossible deadlines and was the motivating force for our
nuclear effort. The drive for nuclear weapons began in earnest when
he rose to a position of power in 1987. He placed a detail of 20
fearsome security men on the premises of our centrifuge lab, and my
staff and I worked wonders just to stay out of his dungeons. But
after he defected to Jordan in 1995, and then returned months later
only to be assassinated by his father-in-law's henchmen, the nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons programs lost their top promoter.
In addition, the West never understood the delusional nature of
Saddam Hussein's mind. By 2002, when the United States and Britain
were threatening war, he had lost touch with the reality of his
diminished military might. By that time I had been promoted to
director of projects for the country's entire military-industrial
complex, and I witnessed firsthand the fantasy world in which he was
living. He backed mythic but hopeless projects like one for a long-
range missile that was completely unrealistic considering the
constraints of international sanctions. The director of another
struggling missile project, when called upon to give a progress
report, recited a poem in the dictator's honor instead. Not only did
he not go to prison, Saddam Hussein applauded him.
By 2003, as the American invasion loomed, the tyrant was alternately
working on his next trashy novel and giving lunatic orders like
burning oil around Baghdad to "hide" the city from bombing attacks.
Unbelievably, one of my final assignments was to prepare a 10-year
plan for military-industrial works, even as tens of thousands of
troops were gathering for invasion.
To the end, Saddam Hussein kept alive the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission, staffed by junior scientists involved in research
completely unrelated to nuclear weapons, just so he could maintain
the illusion in his mind that he had a nuclear program. Sort of like
the emperor with no clothes, he fooled himself into believing he was
armed and dangerous. But unlike that fairy-tale ruler, Saddam Hussein
fooled the rest of the world as well.
Was Iraq a potential threat to the United States and the world?
Threat is always a matter of perception, but our nuclear program
could have been reinstituted at the snap of Saddam Hussein's fingers.
The sanctions and the lucrative oil-for-food program had served as
powerful deterrents, but world events - like Iran's current efforts
to step up its nuclear ambitions - might well have changed the
situation.
Iraqi scientists had the knowledge and the designs needed to
jumpstart the program if necessary. And there is no question that we
could have done so very quickly. In the late 1980's, we put together
the most efficient covert nuclear program the world has ever seen. In
about three years, we gained the ability to enrich uranium and nearly
become a nuclear threat; we built an effective centrifuge from
scratch, even though we started with no knowledge of centrifuge
technology. Had Saddam Hussein ordered it and the world looked the
other way, we might have shaved months if not years off our previous
efforts.
So what now? The dictator may be gone, but that doesn't mean the
nuclear problem is behind us. Even under the watchful eyes of Saddam
Hussein's security services, there were worries that our scientists
might escape to other countries or sell their knowledge to the
highest bidder. This expertise is even more valuable today, with
nuclear technology ever more available on the black market and a
proliferation of peaceful energy programs around the globe that use
equipment easily converted to military use.
Hundreds of my former staff members and fellow scientists possess
knowledge that could be useful to a rogue nation eager for a covert
nuclear weapons program. The vast majority are technicians who, like
the rest of us, care first about their families and their
livelihoods. It is vital that the United States ensure they get good
and constructive jobs in postwar Iraq. The most accomplished of my
former colleagues could be brought, at least temporarily, to the West
and placed at universities, research labs and private companies.
The United States invaded Iraq in part to end what it saw as a
nuclear danger. It is now vital to reduce the chance of Iraq's
dangerous knowledge spilling outside of its borders. The nuclear
dangers facing the world are growing, not decreasing. My hope is that
the Iraqi example can help people understand how best to deal with
this threat.
Mahdi Obeidi is the author of "The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of
Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind." Kurt Pitzer, who collaborated on the
book, assisted with this article.
Saddam, the Bomb and Me
By MAHDI OBEIDI
Published: September 26, 2004
While the final report from Charles A. Duelfer, the top American
inspector of Iraq's covert weapons programs, won't be released for a
few weeks, the portions that have already been made public touch on
many of the experiences I had while working as the head of Saddam
Hussein's nuclear centrifuge program. Now that I am living in the
United States, I hope to answer some of the most important questions
that remain.
What was really going in Iraq before the American invasion last year?
Iraq's nuclear weapons program was on the threshold of success before
the 1991 invasion of Kuwait - there is no doubt in my mind that we
could have produced dozens of nuclear weapons within a few years -
but was stopped in its tracks by United Nations weapons inspectors
after the Persian Gulf war and was never restarted. During the
1990's, the inspectors discovered all of the laboratories, machines
and materials we had used in the nuclear program, and all were
destroyed or otherwise incapacitated.
By 1998, when Saddam Hussein evicted the weapons inspectors from
Iraq, all that was left was the dangerous knowledge of hundreds of
scientists and the blueprints and prototype parts for the centrifuge,
which I had buried under a tree in my garden.
In addition to the inspections, the sanctions that were put in place
by the United Nations after the gulf war made reconstituting the
program impossible. During the 1980's, we had relied heavily on the
international black market for equipment and technology; the
sanctions closed that avenue.
Another factor in the mothballing of the program was that Saddam
Hussein was profiting handsomely from the United Nations oil-for-food
program, building palaces around the country with the money he
skimmed. I think he didn't want to risk losing this revenue stream by
trying to restart a secret weapons program.
Over the course of the 1990's, most of the scientists from the
nuclear program switched to working on civilian projects or in
conventional-weapons production, and the idea of building a nuclear
bomb became a vague dream from another era.
So, how could the West have made such a mistaken assessment of the
nuclear program before the invasion last year? Even to those of us
who knew better, it's fairly easy to see how observers got the wrong
impression. First, there was Saddam Hussein's history. He had
demonstrated his desire for nuclear weapons since the late 1970's,
when Iraqi scientists began making progress on a nuclear reactor. He
had used chemical weapons against his own people and against Iran
during the 1980's. After the 1991 war, he had tried to hide his
programs in weapons of mass destruction for as long as possible (he
even kept my identity secret from weapons inspectors until 1995). It
would have been hard not to suspect him of trying to develop such
weapons again.
The Western intelligence services and policy makers, however,
overlooked some obvious clues. One was the defection and death of
Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, who was in charge of the
unconventional weapons programs in the 1980's.
As my boss, Mr. Kamel was a brutal taskmaster who forced us to work
under impossible deadlines and was the motivating force for our
nuclear effort. The drive for nuclear weapons began in earnest when
he rose to a position of power in 1987. He placed a detail of 20
fearsome security men on the premises of our centrifuge lab, and my
staff and I worked wonders just to stay out of his dungeons. But
after he defected to Jordan in 1995, and then returned months later
only to be assassinated by his father-in-law's henchmen, the nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons programs lost their top promoter.
In addition, the West never understood the delusional nature of
Saddam Hussein's mind. By 2002, when the United States and Britain
were threatening war, he had lost touch with the reality of his
diminished military might. By that time I had been promoted to
director of projects for the country's entire military-industrial
complex, and I witnessed firsthand the fantasy world in which he was
living. He backed mythic but hopeless projects like one for a long-
range missile that was completely unrealistic considering the
constraints of international sanctions. The director of another
struggling missile project, when called upon to give a progress
report, recited a poem in the dictator's honor instead. Not only did
he not go to prison, Saddam Hussein applauded him.
By 2003, as the American invasion loomed, the tyrant was alternately
working on his next trashy novel and giving lunatic orders like
burning oil around Baghdad to "hide" the city from bombing attacks.
Unbelievably, one of my final assignments was to prepare a 10-year
plan for military-industrial works, even as tens of thousands of
troops were gathering for invasion.
To the end, Saddam Hussein kept alive the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission, staffed by junior scientists involved in research
completely unrelated to nuclear weapons, just so he could maintain
the illusion in his mind that he had a nuclear program. Sort of like
the emperor with no clothes, he fooled himself into believing he was
armed and dangerous. But unlike that fairy-tale ruler, Saddam Hussein
fooled the rest of the world as well.
Was Iraq a potential threat to the United States and the world?
Threat is always a matter of perception, but our nuclear program
could have been reinstituted at the snap of Saddam Hussein's fingers.
The sanctions and the lucrative oil-for-food program had served as
powerful deterrents, but world events - like Iran's current efforts
to step up its nuclear ambitions - might well have changed the
situation.
Iraqi scientists had the knowledge and the designs needed to
jumpstart the program if necessary. And there is no question that we
could have done so very quickly. In the late 1980's, we put together
the most efficient covert nuclear program the world has ever seen. In
about three years, we gained the ability to enrich uranium and nearly
become a nuclear threat; we built an effective centrifuge from
scratch, even though we started with no knowledge of centrifuge
technology. Had Saddam Hussein ordered it and the world looked the
other way, we might have shaved months if not years off our previous
efforts.
So what now? The dictator may be gone, but that doesn't mean the
nuclear problem is behind us. Even under the watchful eyes of Saddam
Hussein's security services, there were worries that our scientists
might escape to other countries or sell their knowledge to the
highest bidder. This expertise is even more valuable today, with
nuclear technology ever more available on the black market and a
proliferation of peaceful energy programs around the globe that use
equipment easily converted to military use.
Hundreds of my former staff members and fellow scientists possess
knowledge that could be useful to a rogue nation eager for a covert
nuclear weapons program. The vast majority are technicians who, like
the rest of us, care first about their families and their
livelihoods. It is vital that the United States ensure they get good
and constructive jobs in postwar Iraq. The most accomplished of my
former colleagues could be brought, at least temporarily, to the West
and placed at universities, research labs and private companies.
The United States invaded Iraq in part to end what it saw as a
nuclear danger. It is now vital to reduce the chance of Iraq's
dangerous knowledge spilling outside of its borders. The nuclear
dangers facing the world are growing, not decreasing. My hope is that
the Iraqi example can help people understand how best to deal with
this threat.
Mahdi Obeidi is the author of "The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of
Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind." Kurt Pitzer, who collaborated on the
book, assisted with this article.