NationStates Jolt Archive

(Dont know if I spelled those correctly :P)

So, Ive seen lots of people here posting about how horrible and evil the US is for nuking Japan.
My question is, why?
Of course you could argue that it was not JUST, but the world seldom is.
BUT, I am guessing that few people have looked at Japan just before the bombs fell. Yes, they were weakening militarily, but the problem was that most of the Japanese civilian population was ready to:
a. Commit suicide
b. Fight to the death

This would have resulted in HUGE casualties on BOTH sides. More bombing raids on cities, killing more people.
The US casualties figure by itself was in the millions I beleive.
I dont like to speculate on the Japanese totals.

So, what would you say?
Bloody invasion, most of you (If your in the US, or any other nations with plans to invade Japan during WWII) would not be here because your grandparents would be buried in Japan, and of course, theres a %75 chance that you wouldnt be here if you were Japanse because the US would have had to kill most of your relatives to get the country under control.
As I said above, this would also entail more bombings, reducing Tokyo and other cities (Most likly including Hiroshima and Nagasaki) to rubble.

So, we chose the easy way.
Two bombs, two cities, about 500,000 people (Each, or total, I cant remember), no US casualties.

BEFOR YOU POST:
Please, this is about World War 2, not Iraq, Bush or the upcoming election. Disregard them, Bush and Kerry have not been born yet. ;)

BEFOR YOU POST:
Please, this is about World War 2, not Iraq, Bush or the upcoming election. Disregard them, Bush and Kerry have not been born yet. ;)
Kerry was born 1943.

Ok. Let's say it was necessary to drop the bombs in order to get Japan to surrender. Was it necessary to drop them on civilians though? Would it have been enough to drop them in rural areas and maybe ask the Japanese to consider surrendering, or the next ones will hit cities?

Ok, so hes two years old and doesnt care about politics at all.

EDIT:
As I recall, one of the cities was a bomb factory or some sort of military storehouse.
That aside, nuking a random area of country doesnt have the same effect as a city. AND, what about every other nation in the war flattening cities with conventional bombs? Not to be disrespectful to the Japanese, but we were simply more effecient.

EDIT AGAIN:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki#The_bombing_2
Good details on the bombings, it seems

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall
US planned invasion of Japan.

It seems I overesimated the casualties, the first article gives about 200,000 plus, the plus mostly consisiting of those who were vaporized.

Its not so much the numbers of dead that matter, but the fact that anyone would even consider using a nuclear weapon. Had Japan had nuclear weapons at the time, which it didnt, but had a U-Boat carrying uranium to Japan not been sunk (not that the ship that sunk it knew what it was carrying) they may well have, it could of caused the worlds first and last nuclear war.

Someone once said (cant remember who) "I do not know with what weapons world war III will be fought with but world war IV will be fought with sticks and stones"

There is also the issue of dropping fu**ing nukes! The Allied forces had plenty of other weapons at it's disposal that could have targetted areas more specifically.

The Japanese were nuked because the powers-that-be had the ability and didn't want their precious new weapons to go to waste. Plus, it showed the rest of the world exactly what the US were capable of.

The only thing nuclear technology should be used for is creating electricity.

Happy Hospital, MAD was not an issue at the time, aside from that, what would you suggest we do?
Conventional invasions, while possible, would have resulted in MORE Japanese casualties, as i said.

New Raveena, see above.

Efficient? The bombing created fall-out that is still being felt today.

If you call the legacy of a war that will poison a country for centuries efficient, then I take my hat off to good ol' US efficiency.

Happy Hospital, MAD was not an issue at the time, aside from that, what would you suggest we do?
Conventional invasions, while possible, would have resulted in MORE Japanese casualties, as i said

Just because you have a thing, doesn't mean you have to use it.

The Allied forces were bombing the crap out of countries all over the world all through the war with great effect. Not one nuclear weapon was used. Air strikes were surgical and tactical and could have been used on Japan, if it was required. They used nuclear weapons because they could, not because they had to.

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a barbaric act. The plan as proposed by the scientists who worked on it, was to drop it as a demonstration of the possible destruction and therefore coerce them into surrendering. You might say "They wouldn't have listened! They were ready to kill themselves anyways!." That's not the point. No one knows what would have happened if we had done that (logical) step. People are still developing cancer at much higher rates in both those cities because of the action we took. I will never believe the act was justified.

[QUOTE=Dontgonearthere]...That aside, nuking a random area of country doesnt have the same effect as a city... [QUOTE]

So You don't think they could have produced a show big enough with 2 a-bombs dropped ANYWHERE BUT in a city to make Japanese high command to think things over?

So, you would rather we flattened cities the old fashioned way?
How many would it take, do you think, before Japan surrendered?
And the REASON nobody else used nukes was because they didnt have them, or because the war in their area was over and there was no need.

EDIT:
No, I dont think dropping them outside of cities would have the same effect.

And again, I ask you, WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE? What BETTER COURSE, is there?
An invasion of Japan would have crippled both the US and Japan, with MILLIONS of casualties on BOTH sides. Sure, some people wouldnt have cancer, and I feel sorry for those that developed it, but you know, they wouldnt be here at all if we had tried a conventional invasion.

Who ever said that Japan had to be bombed to surrender? The rulers were ready to surrender before the bombs were dropped. This is accepted military history.

And as for the line about all Japanese citizens being ready to commit suicide and fight to the death? Sounds like somebody got sold a polictically dubious line about the Japanese people and figured that there was no need to check out the real story behind the kamikaze myth.

Next you'll be posting that everyone in Japan is an inscrutable ninja.

So, you would rather we flattened cities the old fashioned way?
How many would it take, do you think, before Japan surrendered?
And the REASON nobody else used nukes was because they didnt have them, or because the war in their area was over and there was no need.

EDIT:
No, I dont think dropping them outside of cities would have the same effect.

And again, I ask you, WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE? What BETTER COURSE, is there?
An invasion of Japan would have crippled both the US and Japan, with MILLIONS of casualties on BOTH sides. Sure, some people wouldnt have cancer, and I feel sorry for those that developed it, but you know, they wouldnt be here at all if we had tried a conventional invasion.

<sarcasm> Oh, you dont think dropping them outside of cities would have had the same effect? And that's why you're dismissing my argument? Well YOU don't think so, I suppose the argument must be invalid... </sarcasm>

No, I dont think dropping them outside of cities would have the same effect.

And again, I ask you, WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE? What BETTER COURSE, is there?
An invasion of Japan would have crippled both the US and Japan, with MILLIONS of casualties on BOTH sides. Sure, some people wouldnt have cancer, and I feel sorry for those that developed it, but you know, they wouldnt be here at all if we had tried a conventional invasion.

Well, seems like you are pretty sure it was the right thing to do. No point arguing that I suppose.

What would I have done? What better course in the case the bombs HAD to be dropped? Well, maybe choosing smaller cities then...

Ok, let me remind all of you: this was a war, people were dying, things were getting blown up everywhere. The fact that a nuke was used is not something to be outragedd about, and especially not fifty years after the fact, considering the conditions and circumstances. America was faced with an enemy who had fought to the death on smaller islands such as Tarawa, Guadalcanal, and Iwo Jima with devestating effectiveness, hiding in caves, making it hard for them to be found, causing countless searches for Japanese soldiers which generally ended in at least a few fatalaties, and generally more. Truman was faced with the option of a quick end with a few devestating attacks (which were said to cause unspeakable horrors, but hey, so does napalm, so do incendiary attacks) or fight as long as Japanese citizens thought they had a chance. He took what, to him, seemed to be the wiser of the two paths. As for the arguement, "oh, but they poisoned the land:" they didn't know that would happen. They had no idea how long radioactivity would stay in the area, what it would do, what the fallout would do. That wasn't realized until well after 1950 (remember the pictures of Las Vegas all lit up and with a mushroom cloud in the background?). IMHO, America chose a path which, while it would be reprehensible today, was then the wisest course of action possible.

As a student of WW2 in the Pacific for a few years I understand that many of you think that all Japanese people were blood thirsty war-mongers, and that the only way to stop them was to end the war by the bomb. However, as numerous studies have shown this is not the case.

The Japanese government was in ruins by 1945. They saw the collapse of the Nazi regime, the war in China going badly, the Russians moving towards attack, and the United States as an undefeatable enemy. The Emperor himself was ready for surrender, unfortunately, at the time he had little real say in what went on. The military's power had grown astronomically throughout the war and they weren't about to let go. As shown by the number of civilians killed on Okinawa becaues the military told them either to die in battle or at the hands of their neighboors, but under no circumstances should they be taken as prisoners of war. How many civilians od you think really wanted to die like that? From the personal accounts I've read the result is not many.

By the time the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the Emperor and the small faction of pro-surrenderists were gaining ground. Had the US not stipulated an unconditional surrender in the Postdam Declaration it is possible that the bombing could have been avoided altogether. As it is however the initial bombing of Hiroshima could be argued as necessary. It gave the Emperor the momentum needed to kick out the militarists.

The bombing of Nagasaki however was completely unnecessary. The Japanese government had 2 full days to bring about some course of action, which wasn't nearly enough time. It took them a day to figure out that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was no ordinary bomb. Had the US given the Japanese more time they would have been able to start negotiating peace.

The loss of Japanese lives would have been astronomical as both civilians and soldiers would have died. The loss of American lives on the other hand would have been high, but no where near the number those in charge initially estimated. The Japanese people were already demoralized by the lack of food, resources, and government support that it would have been easier than many thought to invade Honshu. (I'm not implying that they would been push overs, as shown by the invasion of Okinawa.) If you look at the invasion of Okinawa the Japanese people were told that the Americans were white devils and would rape, pillage, and kill to their hearts content. What many of the survivors of Okinawa found was that the Americans were there to save them from their militarist government. They offered the children shelter and food, and the adults life.

In short, there were options besides the use of 2 atomic bombs. The government should have looked at their options before deciding that the bomb needed to be used to appease the people of America. Their decision has repurcussions even today, leading to the possibility of nuclear holocaust.

As a student of WW2 in the Pacific for a few years I understand that many of you think that all Japanese people were blood thirsty war-mongers, and that the only way to stop them was to end the war by the bomb. However, as numerous studies have shown this is not the case.

The Japanese government was in ruins by 1945. They saw the collapse of the Nazi regime, the war in China going badly, the Russians moving towards attack, and the United States as an undefeatable enemy. The Emperor himself was ready for surrender, unfortunately, at the time he had little real say in what went on. The military's power had grown astronomically throughout the war and they weren't about to let go. As shown by the number of civilians killed on Okinawa becaues the military told them either to die in battle or at the hands of their neighboors, but under no circumstances should they be taken as prisoners of war. How many civilians od you think really wanted to die like that? From the personal accounts I've read the result is not many.

By the time the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the Emperor and the small faction of pro-surrenderists were gaining ground. Had the US not stipulated an unconditional surrender in the Postdam Declaration it is possible that the bombing could have been avoided altogether. As it is however the initial bombing of Hiroshima could be argued as necessary. It gave the Emperor the momentum needed to kick out the militarists.

The bombing of Nagasaki however was completely unnecessary. The Japanese government had 2 full days to bring about some course of action, which wasn't nearly enough time. It took them a day to figure out that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was no ordinary bomb. Had the US given the Japanese more time they would have been able to start negotiating peace.

The loss of Japanese lives would have been astronomical as both civilians and soldiers would have died. The loss of American lives on the other hand would have been high, but no where near the number those in charge initially estimated. The Japanese people were already demoralized by the lack of food, resources, and government support that it would have been easier than many thought to invade Honshu. (I'm not implying that they would been push overs, as shown by the invasion of Okinawa.) If you look at the invasion of Okinawa the Japanese people were told that the Americans were white devils and would rape, pillage, and kill to their hearts content. What many of the survivors of Okinawa found was that the Americans were there to save them from their militarist government. They offered the children shelter and food, and the adults life.

In short, there were options besides the use of 2 atomic bombs. The government should have looked at their options before deciding that the bomb needed to be used to appease the people of America. Their decision has repurcussions even today, leading to the possibility of nuclear holocaust.

Thankyou for that very well thought out response, Karvaya. As to the post above this about "...is nothing to be outraged about - especially 50 years after the fact." Better rethink that statement, friend.

As a student of WW2 in the Pacific for a few years I understand that many of you think that all Japanese people were blood thirsty war-mongers, and that the only way to stop them was to end the war by the bomb. However, as numerous studies have shown this is not the case.

The Japanese government was in ruins by 1945. They saw the collapse of the Nazi regime, the war in China going badly, the Russians moving towards attack, and the United States as an undefeatable enemy. The Emperor himself was ready for surrender, unfortunately, at the time he had little real say in what went on. The military's power had grown astronomically throughout the war and they weren't about to let go. As shown by the number of civilians killed on Okinawa becaues the military told them either to die in battle or at the hands of their neighboors, but under no circumstances should they be taken as prisoners of war. How many civilians od you think really wanted to die like that? From the personal accounts I've read the result is not many.

By the time the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the Emperor and the small faction of pro-surrenderists were gaining ground. Had the US not stipulated an unconditional surrender in the Postdam Declaration it is possible that the bombing could have been avoided altogether. As it is however the initial bombing of Hiroshima could be argued as necessary. It gave the Emperor the momentum needed to kick out the militarists.

The bombing of Nagasaki however was completely unnecessary. The Japanese government had 2 full days to bring about some course of action, which wasn't nearly enough time. It took them a day to figure out that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was no ordinary bomb. Had the US given the Japanese more time they would have been able to start negotiating peace.

The loss of Japanese lives would have been astronomical as both civilians and soldiers would have died. The loss of American lives on the other hand would have been high, but no where near the number those in charge initially estimated. The Japanese people were already demoralized by the lack of food, resources, and government support that it would have been easier than many thought to invade Honshu. (I'm not implying that they would been push overs, as shown by the invasion of Okinawa.) If you look at the invasion of Okinawa the Japanese people were told that the Americans were white devils and would rape, pillage, and kill to their hearts content. What many of the survivors of Okinawa found was that the Americans were there to save them from their militarist government. They offered the children shelter and food, and the adults life.

In short, there were options besides the use of 2 atomic bombs. The government should have looked at their options before deciding that the bomb needed to be used to appease the people of America. Their decision has repurcussions even today, leading to the possibility of nuclear holocaust.

Two days is at least enough time to send a radio message, a telegram, anything, saying "We're considering surrender, can we have a temporary cease-fire?" Japan did nothing of the sort, and, as such, America assumed that they still intended to make war with America.

As for the "other options," I would like to hear them. If they involve an American invasion of the Japanese mainland, you are suggesting that America should sacrifice American soldiers to end a war started by Japan in such a way that the Japanese citizens (who were, at one point, more than ready to go to war with America) would lose as little as possible. If they involve firebombing Japan into submission, that would have had the same kind of effect as the atomic bombs. The fact of the matter is that the Japanese military was not going to surrender (and, as they had more power than the citizens, Japan was not going to surrender) until they were clearly beaten or until they were shown the new nuclear firepower of America.

Killing human beings is wrong, and a bad thing. There is no circumstance wherein murder is justifiable. If ever the thought of human pain, suffering, and denial of existence gives one cause for joy, glee, or satisfaction, that is the time for deep self-examination.

OK, so what about demonstarting nuclear capability on somewhere uninhabited, as with all the tests they later did when developing larger ones?

Yes, there was the question of "what if it didn't work?" But that question existed if it hadn't worked the situation it was used in. In that case, no-one would have been any the wiser. So they could have detonated one somewhere uninhabited, without alerting people first, but so that if it succeded then the Japanese blooming well knew about it. Bingo, no-one dies; the Japanese know about nuclear capability; war ends.

Killing human beings is wrong, and a bad thing. There is no circumstance wherein murder is justifiable. If ever the thought of human pain, suffering, and denial of existence gives one cause for joy, glee, or satisfaction, that is the time for deep self-examination.

What if by killing person A, you save persons B, C, and D? Is it alright then? Technically, you are saving life, right?

(Dont know if I spelled those correctly :P)

So, Ive seen lots of people here posting about how horrible and evil the US is for nuking Japan.
My question is, why?
Of course you could argue that it was not JUST, but the world seldom is.
BUT, I am guessing that few people have looked at Japan just before the bombs fell. Yes, they were weakening militarily, but the problem was that most of the Japanese civilian population was ready to:
a. Commit suicide
b. Fight to the death

This would have resulted in HUGE casualties on BOTH sides. More bombing raids on cities, killing more people.
The US casualties figure by itself was in the millions I beleive.
I dont like to speculate on the Japanese totals.

So, what would you say?
Bloody invasion, most of you (If your in the US, or any other nations with plans to invade Japan during WWII) would not be here because your grandparents would be buried in Japan, and of course, theres a %75 chance that you wouldnt be here if you were Japanse because the US would have had to kill most of your relatives to get the country under control.
As I said above, this would also entail more bombings, reducing Tokyo and other cities (Most likly including Hiroshima and Nagasaki) to rubble.

So, we chose the easy way.
Two bombs, two cities, about 500,000 people (Each, or total, I cant remember), no US casualties.

BEFOR YOU POST:
Please, this is about World War 2, not Iraq, Bush or the upcoming election. Disregard them, Bush and Kerry have not been born yet. ;)
While I agree that the Japanese would have inflicted tremendous casualities upon the US.
I do not approve of the use Atoms bombs for that reason.
I approve of the use of Atom bombs for revenge for the cold blooded murder of millions of Chinese, acts so vile that they rival if not exceed the German crimes against the Jews.
Pearl Hobour doesnt jusitfiy the use of Atomic weapons, the nightmare of the Japanese on Chinese soil truthfully required more then those two explosions.
I have no pity what so ever for the Japanese, it was a war.
You fight wars to win them.
Respecting an adversary is one thing, sympathizing is very much another.
There are still Japanese today who feel justified in their nations barbaric treatment of the Chinese, America was simply the Karmic reactions of those attrocities.
It is only a pity that they in the West do not do more to educate in the public schools the horror perpetrated by the Japanese on the Chinese, this can only be blamed on the American concept of not having Americans sympathize with a Communist society.
Luckily the cold war is over, hopefully schools will teach children that both our German and Japanese allies have been responsible for two of the most obscene acts of human depravation the twentieth century saw.

Two days is at least enough time to send a radio message, a telegram, anything, saying "We're considering surrender, can we have a temporary cease-fire?" Japan did nothing of the sort, and, as such, America assumed that they still intended to make war with America.

Japan was suing for peace before the bombs were dropped.
I think the bombing was more important politically than millitarily. It was demonstrate to the post-war world that US was an overwhelmingly superior force. Plus, the allies had already agreed at Yalta that the USSR would attack Japan three months after Germany surrendered. Stalin had notified the United States that the Russian armies would be ready for that attack on schedule, that is, August 8. By bombing before that, the US was able to keep the Soviet Union out of the Japanese peace settlement.

Droping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the best course of action Truman could have chosen. Karvaya made the case that the Emperor of Japan was slowly gaining support for surrender, but the fact that's missing here is whether or not the United States, specifically President Truman, knew that there was a move to surrender. It appears that the US didn't know, which makes the resulting actions tragic, but it no way wrong. Truman had to make the call that was best for his people. Karvaya also seems to imply that the Allied call for unconditional surrender was foolish. The demand for unconditional surreder was required. Only unconditional surrender would be considered a victory for the Allied Forces. If Germany and Japan had been allowed to surrender on thier own conditions, I have no doubts in my mind that our map of the globe would be very different from what it is today. The axis nations would have been able to claim parts of the conqured territories as their own, which was unacceptable to the Allied Forces.

Remember people had just split the atom, nobody had a clue what an uncontroled nuclear reaction would do until the Trinity Field test. A number of well respected scientist speculared that the sky would burn. Of course they were wrong, but it illustrates thier sheer ignorance in the matter. Nobody had ever seen anything like this before. About radiation there were predictions that it would be around for centuries and others that it would be gone almost instantly. When the Bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, many survivors could only explain the devastation by saying the US had dropped gasoline all over the city. Now why was Nagasaki bombed? Only a one-two punch would deliver the blow required to bring the Japanese military to it's knees (working from the assumption that Truman believed the Japanes military to still be formidable.). It was a bluff. The US had to show that it had the capability to totally destroy the island nation, to reduce it to litterally ash. But the US only had 2 bombs. It couldn't use one and then allow the Japanese time to recover, and develop a reslove, such to the point that a second bombing could prove fruitless, and never have the abilty to lauch a third. The Japanese had to be shown that there were no other options, they had to believe that if they did not surrender, not only would they lose the war, but their nation would ultimately be wiped from the surface of the Earth.

I find it amazing that people decry the loss of life associated with the dropping of the two A-bombs. However, more people were killed in the firebombing of Tokyo and Dresden than both Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. Secondly, the Japanese military staged a coup after the bombs were dropped to stop the Emperor from surrendering. They failed and the Japan surrendered the next day. The mindset of the Japanese military was to fight to the last man, woman and child for their homeland. The Allies were planning an invasion for 1946 that would dwarf D-Day and projected, based on the cost of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, 1 million Allied casualties for the Japanese home Islands. Japanese home guard was training woman, children and elderly people to fight the invaders coming ashore with sharpened bamboo poles. I am here today probably because my grandfathers (both in the US Army, serving in Europe) were not redeployed to the Pacific for the Japanese Home Islands Invasion. Should we have dropped the bomb? I say drop that fucker. Twice.

Who ever said that Japan had to be bombed to surrender? The rulers were ready to surrender before the bombs were dropped. This is accepted military history.

And as for the line about all Japanese citizens being ready to commit suicide and fight to the death? Sounds like somebody got sold a polictically dubious line about the Japanese people and figured that there was no need to check out the real story behind the kamikaze myth.

Next you'll be posting that everyone in Japan is an inscrutable ninja.


The Emperor may have wanted to surrender but the powerful military leadership did not. Tojo wanted to fight to the last man.

Two days is at least enough time to send a radio message, a telegram, anything, saying "We're considering surrender, can we have a temporary cease-fire?" Japan did nothing of the sort, and, as such, America assumed that they still intended to make war with America.

How do we know they hadn't received a message from the Japanese? As Pelliwink said, the whole think stinks of being a political strike more than a military strike.

The Japanese had bombed the crap out of Pearl Harbour and the US government were really pissed off. They had the means and the stomach to teach the world a lesson and they did just that.

I'm not going to infiltrate this thread with anything from direct from current history, but that sort of political strike occurs constantly and will continue to occur. The Japanese hurt the US, the US hurt the Japanese 10-fold.

Just be glad Bohr had better scientific support than Heisenburg or we probably wouldn't be having this conversation.

Um, people? We were *already* firebombing the hell out of cities in Japan (among other countries) before we dropped the A-bombs. The country was basically in ruins when the decision was made to kill thousands *more* innocent civilians; I believe the total estimate of those killed in two attacks amounts to somehting not unlike 200,000 people in Hiroshima and 250,000 in Nagasaki. 150 of those 250,000 were military personnel, according to http://www.isreview.org/issues/13/Hiroshima-Nagasaki.shtml. Anyone saying that it was fair because we killed soldiers, too, think of this: what if another country dropped nuclear bombs on D.C.? They would kill a much larger number of soldiers than were killed in the two A-bomb attacks in Japan, as well as a larger number of civilians. Would that be just? And even after we bombed the hell out of them, why couldn't we have treated the Japanese people with more respect? There's a famous story about an American soldier who unwittingly caused his Japanese servent to commit suicide by chewing him out over a small mistake in front of a group of people. I mean, we occupied their country and *wrote their constitution for them.* If the British had written the American Contitution, would we regard it with such veneration as we do today?
Everything we did in Japan was overkill.

Dresden

Now that was a travesty of an attack and something the British will probably never forget. I was shocked what I first heard about the attack on Dresden during studies of history at school.

What if by killing person A, you save persons B, C, and D? Is it alright then? Technically, you are saving life, right?

Technically, yes, you are 'saving' life, in much the same way that you 'save' money by using a coupon to by grocery items. But, you're still spending money, coupon or not.

I firmly, firmly believe what Isaac Asimov said in the 'Foundation' series of books, that 'Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent'. Would it not be possible to save persons, B, C, and D through nonviolent means? Why must I accept an all-or-nothing scenario? It's not as if we are dealing with forces of Nature, we are talking about human beings, who are terribly intelligent, flexible entities, capable of seeing more than black & white on any given issue.

The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were TERRORIST ATTACKS.

They weren't military strikes. Neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki were Army bases, they were cities. They weren't all stuffed with soldiers and weapons, civilians were living there. Both cities were of little strategic value to the U.S. at that time.

The bombs were dropped to create fear and terror among the population to create pressure upon those in charge. And that is exactly what terrorism is all about: you strike against civilians to pressure the politicians.

Those saying "It was a war - bad things happen" or "It was efficient, the best thing the U.S. could do" couldn't express a simpler logic. There are rules in war, as funny as it may sound. And the prime rule is to not attack those not involved in the fighting. If weapon factories are situated in urban areas and bombardments ment for the factories hit the housings it is aweful, but probably not to prevent. But dropping A-Bombs on metropolisses the U.S. officials knew they were slaughtering millions of innocent people.

Especially an enlightened democratic country, as the U.S. claims to be one, cannot commit warcrimes like these.

I'd agree with what a lot of the pro-dropping people said, especially Blink. What people have to remember is that we didn't have a large stockpile of these things, only two - so we can't really afford to take a gamble that dropping it in a rural area will have the same effect as leveling a whole city.

I mean, we occupied their country and *wrote their constitution for them.* If the British had written the American Contitution, would we regard it with such veneration as we do today?
Everything we did in Japan was overkill.

There's just one major difference: America won the war of Independence. Japan lost world war II. After you get defeated, you play by the victor's rules.

The best way to end the war was to use the bombs, but I disagree with the way they were used.

For starters, that World War III/World War IV/sticks and stones quote was Albert Einstein. :)

I'll keep this short since the topic seems to have already been exhausted.
World War II was an entirely different time, and a different state of mind, not to mention a different stance on war. It was the last time we had a true MILITARY threat against the United States. America bombed German cities, Germany bombed British cities, Britain bombed German cities... Military targets were sometimes just targets of opportunity. Intelligence was not collected by satellites or sophisticated radar (though it was in development). We didn't know where moving tank columns were all the time, but Berlin didn't get up and move. It's sad but true--World War II was fought heavily with propoganda and demoralization. A nuclear weapon can be more demoralizing than any soldier's (or civilian's for that matter) will to fight.

I saw that someone here said that we should demonstrate the bomb before using it. It was ruled out because they were set to fight till the end. As for trying to sue for peace? They went to the USSR to contact America. USSR didn't because of an agreement made with the USA. (and here I thought everyone knew this)

The first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. After that bomb dropped, it sent ripples through the military hirearchy. Did Japan surrender? NO THEY DID NOT! Three days later, Nagasaki went up. Japanese Emperor Hirohito (and yea I do think that is spelled right) was ready to surrender. The Japanese Military tried a coup but was defeated. That was when the Emperor went on the radio and announced it was over. However, he never did utter the word surrender in his radio address. On August 14, 1945, five days after Nagasaki, Japan surrendered. It wasn't official til September 2, 1945!

sophisticated radar (though it was in development)

Radar was actually used by the British in WW2. Think it was the main reason the Battle of Britain was a success, we saw them flying over the British channel before they got too close!

The atomic bombs may not have been nessary at all. There was a Japanese admiral (forgot his name) with had a high post in the military government who offered a Japanese surrender with the one condition that they keep their Emperor. Also, the Japanese military government was holding out for the slight chance that the Soviet Union would ally with them. Conversely, they were also afrade of the Soviet military due to the fact that the Japanese military lost their first major battle to the Soviet army in an attempted invasion of Siberia. Many observers, advisors and experts said that if the Soviet Union offically declared war on Japan and started moving on Japanese terratory the Japanese would of surrendered. In fact, the head of the OSS told Truman to wait for Japan to surrender because they would soon after the Soviet declaration of war.

Its not so much the numbers of dead that matter, but the fact that anyone would even consider using a nuclear weapon. Had Japan had nuclear weapons at the time, which it didnt, but had a U-Boat carrying uranium to Japan not been sunk (not that the ship that sunk it knew what it was carrying) they may well have, it could of caused the worlds first and last nuclear war.

Someone once said (cant remember who) "I do not know with what weapons world war III will be fought with but world war IV will be fought with sticks and stones"


The U-boat wasn't sunk, it was forced to surface and was captured.


Albert Einstein said the quote.

Now that was a travesty of an attack and something the British will probably never forget. I was shocked what I first heard about the attack on Dresden during studies of history at school.
I live in Dresden. Its back to about 600k citizens again, but was in ashes after WW2. A really beautiful city flattened - for nothing, since the war was practically over in February 1945. With the death of many hundreds of thousands of civilians as result. I have read a version of a history website stating that "only" about 35.000 civilians died, which I highly doubt, considering the masses of refugees that were seeking shelter in Dresden from the advancing Red Army. It is good to see however that it has not been forgotten. Let this be a lesson that war causes endless grief and is seldom the absolute solution. My grandmother survived the attack and just recently told me what it was like to flee with her mother from the suction of the burning city and how sparks of fire burned through her trousers, while sitting on the bicycle with her mother. The pain she felt is still real for her today and she is an avid anti-american now when she sees how carelessly the US start wars and how little respect the US have for civilian lives.

I saw that someone here said that we should demonstrate the bomb before using it....

That would be me then, I guess. Except I didn't say you should have demonstrated it before using it. I said you could have used it in a demonstrative manner.

Did that only to address the initial question, which was something in the lines of "Some ppl seem to think nuking two cities was horrific. WHY? What would you have done?".

I do realize the facts present when the decision was made. I do not think it was an accident the first one was dropped when Attlee, Stalin and Truman were gathered in Potsdam. It was to serve political purposes as much as a way to end the war and save American lives. I do not think they cared much about Japanese lives at that point.

Japanese indeed committed horrible acts all across the pacific theatre. Tens, hundreds of thousands of people were killed in conventional bombings across the world in ww2.

So, was nuking 2 cities a horrific act. Well, after all that said above, I still believe it was. Seems like people in this thread are 50-50 for and against... for some reason that makes me sad.

The pain she felt is still real for her today and she is an avid anti-american now when she sees how carelessly the US start wars and how little respect the US have for civilian lives.

NEWSFLASH Gigatron:

The war in Europe was started by GERMANY!!!! The war in the Pacific was started by JAPAN!!! We sure as hell didn't start the war on terror or the war of 1812 or the Civil War, or the Spanish American war nor WWI nor Korea nor Vietnam nor did we start the first Iraq war! Our enemies started them and we finished them. The latter wars with allies! I guess your grandmother forgot that.

I firmly, firmly believe what Isaac Asimov said in the 'Foundation' series of books, that 'Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent'. Would it not be possible to save persons, B, C, and D through nonviolent means? Why must I accept an all-or-nothing scenario? It's not as if we are dealing with forces of Nature, we are talking about human beings, who are terribly intelligent, flexible entities, capable of seeing more than black & white on any given issue.

As much as I respect you for your ideals, I'm afraid you have left an important factor out of your reasoning. There are incompetent people in the world, there is violence. If you react to violence with passivity, you end up with a madman raging unstopped (Remember how Britain and France gave Hitler the Sudetenland to try and get him to stop?). If someone perpetrates violence, and threatens to continue doing so, then you must react. In a one-on-one situation, the solution can very well be at least nonlethal, and perhaps even nonviolent. However, when an entire nation's army attacks another with no warning, and refuses to say they will desist, they must be fought, or else they will continue committing such crimes. The atom bombs were thought to be the least deadly way of achieving the goal of subduing Japan, justifying their use at the time. Whether or not there was a better way is hard to say, and, even if there was, hindsight is 20/20, and not really available at the moment you must make the decision. I think the atom bombs, even using your philosophy (although a slight bastardization), were the best decision in that scenario.

NEWSFLASH Gigatron:

The war in Europe was started by GERMANY!!!! The war in the Pacific was started by JAPAN!!! We sure as hell didn't start the war on terror or the war of 1812 or the Civil War, or the Spanish American war nor WWI nor Korea nor Vietnam nor did we start the first Iraq war! Our enemies started them and we finished them. The latter wars with allies! I guess your grandmother forgot that.
You seem to have no scale of what is neccessary and justified in a war and what is not. That may be due to the US never suffering through real war on their own turf. All you see and cause is the suffering of others while you can safely sit on your continent. Besides this, my grandmother did not forget why the war started. She didnt want the war and didnt support it, but as usual in politics, she had no say in the matter.

MY GRANDFATHER WAS HELD BY THE JAPS IN BURMA ,
SINCE THEN HE REFUSES TO BUY ANYTHING FROM THEIR COUNTRY, OR EVEN TALKS ABOUT THEM , OR HIS INCARCERATION ( if thats how it,s spelt )
THEY HAVE DONE A LOT MORE DAMAGE (PHYSICALLY & MENTALLY ), TO THEIR PRISONERS THAN WE EVER DID !!!!!, TO THEM THE GENEVA CONVENTION AND RED CROSS WAS NEVER EVER RECOGNISED, I,M NOT A VINDICTIVE PERSON BUT HEY LOOK AT THEIR HISTORY TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE ..... :confused:

That would be me then, I guess. Except I didn't say you should have demonstrated it before using it. I said you could have used it in a demonstrative manner.

what is the difference? That is almost as bad as Kerry saying "I'll fight a more sensative war.."

Did that only to address the initial question, which was something in the lines of "Some ppl seem to think nuking two cities was horrific. WHY? What would you have done?".

I would've dropped them. It was either that or wipe out the entire Japanese islands. Be advised, I saw a plan in there to use poison gas in the initial landing. More people died in the firebombings on Japanese cities than in the Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki!

I do realize the facts present when the decision was made. I do not think it was an accident the first one was dropped when Attlee, Stalin and Truman were gathered in Potsdam. It was to serve political purposes as much as a way to end the war and save American lives. I do not think they cared much about Japanese lives at that point.

Actually I believe otherwise. If they didn't, how many MORE would've died in the invasion of Japan? Remember, it was the Military Junta that started the war, not the emperor or the civilians.

Japanese indeed committed horrible acts all across the pacific theatre. Tens, hundreds of thousands of people were killed in conventional bombings across the world in ww2.

This I won't argue with because this is most definitely true.

So, was nuking 2 cities a horrific act. Well, after all that said above, I still believe it was. Seems like people in this thread are 50-50 for and against... for some reason that makes me sad.

I won't say it wasn't horrific but I would rather use a weapon that would end the war quickly than prolong a war in which the enemy WON'T SURRENDER no matter what the circumstances. I am of the opinion that it was the right thing to do considering what the projected casualties where in an invasion.

NEWSFLASH Gigatron:

The war in Europe was started by GERMANY!!!! The war in the Pacific was started by JAPAN!!! We sure as hell didn't start the war on terror or the war of 1812 or the Civil War, or the Spanish American war nor WWI nor Korea nor Vietnam nor did we start the first Iraq war! Our enemies started them and we finished them. The latter wars with allies! I guess your grandmother forgot that.

No. WWII was started by an insane Austrian who just happened to get enough power in Germany to launch a war that dragged the whole world to the brink of annihilation.

And I don't think Gigatron's grandmother would have forgotten that seeing as she lived through it!!!!

What happened at Dresden was fu**ed up and was not necessary. I am British, it is a blight in our history that I hope we never forget and, more importantly never repeat.

You seem to have no scale of what is neccessary and justified in a war and what is not. That may be due to the US never suffering through real war on their own turf.

You forget the Civil War, the War of 1812, and the Revolutionary War.

The bombings were not necessary.

This article explains why in great detail:
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm

well we did start the Civil War and the Spanish American War, and the Mexican War to add.

I have dealt with many WWII veterns, i've asked them what they felt and all of them agreed that the bomb was right. No one wanted to fight.

As for the mass suicide thing, many Japanese(somewhere in the thousands) committed suicide after the U.S. took Okinawa

No. WWII was started by an insane Austrian who just happened to get enough power in Germany to launch a war that dragged the whole world to the brink of annihilation.

Well he was the ruler of Germany thus Germany started the war. Doesn't matter where Hitler was from. The fact was he was the ruler of Germany and launched the Invasion of Poland!

And I don't think Gigatron's grandmother would have forgotten that seeing as she lived through it!!!!

Thanks for the minor correction, I took the words out of context. It was Gigatron that stated "carelessly the US start wars and how little respect the US have for civilian lives." We didn't start the wars that we have been in and Giga needs to realize it

What happened at Dresden was fu**ed up and was not necessary. I am British, it is a blight in our history that I hope we never forget and, more importantly never repeat.

This I won't argue. I may not know much about the European theater, well I do know alot but its spotty at best, but I do know about Dresden and I agree with you.

well we did start the Civil War



Of course we started the Civil War, it was between Americans and Americans! Who the hell else could have started it!

...I won't say it wasn't horrific but I would rather use a weapon that would end the war quickly than prolong a war in which the enemy WON'T SURRENDER no matter what the circumstances. I am of the opinion that it was the right thing to do considering what the projected casualties where in an invasion.

Right. We are on the same page then. It's done and nothing can make it undone now. As an European I'm glad they didn't get the bombs ready before Germany surrendered.

It's impossible to say if Japan would have surrendered if a bomb was dropped, say 70km off Tokyo in the sea, and another in rural area as a demo. What's positive is that they didn't drop them in Tokyo and Kyoto. That to me proves the American high command weren't such savages.

peace

You forget the Civil War, the War of 1812, and the Revolutionary War.

Weren't all of those wars started by the Americans? Well, I'm fairly sure the Civil War was, what with it being a Civil War and everything.

The 1812 war was started by the Americans against the British.

Oh, and the Revolutionary War got you a country.

Wow. You have had a bad time of it.

Now, lets look at the last century when wars really fu**ed up countries...oh, sorry, other side of the Atlantic.

well we did start the Civil War and the Spanish American War, and the Mexican War to add.

The Civil war wasn't started by the UNION! It was started by the Confederate states. Mexican War started because the ruler of Mexico continued to move the recognized border that was established after Texas Independence and after Texas was admitted into the Union. You can say we started the Spanish American War after the fact because we NOW know what happened to the USS Maine. Back then we really didn't but we do now so I'll give you that one on a technicality.

I have dealt with many WWII veterns, i've asked them what they felt and all of them agreed that the bomb was right. No one wanted to fight.

I agree!

As for the mass suicide thing, many Japanese(somewhere in the thousands) committed suicide after the U.S. took Okinawa

Heard this was a rumor but never could get it verified. Thanks. I also know the samething happened on Siapan, the so-called Suicide Cliffs.

Weren't all of those wars started by the Americans? Well, I'm fairly sure the Civil War was, what with it being a Civil War and everything.

Revolutionary War know one really knows who started it. The Civil War was started by the Confederate States of America.

The 1812 war was started by the Americans against the British.

The British were impressing our service people at sea into their navy and was told to stop and they didn't! Thus Britian started it.

Oh, and the Revolutionary War got you a country.

Thank God!

In August of 1945 nuclear weapons were exploded upon the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Following these atomic bombings, Japan surrendered. But were the atomic bombings necessary to save Allied lives and end Japan's threat to world peace while avoiding a deadly invasion of the Japanese mainland? The following account summarizes the events that led to Japan's surrender in World War II and then considers other means of achieving Japan's surrender. The second half of this article, which also includes the bibliography, can be found in Part 2.

For some who are accustomed to the popular beliefs about this matter, this study may be discomforting, although that is not its intent. But if we learn from past occurrences, it may make our future decision-making abilities more capable of saving the lives of our soldiers and sailors and of people on all sides.


The Tide Turns

As the war with Germany drew closer to the end, the Allies waged an increasingly effective war against Japan. After the fall of the Mariana Islands, including Saipan, to the U.S. in July of 1944, the impending defeat of Japan became increasingly apparent to many Allied and Japanese leaders.

The Marianas had been a key area within Japan's defense perimeter; now Japan would be within range of bombing runs from Pacific Ocean locations that were superior to the China bases that had been used for bombing missions (Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945, pg. 174; Michael Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power, pg. 176).

And so from November 1944 onward, Japan was the subject of numerous large-scale B-29 non-nuclear bombing raids (Robert Butow, Japan's Decision To Surrender, pg. 41). When Air Force chief General Hap Arnold asked in June 1945 when the war was going to end, the commander of the B-29 raids, General Curtis LeMay, told him September or October 1945, because by then they would have run out of industrial targets to bomb (Sherry, pg. 300 & 410(143n)).

While Japan was being bombarded from the sky, a Naval blockade was strangling Japan's ability to import oil and other vital materials and its ability to produce war materials (Barton Bernstein, ed., The Atomic Bomb, pg. 54). Admiral William Leahy, the Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt and then to President Truman, wrote, "By the beginning of September [1944], Japan was almost completely defeated through a practically complete sea and air blockade." (William Leahy, I Was There, pg. 259).

Then in May of 1945 the surrender of Germany freed the Allies to focus their troops and resources on defeating the final enemy, Japan.

Although fighting fanatically, Japan had lost a string of high-casualty battles (U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S., The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, vol. 1, pg. 905).


The Potsdam Proclamation

On the evening of July 26, 1945 in San Francisco (which in Tokyo was the morning of July 27) a message from the Allies now commonly known as the Potsdam Proclamation was broadcast in Japanese. The broadcast was relayed to the Japanese government on the morning of the 27th (Pacific War Research Society, The Day Man Lost, pg. 211-212).

The proclamation demanded "the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces" (U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S., The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. 2, pg. 1474-1476). It made no mention of Japan's central surrender consideration: the retention of the Emperor's position (Butow, pg. 138-139). What made this crucial was that the Japanese believed their Emperor to be a god, the heart of the Japanese people and culture (Pacific War Research Society, Japan's Longest Day, pg. 20). The absence of any assurance regarding the Emperor's fate became Japan's chief objection to the Potsdam Proclamation (Pacific War Research Society, The Day Man Lost, pg. 212-214). In addition, the proclamation made statements that, to the Japanese, could appear threatening to the Emperor: "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest" and "stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals" (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1474-1476).


Enter the Bomb and the Soviets

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on the people of Hiroshima.

Early in the morning of August 9th Manchuria was invaded by the Soviet Union. The Soviets had notified Japan's Ambassador to Moscow on the night of the eighth that the Soviet Union would be at war with Japan as of August 9th (Butow, pg. 153-154, 164(n)). This was a blow to the Japanese government's peace-seeking efforts. The Russians had been the only major nation with which Japan still had a neutrality pact, and, as such, had been Japan's main hope of negotiating a peace with something better than unconditional surrender terms (Butow, pg. 87). To that end, the Japanese government had been pursuing Soviet mediation to end the war in response to the Emperor's request of June 22, 1945, a fact often overlooked today. (Butow, pg. 118-120, 130).

Late on the morning of August 9th, the U.S. dropped a second atomic bomb without a second thought, this time on the people of Nagasaki. Rather than wait to see if the Hiroshima bomb would bring surrender, the atomic bombing order to the Army Air Force stated, "Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff." (Leslie Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pg. 308). Word of the second nuclear attack was relayed that day to the Japanese government (Leon Sigal, Fighting To a Finish, pg. 240).

Bringing the nuclear threat closer to home, rumors were reported to the Japanese military that the next atomic bomb would be dropped on Tokyo, where the government leaders were meeting (William Craig, The Fall of Japan, pg. 116). Bombed by the Allies at will, Japan was militarily defeated. It still remained, however, for defeat to be translated into surrender.

After the Hiroshima atomic bombing, the Japanese Army and Navy had sent separate teams of scientists to determine what type of bomb had destroyed the city. By August 11th, both teams had reported to Tokyo that the bomb was, indeed, atomic (Sigal, pg. 236).


No Surrender

Japan had received what would seem to have been overwhelming shocks. Yet, after two atomic bombings, massive conventional bombings, and the Soviet invasion, the Japanese government still refused to surrender.

The Potsdam Proclamation had called for "Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers" (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1475). On the 13th, the Supreme Council For the Direction of the War (known as the "Big 6") met to address the Potsdam Proclamation's call for surrender. Three members of the Big 6 favored immediate surrender; but the other three - (War Minister Anami, Army Chief of Staff Umezu, and Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda - adamantly refused. The meeting adjourned in a deadlock, with no decision to surrender (Butow, pg. 200-202).

Later that day the Japanese Cabinet met. It was only this body - not the Big 6, not even the Emperor - that could rule as to whether Japan would surrender. And a unanimous decision was required (Butow, pg. 176-177, 208(43n)). But again War Minister Anami led the opponents of surrender, resulting in a vote of 12 in favor of surrender, 3 against, and 1 undecided. The key concern for the Japanese military was loss of honor, not Japan's destruction. Having failed to reach a decision to surrender, the Cabinet adjourned (Sigal, pg. 265-267).


The Emperor's Desire

On the following day, August 14, Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda were still arguing that there was a chance for victory (John Toland, The Rising Sun, pg. 936). But then that same day, the Cabinet unanimously agreed to surrender (Toland, pg. 939). Where none of the previous events had succeeded in bringing the Japanese military leaders to surrender, surrender came at Emperor Hirohito's request: "It is my desire that you, my Ministers of State, accede to my wishes and forthwith accept the Allied reply" (Butow, pg. 207-208).

What made the Emperor's "desire" more powerful than the revulsion the military leaders felt toward surrender? The Emperor was believed to be a god by the Japanese. The dean of historians on Japan's surrender, Robert Butow, notes in regard to the military leaders in Japan's government, "To have acted against the express wishes of an Emperor whom they had unceasingly extolled as sacred and inviolable and around whom they had woven a fabric of individual loyalty and national unity would have been to destroy the very polity in perpetuation of which they had persistently declared they were fighting" (Butow, pg. 224). Or as War Minister Anami said after he agreed to surrender, "As a Japanese soldier, I must obey my Emperor" (Pacific War Research Society, JLD, pg. 87-88).

Surrender was so repugnant to Anami that he committed hara-kiri the day after he signed the surrender document (Butow, pg. 219-220). Where fear and reason had failed, religious devotion to the Emperor enabled the military leaders to overcome their samurai resistance to surrender.


Japanese Hawks versus Japanese Doves

If the hawks in Japan's government surrendered only when the Emperor requested them to do so, what brought the Emperor to express his wish for surrender? For prior to August 1945, it was unprecedented for an Emperor to express a specific policy preference directly to the Cabinet (Butow, pg. 224). The role of the Emperor was to sanction decisions made by the Cabinet, whether he personally approved of them or not (Butow, pg. 167(1n)). As a god, he was considered to be above human politics.

Emperor Hirohito was persuaded to cross this line by the doves in Japan's government, particularly Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido (the Emperor's closest advisor) and Foreign Minister Togo, a member of Japan's cabinet (Butow, pg. 206; Pacific War Research Society, JLD, pg. 28-30; Sigal, pg. 71 & 268).

If it was the doves, thru the Emperor, who brought surrender, what moved the doves to ask the Emperor to make his direct request to the government? For not only did this circumvent Japanese tradition, it also put the doves in danger of arrest and assassination and the government at risk of a possible coup, by members of the Japanese military.

The military had been arresting people who spoke out in favor of peace. (Pacific War Research Society, DML, pg. 167-168; Butow, pg. 75(56n) & 178-179; Sigal, pg. 228-229). Japan's Prime Minister Suzuki had personal experience with the military's extremism; he had been seriously wounded and nearly killed during an attempted coup in 1936 by a faction of the Army (Craig, pg. 137). A careless pursuit of peace could have resulted in the destruction of the peace movement and, perhaps, the end of any chance to preserve the throne.


What took Japan's Doves so long?

There were three primary considerations behind why the doves made their move when they did:

1. Some doves, realizing Japan only faced further destruction, had wanted to end the war long before the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima (Pacific War Research Society, JLD, pg. 11; Toland, pg. 843-845; Butow, pg. 17-18, 46-50, 65(33n), 66).
2. As noted above, the fear that the Japanese military would destroy the peace movement restrained the doves from taking action sooner than they did.
3. The doves minimum requirement for surrender was the retention of the Emperor's position (Pacific War Research Society, DML, pg. 200; Butow, pg. 132, 140, 179-180).

But in order for the peace of point 1 to be achieved, points 2 and 3 had to be dealt with first.

The doves were able to surmount their fear of military reprisal when a greater danger appeared: the imminent loss of the Emperor. Even before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the declaration of war against Japan by the Soviets, Japan's doves realized that Japan's defeat was certain (Butow, pg. 47; Sigal, pg. 48). But with the atomic bomb, which could bring mass destruction easily and instantly, and the loss of the Soviet Union as a possible mediator of a negotiated surrender, defeat - and the destruction of the Emperor system - became an imminent threat (Butow, pg. 193).

The doves had run out of time; their religious devotion to the Emperor forced them to risk their lives to save his or, at the minimum, to save the position of the Emperor (Pacific War Research Society, DML, pg. 200). The only chance to save the Emperor was to surrender.

On August 8 - before the Soviets announced their declaration of war and before the Nagasaki a-bomb was detonated - Foreign Minister Togo met with the Emperor to tell him what he knew of the Hiroshima bombing. They agreed that the time had come to end the war at once (Pacific War Research Society, DML, pg. 300; Pacific War Research Society, JLD, pg. 21-22).


The problem of Unconditional Surrender

But unconditional surrender would still leave the doves' central issue unanswered: would surrender allow Japan to retain the Emperor? Japan's Prime Minister Suzuki spelled out the problem of "unconditional surrender" well for doves and hawks alike when he publicly announced on June 9, 1945, "Should the Emperor system be abolished, they [the Japanese people] would lose all reason for existence. 'Unconditional surrender', therefore, means death to the hundred million: it leaves us no choice but to go on fighting to the last man." (Pacific War Research Society, DML, pg. 127; Butow, pg. 69(44n)). From this time on, if not earlier, the Allies knew that the throne was the primary issue for Japan. While some of Japan's military leaders preferred additional conditions for ending the war, ultimately their control proved to be secondary to the desire of the Emperor - and Japan's doves - for surrender.

Much has been written about the vagueness of the Allies' call for "unconditional surrender". This vagueness, combined with many hostile references to Japan's leaders (Henry Stimson & McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and War, pg. 626; Butow, pg. 136), contributed heavily to the conclusion by many in Japan that unconditional surrender could mean the end of their Emperor. Even Foreign Minister Togo, one of the leaders of Japan's doves, noted in a July 12, 1945 message to Sato, Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, "as long as America and England insist on unconditional surrender, our country has no alternative but to see it [the war] through in an all-out effort". The telegram was intercepted by the U.S., decoded, and sent to President Truman (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873, 875-876).

Robert Butow has aptly portrayed the feelings the Japanese had for the Emperor, in noting, "The one thing they could not do was sign a death warrant for the imperial house", and if it appeared that the Allies would take steps against the Emperor, "then even the most ardent advocates of peace would fall into step behind the [pro-war] fanatics" (Butow, pg. 141).

To demand unconditional surrender, without comment as to the Emperor's fate, meant a choice, Truman thought, between an invasion of the Japanese mainland or the use of atomic bombs on Japan, or possibly both. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall thought that even after using A-bombs on Japan the invasion would still be necessary, anyway, as opposed to the belief that using atomic bombs on Japan would make the mainland invasion unnecessary (David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume Two, pg. 198).

Most high-level discussions that assumed either nuclear weapons or a mainland invasion of Japan would be necessary to end the Pacific war did so with the knowledge that unconditional surrender was the official Allied policy. The "a-bombs or invasion" choice was based in part on the assumption that retention of the Emperor would probably not be offered to Japan. Nor was a warning to Japan of the atomic bomb in the decision-makers' plans, as they considered what would be necessary to end the war. These omissions made the use of the atomic bomb seem all the more necessary for winning the war without an invasion.


U.S. learns of Emperor's importance

The U.S. government was not ignorant of the importance of the Emperor to Japanese surrender. Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew had explained this to President Truman in person on May 28, 1945. Grew had been U.S. Ambassador to Japan for 10 years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and was regarded as the most knowledgeable on Japan of any U.S. government official (Leahy, pg. 274). On May 28th Grew informed Truman, "The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the throne" (Walter Johnson, ed., Turbulent Era, Joseph Grew, Vol. 2, pg. 1428-1429).

In a June 18, 1945 meeting with Truman and his military advisors, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy argued that Japan should be permitted to retain the Emperor and should be given a warning of the atomic bomb in order to bring an earlier and less deadly surrender (Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pg. 70-71; Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb, pg. 134-136).

On June 28, 1945, a memo from Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard was given to Secretary of War Stimson. In the memo, Bard recommended the points made by McCloy and suggested Japan be told that Russia would enter the war against them (Manhattan Engineering District Records, Harrison-Bundy files, folder # 77, National Archives; see also Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 1987 edition, pg. 307-308). Bard may have also discussed this memo with Truman in early July (Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope, pg. 52-53; altho 15 years later, Bard did not recall the meeting: U.S. News & World Report, 8/15/60, War Was Really Won Before We Used A-bomb, pg. 73).

On July 2, 1945, Sec. of War Henry Stimson and Truman discussed a proposal by Stimson to call for Japan to surrender. Stimson's memo to the President advised, "I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance". Stimson's proposed surrender demand stated that the reformed Japanese government "may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty" (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 889-894).

However, the constitutional monarchy line was not included in the surrender demand, known as the Potsdam Proclamation, that was broadcast on July 26th, in spite of Stimson's eleventh hour protestations that it be left in (Diary of Henry L. Stimson, 7/24/45, Yale Univ. Library, New Haven, Conn). Pacific war historian Akira Iriye explains, "One reason for this change [the removal of the Emperor retention line] was the growing influence within the State Department of men like [Sec. of State] Byrnes, Acheson, and MacLeish - with no expertise on Japanese affairs but keenly sensitive to public opinion - and the president's tendency to listen to them rather than to Grew and other experts." (Iriye, pg. 255-256). In regard to his disagreement with Under Sec. of State Grew over allowing Japan to retain the Emperor, Dean Acheson later admitted, "I very shortly came to see that I was quite wrong." (Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, pg. 112-113).


Japan seeks peace through the Soviets

In the meantime, the Japanese government was attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to mediate a peace for Japan that would not be unconditional. This was in response to the Emperor's request at a Big Six meeting on June 22, 1945 to seek peace thru the Soviets, who were the only major member of the Allies that had a neutrality pact with Japan at the time (Butow, pg. 118-120). Unfortunately for all concerned, Japan's leaders were divided over precisely what terms should be sought to end the war, with the Japanese military leaders still wishing to avoid anything that the Allies would have considered a clear "surrender". Surely Japan's leaders hold the lion's share of the responsibility for the fate that befell Japan.

Having broken the code Japan used for transmitting messages, the U.S. was able to follow Japan's efforts to end the war as it intercepted the messages between Foreign Minister Togo and Japan's Ambassador to Moscow Sato. The messages were sent as the result of the June 22, 1945 Japanese Cabinet meeting. The conditions under which Japan was willing to surrender were not clearly spelled out in the messages, aside from a willingness to give up territory occupied during the war and a repeated rejection of "unconditional surrender".


July 1945 - Japan's peace messages

Still, the messages from Togo to Sato, read by the U.S. at the time, clearly indicated that Japan was seeking to end the war:

* July 11: "make clear to Russia... We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war; we hope to terminate the war".
* July 12: "it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war".
* July 13: "I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs to communicate to the [Soviet] Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (for above items, see: U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873-879).
* July 18: "Negotiations... necessary... for soliciting Russia's good offices in concluding the war and also in improving the basis for negotiations with England and America." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/18/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
* July 22: "Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government." The July 21st communication from Togo also noted that a conference between the Emperor's emissary, Prince Konoye, and the Soviet Union, was sought, in preparation for contacting the U.S. and Great Britain (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/22/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
* July 25: "it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter." (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1260 - 1261).
* July 26: Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, to the Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lozovsky: "The aim of the Japanese Government with regard to Prince Konoye's mission is to enlist the good offices of the Soviet Government in order to end the war." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/26/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).

President Truman knew of the messages' content, noting, for instance, in his diary on July 18, "Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] of telegram from Jap [sic] Emperor asking for peace" (Robert Ferrell, ed., Off the Record - the Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, pg. 53). In passing up this possible opportunity for an earlier and less deadly peace, Truman was not deliberately trying to prolong the war so the atomic bomb could be used on Japan to intimidate the Soviets. Briefly stated, it is likely that Truman believed the use of atomic bombs on Japan was necessary primarily for the reasons he always gave: "We have used it in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans" (Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945, pg. 212). (For the most thorough exposition of the view that the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan primarily for their effect on the Soviet Union, see Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb. Due to its many sources of documentation, this book will be of interest whether one shares Alperovitz' views or not).

Objections to letting Japan keep the Emperor

There were various factors that might have made offering retention of the Emperor a difficult choice for Truman. It was believed by some that such a concession would embolden Japan to fight on. This argument, however, rings hollow, for it was all too obvious that the Japanese were fighting on anyway. In regard to American public opinion, it was well known to Truman that unconditional surrender was a popular, albeit vague, idea. For many people, this included punishment of the Emperor. Making an exception in the unconditional surrender to allow Japan to retain their Emperor would have been politically incorrect for the time (and in view of the Smithsonian Enola Gay exhibit controversy, for the current time as well). In August of 1945 both Truman and his primary foreign policy adviser, Sec. of State James Byrnes, expressed concern over publicly appearing soft on Japan (John Blum, ed., The Price of Vision - The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946, pg. 474; David Robertson, Sly and Able - A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes, pg. 435).

But in spite of the U.S. emphasis that the surrender must be unconditional, the Potsdam Proclamation included in its unconditional surrender terms the condition that the Japanese would be allowed to establish their own government. Perhaps the Proclamation could have gone a step further and stated clearly, as Sec. of War Stimson suggested, that the Japanese could retain the throne. In the end, after atomic bombs were detonated on the people of two cities, the Emperor was allowed to remain, anyway.

It is sometimes argued that an unconditional surrender was absolutely necessary for the purpose of keeping allies Great Britain and the Soviet Union committed to participation in the Pacific war. But Churchill had reservations about requiring Japan's surrender to be unconditional. He stated them to Truman on July 18, 1945: "I dwelt upon the tremendous cost in American and to a smaller extent in British life if we enforced 'unconditional surrender' upon the Japanese.". Churchill came away from his conversation with Truman believing "there would be no rigid insistence upon 'unconditional surrender'" (Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, paperback edition, pg. 547-548). The Soviets favored unconditional surrender because they felt it would prolong the war, enabling them to advance their troops further into conquered territory. But any desire the West had for Soviet participation in the Pacific war was luke-warm at best after July 21st, when President Truman received the full report of the successful atomic bomb test of July 16. Moreover, the U.S. did not even consult with the Soviets on the Potsdam Proclamation, which contained the proposed terms of surrender, before sending it out.

Not surprisingly, the Soviets were angered by this (James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pg. 207). And on August 10th, Truman told his cabinet he was prepared to accept Japan's surrender without Soviet agreement (Blum, pg. 473-474).


Military rather than Diplomatic approach

A point made by then Assistant Sec. of War John McCloy and seconded by the then Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Captain Ellis Zacharias is of particular importance. Regarding the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan, McCloy later wrote, "everyone was so intent on winning the war by military means that the introduction of political considerations was almost accidental" (John McCloy, The Challenge to American Foreign Policy, pg. 42, my emphasis). Zacharias lamented, "while Allied leaders were immediately inclined to support all innovations however bold and novel in the strictly military sphere, they frowned upon similar innovations in the sphere of diplomatic and psychological warfare" (Ellis Zacharias, The A-Bomb Was Not Needed, United Nations World, Aug. 1949, pg. 29). Defeating Japan was perceived of by the Allies in the narrow terms of military methods. The Japanese messages intercepted by the U.S. in July showed the Japanese government's view toward the war had changed. However, the U.S. didn't keep up with this change, and the advantage of combining diplomatic methods with military methods was largely missed.

The reason for the emphasis on military solutions, as opposed to diplomatic efforts, may lie in the emotionalism and the desire for revenge that accompanies war. Many found the revenge satisfying, regardless of the loss of additional American lives spent to achieve it.

Truman reflected this feeling in a radio broadcast to the public on the night of Aug. 9, after an atomic bomb had been exploded upon the Nagasaki populace: "Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare" (Public Papers of the President, 1945, pg. 212). However, the vast majority of the people killed and injured by the atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not fall into those categories.

From a purely emotional standpoint, the desire for revenge is understandable in a wartime situation. But from the standpoint of finding the least deadly way to bring the enemy's surrender and save the lives of one's own military personnel, emotionalism may divert leaders from considering diplomatic solutions by making military/punitive measures seem more attractive and necessary. This may have contributed to Truman's belief that Japan would not surrender without a large-scale invasion of her mainland and/or atomic bombings.


The Emperor stays

Ultimately, Japan was allowed to keep her Emperor. But the Emperor's retention was not established with complete explicitness at the time of Japan's surrender. Two main factors helped Japan's doves resolve the issue:

1. The atomic bomb had shown the doves that they had run out of time and that further delay would result in the Emperor's demise.

2. While the Allied surrender terms did not explicitly guarantee the Emperor's retention, neither did they refuse the request made by Japan to the Allies on August 10, 1945 to keep the Emperor.

Moreover, the August 11, 1945 Allied response referred to the Emperor's continuing role in Japanese government: "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers" (Butow, pg. 245). Sec. of War Stimson later explained, "the Allied reply... implicitly recognized the Emperor's position by prescribing that his power must be subject to the orders of the Allied supreme commander" (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 627).

The Japanese government correctly interpreted this and other statements in the Allied surrender terms to mean that the Emperor could be retained. On August 14 the Emperor told Japan's cabinet, "I have studied the Allied reply and concluded that it virtually acknowledges the position of our note [requesting the Emperor's retention] sent a few days ago. I find it quite acceptable." (Toland, pg. 936-937). With this reassurance and at the Emperor's "desire", on August 14 the Japanese Cabinet unanimously signed the surrender document, agreeing to Allied terms (Toland, pg. 939).

Altho the Japanese military still wished to fight on as late as August 14, it was the doves rather than the hawks in Japan's government who had the final say. As mentioned earlier, it was the atomic bomb plus the belief that the Emperor might be retained that finally led the doves to play their trump card: the direct intervention of the Emperor requesting the Cabinet to surrender immediately.


Were Atomic Attacks Necessary?

But was the use of atomic bombs on Japanese cities necessary to bring Japan's doves to play the Emperor card? The Japanese doves had been working to end the war on the condition of retention of the throne (Butow, pg. 141) before the a-bombs that killed over 200,000 people were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (The Committee For the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings, pg. 113-114).

Might the war have been ended sooner, with fewer deaths on both sides, before the Soviets had gotten into northern Korea (thus possibly avoiding the Korean War), before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima frightened the Soviets into putting their atomic bomb program into high gear (David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pg. 127-129, 132), and before an atomic precedent had been set? While there can be no conclusive answer to this question, it is worthwhile to study this topic for whatever insight it may give for future decision-making and the future saving of lives on all sides.

Historian and former Naval officer Martin Sherwin has summarized the situation, stating, "The choice in the summer of 1945 was not between a conventional invasion or a nuclear war. It was a choice between various forms of diplomacy and warfare." (Sherwin, pg. xxiv).

Long-time historian of the atomic bombings Barton Bernstein has taken a cautious view of what might have been: "Taken together, some of these alternatives [to dropping atomic bombs on Japan] - promising to retain the Japanese monarchy, awaiting the Soviets' entry, and even more conventional bombing - very probably could have ended the war before the dreaded invasion [of the Japanese mainland by the Allies]. Still, the evidence - to borrow a phrase from F.D.R. - is somewhat 'iffy', and no one who looks at the intransigence of the Japanese militarists should have full confidence in those other strategies. But we may well regret that these alternatives were not pursued and that there was not an effort to avoid the use of the first A-bomb - and certainly the second." (Barton Bernstein, The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 1995, pg. 150).

Echoing the concern of Assistant Sec. of War John McCloy and Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Captain Ellis Zacharias that the Allies became overly dependent on military means, Leon Sigal writes, "At worst, withholding force might have prolonged the war for a while at a time when little combat was taking place; it would not have altered the final result. Yet restraint could have significantly reduced the gratuitous suffering on both sides, especially for noncombatants." Sigal concludes, "it could be argued that the United States behaved as if the objective of inducing Japan to surrender was subordinated to another objective - in Stimson's words, that of exerting 'maximum force with maximum speed.' American policy was guided by an implicit assumption that only the escalation of military pressure could bring the war to a rapid conclusion." (Sigal, pg. 219).

Regarding claims that the atomic bombings saved lives, Gar Alperovitz has noted, "It has been argued in this connection that using the atomic bomb was less costly in human life than the continuation of conventional bombing would have been. Apart from the fact that accounts which urge such a view commonly leave aside questions concerning [modifying the unconditional] surrender formula and the impact of the Russian attack, by early August 1945 very few significant Japanese civilian targets remained to be bombed. Moreover, on July 25 a new targeting directive had been issued which altered bombing priorities." "Attacks on urban centers became only the fourth priority, after railway targets, aircraft production, and ammunition depots." "...the new directive (as the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey noted) 'was about to be implemented when the war ended.'". (Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 342).

It didn't take long after the atomic bombings for questions to arise as to their necessity for ending the war and Japan's threat to peace. One of the earliest dissents came from a panel that had been requested by President Truman to study the Pacific war. Their report, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, was issued in July 1946. It declared, "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." (Bernstein, ed., The Atomic Bomb, pg. 52-56).

In 1948 Sec. of War Henry Stimson published his memoirs, ghost-written by McGeorge Bundy. In them Stimson revealed, "It is possible, in the light of the final surrender, that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending to the war". Stimson and Bundy continued, "Only on the question of the Emperor did Stimson take, in 1945, a conciliatory view; only on this question did he later believe that history might find that the United States, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war." (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 628-629).

Robert Butow has affirmed Stimson's position: "Secretary of War Stimson has raised the question of whether an earlier surrender of Japan could have been achieved had the United States followed a different diplomatic and military policy during the closing months of the war. In the light of available evidence, a final answer in the affirmative seems possible, even probable." Butow continues, "Although it cannot be proved, it is possible that the Japanese government would have accepted the Potsdam Proclamation immediately had Secretary Stimson's reference to the imperial structure been retained. Such a declaration, while promising destruction if Japan resisted, would have offered hope if she surrendered. This was precisely Stimson's intention." Butow adds, "The Japanese military... interpreted the omission of any commitment on the Throne as evidence of the Allied intention to destroy forever the foundation stone of the Japanese nation. Here was an invaluable trump card unintentionally given them by the Allies, and the militarists played it with unfailing skill." (Butow, pg. 140-141).

Martin Sherwin has also followed up on Stimson's observation: "That unconditional surrender remained an obstacle to peace in the wake of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Soviet declaration of war - until the government of the United States offered the necessary (albeit veiled) assurance that neither Emperor nor throne would be destroyed - suggests the possibility, which even Stimson later recognized, that neither bomb may have been necessary; and certainly that the second one was not." (Sherwin, pg. 237, emphasis in original). As noted earlier, Stimson explained, "the Allied reply [to Japan's 8/10 surrender offer]... implicitly recognized the Emperor's position" (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 627).

In regard to the U.S. knowledge at the time of Japan's effort to end the war, Butow writes: "the fact is there was at least something of an opportunity here, or perhaps a gamble, which might have yielded startling results had it not been ignored. Although this criticism may be the product of too much hindsight, it is difficult to explain why the Togo-Sato intercepted messages did not at least produce a logical revision of the then current draft of the Potsdam Proclamation to include some guarantee - even a qualified one - with respect to the preservation of Japan's imperial system." (Butow, pg. 135).

From information contained in the Togo-Sato dispatches, the U.S. knew that Japan wished to send to Russia "Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (7/13/45 message from Togo to Sato; U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 879). Here may have been another opportunity to bring the war to an earlier end, with lives saved on both sides. Butow notes, "Had Prince Konoye, as the fully empowered personal representative of the Emperor of Japan, been permitted to travel to Moscow (or anywhere else, for that matter) and had he there been handed the text of this [Potsdam] proclamation prior to its release to the world at large, he conceivably could have resolved speedily the very issues which government leaders in Tokyo spent the next three weeks in debating without result. Had the Allies given the prince a week of grace in which to obtain his government's support for acceptance, the war might have ended toward the latter part of July or the very beginning of August, without the atomic bomb and without Soviet participation in the conflict. Although Stalin's price for co-operation might have been equal to what he had already been promised at Yalta, the Western Allies might at least have been spared the added burden of subsequently having the Yalta concessions flagrantly augmented many-fold by hostile Soviet action in Manchuria and Korea." (Butow, pg. 133).


Use Both Carrot and Stick

The full weight of both carrot and stick could have been spelled out to Konoye in private: an opportunity to retain the throne in return for a quick surrender versus the alternative of Soviet invasion and atomic destruction. Allowing retention of the throne, the threat of Soviet invasion, and the threat of atomic attack were the three most powerful inducements for Japan to surrender. None of the three were mentioned in the Potsdam Proclamation, nor were they used to try to bring surrender before an atomic bomb was exploded upon the people of Hiroshima. Weren't our troops, not to mention hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives, worth this effort to end the war sooner?

Butow adds, "Had anyone thought of pursuing the Konoye feeler in preference to displaying America's atomic achievement and in preference to seeking a belated Soviet entry into the conflict through Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin, an excellent avenue of approach existed in Switzerland where the [Allen] Dulles organization [U.S. Office of Strategic Services] had been in touch with the Fujimura and Okamoto [Japanese peace feeler] groups for several months." (Butow, pg. 134).

Setting up surrender talks sanctioned by both the U.S. and the Japanese governments would likely have been difficult. But there is no easy way of ending a war. The primary question is not what is the easier path, but what path will bring a lasting peace while sparing the most Allied lives and, secondarily, "enemy" civilian lives.

While it cannot be proven, had officially sanctioned communication been made by the Allies or the U.S. to Japan thru Konoye, the various peace feelers, or other credible diplomatic channel stating that Japan's time had completely run out due to the impending threats of nuclear destruction and Soviet invasion, and that immediate surrender would mean the opportunity to retain their throne, there is a good chance the Japanese doves would have enlisted the Emperor to bring Japan to surrender in late July or early August of 1945.

We could have informed the Japanese, as Sec. of War Stimson informed President Truman on April 25, 1945, that one atomic bomb "could destroy a whole city" (Stimson diary, 4/25/45), perhaps presenting evidence from the Trinity test. The knowledge that the Soviets were about to declare war upon them would have destroyed any hope Japan had of negotiating peace terms thru the Soviets, and the impending two front war would have disabused Japan's military leaders of their plan to mass their remaining forces against the anticipated U.S. invasion.

And ultimately we did allow Japan to retain their Emperor; as Truman biographer Robert Donovan described it, "accept a condition but call it unconditional surrender." (Robert Donovan, "Conflict and Crisis", pg. 99). As Truman wrote in his diary on August 10, 1945 regarding the Japanese request to keep the Emperor, "Our terms are 'unconditional'. They wanted to keep the Emperor. We told 'em we'd tell 'em how to keep him, but we'd make the terms." (Ferrell, pg. 61).


Atomic Bomb - the Last Resort

There is no way we can know for certain whether this approach would have ended the Pacific war sooner and with fewer deaths. But one may regret that such an attempt was not made. Had the attempt failed, the continuing blockade of supplies, Soviet invasion, and the atomic bombs were still available. However, anyone tempted to use the atomic bomb would have done well to share the hesitancy agreed upon by President Roosevelt and Great Britain Prime Minister Winston Churchill on September 19, 1944: the atomic bomb "might, perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese" (Robert Williams and Philip Cantelon, ed., The American Atom, pg. 45). (School of Advanced Airpower Studies historian Robert Pape has written an intriguing paper stating that further conventional air bombing would have been unnecessary: Why Japan Surrendered, International Security, Fall 1993).

It is likely Dwight Eisenhower was right when he said of the atomic bombings of Japan, "it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." (Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63, pg. 108).


- Doug Long

SOURCES:


Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation

Gar Alperovitz, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb

Barton Bernstein,ed., The Atomic Bomb

Barton Bernstein, The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 1995

John Blum, ed., The Price of Vision - The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946

Robert Butow, Japan's Decision To Surrender

James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly

Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, paperback edition

The Committee For the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings

William Craig, The Fall of Japan

Robert Donovan, Conflict and Crisis

Robert Ferrell, ed., Off the Record - the Private Papers of Harry S. Truman

Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb

Leslie Groves, Now It Can Be Told

David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb

Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941-1945

Walter Johnson, ed., Turbulent Era - Joseph Grew, Vol. II

William D. Leahy, I Was There

David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume Two

Magic-Diplomatic Summary, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives

Manhattan Engineering District Records, Harrison-Bundy Files, folder 77, National Archives

John McCloy, The Challenge to American Foreign Policy

Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries

Newsweek, 11/11/63, Ike on Ike

Pacific War Research Society, The Day Man Lost

Pacific War Research Society, Japan's Longest Day

Robert Pape, Why Japan Surrendered, International Security, Fall 1993

Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945

David Robertson, Sly and Able - A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes

Michael Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power

Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 1987 edition

Leon Sigal, Fighting To a Finish

Alice Kimbal Smith, A Peril and A Hope

Henry Stimson & McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and War

Diary of Henry L. Stimson, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn.

John Toland, The Rising Sun

U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S., The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, vol. 1

U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S., The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945, vol. 2

U.S. News and World Report, 8/15/60, War Was Really Won Before We Used A-bomb

Robert Williams and Philip Cantelon, ed., The American Atom

Ellis Zacharias, The A-Bomb Was Not Needed, United Nations World, Aug. 1949

Right. We are on the same page then. It's done and nothing can make it undone now. As an European I'm glad they didn't get the bombs ready before Germany surrendered.

It's impossible to say if Japan would have surrendered if a bomb was dropped, say 70km off Tokyo in the sea, and another in rural area as a demo. What's positive is that they didn't drop them in Tokyo and Kyoto. That to me proves the American high command weren't such savages.

peace

Yea we are on the same page

Tokyo and Kyoto were pretty much ravaged by the firebombings whereas no bombs where dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Civil war wasn't started by the UNION! It was started by the Confederate states.

Bullshit. Lincoln refused to move Union troops from the sovreign state of the CSA, essentially a declaration of war. It comes down to the fact that the Consititution left no guidelines for secession, which Lincoln interpreted to mean it was illegal, and to mean that the CSA was an extension of America that had all revolt, which was not the case. Confederates had had no official agression against the government of the USA, they merely said they would no longer be a part of a system that didn't respect them, and formed a new country with the property they owned. Needless to say, I think that Lincoln was wrong, so I am biased. Anyways, we (as in America) did start that one.

MY GRANDFATHER WAS HELD BY THE JAPS IN BURMA ,
SINCE THEN HE REFUSES TO BUY ANYTHING FROM THEIR COUNTRY, OR EVEN TALKS ABOUT THEM , OR HIS INCARCERATION ( if thats how it,s spelt )
THEY HAVE DONE A LOT MORE DAMAGE (PHYSICALLY & MENTALLY ), TO THEIR PRISONERS THAN WE EVER DID !!!!!, TO THEM THE GENEVA CONVENTION AND RED CROSS WAS NEVER EVER RECOGNISED, I,M NOT A VINDICTIVE PERSON BUT HEY LOOK AT THEIR HISTORY TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE ..... :confused:

Really? Because you sound awefully vindictive to me. (And I should know, as this is the first tme I've come across this word and had to look it up. My english is damn good, but not perfect.) Firstly, eye for and eye is a horrible philosophy. Just because someone has done something horrible does not make it right to return to them in like form. What a childish way of living, rationalizing an action by saying the other person was doing worse. That does not make it any better of an action.
Furthermore, we japanese are not all the backwards you make us out to be. I respect the Geneva Convention fully and in fact have made many a post here complaining about Bush's many breaches of convention. Think I you may be far more vindictive than you realize. That is all rigth, so long as you realize and move on. The past is past, the future is ahead. Most Japanese are not even from that time period, and I would be pissed great off if someone were to be spiteful to me for some history that I was not at all involved in or supporting of.

It seems that no one has mentioned the other reasons to drop the bomb rather than wait/invade.

1. Prevent the USSR from invading Japanese-conquered China and keeping it, and/or even invading the Home Islands themselves (Russia took Manchuko back from the Japanese in the war's waning moments and massed troops for more).

2. Demonstrate to the USSR that we had nuclear weapons, to try and convince them to back off in their demands (that's worded badly, basically the force of our atomic bomb was supposed to reduce Soviet aggression on the negotiation table). It would also bolster western Europe, who are seeing the USSR right on their border and not liking it.

The decision was not only concerning Japan. World politics were taken into play.

And, as an aside, had the Emperor's group failed and the military retained control, any invasion of the Home Islands would have killed many millions of people. Japan had stockpiled thousands of kamikaze aircraft, and had trained virtually every civilian to carry a weapon (even bamboo spears, if it came to that) and fight. They had old men with crude aqualungs and bombs on sticks trained to walk on the sea floor and blow up invasion boats as they chugged overhead, for Christsake.

EDIT: I'm sort of surprised no one has mentioned the millions of civilians Japan killed in China, especially the Rape of Nanking.

Bullshit. Lincoln refused to move Union troops from the sovreign state of the CSA, essentially a declaration of war. It comes down to the fact that the Consititution left no guidelines for secession, which Lincoln interpreted to mean it was illegal, and to mean that the CSA was an extension of America that had all revolt, which was not the case. Confederates had had no official agression against the government of the USA, they merely said they would no longer be a part of a system that didn't respect them, and formed a new country with the property they owned. Needless to say, I think that Lincoln was wrong, so I am biased. Anyways, we (as in America) did start that one.

WRONG OH! South Carolina said we could keep Fort Sumter as long as we didn't fortify it. We didn't fire the shot that started the war. That would be the Confederates that started the war. I'm an Amateur Civil War Historian. It wasn't started because we refused to leave, it started because the Confederates saw that we were going to fortify the fort with additional troops and opened up on the fort! Thus the war was started by the Confederates because they felt 1) Betrayed and 2)trust was broken. That was when the confederates fired on the Fort!

Two days is at least enough time to send a radio message, a telegram, anything, saying "We're considering surrender, can we have a temporary cease-fire?" Japan did nothing of the sort, and, as such, America assumed that they still intended to make war with America.

As for the "other options," I would like to hear them. If they involve an American invasion of the Japanese mainland, you are suggesting that America should sacrifice American soldiers to end a war started by Japan in such a way that the Japanese citizens (who were, at one point, more than ready to go to war with America) would lose as little as possible. If they involve firebombing Japan into submission, that would have had the same kind of effect as the atomic bombs. The fact of the matter is that the Japanese military was not going to surrender (and, as they had more power than the citizens, Japan was not going to surrender) until they were clearly beaten or until they were shown the new nuclear firepower of America.

What many of you are forgetting is that the military is just one part of Japan. So the military wanted to fight until the last man, woman, and child, but that doesn't mean that the people wanted to fight until the last man, woman, and child.

As for your question about other options, the best course of action would have been to drop the unconditional surrender part of the Postdam Declaration. The Japanese people, and especially the Imperial Household wanted to ensure that the position of the Emperor would remain in tact after they surrendered. The Emperor was Japan's life and under no circumstances did they want to have him obliterated (note: it was for this reason that MacArthur kept the position of the Emperor, albeit he was no longer deified).

Had America invaded the main islands of Japan I believe that the soldiers would have been quickly demoralized (even more so than they already were), and it would have led to a long drawn out process. I am not insinuating that America should have invaded with the idea of saving as many Japanese civilians as they could, but I am implying that you have to remember that it was just not the military they were invading, it was everyone. Unlike the war in Europe the Americans did not distiinguish between the military in Japan and the civilians. They saw them all as the "Yellow Devil;" as a threat that needed to be wiped off the face of the planet.

As such, America's decisions were rash. Two days was not enough time to guage the situation. The Japanese government didn't even know if America had more than one of the bombs or if they were bluffing. It took a month for the government to reach its forces in Okinawa and inform them of the surrender. It was war. Communications at at time like that are limited.

I reiterate my point in my first post: the bombing of Hiroshima can be seen as legitimate, however, the Nagasaki bombing (which caused more damage both in the short and long term) was unnecessary. America wanted to show its might to the world and scare the Soviet Union into submission for the days following the wars end. The bombs were a political tactic for home and abroad, no more, no less.

WRONG OH! South Carolina said we could keep Fort Sumter as long as we didn't fortify it. We didn't fire the shot that started the war. That would be the Confederates that started the war. I'm an Amateur Civil War Historian. It wasn't started because we refused to leave, it started because the Confederates saw that we were going to fortify the fort with additional troops and opened up on the fort! Thus the war was started by the Confederates because they felt 1) Betrayed and 2)trust was broken. That was when the confederates fired on the Fort!

Well, they were betrayed and the trust was broken. The USA, under that agreement, would have lost the fort, except a) they weren't going to just hand it over, and b) it's a fort, for chrissake. You fight from those, with guns and stuff (which more of were being brought in by ship). The Confederates, seeing that they weren't going to be given the rights of a sovreign power, and were instead going to be treated as regular citizens in revolt, took action on Lincoln's betrayal, and took Fort Sumter for the CSA, as it rightfully should have been, being on the soil of South Carolina and therefore part of the new CSA.

Yea we are on the same page

Tokyo and Kyoto were pretty much ravaged by the firebombings whereas no bombs where dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Actually, throughout the whole of the war Kyoto was never touched. America knew that if they bombed Kyoto, the ancient capital and cultural cent of Japan, the Japanese people would be infuriated and incensed into continuing the battle. Kyoto was on the list of cities to drop the atomic bomb, but was taken off due to this line of thinking.

One line of thinking I question is the bit about "they were about to surrender" or "it was almost over".

Frankly, no one knew that at the time. This is a war. A fight for survival. You don't let up because you seem to be gaining ground. You don't know what the other side still has. Things could quickly and easily turn around on you. You continue on until it is over. Period.

Dresden is a beautiful city - I've been there, and it's a tragic what happened... But this was a war Germany started. There's no room 60 years after the fact to say that it was wrong.

Anyone speculating on what might have happened in Japan is just guessing. Japan might have surrendered - They might not have. The only thing we know for a fact is that dropping these bombs brought a quick end to the war.

And I'd also argue that seeing so clearly the aftermath helped the MAD doctrine to be so successful. Without that, there may have been more, and more deadly use of them in the years after. There may have been a WW3 that wiped out everything.

Actually, throughout the whole of the war Kyoto was never touched. America knew that if they bombed Kyoto, the ancient capital and cultural cent of Japan, the Japanese people would be infuriated and incensed into continuing the battle. Kyoto was on the list of cities to drop the atomic bomb, but was taken off due to this line of thinking.

Wait, Kyoto was a target for the bomb I think but because of weather, Nagasaki was destroyed instead. I'll have to look this up.

Edit! From the Minutes of the targeting committee!

(1) Kyoto - This target is an urban industrial area with a population of 1,000,000. It is the former capital of Japan and many people and industries are now being moved there as other areas are being destroyed. From the psychological point of view there is the advantage that Kyoto is an intellectual center for Japan and the people there are more apt to appreciate the significance of such a weapon as the gadget. (Classified as an AA Target)

Kyoto was a target so it wasn't attack probably for this reason during the firebombing campaign.

(2) Hiroshima - This is an important army depot and port of embarkation in the middle of an urban industrial area. It is a good radar target and it is such a size that a large part of the city could be extensively damaged. There are adjacent hills which are likely to produce a focussing effect which would considerably increase the blast damage. Due to rivers it is not a good incendiary target. (Classified as an AA Target)

And that was Hiroshima!

And here's more on the decision process!

http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were major military industrial cities.
Dropping the bombs saved an estimated 1 MILLION lives on both sides.

Period.

One line of thinking I question is the bit about "they were about to surrender" or "it was almost over".

Frankly, no one knew that at the time. This is a war. A fight for survival. You don't let up because you seem to be gaining ground. You don't know what the other side still has. Things could quickly and easily turn around on you. You continue on until it is over. Period.

<snip>

Anyone speculating on what might have happened in Japan is just guessing. Japan might have surrendered - They might not have. The only thing we know for a fact is that dropping these bombs brought a quick end to the war.

And I quote from http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm:
Japan seeks peace through the Soviets

In the meantime, the Japanese government was attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to mediate a peace for Japan that would not be unconditional. This was in response to the Emperor's request at a Big Six meeting on June 22, 1945 to seek peace thru the Soviets, who were the only major member of the Allies that had a neutrality pact with Japan at the time (Butow, pg. 118-120). Unfortunately for all concerned, Japan's leaders were divided over precisely what terms should be sought to end the war, with the Japanese military leaders still wishing to avoid anything that the Allies would have considered a clear "surrender". Surely Japan's leaders hold the lion's share of the responsibility for the fate that befell Japan.

Having broken the code Japan used for transmitting messages, the U.S. was able to follow Japan's efforts to end the war as it intercepted the messages between Foreign Minister Togo and Japan's Ambassador to Moscow Sato. The messages were sent as the result of the June 22, 1945 Japanese Cabinet meeting. The conditions under which Japan was willing to surrender were not clearly spelled out in the messages, aside from a willingness to give up territory occupied during the war and a repeated rejection of "unconditional surrender".

July 1945 - Japan's peace messages

Still, the messages from Togo to Sato, read by the U.S. at the time, clearly indicated that Japan was seeking to end the war:

July 11: "make clear to Russia... We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war; we hope to terminate the war".

July 12: "it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war".

July 13: "I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs to communicate to the [Soviet] Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (for above items, see: U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873-879).

July 18: "Negotiations... necessary... for soliciting Russia's good offices in concluding the war and also in improving the basis for negotiations with England and America." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/18/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).

July 22: "Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government." The July 21st communication from Togo also noted that a conference between the Emperor's emissary, Prince Konoye, and the Soviet Union, was sought, in preparation for contacting the U.S. and Great Britain (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/22/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).

July 25: "it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter." (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1260 - 1261).

July 26: Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, to the Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lozovsky: "The aim of the Japanese Government with regard to Prince Konoye's mission is to enlist the good offices of the Soviet Government in order to end the war." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/26/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).


Looks like they were eager to make peace to me.

as stated in this article (http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/nagasaki.htm) the city of Kokura was the other city to be bombed, however, due to weather conditions and extenuating circumstances Nagasaki was chosen as the target.

In reponse to those who say the Japanese killed millions of people throughout the war, I do not disagree. But you must look at the long range aftermath of the atomic bombs. Hundreds of thousands of people have suffered because of these bombs. They have watched family members waste away due to uranium poisoning, or mental illnesses that resulted from the bombs. And they've watched as the Japanese government did nearly nothing for the victims and those unaffected by the bombs treated the victims as vermin.

Japan did some truly horrible things throughout the war and in its own way it has admitted to its crimes. The US on the other hand has not. The bombings were atrocious, and have had a lasting negative effect not only on Japan but on the world.

While I agree that the Japanese would have inflicted tremendous casualities upon the US.
I do not approve of the use Atoms bombs for that reason.
I approve of the use of Atom bombs for revenge for the cold blooded murder of millions of Chinese, acts so vile that they rival if not exceed the German crimes against the Jews.
Pearl Hobour doesnt jusitfiy the use of Atomic weapons, the nightmare of the Japanese on Chinese soil truthfully required more then those two explosions.
I have no pity what so ever for the Japanese, it was a war.
You fight wars to win them.
Respecting an adversary is one thing, sympathizing is very much another.
There are still Japanese today who feel justified in their nations barbaric treatment of the Chinese, America was simply the Karmic reactions of those attrocities.
It is only a pity that they in the West do not do more to educate in the public schools the horror perpetrated by the Japanese on the Chinese, this can only be blamed on the American concept of not having Americans sympathize with a Communist society.
Luckily the cold war is over, hopefully schools will teach children that both our German and Japanese allies have been responsible for two of the most obscene acts of human depravation the twentieth century saw.

dont leave the koreans out of this. dont forget the filipinos. the other pacific islanders.

japan was brutal. they did things 100 times worse than the deaths at hiroshima and nagasaki. they were not innocents being murdered by an aggressor. they were reaping what they sowed

so WHY is it so immoral? is it that civilians died? setting aside the hundreds of thousands of civilians that the japanese killed. (and lets not forget that the "rape of nanking" was just that. japanese soldiers raped every chinese woman they could find) forgetting retribution... carpet bombing would have killed more civlilans, firebombing would have killed more civilians, invading would have killed more civilians.

is it the nuclear part? that radiation is so evil that it cant ever be used no matter the circumstances? ya know, if we hadnt developed the bomb SOMEONE ELSE would have, and they would have used it sooner or later. its not like if we had just kept the bombs secret the nuclear age would never have happened

do you have the notion that the japanese were innocent and didnt deserve such a fate? well, not that anyone DESERVES nuking but they started the war. they started it well before pearl harbor.

they started it and we finished it and i dont see that they have any right to complain. they should be ashamed of what their country did and be ashamed that we were brought to the point where we had to devastate them. any blame is squarely on them, not us.

do you have the notion that the japanese were innocent and didnt deserve such a fate? well, not that anyone DESERVES nuking but they started the war. they started it well before pearl harbor.

they started it and we finished it and i dont see that they have any right to complain. they should be ashamed of what their country did and be ashamed that we were brought to the point where we had to devastate them. any blame is squarely on them, not us.

The blame is on all sides. The Japanese felt closed off and dependent on the United States. They were afraid of colonization, so for the first time in history a potential colony stood up for itself. I, by no means, agree with how they went about standing up for themselves. Millions were killed and enslaved and it has caused a rift in regional affairs for decades.

I do however, believe that we should no longer punish them for their actions. The government and people are different, literally. Those who were in control are dead and those born in the immediate aftermath of the war only know peace as stated by Article 9. The continued Japan bashing by all involved is only creating more tension in an already politically strained area. I believe that we need to remember and learn from the past, but not continue to live it.

The blame is on all sides. The Japanese felt closed off and dependent on the United States. They were afraid of colonization, so for the first time in history a potential colony stood up for itself. I, by no means, agree with how they went about standing up for themselves. Millions were killed and enslaved and it has caused a rift in regional affairs for decades.

I do however, believe that we should no longer punish them for their actions. The government and people are different, literally. Those who were in control are dead and those born in the immediate aftermath of the war only know peace as stated by Article 9. The continued Japan bashing by all involved is only creating more tension in an already politically strained area. I believe that we need to remember and learn from the past, but not continue to live it.
im an american, karvaya. japan is one of our biggest allies in the world today. i utterly agree with you that these things need to be kept in the past but remembered so we dont repeat them.

its good to remember the devastation of hiroshima and nagasaki every year. otherwise we are tempted to use those bombs again. the devices we have now make those from ww2 look weak.

we must remember

dont leave the koreans out of this. dont forget the filipinos. the other pacific islanders.

japan was brutal. they did things 100 times worse than the deaths at hiroshima and nagasaki. they were not innocents being murdered by an aggressor. they were reaping what they sowed

so WHY is it so immoral? is it that civilians died? setting aside the hundreds of thousands of civilians that the japanese killed. (and lets not forget that the "rape of nanking" was just that. japanese soldiers raped every chinese woman they could find) forgetting retribution... carpet bombing would have killed more civlilans, firebombing would have killed more civilians, invading would have killed more civilians.

is it the nuclear part? that radiation is so evil that it cant ever be used no matter the circumstances? ya know, if we hadnt developed the bomb SOMEONE ELSE would have, and they would have used it sooner or later. its not like if we had just kept the bombs secret the nuclear age would never have happened

do you have the notion that the japanese were innocent and didnt deserve such a fate? well, not that anyone DESERVES nuking but they started the war. they started it well before pearl harbor.

they started it and we finished it and i dont see that they have any right to complain. they should be ashamed of what their country did and be ashamed that we were brought to the point where we had to devastate them. any blame is squarely on them, not us.

And let's not all forget about how the American military has an entirely blameless and unblemished history when it comes to warfare and civilians, treating the citizens of the country who didn't want to be involved in the war with respect and civility, such as in Vietnam....

Wow, this topic has gotten quite large in the last six hours.
Sorry folks, I was at school at the time and the topic seems to have been fairly well addressed.
Too bad, I was looking forward to *GASP!* a non-Bush/Kerry topic.
Darn :)

Wait, Kyoto was a target for the bomb I think but because of weather, Nagasaki was destroyed instead. I'll have to look this up.

Edit! From the Minutes of the targeting committee!

(1) Kyoto - This target is an urban industrial area with a population of 1,000,000. It is the former capital of Japan and many people and industries are now being moved there as other areas are being destroyed. From the psychological point of view there is the advantage that Kyoto is an intellectual center for Japan and the people there are more apt to appreciate the significance of such a weapon as the gadget. (Classified as an AA Target)

Kyoto was a target so it wasn't attack probably for this reason during the firebombing campaign.

However after much debate Kyoto was taken off the target list for cultural reasons, and replaced by Nagasaki. The not the target thing you are referring to is true to a point, that becuase of bad weather (heavy cloud cover over the target), they went for their secondary target (Nagasaki), but the target was the Kokura Arsenal, a massive depot for the Japanese forces on Kyushu, and a prime target. When they reached Nagasaki they found heavy cloud cover there as well, but, running past their point of no return, they had to drop their bomb on Nagasaki, so that is how it got hit.

However after much debate Kyoto was taken off the target list for cultural reasons, and replaced by Nagasaki. The not the target thing you are referring to is true to a point, that becuase of bad weather (heavy cloud cover over the target), they went for their secondary target (Nagasaki), but the target was the Kokura Arsenal, a massive depot for the Japanese forces on Kyushu, and a prime target. When they reached Nagasaki they found heavy cloud cover there as well, but, running past their point of no return, they had to drop their bomb on Nagasaki, so that is how it got hit.

Not disputing it! Just stating that at one point Kyoto was a target.

Most Japanese are not even from that time period, and I would be pissed great off if someone were to be spiteful to me for some history that I was not at all involved in or supporting of.


This lesson needs to be learned by Von Witzleben and others, in regards to the US and it's past actions....