NationStates Jolt Archive

The Emergency Powers Act
Category: Political Stability
Strength: Mild

Commending the efforts of previous resolutions to guarantee and protect civil and human rights;

Noting the rights granted by previous legislation such as 'The Universal Bill of Rights', 'Freedom of Press', 'Habeas Corpus', and 'Universal Freedom of Choice';

Aware that there may be times when the rights granted by previous legislation may need to be restricted in states of emergency in the name of National Security;

The United Nations;

Defining for the purposes of this resolution, State of Emergency as a governmental declaration that may suspend certain normal functions of government, may work to alert citizens to temporarily change their normal behaviors, or may order government agencies to implement emergency preparedness plans, during times of natural disaster, civil unrest, or significant threats to public order or national security;

Also defining for the purposes of this resolution, a normal function of government as any activity or right done or furnished for the good of the general public, including but not limited to, legal duties imposed by the government upon its agents;

Declares that, during a declared State of Emergency, member nations have the right to restrict and/or suspend certain functions of government as determined by said member nations;

Requires nations to restore normal government functions once the conditions necessitating a declared State of Emergency have been resolved;

Suggests that member nations develop Emergency Preparedness Plans for situations that are common or readily foreseeable within their area;

Requests that member nations have an Emergency Preparedness Plan in place before a State of Emergency is declared and;

States that functions of government may not be suspended where such suspension is expressly prohibited by previously enacted and currently extant UN legislation.

Currently, I am looking for comments and any help cleaning up language and the like.

I'm very concerned about how this resolution may be manipulated by member nations.

Say, I am the President of Dictatorshipistan. What in this resolution is preventing me from deciding that political dissents are constituting a "national emergency", suspending civil rights and deciding that the threat is ever present and that emergency conditions will not soon be resolved.

Is this resolution not just giving dictators a legal way to suspend political and civil rights?

This is a work in progress. We are attempting to tighten such loopholes, which is why this is here for drafting. We have no intentions of submitting this anytime soon.

That being said, your concerns are valid. Do you have any suggestions as to how this would be fixed?

I am smart enough to understand that no UN resolution will be without its manipulation, but the point is to minimize dictators being able to hide behind it. Perhaps this proposal could establish a commission that will supervise "national emergencies" through the eyes of the international community and report about its validity.

Any such commission runs a significant risk of exacerbating genuine emergencies, surely, since it will invariably be slow to operate and necessarily intrusive at a time when a national government needs to move with uncommon speed. We share the honoured representative of Pilot's misgivings, but we do not think that without very great care in its definition this is an appropriate mechanism. Sadly we are unable to offer a reasonable alternative at this time. We shall consider further.

Any such commission runs a significant risk of exacerbating genuine emergencies, surely, since it will invariably be slow to operate and necessarily intrusive at a time when a national government needs to move with uncommon speed. We share the honoured representative of Pilot's misgivings, but we do not think that without very great care in its definition this is an appropriate mechanism. Sadly we are unable to offer a reasonable alternative at this time. We shall consider further.
I think the Representative from Gobbannium is a little bit confused as to the authority of the commission. It will not rule, at the beginning, whether a state will be allowed to declare a national emergency. Its function will most likely be, 3-4 months after the fact, it can tell the international community whether national emergency conditions are still needed or whether or not leaders are abusing the statutes. Its opinions are non-binding.

Here is an updated version, minus that committee for the time being. If it is at all possible, I would like to avoid the use of a committe. If it can't be avoided, then I will attempt to work it in.

The Emergency Powers Act
Category: Political Stability
Strength: Mild

Commending the efforts of previous resolutions to guarantee and protect civil and human rights;

Noting the rights granted by previous legislation such as 'The Universal Bill of Rights', 'Freedom of Press', 'Habeas Corpus', and 'Universal Freedom of Choice';

Aware that there may be times when the rights granted by previous legislation may need to be restricted in states of emergency in the name of National Security;

The United Nations;

Defining for the purposes of this resolution, State of Emergency as a governmental declaration that may suspend certain normal functions of government, may work to alert citizens to temporarily change their normal behaviors, or may order government agencies to implement emergency preparedness plans, during times of natural disaster, civil unrest, or significant threats to public order or national security;

Also defining for the purposes of this resolution, a normal function of government as any activity or right done or furnished for the good of the general public, including but not limited to, legal duties imposed by the government upon its agents and rights and privliges granted to its citizens by member nations;

Declares that, during a declared State of Emergency, member nations have the right to restrict and/or suspend certain rights or govenment functions as determined by said member nations;

Requires nations to restore any rights and normal government functions once the conditions necessitating a declared State of Emergency have been resolved;

Suggests that member nations develop Emergency Preparedness Plans for situations that are common or readily foreseeable within their area;

Requests that member nations have an Emergency Preparedness Plan in place before a State of Emergency is declared and;

States that such rights or government functions may not be suspended where such suspension is expressly prohibited by previously enacted and currently extant UN legislation.

Generally, we are open to any idea that would install needed safeguards to this resolution. As it stands, even with the very modestly edited "updated" version, this resolution is too easily manipulated to mean that the United Nations is providing despots a legal framework in which to suspend the rights of their citizens.

You know, this resolution isn't granting nations any rights that they didn't already have. How in heck did we ever make decisions regarding our own nations' security without the help of a UN commission in the first place?

We are also concerned about the language, and the nature of the resolution. For example, I can declare a temporary shortage of canolla oil as a national emergency and claim totalitarian powers.

Furthermore, it almost seems as if you are stating that the UN can do the same thing to my country performing a coup.

The power that you are seeking to create exists within all nations as a matter of practicality, without that power, a criminal justice system could not operate, taxes could not be collected, and disasters, no matter how small or large, could not be dealt with.

We are also concerned about the language, and the nature of the resolution. For example, I can declare a temporary shortage of canolla oil as a national emergency and claim totalitarian powers.

Furthermore, it almost seems as if you are stating that the UN can do the same thing to my country performing a coup.

The power that you are seeking to create exists within all nations as a matter of practicality, without that power, a criminal justice system could not operate, taxes could not be collected, and disasters, no matter how small or large, could not be dealt with.

Take a look at almost every single resolution on the books that guarantees any form of right treatment. They lack anything that would allow for nations to alter those rights in the case of any emergency of any nature. It is an unfortunate oversight that this would help prevent in the future.

Take a look at almost every single resolution on the books that guarantees any form of right treatment. They lack anything that would allow for nations to alter those rights in the case of any emergency of any nature. It is an unfortunate oversight that this would help prevent in the future.

Resolutions rarely survive their first encounter with a volcanic eruption.

Take a look at almost every single resolution on the books that guarantees any form of right treatment. They lack anything that would allow for nations to alter those rights in the case of any emergency of any nature. It is an unfortunate oversight that this would help prevent in the future.
Almost every nation, from liberal democracy to militarist dictatorship, has some form of expedited decision making procedure in the face of emergency - without the input of the United Nations. We would argue, in fact, that the U.N.'s involvement in this area would just make national management of a disaster more complex.

Resolutions rarely survive their first encounter with a volcanic eruption.

Almost every nation, from liberal democracy to militarist dictatorship, has some form of expedited decision making procedure in the face of emergency - without the input of the United Nations. We would argue, in fact, that the U.N.'s involvement in this area would just make national management of a disaster more complex.

Any actions that a nation took that would infringe upon a right guaranteed by the UN would still run be an illegal act in the eyes of the UN Gnomes. They don't respond to pleas about necessity of the action or the causes whereby it might be justified. They simply enforce UN law.

I agree that nations should be allowed to bypass certain laws in efforts to deal with emergencies and save their populaces from certain doom, to take an extreme example. The Gnomes do not agree. They believe that the letter of the law is what matters, and if there is no exemption made in the law, then there can be no exemptions made for special circumstances.

Guaranteeing a nations right to do something is hardly interfering. It is mandating that there will be no interference.

One can argue what exactly UN gomes can and can not do but I think the problem is simplier than that. In the event of an emergency where it is necessary to violate for a short time UN law you can simply leave the UN. Then you can join the UN when the emergency is over.

I do not think this is workable. As it stands, the proposal provides governments with carte blanche to disregard any law - national or international - in the name of a 'state of emergency'. I can see circumstances where a temporary suspension of laws might be appropriate, but I doubt that a satisfactory proposal can be drafted that differentiates between valid and invalid suspensions.

Benedictions,

As it stands, the proposal provides governments with carte blanche to disregard any law - national or international - in the name of a 'state of emergency'.

This bit isn't good enough for you, is it?

States that functions of government may not be suspended where such suspension is expressly prohibited by previously enacted and currently extant UN legislation.

Is there anything else that people would like to see added or taken out of this proposal?

This bit isn't good enough for you, is it?

While I like the resolution, I have to disagree with you here. That bit isn't anything really. I mean how many UN resolutions have specific clauses that prohibit their suspension in times of emergency. I haven't gone through them all, but I would say the number is zero.

States that such rights or government functions may not be suspended where such suspension is expressly prohibited by previously enacted and currently extant UN legislation.

That's a fluff clause in order to keep the mods from hitting the delete button.

The really odd thing about this resolution is it either does nothing or else it is illegal. It could pretend to do something, in which case nations can think it actually does something, but technically it is impossible to suspend for any reason whatsoever an existing UN resolution because that would be amending the resolution which is technically illegal.

So in this case the resolution simply suspends "certain rights" and "government functions." But for the most part this is something individual nations can do on their own. (Especially since the "certain rights" are not defined ... not all rights can be suspended only certain ones.)

While I like the resolution, I have to disagree with you here. That bit isn't anything really. I mean how many UN resolutions have specific clauses that prohibit their suspension in times of emergency. I haven't gone through them all, but I would say the number is zero.

It doesn't have to specify for a time of emergency. It merely has to state that the right in question cannot be suspended or infringed upon.

That's a fluff clause in order to keep the mods from hitting the delete button.

It's actually one of, if not the most, powerful clauses in the entire act. It makes the allowance for past legislation to exist, while demanding that future legislation allow for states of emergency to exist.

For example, let's say that this passes and becomes UN law, just for the sake of this discussion. Freedom of Speech would still stand unobstructed, because it declares Speech as a right and doesn't allow any exception for it to be suspended. However, after the passage of the Emergency Powers Act, the UN wishes to pass some law that guarantees the right of citizens in democratic nations to vote in national elections at least once every four years. This new proposal would have to make the allowance for states of emergency where elections might be postponed, or some of the populace might not be able to vote due to some natural disaster or terrorist threat, let's say.

That clause pretty much just means that it won't affect what has already occured in the past, only what comes in the future.

The really odd thing about this resolution is it either does nothing or else it is illegal.

The same could be said for many human rights, furtherment of democracy, or free trade proposals. All they do is guarantee a right, conditional on a few things. Nations or people are probably already doing these things, so what does it accomplish? It makes it so that nobody can take that right away without first removing that law. I'd definitely say that would be a lot more than nothing.

It could pretend to do something, in which case nations can think it actually does something, but technically it is impossible to suspend for any reason whatsoever an existing UN resolution because that would be amending the resolution which is technically illegal.

Which is why this has no effect on things that are already in place. It is unfortunate that these things make no allowance for emergency measures, but we are stuck with it for the time being.

So in this case the resolution simply suspends "certain rights" and "government functions." But for the most part this is something individual nations can do on their own.

Unless there is some international law preventing them from doing so. With this in place, it would limit further incursions into a nations power to protect its people.

(Especially since the "certain rights" are not defined ... not all rights can be suspended only certain ones.)

Which ones might need to be suspended will vary from case to case and nation to nation. Trying to delineate all of the various possibilities would be unnecessarily cumbersome and would leave far too great a chance of error. Referring to them in vague terms leaves it up to the nations to figure out what might need to be taken care of for themselves as the situation requires. This is another area where a single catch all solution just won't fly. Guarantee nations the right to do it, try to put some basic safeguards in place to prevent abuse, and let nations figure it out for themselves. The basic point is to keep the UN from crippling the capacity of nations to deal with emergencies. It should be unnecessary for that same act to tell nations exactly how to deal with emergencies that the nation would be in a better position to evaluate for themselves.

We agree with our friends from Dashanzi. This proposal is virtually unworkable, as any version that contains the doctrine outlined in the current resolution is tantamount to providing despots a legal framework in which to oppress their citizens. Without a doubt, there are many free countries which can point to this, as well as their own laws, as a way to temper a natural disaster or emergency. But the potential for abuse is so great that it becomes prohibitive.

One can argue what exactly UN gomes can and can not do but I think the problem is simplier than that. In the event of an emergency where it is necessary to violate for a short time UN law you can simply leave the UN. Then you can join the UN when the emergency is over.

That's not always so easy. For awhile, my cousin, General Black, was in charge of the Region of Bacardi. If Sirat had been forced to resign from the UN, the region could have been thrown into chaos. Okay, technically, the general CAUSED the chaos in the first place, but you get my point.

But the potential for abuse is so great that it becomes prohibitive.

There's the real issue, unfortunately. How could something like this be done without essentially offering legal warrant to oppressive regimes. You'd somehow have to establish that it must be an honest state of emergency and not something that the government either cooked up or is overreacting to, which turns into an argument over what would constitute overreacting. Then you have to somehow ensure that the rights/freedoms/priviledges/whatever that are suspended or altered are justifiably affected, and returned to normal with reasonable haste after the emergeny has ended. Somehow try to do all that without all the normal bureaucracy that would normally be associated with a committee, commission, review panel, or what all, since nations would need to act with fleetness in the face of disaster.

How to fix it? I don't have the slightest clue. I just like the idea of nations being able to save themselves when things get rough.

How to fix it? I don't have the slightest clue. I just like the idea of nations being able to save themselves when things get rough.
I don't know how to fix it either, save for some sort of commission that would be able to supervise the use of this resolution to justify restricting civil liberties. I do believe that if something like that was to be set up, where it could rule on the validity of a state of emergency declaration some time after it had been announced (and therefore not interfering with quick government actions), it would provide a good safety control. It's not the best solution, but it is a solution.

As I said before though, I think just about every nation stakes claim to some sort of expedited decision-making process when dealing with national emergencies. Even Pilot, a beacon of freedom in both the civil and political arenas throughout the world, has a strong code of laws which afford the government considerable latitude in this area.

No, I want to avoid having a committee. I do have an idea though.

Instead of having one committee to decide what is considered to be a State of Emergency for all member nations, why not have one or two individuals, chosen by each individual member nation, who is unbiased and not a part of the government itself to decide for that nation?

It would lessen the amount of bureaucratic red tape that the nations would have to go through, and therefore, the government would then be able to act quickly to end the state of emergency. It would also offer an independent source from which the decisions are being made, who would not really benefit from the emergency powers being enacted.

Given that states of emergency are almost by definition unpredictable events, we hesitate to recommend anything that would interfere with the actual running of a nation under such circumstances. Perhaps it would be better to specify that there will be a UN inquiry into the validity of a state of emergency once a nation has returned to normality, or after some suitable time period from the declaration of the state of emergency -- one or two months would seem plausible. For those averse to the formation of committees, we would suggest not specifying the make-up of any such board of inquiry beyond it not containing members from the nation under inspection.

We do have a more serious problem with the final provision of the proposal:

States that such rights or government functions may not be suspended where such suspension is expressly prohibited by previously enacted and currently extant UN legislation.

We would be keen to phrase this clause differently. As it stands, it is unclear whether or not future legislation can be suspended in states of emergency, or more importantly whether it can legally prohibit such suspension. Given that we have concerns about a number of resolutions which have 'future-wrecking' clauses like this in them, we are not keen to see another added to the list.

Just curious, what would be the point of assessing the situation after the fact?

As for your problem with the last clause, the representative from Kivisto explained it and since I'm feeling mildly lazy at the moment, I'll just quote him.

It's actually one of, if not the most, powerful clauses in the entire act. It makes the allowance for past legislation to exist, while demanding that future legislation allow for states of emergency to exist.

What's wrong with having future legislation that allows for states of emergency to exist?

Just curious, what would be the point of assessing the situation after the fact?

Allowing that it is impractical to assess the rightfulness of a state of emergency during the chaos of an actual emergency, we would still like to see some means of validating the (hopefully rare) needful invocations of this act and condemning the needless ones. Granted this is of small comfort to those citizens whose rights would have been illegally abridged, but we believe it to be better than nothing and the most practical option we believe might work. Quite what sanctions the UN may put into place against such a malefactor is unclear, but that always appears to be the case in UN legislation.

What's wrong with having future legislation that allows for states of emergency to exist?
Nothing, self-evidently. What we are not clear on due to the presence of the word 'previous' is whether future legislation can allow for states of emergency not to take precedence.

Ardchoille would be unable to support this proposal. First, we don't see it as something on which the UN needs to legislate. Next, we believe part of it touches on areas where the UN can't legislate. Finally, one section of it seriously undermines the UN's powers in the areas in which it can legislate.

We're not arguing for diehard Darwinism; we've no real objection to the UN "suggesting" and "requesting" that our less prudent member nations act in their own interests and develop an Emergency Preparedness Plan. At least it's not "requiring", which would be hand-holding to an unacceptable degree.

But why bother going through any sort of UN legislative process at all, just for that? Send out a nice little pamphlet tucked in with each delegation's monthly accounts -- "Have YOU protected those who sent you here? Make SURE your nation has an Emergency Preparedness Plan!".

It's the underlying assumption of this proposal -- that it is desirable, or even possible, to give nations the right to abrogate rights -- that is, we feel, beyond the UN's powers. It is Ardchoille's position that the UN cannot confer, or remove, rights; it can recognise, define or enforce them, but it cannot cause them to stop existing, for however brief a period. (We realise some nations would consider this an extremist viewpoint, and we would expect it to be debated should this proposal come to the floor of the General Assembly; but, for now, I am merely stating that this is our position.)

Finally, the clause that has been a sticking-point for many delegates:States that functions of government may not be suspended where such suspension is expressly prohibited by previously enacted and currently extant UN legislation.

The Kivistan delegate rightly calls it "one of, if not the most, powerful clauses in the entire act". If his interpretation is correct, it's also the most dangerous.

It makes the allowance for past legislation to exist, while demanding that future legislation allow for states of emergency to exist.

If I understand him correctly -- and I agree, that's what the clause seems to say --- then any future UN resolutions on rights would automatically have to contain a flaw: "These rights are rights only in certain circumstances."

Furthermore, all existing UN legislation is open to repeal. Some of the existing resolutions on rights may be phrased badly, and rightly subject to repeal with a view to a better replacement. But, should this pass, that replacement would have to carry the qualification "except under Declarations of Emergency"; that is, it would not be possible to write a "better" version of rights legislation, because all such new versions would have to carry the qualifying phrase that limits their application.

We are not prepared to tie the UN's hands in this way.

If I understand him correctly -- and I agree, that's what the clause seems to say --- then any future UN resolutions on rights would automatically have to contain a flaw: "These rights are rights only in certain circumstances."But wouldn't any future UN Resolutions then be "extant" and thus exempt from this particular piece?

If you read it that way, then any future legislation on rights, if you wanted it to be comprehensive, would have to include something along the lines of "and this right may not be suspended even during Declarations of Emergency". Which could lead to decent rights proposals sinking because the proposer forgot it. Possibly all proposals would have to have a "may be/may not be suspended" clause.

There are already lots of hoops to jump through before a proposal gets into a form in which it can be submitted. I just don't see the point in adding another, particularly one that isn't immediately evident after studying the rules. (And when it's part of a proposal that I don't think is really necessary anyway.)

Plus, it implies that rights can be limited. I know this can all too easily lead into the "yes, but I'm talking about fundamental rights" /"Okay, but that one's not fundamental" argumemt. I don't want to get into that philosophical argument when the proposal's not even firmed up yet; just to point out that I see it as a possible bottleneck.

By "this particular piece" I meant "the entire Resolution, just like every other 'extant' law".

Sorry, Hack, I'm missing your point. If I go through what I'm thinking, perhaps you could pinpoint the bit where I wander off track?

The way I'm reading it is:

... Such rights may not be suspended ... (if) such suspension is expressly prohibited ...

ie, you can't suspend rights if the legislation defining them specifically said, "you can't suspend this right". Otherwise, you can suspend them. And (though I haven't checked) I'm betting that most of the past resos don't have a clause saying "and you can't suspend this in any circumstances". It may be implied, but I doubt that it's stated.

... by previously enacted and currently extant UN legislation.

ie, any UN legislation that was previously enacted and that still exists, because nobody's managed to repeal it yet.

So my concern is that this guarantees that rights cannot be suspended IF the laws guaranteeing them said they couldn't be suspended.

But any future legislation would be affected by this, if it became law.

So any future legislation would have to have a clause saying "this can never be suspended in any circumstances" if you wanted to make sure that this was the case.

And if an existing resolution is repealed, and a new one replaces it, then it is a new one -- not extant at the time of this proposal -- and therefore would be affected by this proposal,

What I'm hung up on is the point Gobbannium made much more succinctly (and, as usual, much more clearly): that this binds all future legislation (by requiring that, if the right/law is never to be suspended, it must specifically say so).

I don't think that's exactly a blocker; I don't know what you'd call it. A shackle, maybe.

What I'm hung up on is the point Gobbannium made much more succinctly (and, as usual, much more clearly): that this binds all future legislation (by requiring that, if the right/law is never to be suspended, it must specifically say so).

While we thank Mme Riley for her kind words, we are not even certain that the limited binding she sets out is legal if this proposal becomes law. If she and we read the logic of the exemption correctly, future legislation (i.e. legislation which was not previously enacted by the UN and therefore was not extant at the time the proposal was enacted) is not covered by the exemption at all. That would make any attempt to write a clause forbidding a right to be suspended under a state of emergency in direct contradiction to this proposal, and thus illegal.

Therefore, all rights supported by the UN (since we are not aware of any previously enacted and currently extant rights that are explicitly exempted) can be suspended during a state of emergency, the declaration of which currently has no check on it whatsoever. This we find somewhat concerning.

The more we consider this, the larger the container of vermiforms appears to be.

Hm. Then the vulnerability isn't limited to new legislation, but old as well, which raises legality issues.

That it does, Hack. As mentioned on another forum, I'm going to leave this be for now. I ask that you kindly let the thread fall into oblivion. If not, then I will request that it gets locked.

While we thank Mme Riley for her kind words ...Mme. "Riley" would be very insulted that you mistook her for Jack (ns.goobergunch.net/wiki/index.php/Jack_Riley)'s kin ....

(It's "Reilly." :p)