Meginlu
24-01-2006, 00:43
I just made this proposal to the UN under the title "Proportional UN Commitment". Please approve it for consideration as a resolution.
The UN is clearly a wonderful to engender global coordination on globally relevant issues.
However, there are also clearly times when UN resolutions are passed which are not wholeheartedly supported by all members of the UN and where, by right of the fact that membership of the UN requires adherence to those proposals which are passed, member nations are technically being deprived of the freedom to implement those resolutions only to the extent to which they have be democratically approved.
This resolution suggests that member nations should have the right to only commit to as much of a resolution as the proportion of the membership that have passed the vote.
This would clearly require a slight restructuring of how proposals are presented, in the sense that the points of each proposal would have to be assessed and prioritised according to their individual contribution toward implementation of that proposal.
That being the case, each member nation would then have the option of fulfilling only as many of the points of each proposal as would be required to match the proportion of the UN population that had passed the proposal.
For example, in the case where a proposal was passed by 60% of the UN membership, then any member might choose only to commit to fulfilling 60% of the points that are outlined as beingg necessary to implement the proposal.
A clear disadvantage of implementing THIS proposal is that each proposal would cost more to implement, since more time would have to be sepnt assessing what points of the proposal were most relevant, and possibly also clearly mandatory in carrying out the proposal.
Clear advantages would be that each proposal would be more clearly outlined prior to being put before the assembly, thus making it easier and faster to resolve.
Another clear advantage is that each member nation then has more, and more democratically representative, control over how much of and what parts of each proposal it then implemented thus giving each member government much more freedom to represent the democratic views of its own nation within whatever limits the income of the member nation might also impose.
Thus, member nations would clearly find supporting the UN financially and democratically more bearable with the likely result that more nations would join and participant nations would have more funds available with which to actually support the UN.
Comment: I would suggest that supporting this bill would indicate favour of personal and general democracy and that, given that the resolution was passed, that all member nations would have to be considered financially better off as the result of having a lower overhead in their obligations toward financial commitment to proposals passed by the UN.
Extended: This proposal might, optionally, actually affect the game mechanics by allowing member nations to vote quantitatively for each proposal, in the sense that they would vote either against, in which case their financial commitment to a passed proposal would be considered to be only as much as the percent of the population that passed it, OR vote in favour, indicating how much they are in favour from 51% to 100% so that, a proposal having been passed, they would then commit to the greater of their personal level of commitment or the minimum commitment required to comply with the proportion of the vote that was in favour of the proposal.
The UN is clearly a wonderful to engender global coordination on globally relevant issues.
However, there are also clearly times when UN resolutions are passed which are not wholeheartedly supported by all members of the UN and where, by right of the fact that membership of the UN requires adherence to those proposals which are passed, member nations are technically being deprived of the freedom to implement those resolutions only to the extent to which they have be democratically approved.
This resolution suggests that member nations should have the right to only commit to as much of a resolution as the proportion of the membership that have passed the vote.
This would clearly require a slight restructuring of how proposals are presented, in the sense that the points of each proposal would have to be assessed and prioritised according to their individual contribution toward implementation of that proposal.
That being the case, each member nation would then have the option of fulfilling only as many of the points of each proposal as would be required to match the proportion of the UN population that had passed the proposal.
For example, in the case where a proposal was passed by 60% of the UN membership, then any member might choose only to commit to fulfilling 60% of the points that are outlined as beingg necessary to implement the proposal.
A clear disadvantage of implementing THIS proposal is that each proposal would cost more to implement, since more time would have to be sepnt assessing what points of the proposal were most relevant, and possibly also clearly mandatory in carrying out the proposal.
Clear advantages would be that each proposal would be more clearly outlined prior to being put before the assembly, thus making it easier and faster to resolve.
Another clear advantage is that each member nation then has more, and more democratically representative, control over how much of and what parts of each proposal it then implemented thus giving each member government much more freedom to represent the democratic views of its own nation within whatever limits the income of the member nation might also impose.
Thus, member nations would clearly find supporting the UN financially and democratically more bearable with the likely result that more nations would join and participant nations would have more funds available with which to actually support the UN.
Comment: I would suggest that supporting this bill would indicate favour of personal and general democracy and that, given that the resolution was passed, that all member nations would have to be considered financially better off as the result of having a lower overhead in their obligations toward financial commitment to proposals passed by the UN.
Extended: This proposal might, optionally, actually affect the game mechanics by allowing member nations to vote quantitatively for each proposal, in the sense that they would vote either against, in which case their financial commitment to a passed proposal would be considered to be only as much as the percent of the population that passed it, OR vote in favour, indicating how much they are in favour from 51% to 100% so that, a proposal having been passed, they would then commit to the greater of their personal level of commitment or the minimum commitment required to comply with the proportion of the vote that was in favour of the proposal.