NationStates Jolt Archive

Chemical Weapons Management
A resolution to slash worldwide military spending.

Category: Global Disarmament
Strength: Mild
Proposed by: Listeneisse

Description: The United Nations,

DECLARING Chemical Weapons (CWs) as not required for national defense given myriad alternate solutions,

DESIRING to minimize or eliminate CW use as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in committing acts of inhumane terror, genocide, civil repression, war, and environmental harm,

DETERMINED to limit CW production and proliferation,

UNDERSTANDING other UN Resolutions can co-exist which may control CWs further than this resolution may mandate,

DEFINING a 'Chemical Weapon (CW)' as a device specifically designed to cause death, serious injury, chronic or permanent harm through the toxic properties of chemical agents released as a result of their employment,

DEFINING a 'Chemical Weapon Agent' as a substance which, through its chemical action on life processes, can cause death, serious injury, chronic or permanent harm,

DEFINING a 'Precursor Chemical' as a substance which, when combined with another substance during the discharge or detonation of a CW, produce CW agents,

DEFINING 'Dual-Use' as a term to describe any device or substance which may have legitimate civil uses as well as be used, modified or enhanced for use as a CW,

AFFIRMING the rights of nations to use chemically-based non-lethal and non-persistent substances for legitimate riot control devices (RCDs), applicable to law enforcement, personal defense and other civil purposes, while acknowledging their dual-use potential for CW,

FORSEEING the need to investigate and respond to actual or alleged violations by member states of any UN resolutions governing controls placed over CW,

UNDERSTANDING many CW-related inventions, applications and incidents will arise requiring ongoing and clear interpretation for member states,

REQUIRES member nations to disclose and annually update the following reports on all former, actual and planned CW and dual-use activities within their nation: a) production facilities and storage sites, b) production levels and aggregate stockpiles, c) domestic and international sales and transfers, d) domestic safety and security provisions, regulations and effective status,

REQUIRES member nations to report to the UN all significant incidents of purposeful use or accidental discharge of CW within their boundaries, and those incidents abroad which are the responsibility of their government or any citizens, groups or businesses under their jurisdiction, within 48 hours of the incident's commission or discovery,

REQUIRES member nations to permit and cooperate with UN efforts to conduct investigations and disaster relief due to CW-related incidents,

ENCOURAGES all member nations and any willing non-UN nations to limit the development of CW and develop scheduled programs for the safe destruction and decommissioning of stockpiles of CW,

AUTHORIZES the creation of a new standing Committee to coordinate UN activities related to CW, to be named the Chemical Weapons Compliance Commission (CWCC),

CHARGING the CWCC to:

1. ADHERE to all standing UN resolutions covering chemical weapons (CW),

2. ADMINISTER any UN regimes to monitor, control or eliminate CW-related materiel or facilities,

3. INVESTIGATE AND REPORT all significant incidents of CW use or accidental discharge by member nations,

4. CREATE AND UPDATE international standard CW-related definitions and materiel lists, and specify what does and does not fall under such definitions and controls.

It is the hope of our nation that a Chemical Weapons Management (CWM) regime would be less intrusive to national sovereignty than an outright ban on all development or use of Chemical Weapons (CW), and thus more acceptable.

It is written so it would not preclude other regimes to limit or ban CWs, but it does not require them either. It does not, of itself, outrightly ban CW production, stockpiling, trafficking or even use.

If such activities are permissible for UN member states, or banned by other UN resolutions, this resolution can remain standing and simply track member nations' compliance to other UN provisions within the CW domain.

It is not a panacea for world peace. It is solely one step, limited even within its domain, with possibly many steps to follow, in a road towards global disarmament.

This resolution seeks foremost to set the tone for the discouragement of this class of weapon, establish a methodology to share knowledge and information for the safety and security of the global community, and project the acceptance of all necessary and solemn responsibility upon those member states who so choose to develop such weapons.

We present it before the representative delegates and members of the United Nations for your approval with hope to avert catastrophic loss of life and unmitigated misery in the years ahead if these weapons are allowed to proliferate uncontrolled and unmonitored.

Respectfully submitted,

Sir Nasciens d'Hermitage
UN Ambassador of Listeneisse
UN Delegate, Warzone of the Defenders

Better than nothing. (Well-written too).

But - mild strength? Significant, I would say.

It is the hope of our nation that a Chemical Weapons Management (CWM) regime would be less intrusive to national sovereignty than an outright ban on all development or use of Chemical Weapons (CW), and thus more acceptable.

It is written so it would not preclude other regimes to limit or ban CWs, but it does not require them either. It does not, of itself, outrightly ban CW production, stockpiling, trafficking or even use.

To phrase that differently, it doesn't actually do much of anything at all that isn't already accomplished by the Compliance Ministry. As noted previously. To expand on that:

DECLARING Chemical Weapons (CWs) as not required for national defense given myriad alternate solutions,

Why bother trying to get around the UNSA? You're not banning the weapons.

DESIRING to minimize or eliminate CW use as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in committing acts of inhumane terror, genocide, civil repression, war, and environmental harm,

And yet (apparently deliberately) not taking any steps whatsoever to do so...

DETERMINED to limit CW production and proliferation,

How?

UNDERSTANDING other UN Resolutions can co-exist which may control CWs further than this resolution may mandate,

Further than "not controlled at all" wouldn't take much.

<snip definitions which the resolution doesn't use for anything>
AFFIRMING the rights of nations to use chemically-based non-lethal and non-persistent substances for legitimate riot control devices (RCDs), applicable to law enforcement, personal defense and other civil purposes, while acknowledging their dual-use potential for CW,

One of only two clauses of the resolution that actually has any definable effect... this is not actually one we disagree with if it wasn't for it being tied up with the creation of the committee that doesn't do anything.

FORSEEING the need to investigate and respond to actual or alleged violations by member states of any UN resolutions governing controls placed over CW,

Which is what the Compliance Ministry does already.

UNDERSTANDING many CW-related inventions, applications and incidents will arise requiring ongoing and clear interpretation for member states,

Recognizing, but not doing anything about it.

REQUIRES member nations to disclose and annually update the following reports on all former, actual and planned CW and dual-use activities within their nation: a) production facilities and storage sites, b) production levels and aggregate stockpiles, c) domestic and international sales and transfers, d) domestic safety and security provisions, regulations and effective status,

REQUIRES member nations to report to the UN all significant incidents of purposeful use or accidental discharge of CW within their boundaries, and those incidents abroad which are the responsibility of their government or any citizens, groups or businesses under their jurisdiction, within 48 hours of the incident's commission or discovery,

These accomplish what? The Compliance Ministry already ensures compliance with resolutions (none of which even exist on CWs at this time) so this isn't needed for that purpose either now or in the future. So why are they a requirement?

REQUIRES member nations to permit and cooperate with UN efforts to conduct investigations and disaster relief due to CW-related incidents,

The other clause that has any practical effect. Again, not a bad effect, if it wasn't tied up with the rest of the formation of the committee which doesn't do anything.

CHARGING the CWCC to:

1. ADHERE to all standing UN resolutions covering chemical weapons (CW),

Already required by the Compliance Ministry. Thus, this does nothing.

2. ADMINISTER any UN regimes to monitor, control or eliminate CW-related materiel or facilities,

The job of the Compliance Ministry IF any resolutions actually mandate the monitoring, eliination or control of CW related materiel or facilities. Thus, this does nothing.

3. INVESTIGATE AND REPORT all significant incidents of CW use or accidental discharge by member nations,

Investigate for what purpose? If it's not against a UN resolution they have no authority to do anything about it, and if it is against a UN resolution enter the Compliance Ministry. Thus, this does nothing.

4. CREATE AND UPDATE international standard CW-related definitions and materiel lists, and specify what does and does not fall under such definitions and controls.

Which can't actually be done. If something isn't already defined as falling under the definitions and controls of a resolution BY that resolution you can't have your committee summarily declare some time in the future that, well, now it is because they say so due to new developments in the field. That would be an amendment of the original resolution.

Thus, this does nothing, because it would be illegal.

Ausserland wholeheartedly supports this fine proposal. It is an excellent first step towards the elimination of chemical weapons from the world of the NSUN.

Members might note that this proposal was originally drafted as a companion proposal to our "Chemical Weapons Ban" proposal, which failed to get enough delegate approvals to be brought to a vote. If, in the future, a ban on chemical weapons is enacted, this proposal will serve as a pre-positioned "implementer".

We respectfully urge delegates to take the time to add their approval to this proposal. It richly deserves to be thoughtfully debated and brought to a vote.

Link for approvals (http://www.nationstates.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi/page=UN_proposal1/match=chemical%20weapons%20management)

Patrick T. Olembe
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Perhaps in some nations information is not considered a valuable asset, but it would be considered, by other nations, a rather significant compromisation of their national security to have to report to an international body the state and disposition of their chemical weapon stockpiles, production capabilities, and safety and security provisions.

Even the report gives the United Nations strategic information to track CW activities useful for their eventual eradication. These reports can also be shared by law enforcement and export control groups in each UN member nation, to monitor disposition and trafficking between states.

While this resolution does not make any outright ban, individual member nations might have local bans or restriction regimes. This information would help in the enforcement of such controls.

It also requires member states to permit international involvement on their sovereign territory in case of chemical weapons discharge, purposefully or accidentally. While that may seem inconsequential to some, I am sure there are national sovereigntists positively twitching at the thought.

(Then again, if there was CW discharge in their nation, they might just simply be twitching at this point. Hence why we'd want to investigate.)

While on a daily basis the effects of disclosure and reporting are negligible to the vast majority of citizens of a nation -- and even miniscule compared to the overall defense activities of a nation state -- as soon as a single international incident occurs wherein a nation is being accused of use of CW against its own citizens or against a foreign power, or gross negligence in the case of an accidental discharge, someone may suddenly consider this a 'severe' compromise of their national sovereignty.

Yet barring such (hopefully) rare critical issues, the general provision of this resolution is to be regarded as mild in effect overall.

Since it is not permitted in the writing of resolutions to expressly make reference to other UN Resolutions, I shall draw attention to how the CWCC might work or interact with other standing UN Committees outside the Compliance Ministry.

Any decision to investigate an accidental or purposeful CW discharge would need to be exercised actively by a Committee charged with determining whether further UN was necessary. Just as the UN IROC determines when to respond to a war or disaster with medical aid workers, the CWCC would need to determine whether a CW discharge warranted international intervention or investigation by the UN.

Indeed, the CWCC might even need to offer its expertise in CW to the IROC, and accept the IROC's assistance in return, coordinating an overall disaster response to a CW discharge.

Any investigation of the CWCC into a report of CW use by a member state to commit genocide could be handed over to another standing UN Committee: TPP.

While CWs are not typically small arms or light weapons, it is theoretically possible some classes of tactical or irregular CW devices could fall under the UNCIAT's regime.

Even beyond all of this, the CWCC can spend years encouraging and helping member states and even non-member states with voluntary regimes for reduction or elimination of CW.

This resolution is about taking stock, literally, by reporting CW activities, and openly accepting international investigation, and thus possible international response. It is not, as some would purport, toothless nor useless.

It serves an investigative and educative purpose and facilitates the voluntary control and eradication of this class of war materials.

If other nations want to write far more stringent resolutions to eradicate CW altogether, then by all means, please write and submit your proposals.

(OOC: Yes, the 'gnomes' will take care of all our annual paperwork. There is no requirement to actually have to RP out the entire CWCC process, nor to link it directly to an IROC international incident or TPP case. There's certainly no requirement to pursue every and all claimed cases of chemical weapons discharge. However, if this resolution passed, I was going to scout around for RPing opportunities in regards to this. Ideally, have the CWCC do the investigation, let IROC handle the casualties, and, if it's a case of genocide, pass it on to TPP do the 'trial' based on the evidence amassed. If such is not your cup of tea, not to worry. However, I am hopeful there are sufficient numbers of people involved in the game potentially interested in this type of voluntary UN roleplay.)

Perhaps in some nations information is not considered a valuable asset, but it would be considered, by other nations, a rather significant compromisation of their national security to have to report to an international body the state and disposition of their chemical weapon stockpiles, production capabilities, and safety and security provisions.

We're sorry... we're trying to follow if you're arguing for or against your own proposed resolution by explaining it compromises the national security of UN member nations.

Even the report gives the United Nations strategic information to track CW activities useful for their eventual eradication.

If there is ever a resolution calling for their eradication...

The. Compliance. Ministry. Does. That.

If there isn't a resolution calling for thier eradication the UN will never use this information.

These reports can also be shared by law enforcement and export control groups in each UN member nation, to monitor disposition and trafficking between states.

While this resolution does not make any outright ban, individual member nations might have local bans or restriction regimes. This information would help in the enforcement of such controls.

And why exactly should we have to report to the UN on the state of our military hardware.... compromising, as you pointed out, our nation's national security by providing our enemies means of accessing that information... if that hardware isn't regulated by the UN?

I'm sorry if making it easier on other nations to monitor the exact capabilities of our military, something they have no bloody business knowing if there is no UN resolution regulating the hardware in question... doesn't strike us as a compelling argument in favor of this idea.

And if that hardware is regulated by the UN, one more time... the Compiance Ministry covers this without requiring a report from everyone.

It also requires member states to permit international involvement on their sovereign territory in case of chemical weapons discharge, purposefully or accidentally. While that may seem inconsequential to some, I am sure there are national sovereigntists positively twitching at the thought.

As we said, one of only two clauses in the resolution that accomplishes anything... and doesn't require the formation of a committee.

Since it is not permitted in the writing of resolutions to expressly make reference to other UN Resolutions, I shall draw attention to how the CWCC might work or interact with other standing UN Committees outside the Compliance Ministry.

Other UN resolutions don't require a seperate UN resolution to oversee their enforcement outside of the Compliance Ministry.

Etc, etc, etc... to repeat: This committee doesn't do anything.

To clarify for the representative of the state of Reformentia,

Had this been an extreme proposal, we'd have heard even more castigations for it being a violation of national sovereignty. As it is, we were simply admitting it was a violation, yet not the most extreme one imaginable.

As the authoring state, we are clearly FOR the proposal, and yet we are intellectually honest enough to admit that it does indeed compromise national security in one way for the sake of preserving national security in other ways, and for the overall net gain to global security.

For example, others might not trust certain nations. Perhaps reasoning that they were argumentative, seemingly aggressive in rhetoric or action. They might grow to distrust this sort of stance. They might want to, in due time, crawl up such a nation's colon with a medical scope to see what they were hiding in their dark factories of war.

Rather than have that, the UN would simply have us report what we've been up to. Only if a nation actually allegedly set CW off on purpose, or had a terrible accident, would the international community care to peek over their fence.

Seems a rather mild alternative?

Yes, that would be an incovenience to some nations who have been secretly stockpiling away enough sarin gas to devastate every man, woman, child, dog, cat and chicken of their neighbor, but this is the price that we, as a global community, might be willing to pay in order to preserve the lives of our neighbors. Or, perhaps, our own.

A bit of national security lost for hopefully regional and international stability.

We're quite aware of what the Compliance Ministry does. And hence, in this proposal, which we must point out does not call for CW eradication, yet encourages member nations to voluntarily reduce their stockpiles, this committee can work with governments which seem to need education on the concepts of global disarmament.

Bans of CW may be placed and repealed, and placed and repealed again over time. Indeed, we have seen one CW ban resolution struck down already, and another was put forth, and another is already in queue. Even once a resolution was enacted, it would not necessarily be enforced forever.

Some proposals might be complete, sweeping up production facilities as well as stockpiles. Others might simply ban production and leave stockpiles, or others might get stockpiles but not get production or research capabilities. Throughout it all, the CWCC could help educate nations confused with what was permitted, or banned, under UN Resolutions before the Compliance Ministry took unilateral action or before they wasted potentially billions of dollars of research.

Nations questioning whether to join the UN might wish clarifications on the topic before joining. The Compliance Ministry would never answer them. Ideally, we might reach out to non-UN nations who had been ravaged by CW-strewn battles and wars and, through engagement and disarmament, beat their mustard gas cannisters into plowshares and possibly get them to join the UN.

There might be new scientific discoveries which are questionable. What should the world think about this new breakthrough? If there was a ban, would the Compliance Ministry be empowered to act upon it or not? We'd not want the gnomes scratching their head for long.

Throughout all this, this Commission can continue to do its work, defining what is, or is not, covered under such regimes. It may indeed be quite confusing and complex. As it already seems to be for some. Hence why we'd wish top minds who knew the specialities of the field, not just laymen.

Further, this Commission is enchartered to work with non-UN nations for their voluntary reductions. One with a keen eye might notice the Compliance Ministry stops their work at the borders of UN nations. This group would be allowed, by invitation of foreign governments, to work with non-UN nations looking to decommission their CW.

The UNCIAT is a precedental model. Small arms and light arms are not 'banned' by the UN, but there are measures that the UNCIAT takes to minimize illicit trafficking in contravention of local national laws of UN member states. We are looking forward to the first annual UNCIAT conference later this year. Perhaps we could have a CW conference thereafter. Though that is beyond the actual text of the Resolution, it would not be unreasonable for a standing committee to conduct.

If my esteemed colleague sees this as "doing nothing," then I propose he puts forward a resolution to do what he feels is best. Yet if he can elevate his vision, he might see more possibilities to this.

To clarify for the representative of the state of Reformentia,

Had this been an extreme proposal, we'd have heard even more castigations for it being a violation of national sovereignty. As it is, we were simply admitting it was a violation, yet not the most extreme one imaginable.

As the authoring state, we are clearly FOR the proposal, and yet we are intellectually honest enough to admit that it does indeed compromise national security in one way for the sake of preserving national security in other ways, and for the overall net gain to global security.

And what other ways would those be that require this reporting you've written into the resolution? If the weapons aren't regulated or banned you can't do anything about them, and if they are regulated or banned the Compliance Ministry does this job without this resolution.

For example, others might not trust certain nations. Perhaps reasoning that they were argumentative, seemingly aggressive in rhetoric or action. They might grow to distrust this sort of stance. They might want to, in due time, crawl up such a nation's colon with a medical scope to see what they were hiding in their dark factories of war.

Rather than have that, the UN would simply have us report what we've been up to. Only if a nation actually allegedly set CW off on purpose, or had a terrible accident, would the international community care to peek over their fence.

Or perhaps the UN would recognize that if a country is making weaponry that the UN does not regulate or prohibit it has no business requiring disclosure of what that nation is "up to"... and if the weaponry in question is regulated or prohibitted this reporting requirement is redundant and accomplishes nothing the Compliance Ministry doesn't already do.

Seems a rather mild alternative?

If "mild" is a euphamism for "impotent". The only thing it accomplishes is setting a precedent for breaching national security of member nations by requiring them to give detailed reports of the state of armnaments they possess that it is perfectly legal for them to possess.

Yes, that would be an incovenience to some nations who have been secretly stockpiling away enough sarin gas to devastate every man, woman, child, dog, cat and chicken of their neighbor, but this is the price that we, as a global community, might be willing to pay in order to preserve the lives of our neighbors. Or, perhaps, our own.

Absurd. Requiring reporting of the fact that nations have chemical weaponry when the UN doesn't prohibit or ban that weaponry makes you no safer from that weaponry if they decide to deploy it. How exactly does it preserve lives?

We're quite aware of what the Compliance Ministry does.

And yet you insist on trying to set up a committee that duplicates it's function.

And hence, in this proposal, which we must point out does not call for CW eradication, yet encourages member nations to voluntarily reduce their stockpiles, this committee can work with governments which seem to need education on the concepts of global disarmament.

And we're sure the type of governments anyone would be concerned about disarming in the first place will be incredible receptive to the 'education' efforts of a committee...

Some proposals might be complete, sweeping up production facilities as well as stockpiles. Others might simply ban production and leave stockpiles, or others might get stockpiles but not get production or research capabilities. Throughout it all, the CWCC could help educate nations confused with what was permitted, or banned, under UN Resolutions before the Compliance Ministry took unilateral action or before they wasted potentially billions of dollars of research.

Another action it can't possibly actually perform. If whatever resolution you're speaking of doesn't itself spell it out for the nations in question already no committee can have the authority to "clarify" that resolution's intent regarding what is permitted and what is banned seperate from what is stated in the legislative text. That would be exactly the same as amending. And the Compliance Ministry won't let UN nations pursue the development or production of banned weaponry in the first place, so how is anyone going to end up wasting money on it through some supposed ignorance of the law?

Nations questioning whether to join the UN might wish clarifications on the topic before joining.

Reading the resolutions would be the way to go about that. If the resolutions don't have that information, no external committee has the ability to come in and tell nations what the committee declares the resolutions to mean and have that interpretation stick. Either the committee is staffed by non entity fictional nations who can't perform that function, or you're talking about roleplaying this and any REAL nation cannot be given the authority to bindingly dictate legislative interpretations of vague resolutions to other nations in the UN!

The Compliance Ministry would never answer them.

Neither could your committee.

There might be new scientific discoveries which are questionable. What should the world think about this new breakthrough? If there was a ban, would the Compliance Ministry be empowered to act upon it or not? We'd not want the gnomes scratching their head for long.

Throughout all this, this Commission can continue to do its work, defining what is, or is not, covered under such regimes.

So your committee makes the decision on behalf of the entire UN as to how UN law is to be applied in new situations which the original legislation didn't take into account?

Not going to happen. CAN'T happen. If it isn't already covered by a resolution you need a new resolution that does cover it. Your committee can't just step in and declare that henceforth some old resolution will now apply to some new technology that the text of the legislation doesn't state it applies apply to. Real nations can't be given the authority to do it in a binding manner in roleplay and the mystical beings that actually staff UN committees lack the capacity for what you're claiming this committee will do.

And if the text does cover whatever the new technology is... once again we have redundancy. The committe is not required because the resolution already did the job. And the Compliance Ministry already takes care of it.

It may indeed be quite confusing and complex.

Not to mention impossible. There's no way you can assign real nations the authority to bindingly re-interpret already passed resolutions to apply them to new situations so this can't be roleplayed with any effect... and the mystical beings that actually spring into existence to staff UN committees don't have the capacity to perform that function either.

The distinguished representative from Reformentia is obviously convinced that this proposal is worthless. We strongly disagree. So what does it do?

1) It codifies and makes binding on the NSUN four definitions of terms critical to proper understanding of chemical weapons. Merely by doing so, it might prevent the sort of problems caused by the late and unlamented "Ban Chemical Weapons".

2) It mandates creation and maintenance of a database of information concerning extant chemical weapons and production facilities. This database could be used by nations to plan for protection of their populations in case of chemical accidents or incidents in neighboring nations. [OOC: Can anybody say Chernobyl?] Such a database would also be essential if a chemical weapons ban were to pass.

3) It provides for a committee to aid in the interpretation of any subsequent resolution on chemical weapons. The definition in this proposal (which would be binding on future proposals) is descriptive, not enumerative, and rightly so. The committee would be of great value in determining whether newly-developed chemical substances fit within that definition.

Ausserland remains firm in its support of this proposal.

[OOC: I think my differences with Reformentia on this issue stem from differences in our approach to playing this game. His comments on the Compliance Ministry are quite correct. But when I play in the NSUN sandbox, I like to play as realistically as is possible in this unreal world. I prefer to see solid, workable legislation that minimizes reliance on mystical creatures to interpret and it and make decisions on its implementation. When I drafted my "Chemical Weapons Ban" proposal, I cringed because space limitations wouldn't let me include realistic implementation and verification protocols. I guess it's all in how you prefer to play the game.] :)

Patrick T. Olembe
Minister for Foreign Affairs

As asked regarding the other chemical weapons proposal...

DECLARING Chemical Weapons (CWs) as not required for national defense given myriad alternate solutions,

You are a small developing nation whose small chemical weapons arsenal is the only deterrant you possess against aggressive behaviour from larger, more powerful neighbouring states.

What are your myriad alternate solutions?

The distinguished representative from Reformentia is obviously convinced that this proposal is worthless. We strongly disagree. So what does it do?

1) It codifies and makes binding on the NSUN four definitions of terms critical to proper understanding of chemical weapons. Merely by doing so, it might prevent the sort of problems caused by the late and unlamented "Ban Chemical Weapons".

But since we don't have a ban on chemical weapons this is a fairly pointless exercise... and if we want a ban on chemical weapons it should be up to the ban to decide what it is that it's actually banning. Maybe the author of a future chemical wepaons ban doesn't agree with this proposal on the definition of the chemical weapons which they wish to attempt to restrict.... and since this resolution isn't doing anything at all with these definitions it shouldn't be taking it upon itself to establish them.

2) It mandates creation and maintenance of a database of information concerning extant chemical weapons and production facilities. This database could be used by nations to plan for protection of their populations in case of chemical accidents or incidents in neighboring nations.

The same argument could be made for the development of any dangerous substance/weapon/program by any nation... we don't require nations to give their neighbours a status report on all their internal affairs because of it. Especially a status report which includes specifics of their military programs which compromise their national security when nothing they are doing in those programs is restricted by the UN.

[OOC: Can anybody say Chernobyl?]

"Nu-clee-ur"?

Such a database would also be essential if a chemical weapons ban were to pass.

No, it wouldn't. It would be the polar opposite of essential. It would be completely and utterly without any use whatsoever. Unless you are impllying that the Compliance Ministry is incapable of enforcing any resolution unless the nations it is enforcing that resolution upon voluntarily provide it with a report of all the activities that should now be curtailed by whatever resolution it is that is being enacted???

Is the Compliance Ministry so easily rendered impotent then, such that this act of cooperation by nations subject to the resolutions it enforces is essential to it performing it's function?

3) It provides for a committee to aid in the interpretation of any subsequent resolution on chemical weapons.

Something which, as we have pointed out, they cannot be given the authority to do beyond saying "this is what the resolution says"... which we do need a useless committee for. The resolution itself would just happen to do that very thing.

The definition in this proposal (which would be binding on future proposals) is descriptive, not enumerative, and rightly so. The committee would be of great value in determining whether newly-developed chemical substances fit within that definition.

Again, not something they can be given the authority to do. Either the description fits any new substances, or it doesn't, or it is unclear if it does... and in all three of these cases there is absolutely nothing the committee can do to change that state of affairs. They can't alter the original resolution to make the wording clearly apply to any new substance if it doesn't already. That's illegal.

No player run nation or nations can possibly be given the authority to declare in a binding manner upon the entire UN body that since they decided the resolution would apply to some new substance it now does so. That, too, would be effectively granting them powers of amendment by giving them the ability to bindingly re-interpret already passed resolutions... only they could do it without even submitting a resolution to amend... which is even worse! Who are they to re-interpret on behalf of all the members who voted for that legislation whether it was actually intended to apply to some new situation if that isn't already clear from the content of the resolution itself, and without it even being subject to a vote?

(And OOC: The panel isn't actually staffed by real nations who are going to be doing ANY interpreting so it can't be accomplished in-game either, which finishes off the last of the manners in which this could be looked at. So it can't do what you are saying it will do no matter how you play the game)

You are a small developing nation whose small chemical weapons arsenal is the only deterrant you possess against aggressive behaviour from larger, more powerful neighbouring states.

What are your myriad alternate solutions?
More pertinently, why has said nation placed all of its military eggs into one undersized and poorly designed basket? Why should one have any sympathy for a nation that sought to protect itself in such a reckless and unpleasant manner?

I don't think it's particularly hard to imagine a nation recently declared independant from a defunct confederation, which finds itself economically bankrupt and only has a stockpile of ageing chemical weapons with which to dissuade other nations from aggressive behaviour. Alternatively, a nation recently emerged from a spell under a tyrant-like ruler who, as you say, left all of his weapons-grade eggs in one chemical basket.

Entry to the UN for that nation would see them having to give up their only defense. Possession of or reliance upon chemical weapons does not automatically label the nation as undesirable.

You are a small developing nation whose small chemical weapons arsenal is the only deterrant you possess against aggressive behaviour from larger, more powerful neighbouring states.

What are your myriad alternate solutions?
1. Be part of a regional alliance where billions of people with other conventional munitions or economic power alone can come to your defense.

2. Have plans to blow bridges, highways, and other key transportation links to deny advancement of enemy forces. Flooding a field by bursting a levy or dyke can deny operations in an area just as effectively, if not more, than spreading toxic chemical substances over it.

3. Use heavy artillery and missiles as area denial weapons to stop advancing armored and air forces.

4. If overrun, rely instead on unconventional small arms tactics and operations.

If you are faced with a significantly larger opponent, chemical weapons will not stop them indefinitely. It may indeed bring similar if not greater retributive and recriminative strikes. If you can poison them, they can poison you. It also can escalate into acts of war and genocide directly targeting civilian populations: water supplies, food sources, and even the air you breathe.

Chemical weapons as a defense are simply wretched. They tend to blow over and taint your own civilian areas, causing casualties as indiscriminantly as your enemy is causing.

Aiming them at your opponent's civilian population is a wonderful way to get brought before the TPP on investigation of genocide.

Defensive alliances with far larger partner states is the only sure way to keep aggressive nations at bay. Tactics should thereafter focus on irregular forces and resistence until assistance arrives.

You'll find conventional weapons still work quite well in that regard.

Reformentia,

The only fairly pointless exercise is in trying to argue with a nation who is not in support of the resolution and refuses to hear logical refutations of their prejudiced and narrow-minded decisions.

Your point has been made.

I would call upon other, more reasonable states, to support this resolution if for no other reason than to bring it to vote before the UN body as a whole so that we can see if Reformentia will in due time be proved correct or not in their assertions.

If it does not work, it can of course, be repealed.

Then again, it can also be left on the books as one of those idealistic yet flawed works of policy, doomed by the cynicism of those bent on avoiding the spirit of the resolution and narrowly interpreting the wording in creative non-compliance.

Let's give it a whirl, shall we?

If you'd like to track chemical weapons, and have a ready UN response to purposeful or accidental discharge of chemical weapons, please support this resolution.

With a few days to go:

Approvals: 25

Status: Lacking Support (requires 104 more approvals)

If someone could assist by helping run a TG campaign for this, I would be most appreciative.

Another suggestion:

5. Invest in incapacitant agents which are not technically chemical weapons, as per the definition provided in the proposed resolution, but which may be able to effectively neutralize enemy forces. So long as it does not "cause death, serious injury, chronic or permanent harm," these agents would not be covered under this regime.

Enemies who are incapacitated as a result of such agents may be safely captured. However, research on such agents is not foolproof, and CW defenses may effectively prevent these from working.

Also consider that a larger state, if invading a weaker one, may already have invested in CW defenses for their troops, especially if they know that the small state has pinned their defensive strategy on these weapons. CW suits are rather inexpensive compared to most military forces (emergency CW suits can be purchased for $150 or thereabouts at retail commercially, not including discounts for volume purchcase agreements, or manufactured at-cost by governments).

Again, there are other and better ways to invest your defense dollars.
________
RL Source
The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare (http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/02110b.htm)

Representative Listeneisse,

I believe you miss my point. Chemical weapons are a wretched defense in reality because it is nigh on impossible for their use to avoid affecting the population and environment of the defending nation. Chemical (and nuclear) weapons are an excellent tool for preventing invasion in the first place.

Every one of your alternate solutions involves action being taken once the enemy has invaded; chemical weapons, more than any of your proposed alternatives, make the enemy think twice before getting involved in the first place. I would much rather have the enemy look elsewhere for more land and natural resources, then fight a geurrilla campaign on my own soil while my cities are sacked or destroyed, my population ravaged by conscription and then brutality, and my carefully constructed government and economy crippled by an aggressive external foe. No matter how quickly an ally can mobilise, the aggressor has the opportunity to deal a death blow to short term recovery, both economic and in terms of population growth.

Although my nation does not boast a chemical weaponry arsenal, I will never condemn those nations whose only available defense is the intimidation provided by the possession of potent chemical weaponry. What the resolution should be seeking to punish is irresponsible use of chemical weapons, rather than the possession thereof.