NationStates Jolt Archive

Quote:
The United Nations,

MAINTAINING steadfastly, a disgust of biological weapons,

CONFIRMING the monumental risks of global pandemic should biological weapons be used,

ACKNOWLEDGING te desire in some to take a radical approach to the abolition of biological weapons,

RECALLING the great number of non-UN nations compared to the small number of UN nations,

CONCLUDING that the elimination of military partnerships between UN nations and nations which refuse to abandon biological weapons leaves UN nations at a severe military disadvantage,

CONVINCED UN nations require some military partnerships with non-UN nations to remain free and unconquered,

REPEALS Resolution 113: UN Biological Weapons Ban.

I'm in favor of adding:

"NOTING that many objections and loopholes exist in the banning of biological weapons;"

to somewhere in that text.

Now, note: I don't like Bioweapons. The only WMD I 'like' is a nuke. A TACTICAL nuke. Not used on civilians, unless they're mixed in with the military. And only when we're desperate. Most likely if we're horribly outnumbered. Or the nation has been known to use nukes first, but only with the permission of allies.

However, I don't like the "Either have no bioweapons or you can't ally with us" because then there's no real good reason to ally with a UN member - it gives more incentive to not join the UN because, all of the sudden, your ability to make alliances is theoretically cut by 3/4ths of the NS population, if the Non UN nation in question even just does biological research.

I know thats not the best arguement against this bill that's been presented, but that's been mine.


NOTING that many objections and loopholes exist in the banning of biological weapons and releated fields of research;

FURTHER NOTING that common and well known bioweapons, such as anthrax, are not banned by this Proposeal;

You might want to also point out that one of the most common bioweapons, anthrax, is not covered by the ban.

MMm. I think it should be stated...

"FURTHER NOTING that common and well known bioweapons, such as anthrax, are not banned by this Proposeal;"

MMm. I think it should be stated...

"FURTHER NOTING that common and well known bioweapons, such as anthrax, are not banned by this Proposeal;"

That would be an excellent addition to the repeal text.

Thanks, TH ^^

I'll be putting proposed additions to PC's base in a seperate quote block in the bottom of the first post.

To Lanquassia:

In addition to this repeal, will you be submitting an amended biological weapons ban resolution to the UN? To a large degree support by our nations and allies will depend on this.

Prime Minister Timothy McKenzie
Constitutional Monarchy of Bunny Pancake
UN Delegate of the White Dwarf Dominion

Might want to change to:

NOTING that many objections and loopholes exist in the current ban of biological weapons;

Now, note: I don't like Bioweapons. The only WMD I 'like' is a nuke. A TACTICAL nuke. Not used on civilians, unless they're mixed in with the military. And only when we're desperate. Most likely if we're horribly outnumbered. Or the nation has been known to use nukes first, but only with the permission of allies.

However, I don't like the "Either have no bioweapons or you can't ally with us"

If you don't have it you don't have a ban. It's that simple. It would be like outlawing murder but not making conspiracy to commit murder a crime... while there are people beyond your jurisdiction who can legally commit murder.

Everyone under the rule of your law becomes able to commit murder simply by having someone else do it for them. Without a single legal repercussion.

I would second the call that if you insist on claiming you are against biological weapons but want to repeal the current ban based on the alliance restrictions you provide an alternative means of curtailing the use by UN nations of this weaponry you are so against that compensates for this rather important fact.

Throughout this entire debate I have seen a lot of complaining about that article... and not one single workable alternative that accomplishes the same job.

And that closing "CONVINCED" article is just flat out misleading. There isn't a ban on alliances with non UN nations, there is a ban on alliances with nations who possess biological weapons. You can ally yourself with non UN nations who aren't in possession of this weaponry you just finished saying you were against in the first place all you like.

After reading through Allemande's extensive arguments, I am now at the conclusion there are some serious flaws with the resolution. I wish more could've been done earlier, but it wasn't.

Regardless of the flaws, I steadfastly support the military alliances clause. While it is certainly something that unnerves many people, and certainly there is (at a short term level) much greater loss to the UN nations than the removal of the clause would create, the effect will put significant pressure on both sides of these alliances to consider their position on the matter. In effect, non-UN members would be forced to decide whether they want the alliance on bio-weapons just as the UN members will need to decide whether they want the alliance or the UN. It is, by far, the most substancial effect the UN has ever been able to place upon nations outside of the organization and I applaud Reformatia for attempting it.

There are several flawed areas of the law, questionable loopholes, and potential contradictions with previous UN law (I note Allemande's question about responsible scientific research).

1) More consideration must be addressed with giving exceptions and distinction to diseases.

2) The word isolate needs to replaced with quarantine - as quarantines allow for a more robust consideration of how to address the issue. While I not Allemande's comment about sexual freedom, I believe it to be a non-issue.

3) The virus definition is considerably flawed - declaring every form of mircoorganism as a virus. It is, perhaps, our fault for listening to DLE without checking our facts, but it is one that needs to be fixed.

4) I feel (in much the same was as was used to bypass the UNSA) that a pittance must be paid to Scientific Freedom (in the form of "believing that research of greater than this amount is irresponsible consideration of the dangers of their work").


Further, I would like to bring a point Roathin brought to the table (though it goes down as a fifth point to correct this). Of course, the issue is that (despite, I know, several objections), contagious is not defined, however - Anthrax is contageous under certain definitions (my general lack of knowledge makes it difficult to understand exactly how this works - perhaps someone can enlighten us).

*edit* Forgot to say:

All in all, the resolution needs to be repealed and fixed, but not because of the reason stated.

After reading through Allemande's extensive arguments, I am now at the conclusion there are some serious flaws with the resolution. I wish more could've been done earlier, but it wasn't.

As I've stated elsewhere, if an alternative version of the resolution can be presented which does the job as well or better than the one currently in effect I will drop opposition to a repeal.

Depending on the effectiveness of this hypothetical alternative resolution, I may even contribute to the campaign for it's passage should it come to that.

Regardless of the flaws, I steadfastly support the military alliances clause.

There we remain in agreement. I have seen no way that an alternative bioweapons ban resolution could be enacted in any effective manner without that article.

I find most of Allemande's other arguments attempting to create additional restriction to be as overly legalistic as many of DLE and Vastiva's attempts to get around restrictions were considered to be during the original draft phase... but if a way to address them without compromising the effectiveness of the resolution can be proposed I will accept it.

We will support any and all repeal attempts. We would also support a replacement resolution which prohibited the use of bioweapons against UN nations either personally or by proxy. We will not support any replacement which restricts the right of sovereign states to form alliances as they see fit.

We will support any and all repeal attempts. We would also support a replacement resolution which prohibited the use of bioweapons against UN nations either personally or by proxy. We will not support any replacement which restricts the right of sovereign states to form alliances as they see fit.

Then you are not supporting a ban at all unless you can come up with some other way to prevent a UN nations non UN ally from deploying those weapons against a UN nation when hostilities break out between two UN nations. The proxy clause is only sufficiant to prevent the UN nation from directly requesting the deployment of those weapons. Of course they don't have to, the fact that the alliance exists at all accomplishes everything required.

Is anyone willing to draft a 'Banning the Use of Anthrax' proposal? That should silence a few objections to the recently passed resolution.

Mathieu Vergniaud
Deputy Speaker to the UN

We will gladly support this proposal so long as it allows much more than the current 250mg limit to biologic materials, as this is nowhere near enough of the substance to produce vaccine for an infected populace.

Is anyone willing to draft a 'Banning the Use of Anthrax' proposal? That should silence a few objections to the recently passed resolution.

While we agree that it would, we must state in the interests of honesty that while Reformentia would not actively (at least, beyond discussions in the forums) oppose it we wouldn't support it either. We see banning anthrax in any non contagious form not already covered by the current ban as a waste of UN time.

Why bother banning a weapon that can be used to dust an area and make it hazardous to people for a relatively short time until the weapon biodegrades... when we currently explicitly reserve the right for UN nations to possess weapons that can be used to vaporize an area and that will leave the target area radioactive and hazardous for people to enter for quite a bit longer than anthrax will?

As I've said elsewhere, it's like worrying about banning handguns while legalizing automatic assault rifles. (And for the record, we don't intend to ban either handguns, assault rifles, or nukes).

The real threat is presented by the contagious agents.

We will gladly support this proposal so long as it allows much more than the current 250mg limit to biologic materials, as this is nowhere near enough of the substance to produce vaccine for an infected populace.

You can't use vaccines on an infected populace. They have to be administered prior to infection. They're preventatives, not cures. And 250mg of a biological agent is quite a lot.

Oh, please. Anybody who thinks that this resolution will actually lead to an increase in dialogue between UN and non-UN states on bioweapons is living in Fantasyland. What it will do is to first drive off a number of UN states whose allies actually provide a tangible benefit to their nations, unlike the UN, which appears to be good at pontification but awfully short on positive action, especially if one is capitalist, militaristic, or non-democratic.

Those remaining nations will adopt a "don't ask, don't tell" policy on bioweapons when forming alliances. Biological weapons will become the proverbial elephant in the living room - ever present, but always unaddressed. Thanks to the UN intervention, there is absolutely no incentive for a non-UN state to reveal to a UN ally that it possesses these types of weapons. Of course, it can get even more bizarre:

"Does your nation have bioweapons?"

"Whyever do you ask?"

[hands over copy of Res. 113] "We can't help your nation if you do."

"Um...um...of course not!"

"Oh, good. Now that we've got that out of the way..." [proceeds to form alliance and beat the crap out of another nation despite the second nation having bioweapons but lying about them]

Now, does that lead to disarmament? I didn't think so.

First, I think you should get rid of the ACKNOWLEDGING line. I think it's a little too much--too divisive.

Also, I'm wondering where would be best to place the added lines. I'm thinking of two main possibilities:

The United Nations,

MAINTAINING steadfastly, a disgust of biological weapons,

CONFIRMING the monumental risks of global pandemic should biological weapons be used,

RECALLING the great number of non-UN nations compared to the small number of UN nations, and CONVINCED UN nations require some military partnerships with non-UN nations to remain free and unconquered,

CONCLUDING that the elimination of military partnerships between UN nations and nations which refuse to abandon biological weapons leaves UN nations at a severe military disadvantage,

NOTING that many objections and loopholes exist in the banning of biological weapons and related fields of research,

FURTHER NOTING that common and well known bioweapons, such as anthrax, are not banned by this Proposeal,

REPEALS Resolution 113: UN Biological Weapons Ban.

and

The United Nations,

MAINTAINING steadfastly, a disgust of biological weapons,

CONFIRMING the monumental risks of global pandemic should biological weapons be used,

NOTING that many objections and loopholes exist in the banning of biological weapons and related fields of research,

FURTHER NOTING that common and well known bioweapons, such as anthrax, are not banned by this Resolution,

RECALLING the great number of non-UN nations compared to the small number of UN nations, and CONVINCED UN nations require some military partnerships with non-UN nations to remain free and unconquered,

CONCLUDING that the elimination of military partnerships between UN nations and nations which refuse to abandon biological weapons leaves UN nations at a severe military disadvantage,

REPEALS Resolution 113: UN Biological Weapons Ban.

I'm leaning towards the second, myself. I think the anthrax line catches more attention and should be earlier.

On another matter, I think the NOTING line needs a little more specifism. If it doesn't highlight a specific loophole that is distressing--or portray the 250mg as a infintesimally small amount--I think it might need to be cut.

Before anyone thinks otherwise, I am in no way trying to control this proposal text. I gave it to Lanquassia fully understanding that it was his/hers to change, manipulate, and even scrap. I'm merely offering my suggestions. I will respect Lanquassia just as much (which, Lanquassia, is a fairly high level of resepct :)) should he or she decide every one of my suggestions is unusable as if he or she uses every word I put forth.

It's all good, guys :)

*debates digging up the really old thread that addresses the 250mg issue.....*

First, I think you should get rid of the ACKNOWLEDGING line. I think it's a little too much--too divisive.

Also, I'm wondering where would be best to place the added lines. I'm thinking of two main possibilities:



and



I'm leaning towards the second, myself. I think the anthrax line catches more attention and should be earlier.

On another matter, I think the NOTING line needs a little more specifism. If it doesn't highlight a specific loophole that is distressing--or portray the 250mg as a infintesimally small amount--I think it might need to be cut.

Before anyone thinks otherwise, I am in no way trying to control this proposal text. I gave it to Lanquassia fully understanding that it was his/hers to change, manipulate, and even scrap. I'm merely offering my suggestions. I will respect Lanquassia just as much (which, Lanquassia, is a fairly high level of resepct :)) should he or she decide every one of my suggestions is unusable as if he or she uses every word I put forth.

It's all good, guys :)

When Powerhungry Chipmunks offers a 'suggestion', people listen ;) Especially since you drafted the framework.

I do like the second form of inserting the additonal clauses - it does flow alot better.

And thanks, PC ;) Usually I don't get any respect :D

As for the reasons to repeal this ban:

I have my reasons, which is that it cuts me off from allies that I depend on militarily (When I'm facing nations with twenty times my population, I need allies) that are just doing research. I admit that in some people's minds this is not the best reason, but its my reason.

There are 'better' reasons for other people, such as the fact the ban doesn't cover every bioweapon, or the research clause.

Or those of us that feel that bioweapons, while evil, are a necessary evil.

Okay, just another note that I remebered while looking at other threads -

I will not work to replace the current UN Bioweapons ban with another version.

Why? Because I have no clue how to draft anything complicated enough to make ME happy. Okay, I do, but I also know that it'd be a huge effort, and bigger than I'm capable of pulling.

This repeal will, so long as I'm the one officially drafting it (Despite the fact we all know that PC's the one really writing it ;) ), never say "To be replaced with more effective legislation."

However, that does not mean that I would not support a Bioweapons ban that avoids the three biggest pitfalls that the current ban creates:

1. Attempting to force negative consequences on the actions of non UN nations;

2. Fails to enact anything more than a partial and patchy ban on some bioweapons, but not all;

3. Does not impede biological research.

In fact, if someone did a rewrite of the current ban to address those three issues, I'd support it fully; I'd even try to help make it work. But that isn't my goal.

My goal is to get this repealed.

The Commonwealth of Pontinia's Chief Military Co-Ordinator, Charles Highbury, agrees to this proposal in its essence, but feels uneasy that biological weapons should be developed outside of United Nations control and regulation. He therefore suggests that a United Nations Military Supervision Committee be created as part of this resolution to regulate the production of WMD in UN member countries.

Excerpts from the Testimony of Dr. Edward Chacon, Dean of the Alfred A. Rothschild School of Law at the University of New Bayonne in Allemande, given on 7/25/2005.

I thank the Ambassador from the Republic of Lanquassia for giving me this opportunity to speak.

During the weeks immediately proceeding the passage of Resolution #113, the United States of Allemande assembled a task force of over 250 experts from a wide array of backgrounds: government and military officials, doctors and hospital administrators, academics, insurers, patient advocacy groups, attorneys and experts in international law, disarmament advocates, and many others. Every effort was made to determine if Allemande could live within the proposed protocol, but ultimately the consensus opinion was that we could not.

Yet, having only been out of the U.N. for a very short while, Allemande provides a good yardstick to measure the costs and drawbacks of compliance with Resolution #113, in so far as the bulk of our laws remain as they were while we were still U.N. members. Virtually all of the difference that exist in the affected areas (mainly medical research, education, and health care) are therefore a direct consequence of the passage of Resolution #113.

Contagious Persons and Medical Testing

Resolution #113 is unambiguous in its definition of “bioweapons”: they are “contagious biological viruses, bacteria or microbes with the effect of harming, incapacitating, or killing a person upon infection”. Since even a simple case of diarrhoea can be said to “incapacitate” a person, virtually any disease that is “contagious” falls under this definition. In essence, then, the bioweapons ban is actually a ban on contagious diseases.

A direct logical consequence of this is that blood, semen, urine, stool, saliva, or biopsy samples containing such diseases are necessarily “bioweapon” specimens. While a blood draw of 2ml does not count as 2ml of “bioweapon” mass, certainly some fraction of it does. That fraction, then, both counts against the national limit of 250mg of allowable “bioweapon” mass and necessitates that the specimen be handled as a “bioweapon”.

The impact of this on the health care industry is immediately obvious if you compare the procedures in place within Allemande with those in place within United Nations member states. In Allemande, a medical technician who has been ordered to take a blood draw takes it, labels it, and transports it to a medical laboratory, where the draw is analysed and then disposed of in accordance with environmentally sound medical waste disposal methods.

But in a United Nations member state, this blood draw contains “bioweapon” mass. That means that it must be placed under military control as soon as it is drawn (if not drawn by a member of the military). Military security must be maintained during transport to the lab (for the moment, we'll assume that the lab is in the same building as the patient, since transportation between buildings is problematic under the protocol), and the lab itself must be “a multi-tier (minimum of 2 tier) quarantined building in that nation, and kept under the highest of that nation’s military security”. When the sample has been analysed and is no longer needed, it “must be immediately and completely destroyed through a method which incorporates all possible safeguards against any release of the agent”.

These are far more exacting standards than those now employed in Allemande. Most hospitals - where the bulk of contaminated blood is drawn - are not kept under military lock-down; indeed, they aren't usually even maintained under direct protection by the police. Private security firms usually provide a relatively rudimentary level of physical security for these facilities, and people are allowed to come and go without being subjected to searches, being escorted through the facility, or other similar measures. Physicians and staff do not have received top level military clearance before they can work in such facilities, nor are the vendors who provide such facilities with logistical support forced to pass their people through even the most rudimentary background checks. Indeed, compared to the “highest (levels) of (Allemande's) military security”, or hospitals are horribly lax.

Some have argued that merely placing hospitals under military authority or designating private security personnel as military auxiliaries would be sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 2. This is patent nonsense. The problem with Article 2 is that it employs the superlative term “highest” as a description of the required level of military security. Logically, the “highest” level of security can only be said to be operative when no military installation, facility, or deployment by the nation in question, anywhere in the Universe, can be said to be “more secure”. If retinal scans, guard dogs, pat-down searches, pervasive camera networks, escorts, etc., are employed by the nation in question anywhere else under any circumstance (including in combat zones under actually conditions of warfare), then any facility lacking these measures can not be said to be operative at “the highest of that nation’s military security”.

Some nations, such as Krioval, have unified police and military authority under the same command structure, and as such can rightly consider all peace officers to be military personnel. This can mitigate the problem, but not eliminate it. These nations can at least use police to protect their hospitals from the presumed theft of stool specimens by terrorist groups, but they must still maintain the levels of security at “the highest” of any facility within their jurisdiction. Given that this is an increase beyond what was needed prior to the passage of Resolution #113, it can safely be said that, at the very least, Resolution #113 has increased the costs of health care delivery; at worst it has militarised every United Nations member's health care system.

At the other end of the process, medical waste disposal is also impacted. Resolution #113 is unambiguous in requiring that medical specimens containing “contagions” be “immediately and completely destroyed through a method which incorporates all possible safeguards against any release of the agent”. This imposes on medical waste handling procedures a set of mandates above and beyond what is normally considered best industry practise, in so far as pre-Resolution #113 procedures merely called for the sterilisation of wastes to a degree consistent with public safety. The “incorporation” of “all possible safeguards” requires that samples be handled in such a way as to maximise the possibility of specimen destruction, even where such “safeguards” involve actions undertaken well beyond the point where they are reasonable. If there's a method of sterilisation that hasn't yet been used, and it could theoretically reduce the likelihood of contamination by any amount, however small, it must be used, even beyond the point of marginal gain.

Taken together, these measures serve to vastly increase both the cost and difficulty of conducting medical tests as part of a diagnostic regimen. The effect on both the cost and availability of health care in United Nations member states has been staggering, with a resulting increase in private medical bankruptcies, public heath care budget overruns, hospital and clinic closures, public taxes, and morbidity.

We have asked Vice Admiral Homer L. Humboldt (AN, Ret), one of our nation's formost experts on security management, to comment on the remarks of Dr. Chacon. He focused his comments on this paragraph:

Excerpts from the Testimony of Dr. Edward Chacon, Dean of the Alfred A. Rothschild School of Law at the University of New Bayonne in Allemande, given on 7/25/2005.

Some have argued that merely placing hospitals under military authority or designating private security personnel as military auxiliaries would be sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 2. This is patent nonsense. The problem with Article 2 is that it employs the superlative term “highest” as a description of the required level of military security. Logically, the “highest” level of security can only be said to be operative when no military installation, facility, or deployment by the nation in question, anywhere in the Universe, can be said to be “more secure”. If retinal scans, guard dogs, pat-down searches, pervasive camera networks, escorts, etc., are employed by the nation in question anywhere else under any circumstance (including in combat zones under actually conditions of warfare), then any facility lacking these measures can not be said to be operative at “the highest of that nation’s military security”.

Admiral Humboldt's comments:

While agreeing wholeheartedly with the majority of Dr. Chacon's remarks, I must take exception to this portion. The resolution in question specifies the degree of security required, not the means to achieve it. There are often many ways to attain a particular level of security. Simply because a security technique is used in one "highest level" security schema does not mean it must be used elsewhere to reach the same level. Indeed, our own Security regulations often list alternatives and provide for the use of compensatory measures to obtain "substantially equivalent protection."

That being said, it is my considered opinion, based on 28 years experience in security management, including 15 years of teaching college-level courses in the field, that the security requirement in the resolution is grossly impractical, would be ruinously expensive to implement, and would, of sad necessity, cripple medical research in the Principality.

OOC: This is supposed to stimulate the discussion not kill it. As this is overly long though, feel free to continue the discussion of the proposal texrt OOC and without responding to this RPed post.



IC: Waiting his turn, Dan Yeoman acknowledged Dr. Chacon and Vice Admiral Humboldt and stood to introduce his own guest: Special Advisor Thomas Polzinski.

"Polzinski, Thomas. Special Advisor to the Powerhungry Chipmunk Security Council" Polzinski began, waltzing towards the UN floor, "I humbly ask the UN to hear my words. What I have to say is very similar to Dr. Chacon from the honorable nation in Allemande, so I will cover only those details specific to the individual situation of my nation, and make my presentation as brief as possible” Polzinski stood in the middle of the floor, feeling astonishingly naked for being in full dress uniform, Air Force medals and all.

"I have been a special advisor to the Security Council in Powerhungry Chipmunks for approximately nine years. Before that I worked as a consultant for the Security Council, duties I performed for seventeen years. Previous that, I studied at the Orlandy University in Palenth, Powerhungry Chipmunks and served for five years in the Powerhungry Chipmunks Air Force.”

Yeoman began doodling leisurely on his yellow legal pad, trying to look important and busy. In actuality, though Yeoman had no doubt Polzinski, who Yeoman had first met in his air force years, would get his point across spectacularly.

“During my twenty-six total years involved with the Security Council, I have most often been involved in the task of 'threat assessment', both national and extra-national. 'Threat assessment' for Powerhungry Chipmunks's Security Council involves constant appraisal and acquisition of new and old similar and dissimilar threats" Polzinski stated shakily, "through mine and my colleagues' work, the Powerhungry Chipmunks Security Council is able to recommend accurate budgets and directives to the legislature which in turn what provides the Security Council the resources it needs to protect Powerhungry Chipmunks from attack and invasion and oppression.”

Yeoman made a few furtive motions to the obviously nervous Polzinski, indicating the water that was on the desk beside him. Polzinski took this instead to mean that Yeoman wanted him to expand on the topic of threat assessment.

"As a threat assessor, I have become thoroughly acquainted with a process of 'balancing the equation', if you will. In the course of assessing a threat, I balance existing and potential force from the possible aggressor against existing force and potential or threats of force from Powerhungry Chipmunks. 'Equations' like this that are balanced require little to no action, there is little that aggressor could do without matching or overpowering force. However, once that equation becomes unbalanced I recommend the Security Council one of two things: either and increase in our assets, or a decrease in the possible aggressor's assets.”

Noticing several gasps at this news, Polzinski found the water and sipped carefully. While the water moistened his desert-throat, he held one finger aloft trying to delay a torrent of disapproval until he had refreshed himself.

"This is not always as hawk-ish as it sounds.” He looked around; the representatives seemed unconvinced of this. “Most often, the possible will, through diplomatic means, be persuaded to 'aim' its military strength elsewhere than at my nation. Only on rare occasion, and when there is cause to believe there is an imminent threat, will Powerhungry Chipmunks take preemptive or amply decisive military action to disable the assets of a possible aggressor.” Polzinski again sipped.

"Regardless, I digress.” Polzinski's face sheepishly strayed toward Yeoman as though it had transgressed, now brightly pale at the thought that he had strayed from his original course. ”True, as the Security Council becomes aware of threats, it recommends preventative action from the threat resulting in an unanswerable attack. However, that is not really the realm in which I was most involved in and it is hardly the point I am making today. My point involves these balances of force. Non-UN military allies were added into the calculation of assets of force which Powerhungry Chipmunks wielded, being factored in according to the perceived likelihood of allied assistance from that military ally. To my knowledge, all of these non-UN military allies have fairly substantial stockpiles of biological weapons.” Polzinski began slowly pacing back and forth across the floor.

“The Powerhungry Chipmunks Security Council created agreements with all of these biological weapons wielding nations for to abstain from use of those biological weapons, except in contained environments or situations, in conflicts in which they were coming to the aid of our nation.” Polzinski realized he had begun pacing, and immediately and somewhat uncoordinatedly stopped himself. For a moment it looked to Yeoman he he might fall. Polzinski continued “this use and refraining from use I know of, because the Security Council apprised me and my colleagues of the situation when the agreements were made, and we changed our threat assessments accordingly. Powerhungry Chipmunks has never been involved in a conflict in which an ally, UN or not, has used biological weapons on our behalf.”

Yeoman returned to doodling. At this point, he had crafted a fairly unflattering likeness of Polzinski with steam exiting his mouth. That Polzinski had paused and drunk more water from his cup as he did this only made it harder for Yeoman to suppress mutinous giggles.

"Since the UN biological weapons ban has passed, though, we have had to cut official ties with these non-UN allies, resulting in several unhappy diplomats and countries. Given the non-contractual status of any mutual defense agreement between Powerhungry Chipmunks and any of her non-UN allies now, the threat assessment division of the Security Council has been abuzz with new calculations. We are unable to count our former non-UN allies as likely contributors to our defense assets, and must re-work out projected defenses against possible threats. I know that I myself have lost many nights sleep over the reassessment of threats, along with many of my colleagues. Without the weight of our non-UN allies on our side, many of the possible threats previously considered benign are now actionable.” Polzinski began speaking faster now sprinting harder and harder to reach some sort of finish line, still occasionally pausing for tastes of liquid.

“Though I cannot give specifics for security reasons, Powerhungry Chipmunks Security Council has already recommended covert action be taken to dismantle certain threats which are now too much for Powerhungry Chipmunks’s lonely defense assets.” Polzinski sipped and continued, “though we expect some of our non-UN allies to come to our aid due to unofficial, good-faith agreements and the economic advantage they have with trade between us, the paradigm shift has left the nation’s defenses askew and inadequate.”

Polzinski paused. His water stood empty beside him,“ I ask this body to reject this legislation and enact a more reasonable measures. Powerhungry Chipmunks Security Council is now asking for drastically increased funding from the legislature, because of our deserted non-UN alliances. The legislature, which has long maintained itself as pro-UN, will have trouble increasing taxes to pay for what, in the end, is the fault of the UN. So, this funding will most likely be shifted from public programs, the social net, and business incentives to simply preserving the life of our citizens. I am surprised as the results of this one resolution, and the imprudence which has permeated throughout this august body in that passage of it.

“I simply ask that you consider your own homes, our homes, and the homes of the citizens in your honorable countries” Polzinski looked around the room one last time, “think of them, and remove this resolution.”

Backing toward the Powerhungry Chipmunk delegation, he shot his last words sharply towards the gallery, “thank you for listening. I have more threat assessment to work out. I bid you adieu.” Yeoman greeted Polzinski back at his desk and invited him to stay for the remainder of the meeting. Polzinski simply responded that he had already promised the UN that he was leaving to go back to work and it wouldn’t help their case for repeal if he were still present. Yeoman reluctantly bid farewell to his friend and turned his attention to the next speaker on the floor.

I fully agree with what you are doing. This ridiculous resolution must be repealed immediatley, and if I'm still delegate when this shows up as an official proposal, I will most certainly support it.

I like:

Big Undergarments colored Mauve and Puce.