NationStates Jolt Archive

Are there more liberal delegates than realist delegates? Liberalism as an IR theory is practically dead, yet still I see all these proposals to eradicate militaries of UN member nations, because if the NSUN has 500,000 troops from every nation then we won't need individual militaries; or better, one I just read limiting a nation's ability to declare war (making it more regional, and adding the necessity of majority support).

Don't get me wrong, Liberalism is lovely in that quaint rocking-chair sort of way. But its not feasible. While the number of wars between NSUN nations may be decreased, it will do nothing in regards to wars between NSUN nations and non-NSUN nations. I understand that you see war as a flaw in the system that must be mended. You're wrong.

I'm not a realist. I don't see war as a natural phenomenon in the IR system. I see war as a rejection of the system. Laws against war are like gun control laws: they put guns (or war) only in the hands of the aggressors, and leave potential victims helpless. The idea of a massive NSUN army is great, but aren't there nations in the UN that you wouldn't support sending your troops to die in the defense of? Don't lie, I know there are.

No one can stop you, the proposers of these bills, from typing up outdated int'l theory that, if it passes, will do no more than make NSUN nations fight with one arm tied behind their back, so to speak.

We can, however, do two things:

1) Corinto urges regional delegates to take the safety interests of their region into consideration before supporting such proposals

2) Corinto more strongly urges NSUN members to be responsible if one of these issues ever hits the floor, and bury it in the graveyard of failed proposals.

You may, however, do as you will. Corinto, anticipating that someday one such legislation will pass, has eradicated its armed forces. We have taken our military funding, personnel, and equipment and converted it into use of a massive police force, devoted to law and order in Corinto and its region. We will not, however, allow our sovereign ability to declare war to be taken away from us. Our defense is our greatest interest.

Captain-General Grim
Federation of Corinto

The people of New Clarkhall agree. Resolutions to ban our militaries are not only dangerous, but also unrealistic.

I wouldn't worry though. I have a tough time imagining any such resolution will even get enough endorsements to reach quorum, much less pass in a full assembly vote.

CINC-CAF (Commander in Chief New Clarkhall Armed Forces)

Look at it this way. If the non-UN nations weren't also required to do this, they would wreak havoc with their militaries. So if the UN is going to keep the peace (which it was created to do) they would need to have a way to stem this. So those two are right, it doesn't make sense.

*elbows thread in the ribs*

The creation of a central UN army seems like a feasable idea if two things are true:

1) It is the UN member state's choice as to whether or not it wants to take part in this enterprise, and

2) Only nations that eliminate the substantial portion of their national militaries and instead donate substantial resources to this army will be protected by it.

The end result will be that those nations who think it is in their best interest to do so will all be protected under one centrally controlled military umbrella. Their power to declare agressive wars will be nearly non-existant, as they will have almost no independent military strength at their disposal; however, if *they* are attacked, they will have an army to defend them far superior in numbers to what they could have raised as individual states. Thus, there are both drawbacks and advantages to a nation considering joining this UN defense block.

Nations who do not wish to join do not have to; nations that do wish to join will help bind the UN closer together, and will recieve substantial benefits as to national security.

In practice, this could be a strong proposal submitted under the "decreasing military spending" category. It will be useful in RP, as nations could start a thread in the International Incidents forum, and there declare that they are a part of this UN program, and how much they contribute; then, during RP warfare, a *defending* nation that is a member of the program will be able to claim command over a military force far greater than what it could create by itself, limited only by the sum of all the individual contributions by program members.

As far as the mechanics of NationStates go, such a proposal, should someone consider submitting it, would require no change whatsoever, and thus it would be perfectly eligible. Everyone should give it at least some consideration -- remember, it would not be forcing your nation to do anything that it does not want to.

Office of the Governor

OOC: I'm doing a paper for my IR class on American Foreign Policy and I came across this article, which I can't link to because it's a subscribe-type site...so here's the article. It's about the failings of UNAMIR and the real UN in Rwanda during the Clinton administration.

World Policy Journal, Winter 1994 v11 n4 p44(11)
The question of genocide: the Clinton administration and Rwanda. Burkhalter, Holly J..

"...Later in 1992, the U.N. Security Council voted to deploy a contingent of peacekeeping personnel, known as UNAMIR, in Rwanda. U.N. Security Council Resolution 872 authorized the deployment of 800 troops for an initial six-month period and envisioned upward of 2,500 troops in Rwanda by 1994...On April 6, in an act now attributed by most observers to the army itself, President Habyarimana's plane was shot down, killing all aboard and marking the beginning of the second phase of the Rwandan crisis...Presidential guards were immediately dispatched to the homes of moderates within the government itself to kill them and their families. The chief target was Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, who fled from her home to the U.N. compound, where Belgian UNAMIR soldiers attempted to save her from a mob of Hutu militiamen and soldiers....They failed: the prime minister was murdered, along with three Belgian peacekeepers. The remaining seven Belgian soldiers around Uwilingiyimana laid down their arms in the hope that they would appear nonthreatening, given their rules of engagement requiring them to avoid combat. They were tortured and horribly murdered by members of the militia. Within days, Belgium had deployed 850 troops under its own flag to evacuate Belgian citizens from Rwanda. But once all Belgian nationals had been safely evacuated, Belgian public opinion, inflamed by the deaths of the ten peacekeepers, led Brussels to withdraw its 420 soldiers from UNAMIR...In the weeks following the airplane crash, the U.N. Security Council regularly met to discuss the fate of UNAMIR, with the United States supporting complete withdrawal of the force on the grounds that it could neither carry out its duties nor be protected. On April 21, the Security Council voted to draw down the UNAMIR force to a skeleton crew of just 250 men...Coming as it did at the height of the massacres, the decision had enormous practical and psychological consequences inside Rwanda. It made it impossible for existing troops to expand their efforts to protect the tens of thousands of Tutsi who had taken refuge in churches and schools throughout the country and sent an unmistakable signal to the genocidal forces that there would be no impediment to their finishing the job...With defense stocks depleted by other U.N. operations, the Pentagon's supporters in Congress opposed further allocations for a messy operation in a country where they saw literally no U.S. interests...Unveiled formally on May 5, 1994, directly in the middle of the Rwandan crisis, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) required that for U.S. participation, any U.N. mission must be a response to threats to international peace and security, must advance American interests at acceptable risk, and must have adequate command and control procedures and an exit strategy.... In the first place, the U.S. refusal to commit its own troops to the effort reduced the prestige of the mission and discouraged troop-contributing nations who would have been eager to join an American-led effort...Meanwhile, the U.N. secretary general floated a new plan for a so-called UNAMIR II before the Security Council. The Boutros-Ghali plan envisaged three stages, including in its first week the enlargement of UNAMIR's existing contingent, then comprising approximately 250 Ghanaian soldiers, to full strength, or 800 men. Boutros-Ghali hoped to augment this force over the following two weeks with another two battalions, with two more battalions and a support group to follow within a month. Their mission would be to obtain a ceasefire, open the airport, and support humanitarian assistance and displaced populations, although the mandate would not include the use of force to stop massacres...The Pentagon and the United Nations reportedly negotiated for weeks over such details as whether to buy tank-like (tracked) or wheeled vehicles and whether the United Nations should buy or lease the vehicles..."


This is why I don't support a NSUN military at the expense of individual militaries—it doesn't work. Affluent nations with powerful militaries (Belgium, USA in particular) stood by and watched genocide take place in Rwanda. Coalitions of armies work. Alliances work. International militaries do not—as soon as some of our guys die, if our own interests don't hang in the balance, we're packing our bags home.

Just thought those of you with enough patience might enjoy it...I tried to consolidate the article's main points as much as possible while not tampering with it.

Dear Government of Corinto,

That is, indeed, an interesting article. However, the international force it discusses does not reflect our proposal for a Nation States UN military. All the nations in the article had their own, independent militaries, all the time -- they simply chose to contribute some of those militaries to the international force. What we propose is that nations wishing to join the UN defensive block program in Nation States would have to agree to eliminate their own militaries altogether, essentially relying only on the international force for protection. Nations would be more hesitant to withdraw from such a defensive block because they would no longer benefit from its added defensive protection. Another important difference is that the international military discussed in the article was temporary; called together to deal with only one issue. The UN army we propose would be permanent, and its permanent mission would be to protect all member states that contribute to it.

You can see that while your article does, indeed, cause us to reconsider the effectiveness of international forces in general, it does not apply to the specific sort of international force we propose. Dispite the article, we feel our concept could be most effective. We will gladly join the UN defensive block ourselves if it ever comes into existance, and we are certain that many other non-aggressive nations would see it as being in their advantage to do so.

Office of the Governor