NationStates Jolt Archive

International Conference on Theology and Ethics

God is good. I believe that with all my heart and soul and I feel confident most of you do as well. Still, the relationship between the good and the divine cannot quite be fully expressed in so simple a formulation. Socrates once shocked Euthyphro, a holy man of the old Greek faith, by asking him if piety was pious because the gods loved it or if the gods loved piety because it was pious. That is a question often overlooked to day but one no less important and no less interesting than it was in ancient Athens.

Does the divine define the right or does the right define the divine? As clerics, most of us, myself included, maintain that the divine defines the right, but does it make one faithless to hold that the right defines the divine? God remains quite possible in such a worldview but He or She is now defined not by His or Her power to define the universe but by His or Her perfect harmony with the moral law of reason, by perfect freedom, perfect autonomy of the will, and thus by the possession of the only perfectly good will.

Of course, one can easily grant this and still give the divine a yet higher Being. One can accept the ethics of reason and still maintain that God reserves the right to act outside of them. One thinks of the stories in the ancient Hebrew tradition, the stories of Abraham and of Samson. Both commanded to commit acts that would ordinarily be sin. Abraham was commanded to kill his son but was spared the actual act. Samson was commanded to take his own life and he was not spared the act.

This conference shall make heavy reference to the holy works of all religious traditions, as well as to St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Augustine, Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Hegel, Mikhail Bakunin, Ludwig Feuerbach, Voltaire and Soren Kierkegaard, in addition to any other theologians or philosophers the delegates might see fit to reference.

The questions of the conference shall be as follows:

-Does the right define the divine or does the divine define the right?
-Is morality possible on the basis of reason?
-Is morality possible on the basis of revelation?
-Is morality possible on the basis of faith?
-Is there such a thing as the teleological suspension of the ethical?
-Is there such a thing as the universal?

Lord High Priest Andruik Dova of Krioval is pleased to have received an invitation to this discussion. His presentation will primarily focus on Kriovalian Polytheism and how the Gods are a representatives of the natural forces in the Universe.

As-salam alaikum wa barakatuhu. Thank you for inviting me to this discussion; I believe it will be a most interesting and enlightening one. The question of Allah and recitude, or the recitude of Allah, is one that our imams and mullahs have pondered for some time now, given the murkiness of the question--Gabriel dictated The Book to The Prophet, but there seem to be two voices throughout, and perhaps this is Allah's subtle test of our reason. I do have some, but not too much, background in the history of Christian thought and so I hope to provide a slightly different viewpoint. I apologize in advance if I seem to ask questions borne of inexperience, but how else is one to learn but by asking?

I look forward to meeting you and my peers at this conference and sharing the results of our thoughts. Inshallah, Allah willing, we may achieve a better understanding both of each other and the One Creator that we all share.

Jazakh Allahu khairan,

Mullah Kadira ibnat Neelam Alzeshi Tunisiyyatun (http://www.mosque.org.sg/alistiqamah/miqnew/images/jpg%20pix/jpg_ADMIN/junaidah_bte_junied.jpg)
Scholar of the Qu'ran

The meeting room was nothing too complicated or pretensious but simply a large round table covered in a white cloth. The local delegates were milling about before taking their seats. There were only four of them.

Helga stood near her seat. The nine foot tall, blue woman wore a modest white dress that came down to just above her ankles and a pair of heavy black boots under it. She ran a hand idly through her blue hair, glancing at the door in the hopes of being the first to greet the arrivals from abroad.

Lord Erik ap Aesin casually sat while the others stood, a contemptuous sneer on his face. Technically, he was a beautiful man. He was a sidhe and had all the gifts of his people. Still, there was something very off-putting about him. Anyone not of his own race could not help but feel a smug sense of superiority not just in his words and expressions but permeating his very being. The other delegates were not sitting near him.

David Edwards milled about quietly in his priestly vestments, the Catholic human pondering the points he wished to make here. The balding priest smiled quietly to himself, an eager, optimistic smile.

Kadijah pushed raven hair behind pointed ear. The eshu grinned broadly. It was always an adventure to meet new people. She idly smoothed out her white tunic which accented well the lovely carmel shade of her skin.

Andruik arrived at the conference. A start contrast to the warrior culture of most of Krioval, the Lord Dova exuded elegance and sophistication. As was customary for the Director of Spirituality and Culture, he wore long pants, a short-sleeved shirt, and robes, all white with gold trim. Belonging to one of the oldest families in Krioval, he was pureblood Pacific Islander, and his skin contrasted with the brilliance of his clothing. If one looked closely enough, they could make out a set of symbols on his sash that spelled out "Sol Kiros, the Creator" in the Kriovalian language. He sat down quietly and prepared to begin the conference.

The High Orderman makes his entrance, flanked by two Neophytes. The difference is quite apparent, as the High orderman wears a purple cowl that nearly completely covers his head, save for the tip of his snout sticking out of it, which sports long, leathery growths. His accompanying cloak is full wrapped and clasped around himself covering his entire body except for his tail, which is thin and covered in gray scales. The hunched form carries a thick cudgel, which much weight is born on.

The Neophytes also wear the cloak, but with no cowl, and their appearance is that of youth. They also bear no cudgel with which to lean on.

The High orderman reaches a seat, and sets himself on it with slight aid from the Acolytes. His voice is one that is ancient like dust, yet firm. "It is good to be here. I am High Orderman Rraasha. These talks promise to be most enlightening." The Neophytes on either side of him remain silent, but bow low to each of the present company.

Helga inclined her head to the High Orderman. "It is good to have you here. I have not before had the honor of hearing about your faith. I am Helga. My fellows are Lord Erik ap Aesin, Father David Edwards, and Kadijah." She gestured politely to each person as she named them. "Welcome."

Lord Erik seemed to ignore the new arrivals, though he frowned slightly and looked down, running his hand over the table in silence.

Father Edwards nodded to both of the people who bowed to him, looking slightly embarassed. "I'm glad you could make it." he said simply.

Kadijah curtsied graciously to Rraasha. "Welcome, my lord." She then slipped over towards Andruik. "Good morning. Your entrance was rather quiet."

The Kriovalian looked in the direction of the four local delegates, but found it difficult to decide on which to focus his address. "It is my pleasure to attend this conference. It is important to Krioval that we learn the faith traditions of others." His gaze ultimately made its way to Kadijah, who had said the most and was now the nearest. He laughed somewhat nervously. "I do apologize for not addressing you earlier, my most gracious host. I think it must be a familial trait, our reluctance to be noticed." Despite himself, Andruik's eyes held a twinkle. "But if you would ever desire to visit Krioval, I can assure you I would not make such a mistake again - if that would be your preference."

Kadijah smiled a little. "Maybe...maybe..." She leaned lightly against the table, looking thoughtful. Her pointed ears were perked curiously at the human's words. "As I understand it, we're waiting for one more delegate and then we're going to start the discussion."

The High Orderman seems to sway his head slightly from side to side. the sound of inhalation, not quite louder than usual yet slightly pronounced, could be heard. "Lady Helga, I thank you for your greeting. You introduce three others, and yet two make their presence known to this old self. Perhaps it is a vow of silence, not unlike that of the Vow of Sight within the Order of Rraag? Regardless, I thank you. Perhaps these talks will shed information of interest to you of the Order. But I won't prattle on at length. Lord Erik ap Aesin, Father David Edwards, and Kadijah. Well met."

The tympanum at the sides of the heads of the Neophytes seem to waver a bit, and Rraasha's head tilts to the side. "Eh? Oh, yes. My manners." His hand gestures in the direction of High Priest Andruik Dova, while his head doesn't seem to change position. "My greetings extend to you as well. My sense of smell isn't as sharp as it once was."

Helga nodded. "My lord addresses me above my station. I am no knight. As for Lord Erik..." she paused a moment, seeking the most polite wording "...those of House Aesin tend to socialize rarely, if ever, outside of their own ranks. Lord Erik has not addressed me either and I do not expect him to speak outside addressing the subject matter of the conference."

Erik looked up at that. "Greetings, High Orderman." He went silent and cold again, leaving it at that.

Andruik looked up, slightly abashed. "My apologies, High Orderman. I forget that I am not at Council back home, where one must typically wait until a designated point to speak. Thank you for allowing me to remember the correct protocols."

In short order Kadira makes her entrance, unattended, moving with her typical slow grace born of a sannyasin's concentration, smiling genuinely just as she ought when she sees her peers. "As-salam alaikum wa barakatuhu," she says as she moves to her seat, her slowness not at all caused by age but by constant care and judicious regulation, "peace be upon you, friends, and blessing."

She wears simple white cotton robes, reminiscent of a pilgrim's ihram, and a blue hijab indicating her as a Chishti dervish that has undertaken the hajj. Her clothes are completely unadorned and very simple, but they look comfortable in an aged, worn-in sort of way. She looks to be in her mid-fourties to fifties, and a serene smile never quite seems to leave her face as she sits down and studies each individual, quietly but politely. "Hopefully I have not kept you waiting too long?"

Helga inclined her head to the Mullah. "Peace be upon you as well. It is never an inconvenience to wait for a lady of your reputation."

Father Edwards walked around and pulled a chair out for Kadira with a simple bow. After she's seated, Edwards and the others take their own seats. Helga looked from person to person before speaking. "The first question we were to discuss is 'Does the right define the divine or does the divine define the right?' In the spirit of hospitality, I would offer to our guests the right to speak first, though I do have quite a lot to say on this myself."

"Excuse me, sirs and ladies, and forgive my interruption, but may I perhaps be the first to respond to this timeless question?" The delegation turned their heads at this latest voice, one that came from an elderly man in the pious garb of a Roman Catholic Cardinal. "Ah, but I must first introduce myself. My name is Cardinal Francis Darian, the High Minister of Religious Affairs and religious ambassador of the Holy Empire of The Magisterium. I am pleased to meet you all, and pleased to represent the Emperor at this conference, which has attracted his discerning interest."

The Cardinal took a seat, eager to espouse the teachings of the Church but keeping himself in a dignified restraint. "I maintain, friends, that that it must be the case that the Divine defines the Right. It has always been the position of the Church that God is the highest power, and the Lord of all Creation, and in my opinion it defies our God-given reason to suppose that there is some law higher than God. For if there is a law, there must be a lawmaker, and who could this be but God? The closest that the counter-position could ever come to being true is if there is some even Higher Being than that which we call God that has created a moral law that reigns over our God, but this still admits the existence of a lawmaker. This is the position of myself, my Empire, and my Church, but I would certainly love to hear the positions of my colleagues, so I will now remain silent...for the moment." With a quick grin the Cardinal ended his opening remarks, filled with zeal and keen to listen.

Andruik glanced at the other representatives before softly speaking.

"The Gods of Krioval are neither omniscience nor omnipotence, and while powerful and good, their wish is that the Universe, in its majesty, be allowed to run its course with a minimum of interference. While it is likely construed as uncivil to say such things, I believe wholeheartedly that the people of Krioval are preferentially blessed for our devotions, I also firmly believe that should our belief be extinguished outright, the force of righteousness would live on. Thus, I find that which is right and proper sets what is to be considered divine versus what is to be considered profane.

"I would further argue that, with eleven Gods and Goddesses, each empowered to act through a specific element or force, I ardently believe that despite the invariable workings at cross-purposes, that they mean for all to progress. Disease and hunger are to be diminshed. Life is to be expanded. Death is to be brought with peace and dignity. At the risk of offending some of my colleagues at this very table, I humbly submit as evidence the rather disturbing episode in Krioval during which Christian missionaries attempted to replace our ways with theirs, first through subversion and later through force. I do not find for one moment that their vision of their God was one of grace and glory beyond mortal comprehension, but I do find that the actions taken were not right, and therefore without the mandate of Heaven.

"I thank all present for hearing me speak on this matter. I pray that any offense taken during this and my succeeding remarks remain academic, rather than personal."

The long tendrils on Rraasha's chin are stroked slowly and thoughtfully while the other delegates made their points. "Interesting views. Interesting indeed." He stops stroking and lays a hand on the table. "In our faith, we believe the Pantheon, or the Gods, as you will, are bound to their subjects. And their subjects are bound to them. The will of the Pantheon guides us, yet does not force us. As we grow, so do they. At least, that is how it is told to me by Them from time to time." His cudgel sounds on the floor twice.

"It is our belief that, in our case, the right defines the divine defines the right. The two are inter-meshed for us. When we pass, we rejoin the Pantheon, becoming a part of them. Our memories and our will also join. In essence, the Pantheon is believed to be the essence and total of all of our ancestors from the past multiple millenia brought together in the forms of the deities we pay reverence to." The cudgel sounds twice again.

"This is the basic structure of our belief system. Whether one agrees with it or not, it does not change what it is."

"God has ninety-nine names in my faith," Kadira says with a quietness borne of not needing to speak any louder, "but only one is truly requisite. God is Al Wasi', which translates poorly as "The Vast" or "The All-Encompassing." It is the thought of my school, and of my own readings into the Qu'ran, and of my own experience that much as my peer the Orderman asserts, Allah Al Mubdi' and The Right--that which defines the objective moral quality of anything, the Platonic ideal of Good--must be one and the same. The ninety-nine names are conflicting; Allah is Al Mani', The Defender, and Al Darr, The Harmer. These names do not distinguish between defending the faith and harming the unfaithful, although the Prophet (may Allah bless him) does posit that distinction.

"I understand this perhaps conflicts with the Miltonian fallacy, and I have a response to that as well. But, much like my Catholic peer"--she bows her head with the quiet, sincere respect of an equal to the Cardinal--"it is my opinion that if God is what we think God to be, an all-powerful Creator of infinite scope, there is nothing that Allah is not. What we call 'the right' is merely a component of Al Wasi', a subset."

Helga looked deep in thought for a very long moment. "I had a lot prepared on this question. The more I listen to my distinguished peers, the more I feel the need to change it somewhat, to respond more to what has been said so far. I think that Dana, for so my people name the Creator of Heaven and Earth and the Mother of all the lesser gods...that Dana contains ultimate good and ultimate knowledge and ultimate power. I believe I echo the sentiments of the distinguished Mullah on that point. However, I won't stop at calling ultimate good one of the attributes of Dana. Ultimate good is why we worship Dana. Were we to live in a universe (and such a universe is not truly possible, but bear with my thought experiment)...were we to live in a universe controlled by a being of ultimate power and ultimate knowledge but not ultimate good, then we would be forced to obedience by practical necessity but there would be no absolute moral duty to such a being and there would be no faith. On the other side, what if ultimate good was vested in a being of finite capabilities? Would such an amazing thing not be worthy of worship? I believe that ultimate power, ultimate good, and ultimate knowledge are necessarily aspects of the same being and that being is Dana. Some will say they are so inseparable that the idea of even imagining a separation of a possible distinction can hold no merit. Still, I stand by my experiment. I believe we all did just imagine such worlds. That isn't all I had to say but I wanted to ask another question to those who just spoke. This wasn't on the agenda but I think it highlights the question in a more interesting light. Can an atheist be a good person? I'm going to hold my own thoughts on the matter and give people a chance to answer that."

"The problem with assuming that an infinitely powerful being, good or bad, must be worshipped and therefore destroys the concept of faith ignores that the individual mind simply cannot comprehend the infinite," the mullah replies, hands gently folded on the table as she serenely scans the room, concentrating on each face in turn. "I can see this table, I can see this room. Can I see the atoms that make up all of it? Can I see the rest of this building, or this planet, or the infinite stars of space from where I sit? My view is limited from the macroscopic to the microscopic to only what my mind can comprehend. If Allah is all-encompassing, then how can I distinguish God from the air I breathe, or even my own body, or my own mind? The distinction is a construct, it is an attempt by the infinite to describe itself to the finite. Allah exists in the heavens not because 'He' lives there, and his angels do not travel at the speed of light because that is their pace; those are finite descriptions of the infinite. Much as a very small number can be neglected when compared to a very large one, the heavens are much larger than the Earth, or the land, or the home; light is much faster than the pace of walking--they make our everyday existence negligible in comparison, as the infinite makes the finite negligible. It is an artificial distinction necessary to communicate the thought of the immense nature of a truly infinite being. That infinity makes it difficult to conceptualize, and thus belief is difficult, not like this table which I can see and feel and smell." She gently knocks one hand against the table, a soft tap tap tap with pauses inbetween each rap, like a slow heartbeat. "Conceptualization takes effort, and it cannot be proven because the infinite cannot be experienced by the finite. Such is fate.

"As for atheists doing good--why not? If Allah, the definition of good, deems it right, then it is right regardless of the actor. Even bad people--which athiests need not necessarily be--can perform good actions."

Kadijah perked up, tilting her head slightly. "But why would they? If Allah is the definition of good, why would someone who did not believe in him feel the need to act in such a way? And, if good is the definition of Allah, could anyone who believed in morality be called an atheist?"

Kadijah perked up, tilting her head slightly. "But why would they? If Allah is the definition of good, why would someone who did not believe in him feel the need to act in such a way? And, if good is the definition of Allah, could anyone who believed in morality be called an atheist?"

"Ah yes, the very heart of the matter. Our Gods have done things that we would consider reprehensible even when viewed under the best of circumstances. Plague, war, famine, murder. I marvel at the idea that divinity and goodness need be coupled in the first place. It seems rather arbitrary that we make one dependent on the other when I am not convinced that such a correlation need exist."

Andruik pulls out a worn and old-looking text. The cover reads "The Genesis and Evolution of Krioval". He opens it to a page bookmarked. He reads from it.

"'The Gods command neither your attention nor your obedience, for they already have both.' This is a central tenet of Kriovalian faith. One might go so far as to say it is the central belief. In essence, our Gods are grand reflections of our actions, and we are reflections of theirs. I grant that they must have superior morality, as their intentions are overwhelmingly positive, though their actions often fall short. Though we mortals are similar. Most of us try to do our best. Some succeed while others are doomed to failure. Is a brutal dictator, who ardently believes that he is doing the best for his people, really worse than a faithless benefactor, who gives with the hope that his gifts will bring pain and suffering?"

"Because, as described, Allah is infinite. To be true, it is impossible for anyone to perform any action that is not part of Allah, because to do so would be to suggest that there exists something outside of Allah's domain, thus making God less-than-infinite, less than All Encompassing. Because we are finite creatures, we make distinctions--an athiest who believes in anything believes in Allah, but simply does not admit it; a true athiest would have to be an utter nihilist, believing in absolutely nothing. The athiest may believe in honor, or duty, or morality, but all those are part of the All Encompassing God just as much as anything else. In his own mind, creating the distinction between God and an attribute of God, he believes in the attribute but not his own concept of God. Belief need not resemble, much less adhere strictly to, reality. Any opinion section of any decent newspaper will reflect this."

Kadira continues to smile, quite enjoying this. "Conceptualization is a matter of the individual, and the individual can choose to believe in one thing and not the other. One man may believe that there is no universal ethics, no universal morality, and yet he may believe that responsibility beyond the self exists--although without a universal ethics or morality, what is one responsible to, you could ask? Why to the local or ethics and morality, he would say--however, every action can be ethical or moral from some cultural viewpoint and so, by selecting what one is responsible to at all times, one can consistently be guiltless even though one commits the most horrendous crimes. It is an illogical belief, it is true, to believe that responsibility exists on any scale not mirrored ethically or morally, but some still hold it, as is their prerogative.

"The definition of faith is the choice, the will to believe. The Qu'ran warns us against conversion by force because an unwilling conversion is no conversion at all. Much like the Christians believe, Allah must be accepted for one to truly be a Muslim--Islam, after all, willing submission to God. An athiest can acknowledge any attribute of Allah and yet still deny Allah; denial does not change the truth or untruth of Allah's existence. The ancients acknowledged the points of light in the sky, yet in their ignorance denied the truth that they were balls of luminous plasma like our Sun. Simply believing in a facet is insufficient; to avoid atheism, one must believe in the overriding cohesive element that draws all into it and is all--Al Wasi'."

Helga listened politely to all that was said. "I think now is a good time to move on to the next question, not because this one is finished but because the discussion of this question is inevitably leading there in any event. All of the issues for discussion are rather intimately related, after all. The next question is whether or not morality is possible on the basis of reason, as contrasted to the basis of conscience or revelation. Perhaps, to give us a somewhat clearer topic, we should add a qualifier. Is morality possible on the basis of reason alone?"

OOC: We still doing this?

"If morality were not dependent on reason alone, from where would the Gods have obtained it? Mere mortals, like me, are capable of ascribing our moral sense to sources above us. But what is above the Gods themselves?"

"It is our belief, and some may not agree with me, that the faith of the followers supercedes the deities they worship. For if no being pays homage to that deity, then who would know they even exist? Thus another question, i'm certain. But, no. Reason would not be capable of bringing morality on it's own. Morality is an abstract concept, whilst reason deals in definites. One could say 'Reason dictates that the weak will be beaten by the strong', while morality would say 'The duty of the strong is to aid the weak'.

Helga perked up at the Sakkrans words. "Some would say the opposite, that reasons dictates it is the duty of the week to help the strong. I think that reason is too tied up with the positive sciences these days, so tied up that when we hear the word 'reason' we think only of a low kind of pragmatism. There is another line of reason, a line developed primarily in Kant. Reason says that I, as a rational being, inevitably view myself as an end in myself. If this view is universalized by reason, then I must view all rational beings as ends in themselves equal to myself and treat them as such. Since others, including the weak, are now ends in themselves and thus ends for me as a woman of reason who perceives that all rational beings are ends, they should not be harmed. As I have the capacity to help them, I also have the duty. That is an oversimplified account, of course."

"That, however, does not indicate whose ends they are," the mullah replies thoughtfully. "Each person is one's own end unto oneself," she says, only barely emphasizing those words over the rest of her speech, "but that does not necessarily make that one an end to anyone else. The Aristotlean flaw is that reason is truly universal; that two people using correct reason will inevitably come to the same result--this is what the concept of confirming scientific research is based on. However, given something like morality, two people can use completely unemotional reason and come up with two distinctly different answers based on their initial conditions--a chaotic process. Two butterflies beating their wings in Argentina may have similar effects, but a butterfly in Argentina and a butterfly in Medina will have distinctly different effects albeit coming from the same causes--their contexts and thus what influences them are different.

"That being said, one can use no more than base pragmatism to come up with what is generally considered morality," the dervish continues, seeming to think aloud more than preach. "Certainly it is reasonable that the strong will conquer the weak, however, sufficient weak men can stop a single strong one. While it may be in my immediate best interest only to think of myself, if I make sufficient enemies they can band together and topple me later. It is better to assist others and make them, if not friends, at least keep them from being enemies while keeping my own best interest in mind. This way we can support each other (with the primary thought being them supporting me) and go further with cooperation than we could on simply saying that might-makes-right. This mutual support would sufficiently emulate the moral principles of treating others fairly and respectfully.

"Now, whether or not a morality borne of nothing but rationality is actually moral (especially if it is a selfish rationality) is a different question altogether, but I must partially agree with our host that it is possible to achieve at least a simulacrum of morality with reason."

Helga shook her head. "I most respectfully disagree. If I am an end, reason tells me I am know more an end than anyone else. Whether or not I can act on this, the possibility of genuine altruism, is a much more problematic issue based upon the issue of freedom of the will. The most basic thing that separates any real morality from the pseudo-moralities based on the methods of science, which is an entirely separate thing from reason altogether, is that there is an 'ought' which is fundamentally and entirely separate from an 'is'. For morality to be possible, we have to be able to choose the 'ought' and not simply act out our place on a natural causal chain. If the 'ought' is based upon universal reason, then anyone employing it is able to choose the 'ought' if he or she wills the good. Of course, we can only posit ontological freedom of the will so the actual possible of genuine altruism remains a mystery, but still...Of course, I am still giving a weak and oversimplified version of the argument. This is one question among many and a full explanation of the system would take days."

"Note I said a 'simulacrum' of morality, not the thing itself," the mullah replies with a slightly sly smile. "The greater 'moral' concepts of self-sacrifice, altruism... all of these can be developed through even pragmatic rationality if started from the correct point, from a background of increased empathic or group consciousness. The needs of the many often outweigh the needs of the few; the needs of my group and thus the needs of the members of my group are my own. If I can give up something to benefit the group, then the group survives and thrives..."

She shrugs gently. "What I am trying to get at, in a most roundabout fashion, is that one needn't be good or moral to do good or moral things. Morality is indeed deeper, requiring a Darwinianly-optional 'ought,' but it needn't need to be based on religion. Social groups, ideologies, families, cultures, all non-revelational concepts, do the same thing no matter what name of God they use, if indeed they use one at all. I do believe that my own system of Qu'ran- and Hadith-inspired morality is superior, based as it is on Allah, but if the atheist down the street does a good thing he is still to be praised for it no matter my personal biases in the matter. One who does Allah's work and praises Allah through work, even if it is not done in the name of Allah, still does it and is still to be praised. I can hope to convert that one to my 'true' faith, certainly, out of concern for his soul--but the final judgement on whether that one is worthy of Paradise or not, whether that one's moral virtues were sound, is Allah's alone, not mine."

"God, in His infinite wisdom and foresight, has written the moral law on all of our hearts and minds," said the Cardinal, slightly emphasizing that last point. "It it undeniable that reason coupled with good faith and piety can have some success in discovering ultimate morality; nearly all peoples throughout history have recognized the evils of murder and stealing, for example. Reason alone, however, invariably leads to immorality or, at the very least, amorality-a view of morality as something pragmatic rather than something absolute. How many civilizations have spat on the face of God and insisted on the supremacy of Reason, and have subsequently used that Reason-god to deduce the prudence of performing acts that we pious learners of God's law have recognized as being truly foul and atrocious? No, friends, true morality can only be found (and I specifically say "found" because morality is not a thing to be created, at least not by human hands) by a revelation of God coupled with honest reason. Reason allows us to fill in the gray areas that God does not directly address, but it ultimately cannot come to morality on its own."

"I respectfully disagree with the Cardinal on this point. Science is a wondrous thing, and while my expertise is in other areas of study, I do know that even single-celled organisms are capable of self-sacrifice. Now what need has Nature for a complicated set of morals then? If one's neighbors are threatened, and your sacrifice will save them, even the bacterium knows the answer to that challenge, it would appear. No doubt that my more conservative colleagues at this very table would denounce many Kriovalian acts as vulgar or even blasphemous against the divine. For example, there are people who would denounce the most holy union between our Commander and our most decorated general."

Andruik looked around the table to gauge the response. He knew he was pushing it now.

"The delegates speak of morality and divinity as if they are quantifiable things. Yet as I sat in that chapel that day, I can swear to all present now that, if the presence of the divine at their union were any stronger, we guests would have wondered if we had died and entered Heaven itself. It is reason that has led Krioval to our Gods. Whether it was reason alone, who exactly can say?"

"I am afraid your disagreement with me is imagined, sir-except for your attempted provocation, that is. Your point about altruism and self-sacrifice only reinforces my belief that God has written moral law onto all of our hearts, and that piety and reason can lead to moral discoveries. Why, from the point of view of pure reason, would anybody sacrifice himself for his neighbor in peril? A mechanical mind would do no such thing. Only a mind possessed also of love, that most unreasonable of all emotions, would feel compelled to act, to sacrifice itself if need be."

"If one believes in something greater than oneself, even if that thing be only a family, a tribe, or a town, then one can come to the conclusion that sacrificing oneself for others who are kin by that connection is for the greater good. Social consciousness can produce altruism from reason; however, this also makes the fallacious assumption that people act on reason alone. If Allah is responsible for putting truth and morality into every soul, then it stands to reason that all souls have that truth and morality, and that any deviation on it is fault on their part--sin. On the other hand, what of the people born broken? The truely dehabilitating mental disorders? Schizophrenia, with its psychotic break, and sociopathy, with its deleterious lack of empathy, both born of combinations of genetic and circumstantial precursors?"

The mullah shakes her head. "If Allah had written moral law onto us all, my duties as a scholar of The Book would be much simpler; the relations between us would be simpler as we would all have the same basis. I am afraid that these unfortunates indicate that, through no fault of their own, they have no greater morality written on them like others, despite having the teaching available to others. This suggests, to me, two options. One is that Allah chose not to write a moral code onto their hearts, and while this is a possibility, it is not one I care to believe as I do not wish to believe that Allah punishes the innocent, even as I do believe that Allah punishes. The other is that there is no inherent moral code, and thus it is imperative that we plant it, and teach it so it may flourish. This I believe is closer to the truth, because it becomes our responsibility to ensure that morality is passed on from generation to generation. The flux of society shows that cultural mores change over time; my people no longer find the Shariah to be truly appropriate for a compassionate People of The Book. We must take care of our people, and try to teach and rehabilitate our wayward kin, but judgement is Allah's domain. Previously, perhaps, the Shariah was required to maintain the greater good. Now, it no longer seems the case."

"I am afraid your disagreement with me is imagined, sir-except for your attempted provocation, that is. Your point about altruism and self-sacrifice only reinforces my belief that God has written moral law onto all of our hearts, and that piety and reason can lead to moral discoveries. Why, from the point of view of pure reason, would anybody sacrifice himself for his neighbor in peril? A mechanical mind would do no such thing. Only a mind possessed also of love, that most unreasonable of all emotions, would feel compelled to act, to sacrifice itself if need be."

"Honored delegate, I do try to leave provocation to the younger generation, whenever possible. While that leaves me occasionally vulnerable to its lure, I believe I have evaded it, this time at least.

"But you have asked an important question. A mechanical mind, borne out in pure reason, would sacrifice itself for its neighbors if it realized that the success of many outweighs the success of one. Such a realization is truly the hallmark of Nature. We see it all the time - the larger the threat, the greater the number of individuals willing to sacrifice themselves to protect the collective. Perhaps you perceive your God as separate from Nature, but those of Krioval know that the Divinity and Nature are the same. Truly, it is in advanced creatures, like ourselves, that the crudity of emotion makes some feel as if the individual is more important than the collective. Perhaps, as we have grown to be more like the Gods in magnitude, we have begun to lose direction?"

Helga nodded after a few minutes. "As discussion seems to have died down, I'm going to move on to the next question. It seems much easier but I think it's actually much harder. Is morality possible on the basis of revelation?"

Kadira seems to mull this over in her mind for a while, head canted slightly in thought. "If we assume this revelation to come from a divine source, then this does pose a quandary. On the one hand, the simple, automatic answer should be 'yes;' if God speaks to Brady and teaches him to be moral, then Brady should be able to speak to man with full knowledge of morality. On the other hand, a sentinet being is an imperfect individual, incapable of comprehending the divine in totality and thus probably unlikely to have 'full knowledge' of the morality thus taught. On the gripping hand, this is why sentience revolves around Allah's gift of reason--given information either incomplete or beyond one's ken, one can attempt to determine for themselves the fullness of it, or at least as far as they can.

"Is morality possible on the basis of revelation?" the mullah repeats, looking down at her folded hands in a stern concentration that doesn't enter her voice beyond her usual quiet enunciation and pacing. "Yes, I would say, but not wholly thereupon. Allah has spoken through many prophets, and all of them have added their own particular bias to the True Word because they were still mere men. Even the Prophet Mohammed (Praise be Unto Him) added the results of his own context to that which Jibreel--the angel Gabriel--perfectly related to him." She looks mildly pained and not exactly sheepish at that. "Unfortunately, a bit of bother resulted from that; more unfortunately, that is common to more faiths than just my own. Still, the fact remains that in all these cases of divine inspiration, it was still up to the prophets to evaluate what they were given with their own reason. Revelation itself is not sufficient, but revelation evaluated with correct reason, imnshallah, appears to be the most historically accurate description of how morality can come from revelation."

"Of course," she continues with a almost sly look, "if Allah wanted revelation to be all that was necessary for perfect transmission, then so it would be. However, it appears the All-Merciful has too much respect for the reason and free will He has created for us to use us as He would angels."

Eric frowned slightly. "The Aesir reveal themselves only to heroes and the Fates have determined how such men shall interpret the revelation before it is made. It is perfectly within the power of the Divine to arrange for revelation to perfectly reveal itself to those who will listen. Just because man is fallible does not mean that the Norns are. To say otherwise is to deny the perfection and the absolute knowledge of the Divine."

Helga shook her head. "I disagree, my lord. It is..."

Eric cut her off rather rudely. "You are merely filled with envy that the words of the gods are for your betters and not yourself."

Helga ignored him, turning her gaze back to Kadira. "If I might break the substance of my speech to pay you a compliment, lady, I must say that your wisdom continues to impress me. It is an honor to debate with you."

The Trolless continued without pausing. "While men certainly pose a problem, I think revelation itself is more problematic yet. I'm not sure the moral authority of God can be presupposed. It is something taken on either faith or reason but it is not automatically or axiomatically known. Revelation, in and of itself, cannot tell us that God is All-Good simply because we must presuppose this goodness before we could trust to revelation. Therein lies the greatest difficulty in my view."

"Now, I do believe that we have to move on to faith here. Faith is not something revealed or reasoned out. Faith is not something that can quite be explained. Still, without the concept of faith, religion falls apart. And it is only this movement of the soul that can give moral worth to a revelation in and of itself."

Andruik looked up after a period of reflection. "The Gods of Krioval are constantly revealing things to us. But," he laughed softly, "there are eleven of them - all saying different things. How to tell which God or Goddess is best suited to a given situation?"

The Kriovalian paused momentarily. "It is simple enough for us. Revelation gives us a starting point. Reason gives us the tools to process the revealed information. I believe one is intelligent enough to heed the advice of the Water Goddess when traveling by sea more than the Earth God, where they differ. Thus also works morality. A given situation is most closely aligned with some subset of Gods. They, being the most familiar with the situation, and most willing to assist us in overcoming it, are the Gods to whom one should turn at that time."

The High Priest of Krioval contemplated a response to Eric's outburst. Honor, however misplaced, propelled him forward, and with a sigh, Andruik looked up again, this time fixing his gaze on the man.

"Perhaps it is not my place, but I feel I must caution you. My youngest brother was High Priest before me. He received a most strange revelation some years ago that he was to lead Krioval to a single God. Whether the revelation was pure or polluted by his ego I will never know. What I know are the results.

Krioval suffered under his theocracy for years. He exiled our aged mother, who died outside her homeland. Finally, he brought the wrath of our Lord Raijin upon him, and he was struck down on the battlefield six years ago. Branok was a pious man, to be sure, but he was unreasonable. Such, I suppose, is the fate of young minds. I am confident, though, that you will not fall prey to such opportunistic forces."

That was that. Andruik hoped that it would be taken in the spirit offered, one of true worry. He had seen far too many good people killed over the nature of faith, and he had seen the haunted look in the eyes of the survivors. All over a difference in revealed truth.

Kadira's left eyebrow raises almost imperceptibly at Eric's outburst, but her serene countenance does not change. She does, however, lean forward a few millimeters, and perhaps the very tips of her mouth curl in mischievously. "As my peer from Krioval points out, good sir," she says, addressing Eric, "there is danger in speaking personally to Allah. Many times, I believe, it is a test--a test not only of faith, as previously suggested"--she nods to Helga--"and not only of reason"--another nod to Krioval--"but also, perhaps, humility. Allah builds, true, and lifts up; but He also punishes. The Qu'ran is quite clear on that regard."

She leans back those barest millimeters again, and her eyebrow returns to its former position, the shift of a few hairwidths. Her 'job,' as it is, is to hand out opinions based on her studies. One of those opinions just happens to be that spiritual enlightenment is not a cause for superiority but rather for service, to serve Allah by bringing others to enlightenment.

People that hold "personal conversations with God" as ego-boosts over others just happen to be one of her pet peeves.

Eric arched a brow back. "That is not the appropriate term of address. But, in any event, I never claimed to have personally spoken to the gods. I was merely pointing out that the gods do not give direct revelations to Trolls nor do they expect their appointed rulers over the worldly realm to be humble."

"He is Aesin." Helga offered apologetically, as way of explanation. "It was the decision...my decision as Her Holiness's delegate for organizing this event, to ensure that every major religious group and not simply the official Danaan Church be represented here. In any event, it is an interesting point. I do know that when the Tuatha spoke to Gwydion they attempted to force humility on him through transforming him into an animal but I am not sure the same example accompanies revelation in other religious traditions. Moses, as I recall, was placed in charge of his people, as was Mohammed."

"To be wholly honest," Kadira replies with a slight cant of her head, "Mohammed (praise be unto his name) took control of the Arabic tribes from the less-coordinated pagans who preceded him; beyond being the Prophet of Allah's Word, he had no other duty assigned him. It is exactly this taking of control which has led to so much... difficulty in later times and later evaluations."

Helga bowed her head to Kadira. "I apologize, blessed lady. Islamic theology is not my specialty. I yield to your greater knowledge."

The Trolless looked around the room quietly, taking in each face and frowning ever so faintly at Eric. "I believe we should move to to the next question. Is morality possible on the basis of faith? That is, if faith is even something we could begin to define."

Helga smiled as she continued. "Of course, Kierkegaard, as many of you know, made faith the very antithesis of morality, stating that faith constituted the teleological suspension of the ethical. It is a claim rather shocking to how most of us normally consider the matter."

"While faith can certainly be instrumental in bringing people to morality," Kadira replies in her customary cool, even, quietly content tone, "I for one do not believe it is a sole requirement, or indeed should solely be the formation of one's moral code. History abounds with stories, unfortunately, of people who have taken their true, good faith and corrupted it--or had it corrupted--into a flawed morality. This has happened in every faith that I have researched, and I find it unfortunate that my own still reels from the actions of a few misguided and even fewer truely evil 'moral' agents of the past."

A mild shrug, simply water that has flowed under the bridge and is well on its way to the sea. "No, I believe faith in something is important in bringing one to morality, or at least to see the need for morality. In this way, morality is possible on the basis of faith. On the other hand, faith needs to be tempered by reason to avoid the evils of zealotry. There have been many, many people who have been inspired or brought to morality by faith and Allah's will, but there have been others who have taken it too far, acting solely on faith. Morality is indeed possible on the basis of faith, but sometimes faith must be checked with the empathy and reason that make up the greater portion of moral thought."

Helga looked around with a small frown as it began to seem that only she and Kadira were speaking. "Does anyone have any thoughts?"

"Does faith lead to morality?" Andruik repeated, as if to remind himself of the matter. "I would have to say that it is possible, of course, but I wouldn't go so far as to say that one is truly dependent on the other. My brother was faithful, but his morals declined as his zeal rose. Many moral people, on the other hand, avoid the temples and churches in our land. Then there are those like Lord Raijin, who values both faith and morality, despite his attempts to appear both amoral and sacrilegious." He chuckled lightly as he concluded his comments.

Helga folded her hands on her lap. "I would like to suggest, just to suggest, that it is not only the Divine in which we have faith. Ultimately, freedom of the will is also a matter of faith. It can't be proven by human reason. Not only has it never been proven, but it's been proven that such a proof is impossible. Much to the chagrin of determinists, it's also been proven that the converse cannot be proven. But we must believe in freedom of the will. How else can morality have any meaning? If someone could not have acted other than they did, how can we find them doing what they had no choice in doing to be morally praiseworthy or blameworthy? Free will, I believe, is a necessary pressuposition of any morality which can be actually described as moral. Thus, I would submit that belief in free will on the basis of faith provided a basis for morality."

"That seems fair enough. Free will is indeed a belief that can be rejected, such as in the case of hyperCalvinism," Kadira ponders aloud. "However, one can also deny the curvature of the Earth or the existence of life on Mars." She smiles gently with an almost mischievous glint in her eyes. "While one can argue that the universe is naught more than a extremely-dependent-upon-initial-conditions construct and we are all just cogs in a clockwork orange, that does not change the readily evident phenomena that thinking beings appear to be definitively different from machines--whether we have free will or not in a universal sense, looking down from above, is wholly irrelevant in the realistic appraisal of that it appears that we have free will, just as it appears that the sun travels around the earth to an Iron Age farmer..."

The mullah chuckles. "While the 'true' existence of free will is a belief, in actual application it may as well be a grand reality."

Helga arched a brow slightly. "HyperCalvinism? I believe the statement can be made of Calvinism in general. If I remember my training in comparative religion, Calvin was rather explicit about his theory of determinism. I don't mean to straw man Calvinism and I am aware the theory of determinism is not truly a quietest theory though...that is, perhaps a conversation for another time."

Helga continued. "Faith in free will is not an arbitrary thing. Whenever I speak of faith, I do not speak of some area where there is no reason to believe something but people simply do and I certainly do not mean things which people believe contrary to fact of reason. When I use the term faith, I use it in a very specific sense. I use it to mean a belief which cannot be determined one way or another by speculative reason, (or, to be more precise, which can be determined both ways by speculative reason escaped from its transcendental bonds) but which practical reason nonetheless proves in the sense that it dictates we must posit such a proposition. It is in this sense that I have faith in a necessary, omnibenevelent, omnipresent, eternal, and omnipotent being, as well as faith in free will and in the true immortality of the soul."

"I say hyperCalvinism partly to hedge my bets and partly because there is scholastic evidence that Calvin retracted his theory of limited grace," Kadira says with a peaceful yet slightly sly smile. "Other than the broadest strokes, my knowledge of the finer details of the continuum of Christian theological thought is not my strongest suit, for reasons I can hopefully be forgiven for.

"Concerning that definition of faith," she continues, "I would naturally tend to agree. Still, acting as an opposing side for the sake of argument, your particular propositions must not be posited. God could indeed be a nonactual force in the universe, as Deists believe, or an malevolent actual force (Allah forbid it). There may even be no god at all. The selection of any one of these propositions is a matter of faith except for the agnostic stance, which is possibly the most 'rational' in a scientific way and also the most faithless. Even an atheist has to have faith of some kind to say with definitive clarity that there is no God."

She shrugs slightly. "I have heard this from many who would disagree with our particular faiths, and so I know it rather well. There is, indeed, no objective reason for one to posit the existence or nonexistence of God, souls, or any sort of purpose in the world... except that people desire reason, desire that they be more than insignificant specks--so much more, in fact, that they are vital components in God's plan--and their beliefs reflect that. We wish, at least in an early stage, to be made in the image of God; as we expand and increase our understanding and relationship to the universe, we realize that accepting this desire as canon fact results in contradictions that can only partially be covered by the cop-outs such as 'the will of God is unknowable.' The holy man, needing an answer to why the sun goes around in a circle, says that it goes around the Earth (which is indeed a slab on the back of a giant turtle); needing a reason to inspire his people to combat against another tribe, he creates a story on why his people are good and the other people are bad through some historic act or the decision that God 'chooses' populations." Her voice turns gently wry at this.

"Perhaps I digress," she continues in her usual even and content tone, "but the core counter-argument remains that nothing compels one to posit those possibilities you categorize under 'faith' except for the internal desires of those doing the positing. They may use reason to come up with an answer that completely contradicts their desires, but the initial spur to action is an internal, subjective desire, not a universal force that dictates a thing should be posited. One lacking the desire does not expend the effort to posit."

"To a certain extent we do base these positions on a presupposition, the presupposition of morality. I say to a certain extent because I believe a strong case might be made for an a priori connection between morality and the fact of sentience, though such a discussion would take much more time than we have here. I do, however, feel that that idea is vitally important, illuminating as it is to applying the moral law to peoples who have little reported experience of conscience, such as certain types or orcs and vampires, who other scholars sometimes dismiss with the troubling concept of 'metaphysically evil races.'"

"Even putting that argument aside, I don't feel this presupposition particularly undermines out argument, though it is likely the weakest point." Helga smiled a little. "The argument for positing freedom, God, and immortality involves working back from the real lived experience that we do have morality, we experience conscience. Possessing reason, we first search for any apodictic truth of speculative reason which would contradict what we would posit. We find, in fact, that speculative reason within its just limits remains strictly agnostic on all three questions. This is why I would agree with you agnosticism is the belief most suggested by speculative reason. However, speculative reason providing no answers, we are free to posit as practical reason dictates, as the existence of morality demands we posit to give it a rational basis."

The troll continued, shifting slightly. "For morality to mean anything, we must posit freedom of the will. Otherwise, everyone simply behaves as they must and no action can be called right or wrong in any meaningful sense of the word. Since we experience freedom, we must posit that we have freedom in order to go through life. Even determinists make day to day decisions as though they had freedom. There is no other way to make a choice. God and immortality or less certain. However, practical reason does tell us that we should judge our behavior based on the model of a holy will, motivated only by the moral law and not by contingent circumstances or passions. We call this model Dana or God or Allah. It also tells us that a free will, which initiates causal chains and is not initiated by them, stands outside the temporal order and does not die the natural death of the body. Thus, to posit freedom in an ontological sense is also to posit immortality. To believe what practical reason makes us posit, that is what we call faith."

"Again, acting as what the Christian tradition calls a 'devil's advocate,' it seems that stating that practical reason tells us to judge behavior according to a holy will is perhaps stretching it. What exactly a 'holy will' demands has varied from culture to culture, and indeed within cultures, since the dawn of time. An Aztec's definition of a holy will would be far different from a Catholic's definition of a holy will; your argument supposes that the holy will that morality is based on is universal, just as morality is universal. It can just as easily be argued, without relying on any metaphysical assumption," Kadira says with a mischievous glint, "that morality and ethics are the adaptive results of a society needing to be more-or-less internally consistent to function. One cannot have someone who murders for fun on one end and an absolute pacifist on the other; a society made of these two will become a society of one very quickly. Societies, the superorganisms formed by the aggregation of sentient minds due to family, location, nationalism, or what have you, quickly define a baseline of behavior and belief that its members are judged on for its own protection. Cultures large enough to have subcultures and counter-cultures tend to emphasize this fact; regime changes from conservative to liberal and back again in the social sense highlights what happens when people with perhaps even marginally different ethical beliefs exchange power.

"Like all else, it appears conscience is learned; a feral child does not learn that it is wrong to steal, for example." The mullah frowns softly at this. "Conscience, beliefs of civic virtue, the rights and responsibilities of society, all these are passed from one generation to the next by teaching rather than being engendered naturally by some sort of overarching metaphysical Platonian Ideal of these concepts, the 'holy will.' From an objective standpoint, the question is then begged: what faction has the truest possible formulation of the objective 'holy will?' Without an objective reality for reason to aim to, a metaphysical law on which to compare the results of reason to, the supposition that reason alone can lead to capitalized Morality is perhaps flawed."

"In addition," she continues in her usual thoughtful manner, "saying that a free will exists outside temporality--is immortal--is another overextension of reason. Certainly a free will initiates causal chains, but we know from experience that every being with what we call 'free will' is affected in due kind by its environment, by its experiences, and by its own beliefs. I cannot walk on the ceiling, for example, or fly without aid, and so my arguably free will is limited. I may decide to buy a coconut to make keskul for my friends, but the only store in town with coconuts has none. I may decide to take a walk in a park, but it is surrounded by a fence I cannot climb. While the capitalized-Ideal Free Will exists halfway in causality--being a mover whilst not being moved--Heisenberg is very much real; any being with free will exists in the causal chain; from our observation it begins when the being is concieved and it ends when the being dies. To say that because the being has a lesser form of a pure quality, that is, Free Will albeit moved by external forces, and then from that extrapolate that the being has further qualities that exist only to that pure quality, that is, immortality by fact of moving without being moved, is a logical fallacy. Our bodies are made up of subatomic particles combined stage upon stage to form us; these subatomic particles by themselves last from a few seconds to until the heat death of the universe when at their ideal state, alone in a universe that does not affect them. However, our corporeal forms neither last only a few seconds--unless by most tragic misfortune--and certainly will not last several billion trillion years.

"It is perhaps poor form to resort to physical analogies when in philosophical debate," she muses with a quiet smile, "but I do think that it exposes the flaw in entrusting faith to an extension of reason. The 'reason' behind coming to that sort of faith is Pascal's Wager, a most agnostic and I would say cynical reason to believe. Faith, to me, is simply the belief in the unprovable, whether it be rational or no. I have faith that the universe I perceive is real and meaningful, even if all that can truly be known as per classical cynicism is cogito, erto sum. It can never be proven or disproven that the universe is actually a figment of my or someone else's imagination, as that knowledge exists external of the universe and thus very much outside our ken. Free will, morality, religions are all true to me because I desire to believe something--agnosticism, as you say, provides no answers--and it is what I, in the end, choose to believe. Islam is what feels most real to me, partially from background, partially from my potentially irrational infatuation with the ancient story of the Qu'ran and how any literary piece can have universal value that transcends time... were I born under different circumstances, in a different place, in a different time, in a different culture, I would instantaneously diverge from what I was and am in this life from a few instants after leaving the womb--beyond my infancy, there would be only a small correlation due to what I was when I was newly born, which would be equal between these two timelines. All faith, to me, contains the irrationality of a tiny speck of existentialist absurdity: it relies on a choice, a choice to believe or disbelieve or believe something else. I have seen many, many other belief systems, and I have pondered them, and I have always stayed true to my faith; while I could perhaps rationalize my decisions, once it is reduced to first causes there is always that bit of irrationality left: I prefer my religion, I am more comfortable with it, I am afraid to leave it, and so forth."

She smiles serenely. "To me, faith is a matter of spirituality--it certainly cannot be quantified and, to a large extent, it cannot be reasoned with. It simply is, a qualitative sentiment which is the core of a truly sentient, intuitive mind. Logical reasoning and deduction is a program; nonsentient computers have been doing that for centuries. If A is true, goto X; else, goto Y. The inevitable linear progression from fact to result, which is the core of the belief in universal reason, is less than the sum of what makes me me. I can skip steps and, if I am not careful, I can actually invent false data out of thin air. I am creative and I am destructive, in a far gentler form of the Nietszchean construction; ideal reasoning cannot add nor subtract from fact.

"Faith cannot be generated from first principles, or else it is merely a theorem equivalent to what I learned years ago as a little girl in geometry. Faith can be reasoned with, but only up to the existential absurdity of it being perhaps the freest choice one can make once one has conquered oneself. Faith exists beyond reason, because it calls into things that lay far outside reason's domain; if Allah were the sphere in Flatlander, then my belief in Him when He is translated above or below my two-dimensional plane of existence stands outside of my capability to reason directly--His previous appearances in my plane could be explained by circles with surprising properties."

Kadira smiles broadly yet serenely, just a hint of mischief in the set of her eyes, the tilt of her fine eyebrows. "Reason is the beginning of wisdom, not the end."

Helga shook her head. "I believe that that argument is ignoring the difference between speculative and practical reason. Practical reason, in the most literal sense imaginable, means morality and nothing else. It is certainly not anything comparable with Pascal's Wager but rather the exact opposite. According to the position I am putting forward, someone making Pascal's Wager would be an utterly immoral person, behaving morally only on the basic of possible rewards for doing so. In fact, I believe that if I were to live my entire life believing in Dana and in a reward for virtue and a punishment for vice and, because of that, to behave in accordance with morality at every moment of my life, but if I nonetheless knew that if I did not believe in Dana then I would not behave morally, then I would have no moral worth. What I'm arguing for is good for goodness sake, nothing less."

She sat back in the chair a little. "As for the argument regarding the universal nature of morality, the fact that people hold different opinions as to what moral behavior is does not prove that there is no such universal standard. in fact, I would argue against the idea that people actually do, at heart, hold fundamentally different views of morality. Putting that aside, however, different beliefs about morality no more proves that there is no right answer than people believing that the sun orbits the earth proves there to be no right answer about the structure of the solar system. There is. The earth orbits the sun. In truth, madame, I believe we could argue about this for lifetimes but we are already over our time. I'd like to thank everyone for coming. This has been a very productive conference. If you'd like, you can join me for coffee in the other room to relax and socialize. I do believe there's someone there who would wish to meet you."