Cyberutopia
20-12-2003, 22:49
((I am creating these Rules of War in an attempt to increase the realism of military confontations on these boards, and to bring a greater understanding of war to the roleplayers here. These rules are based on the patterns seen in military history, and are mostly targeted towards modern tech nations, though the rules can be applied to near future, space, and fantasy tech. I got these from the 4th edition of the book How To Make War, by James F. Dunnigan, and my comments are in red. Enjoy!))
1. An armed force's strength is calculatedby mulitplying numbers of men, weapons, munitions, and equipment by the quality factor.
Quality is a seemingly nebulous thing, but it includes the effetiveness of leadership, training, morale, weapons, and equipment. Numbers alone are not the standard by which you can calculate a nation's combat strength. Units with equal numbers of men and equipment can vary substantially in terms of combat effectiveness. In other words, a soldier of one army can be worth several of another. It is also assumed that the armed forces in question have the proper ratios of infantry, ranks, aircraft, artillery, ships, trucks, etc. This is often a rash assumption, because the force with a higher quality rating possesses proporionately more weapons and equpment.
Though a rigid formula to go by to calculate the true combat strength of an army would be vauge at best, there are a couple guidelines which someone can go by. Generally, the larger a force you have, the worse the training and the quality of the weapons, and therefore the more casualties your force will take in combat. Also, you can never assume that the forces actually fighting the enemy have sufficent backup. It is never a given that there will be artillery support, food, or medical supplies to support your men. Prepare to take far more casualties if that is the case.
2. Attack strength ratios.
An attack needs three or more times as much combat strength (not just troops and weapons) in order to overcome a defender at the point of attack. This varies with the size of the forces. At the platoon level, the required ratio can go as high as 10:1. At the theater level, where up to a million or more troops are involved, anything between 1:1 and 2:1 will often suffice because only a small part of the terrain in the theater will be fought over at any one time. You also have to take time into account. The larger the advantage, the less time it will take to win. Keep in mind that the historical record from the last century has shown some armies with troops six or more time effective than their opponents. There have been smaller wars where the ratio is even larger. Remember, it's not the number of troops that count, but combat power (number of troops times the quality factor).
I believe this explains itself very well.
3. Climate and terrain have a severe effect on the tempo and effects of combat.
Rough terrain, darkness, and winter all slow down operations and reduce the casualty rate from combat, while increasing the losses from disease and sickness. The cumulative effects can slow down operations by 50 percent and reduce casualties even more. Chemical weapons have the same general effect as bad weather, although with a slightly higher casualty rate. Flat, open terrain speeds up operations, particularly if the defender cannot put up substantial opposition. Such conditions can also reduce attackers' losses while enormously increasing those of the hapless defender.
Pick your battlefield wisely. The attacker should manuver to force their opposition into open terrain, where they have not had time to prepare defenses. A defender should place their most important assests where the attacker will have an incredibly tough time getting through whatever natural obstacles are in their path. This is important not only for theater tactics, but is relevent down to the individual level. Also, if your forces are charging through tough, well defended terrain, don't expect them to cover even 10 kilometers a day. It would be a foolish decision to send forces into battle when weather conditions are not at least halfway desireable.
4. Modern ground combat causes average losses of 1-5 percent casualties per day of sustained combat per division (of 10,000-20,000 troops).
Losses vary enormously depending on the soldiers' jobs. The infantry units' casualty rate is two to three times the overall rate. Tank-unit losses are about the same as the overall rate. Artillery units suffer half the overall rate, and all other troops are lost at about 1/6 of the division as a whole. Keep in mind that smaller combat units like battalions will have over 50 percent of their strength exposed to enemy fire, while a larger unit like a division will expose only 10-15 percent. You don't have to be a mathmatician to figure out that a battalion will have a much higher rathe of loss than a division. If you have enough of a numeric and quality edge over your opponent, as did the US over iraq in 1991, your losses will be even lower.
There is safety in numbers, and even greater safety in highly advanced numbers. Simple.
5. Combat vehicles (tanks and personnel carriers) are lost in combat at a rate of 5-10 times the personnel rate.
If a division loses 2 percent of it's troops a day in battle, it will lose over 10 percent of it's armored vehicles. Highly mechanized forces tend to grind to a halt over time as their equipment breaks down. Low-tech troops can continue killing each other longer without being stopped by equipment failiure. When low-tech troops (such as the Afghan resistiance of the 1980s) engage high-tech troops (such as the Soviets), the low tech-forces can keep going a lot longer on fewer resources. This is why guerrilla warfare is so difficult for a high-tech force, and why most of the wars in the 21st century will be resistiant to high-tech forces.
How's that for a blast from the past? Logic would dictate you should all go and form a guerrilla unit right now! However, naked men with sticks don't do all that great against a flight of MiGs...it's up to you to decide your tactics, but be warned if your 10 million man army comes up against an enemy skilled in guerrilla tactics. Also, don't go training that massive 10 million man army is guerrilla tactics and claim it as the best fighting force ever. It. Just. Won't. Work.
6. The ratio of dead to wounded is about 1:4 in most armies.
This varies according to how much medical resources you have. Armies with substantial medical resources get the ratio up to 1 dead for 5-10 wounded. Most of the wounded can be returned to service in less than a month. Noncombat losses per month vary from 1-40 percent depending on the living conditions, climate, and medical facilities available. Wars in the twenty-first century will generally be in unhealthful places. Noncombat losses are liable to be higher than combat losses.
Once again, choose your battlefield wisely. Poor weather and disease are the great killers of war, and can crush morale in short order. Take care of the grunts, and the grunts will fight harder and longer.
7. All things being equal, defending is easier than attacking.
This is especially true if the defender is within fortifications that the attacker canot bypass. By defending, a force doubles or triples its combat power. A stalemate can be achieved if both sides are too strong for the other to attack. In World War I, was a classic example, and many other campaigns in the past century suffered from this problem. Guerilla wars often end up as stalemates. This favors the guerillas, as the other side is usually spending a lot more money and will go broke first.
Common sense, play the defense game and you'll exaust your enemies. However, you should remain flexible in case your defense is comprimised, and be ready to evade your enemy, exausting them that way.
8. Modern air combat causes losses averaging 1-5 aircraft lost per 1,000 sorties.
The American experience in Vietnam and the Soviet record in Afghanistan demonstrated that noncombat losses amoung to between 1-5 percent of all the aircraft per month. If you manage to shut down the enemy air defenses right away, as happened in the 1991 Gulf War, you can get the losses down to less than one per 1,000 sorties (it was about .4 per 1,000 sorties in the 1991 Gulf War and none in the 1999 Kosovo campaign).
Despite the fact I have no idea how you'd lose .4 of a plane, these tactics make sense. Rule the ground and you will rule the skies.
9. Naval warfare consists mostly of nations dependent on maritime trade protecting their merchant shipping, or preventing the enemy from using theirs.
Naval warfare is largely a defensive exercise, more so than air or ground combat. The Gulf War was yet another example of this, with allied naval forces shutting down Iraqi ports. The allied naval forces then had to devote considerable resources to protecting themselves from Iraqi air or missile attack.
Be sure to protect your fleets, and stop the other guy from protecting his. Fleets used for massive offensive causes will have their efficiency drasitcally reduced, even when you're facing a far weaker opponent.
10. Suprise in battle can increase one side's combat power by a factor of three or more.
The effect wears off after one to three days. This is one of the key factors in battlefield success and is regularly underestimated and ignored.
The key to attaining suprise is a intitially a simple one. Find out what the other guy is doing while making sure he doesn't do the same. However, this can turn into a complex, unworthy affair, so be careful.
11. Troops that have not been in combat, or have not undergone intensive and realistic training, underestimate how much time, effort, and casualties it will take to accomplish anything in battle.
It is very difficult to break out of this habit. For most armies, only combat experience will provide a realistic attitude toward warfare. A welcome exception was the experience of US forces in the Gulf War. America had spent millions of hours and billions of dollars on realistic training exercises. This preperation was close enough to real warfare to make use of the months of time spent in the Saudi Arabian desert. Here they perfected their techniques with more training on the local terrain and detailed rehersals for the advance north. As the US experience in World War II demonstrated, spending a lot of time on inappropriate training is counterproductive when the shooting starts.
It is common sense that you would want to train your troops to be the most effective in any situation, and some nations on Nationstates are powerful enough to do such a thing. However, others cannot, and they cannot state their troops are perfect for whatever situation arises. Yes, it's godmodding, and is easily realized when exposed, but such incongruities often pass unnoticed otherwise. The rule stands, however small the difference is, that the large the force, the less adept each individual soldier will be.
12. Warfare is expensice.
Depending on how wealthy a nation is, and how many weapons and munitions it can buy, each enemy soldier killed can cost from several thousand to several million dollars. Just moving a lot of troops to an area where there might be a war, but none occurs, can cost billions of dollars. There no such thing as a cheap war.
This is a fact that can absolutely not be overlooked, and yet it happens far more often than is desireable. It's just plain common sense.
((All comments and constructive critisim is encouraged. I'd also like to alert all nations reading this you don't have to follow these guidelines to the letter, or at all. Suggestions for additions to this are also welcome, and credit will be given where credit is due.))
1. An armed force's strength is calculatedby mulitplying numbers of men, weapons, munitions, and equipment by the quality factor.
Quality is a seemingly nebulous thing, but it includes the effetiveness of leadership, training, morale, weapons, and equipment. Numbers alone are not the standard by which you can calculate a nation's combat strength. Units with equal numbers of men and equipment can vary substantially in terms of combat effectiveness. In other words, a soldier of one army can be worth several of another. It is also assumed that the armed forces in question have the proper ratios of infantry, ranks, aircraft, artillery, ships, trucks, etc. This is often a rash assumption, because the force with a higher quality rating possesses proporionately more weapons and equpment.
Though a rigid formula to go by to calculate the true combat strength of an army would be vauge at best, there are a couple guidelines which someone can go by. Generally, the larger a force you have, the worse the training and the quality of the weapons, and therefore the more casualties your force will take in combat. Also, you can never assume that the forces actually fighting the enemy have sufficent backup. It is never a given that there will be artillery support, food, or medical supplies to support your men. Prepare to take far more casualties if that is the case.
2. Attack strength ratios.
An attack needs three or more times as much combat strength (not just troops and weapons) in order to overcome a defender at the point of attack. This varies with the size of the forces. At the platoon level, the required ratio can go as high as 10:1. At the theater level, where up to a million or more troops are involved, anything between 1:1 and 2:1 will often suffice because only a small part of the terrain in the theater will be fought over at any one time. You also have to take time into account. The larger the advantage, the less time it will take to win. Keep in mind that the historical record from the last century has shown some armies with troops six or more time effective than their opponents. There have been smaller wars where the ratio is even larger. Remember, it's not the number of troops that count, but combat power (number of troops times the quality factor).
I believe this explains itself very well.
3. Climate and terrain have a severe effect on the tempo and effects of combat.
Rough terrain, darkness, and winter all slow down operations and reduce the casualty rate from combat, while increasing the losses from disease and sickness. The cumulative effects can slow down operations by 50 percent and reduce casualties even more. Chemical weapons have the same general effect as bad weather, although with a slightly higher casualty rate. Flat, open terrain speeds up operations, particularly if the defender cannot put up substantial opposition. Such conditions can also reduce attackers' losses while enormously increasing those of the hapless defender.
Pick your battlefield wisely. The attacker should manuver to force their opposition into open terrain, where they have not had time to prepare defenses. A defender should place their most important assests where the attacker will have an incredibly tough time getting through whatever natural obstacles are in their path. This is important not only for theater tactics, but is relevent down to the individual level. Also, if your forces are charging through tough, well defended terrain, don't expect them to cover even 10 kilometers a day. It would be a foolish decision to send forces into battle when weather conditions are not at least halfway desireable.
4. Modern ground combat causes average losses of 1-5 percent casualties per day of sustained combat per division (of 10,000-20,000 troops).
Losses vary enormously depending on the soldiers' jobs. The infantry units' casualty rate is two to three times the overall rate. Tank-unit losses are about the same as the overall rate. Artillery units suffer half the overall rate, and all other troops are lost at about 1/6 of the division as a whole. Keep in mind that smaller combat units like battalions will have over 50 percent of their strength exposed to enemy fire, while a larger unit like a division will expose only 10-15 percent. You don't have to be a mathmatician to figure out that a battalion will have a much higher rathe of loss than a division. If you have enough of a numeric and quality edge over your opponent, as did the US over iraq in 1991, your losses will be even lower.
There is safety in numbers, and even greater safety in highly advanced numbers. Simple.
5. Combat vehicles (tanks and personnel carriers) are lost in combat at a rate of 5-10 times the personnel rate.
If a division loses 2 percent of it's troops a day in battle, it will lose over 10 percent of it's armored vehicles. Highly mechanized forces tend to grind to a halt over time as their equipment breaks down. Low-tech troops can continue killing each other longer without being stopped by equipment failiure. When low-tech troops (such as the Afghan resistiance of the 1980s) engage high-tech troops (such as the Soviets), the low tech-forces can keep going a lot longer on fewer resources. This is why guerrilla warfare is so difficult for a high-tech force, and why most of the wars in the 21st century will be resistiant to high-tech forces.
How's that for a blast from the past? Logic would dictate you should all go and form a guerrilla unit right now! However, naked men with sticks don't do all that great against a flight of MiGs...it's up to you to decide your tactics, but be warned if your 10 million man army comes up against an enemy skilled in guerrilla tactics. Also, don't go training that massive 10 million man army is guerrilla tactics and claim it as the best fighting force ever. It. Just. Won't. Work.
6. The ratio of dead to wounded is about 1:4 in most armies.
This varies according to how much medical resources you have. Armies with substantial medical resources get the ratio up to 1 dead for 5-10 wounded. Most of the wounded can be returned to service in less than a month. Noncombat losses per month vary from 1-40 percent depending on the living conditions, climate, and medical facilities available. Wars in the twenty-first century will generally be in unhealthful places. Noncombat losses are liable to be higher than combat losses.
Once again, choose your battlefield wisely. Poor weather and disease are the great killers of war, and can crush morale in short order. Take care of the grunts, and the grunts will fight harder and longer.
7. All things being equal, defending is easier than attacking.
This is especially true if the defender is within fortifications that the attacker canot bypass. By defending, a force doubles or triples its combat power. A stalemate can be achieved if both sides are too strong for the other to attack. In World War I, was a classic example, and many other campaigns in the past century suffered from this problem. Guerilla wars often end up as stalemates. This favors the guerillas, as the other side is usually spending a lot more money and will go broke first.
Common sense, play the defense game and you'll exaust your enemies. However, you should remain flexible in case your defense is comprimised, and be ready to evade your enemy, exausting them that way.
8. Modern air combat causes losses averaging 1-5 aircraft lost per 1,000 sorties.
The American experience in Vietnam and the Soviet record in Afghanistan demonstrated that noncombat losses amoung to between 1-5 percent of all the aircraft per month. If you manage to shut down the enemy air defenses right away, as happened in the 1991 Gulf War, you can get the losses down to less than one per 1,000 sorties (it was about .4 per 1,000 sorties in the 1991 Gulf War and none in the 1999 Kosovo campaign).
Despite the fact I have no idea how you'd lose .4 of a plane, these tactics make sense. Rule the ground and you will rule the skies.
9. Naval warfare consists mostly of nations dependent on maritime trade protecting their merchant shipping, or preventing the enemy from using theirs.
Naval warfare is largely a defensive exercise, more so than air or ground combat. The Gulf War was yet another example of this, with allied naval forces shutting down Iraqi ports. The allied naval forces then had to devote considerable resources to protecting themselves from Iraqi air or missile attack.
Be sure to protect your fleets, and stop the other guy from protecting his. Fleets used for massive offensive causes will have their efficiency drasitcally reduced, even when you're facing a far weaker opponent.
10. Suprise in battle can increase one side's combat power by a factor of three or more.
The effect wears off after one to three days. This is one of the key factors in battlefield success and is regularly underestimated and ignored.
The key to attaining suprise is a intitially a simple one. Find out what the other guy is doing while making sure he doesn't do the same. However, this can turn into a complex, unworthy affair, so be careful.
11. Troops that have not been in combat, or have not undergone intensive and realistic training, underestimate how much time, effort, and casualties it will take to accomplish anything in battle.
It is very difficult to break out of this habit. For most armies, only combat experience will provide a realistic attitude toward warfare. A welcome exception was the experience of US forces in the Gulf War. America had spent millions of hours and billions of dollars on realistic training exercises. This preperation was close enough to real warfare to make use of the months of time spent in the Saudi Arabian desert. Here they perfected their techniques with more training on the local terrain and detailed rehersals for the advance north. As the US experience in World War II demonstrated, spending a lot of time on inappropriate training is counterproductive when the shooting starts.
It is common sense that you would want to train your troops to be the most effective in any situation, and some nations on Nationstates are powerful enough to do such a thing. However, others cannot, and they cannot state their troops are perfect for whatever situation arises. Yes, it's godmodding, and is easily realized when exposed, but such incongruities often pass unnoticed otherwise. The rule stands, however small the difference is, that the large the force, the less adept each individual soldier will be.
12. Warfare is expensice.
Depending on how wealthy a nation is, and how many weapons and munitions it can buy, each enemy soldier killed can cost from several thousand to several million dollars. Just moving a lot of troops to an area where there might be a war, but none occurs, can cost billions of dollars. There no such thing as a cheap war.
This is a fact that can absolutely not be overlooked, and yet it happens far more often than is desireable. It's just plain common sense.
((All comments and constructive critisim is encouraged. I'd also like to alert all nations reading this you don't have to follow these guidelines to the letter, or at all. Suggestions for additions to this are also welcome, and credit will be given where credit is due.))