NationStates Jolt Archive

Since I’m getting tired of posting essentially the same message over and over, I’m going to try posting this as an Aid to Roleplaying thread. Maybe this will help the legions of Napoleon or Genghis Khan wannabes out there to build a realistic military.

Far too many people trying to roleplay military adventures of one sort or another are missing the point. Weapons do NOT win wars. Logistics does. No matter how tough your troops are, if they run out of ammo and food, they’re just cold meat.

Ever hear this one? “For want of a nail, a horseshoe was lost. For want of a horseshoe, a horse was lost. For want of a horse, a rider was lost….” This little thing goes on and on until we discover that a war was lost because one horse didn’t get the proper number of nails in its shoe. That’s logistics.

A modern infantryman carries a load of around 50 kilograms (a little over 100 pounds). This includes a couple of day’s worth of food and water, first aid kit, body armor, ammunition, mess kit, and shelter. Even if the soldier is careful with his ammunition, he will need more ammo by the end of the first or second day of fighting- otherwise his assault rifle becomes a club. By the end of the second or third day, he will need food and water as well.

Let us assume that these consumable items are about 2/3 of the total weight of the soldier’s gear. That’s 66 pounds of ammunition, food, and water per soldier. If you have a unit of 100 soldiers, that’s 6600 pounds of supplies required for that unit.

Every day. These items will have to be delivered to the unit every day. How this is accomplished is through the science of logistics. Food, water, fuel, and ammunition have to be transported from the places where they are assembled or stored to where the soldiers are fighting. Large trucks and trains will get the goods part of the way- most likely to a Supply Depot not too far from the fighting.

Now all of these goods need to be distributed to the combat commands still closer to the fighting. That means the large loads carried by a few trucks and train cars have to be broken down into lots small enough to fit into 5-ton trucks, transport helicopters, and Humvees. Small convoys of trucks move toward the forward supply areas carrying these essential warfighting materials.

Combat commanders have to insure that the supplies that arrive in the rear of the fighting area are protected from enemy attack and also are distributed to the soldiers who are actually doing the fighting. This means either rotating combat units back from the fighting for resupply or sending vehicles with fuel, food, and ammunition up to the fighting. Most military units try to do both.

If the fuel, food, and ammunition do NOT get to the troops where the actual shooting is going on, those troops will be killed, forced to retreat, or captured. Every day. These items will have to be delivered to the soldier every day. Oh, and let us not forget that the people transporting these vital materials will ALSO be using fuel, food, water, and ammunition. Does your head hurt yet? Imagine what kind of headache a Combat Commander gets during a major engagement.

The Combat Commander’s job is far tougher than merely figuring out where to move the troops and what they should do, it is at least as important to get the tools of the trade (fuel, food, ammunition, and REPLACEMENTS) up to where the fighting is. And- just to make the Commander get ulcers and grey hairs before nightfall- the enemy knows all of this and will make energetic efforts to disrupt this entire evolution. Whichever side does the best job of disrupting the enemy’s logistics will have the advantage.

This means that every military force will have a large portion of its resources dedicated solely to supplying the combat trooper with the means of doing his job- Food, fuel, water, ammunition, and spare parts. Along with all of this, there has to be some means of getting the wounded away from the battlefield and back to the medical units behind the lines. For every combat unit involved in the fighting, there will be a long chain of people responsible for getting supplies to that unit. There will be still more people involved in protecting the people getting supplies to that unit, and yet more people getting supplies to the people protecting the suppliers.

Anybody getting the idea about logistics yet?

Having a massive mechanized unit with 300 tanks is LESS THAN USELESS unless the tanks get food, fuel, water, ammunition, spare parts, etc. Each of those tanks will carry a set amount of fuel and ammunition. These will be used up as fighting continues. Pretty soon, each tank is nothing more than an uncomfortable armored box because there’s no fuel for the engine or ammo for the guns. Vehicles will need to carry these items up to where the tanks are fighting, and these vehicles will themselves need fuel and ammunition. The supply depots where the fuel and ammo are stored will need to be protected, and the units protecting the supplies will need fuel and ammo.

Let us issue General Rule #1: We’ll be generous and say that 50% of any Army unit’s resources (manpower and material) will be part of the logistics chain. So, if you have 300 tanks, you’ll need 300 tankers and supply trucks to keep those tanks going.

The same situation is true for Air Forces, perhaps worse. For ever aircraft in use, there will be dozens of people who do nothing except make sure that the plane is in good repair and has all the spare part, fuel, and ammunition to do its job. On top of that, we still need the rest of the logistics chain I described above.

Let us issue General Rule #2: We’ll be generous again and say that 3/4 of any Air Force unit’s assets (manpower and material) will be part of the logistics chain. In other words, you’ll need a minimum of 3 people on the ground supporting every aircraft in the air. You’ll also need support aircraft. In-flight refueling planes, electronic warfare planes, command and control planes. Take a look at how the US Air Force is organized.

Now let’s look at Navies. Back in the 1980’s, the US Navy had 600 ships. 12 of those were aircraft carriers. There were approximately 30 submarines. Toss in two classes of destroyers, three classes of cruisers, three (count ‘em- 3) battleships from World War II, two classes of frigates, for a grand total of around 150 combat ships. Yep, you read that right. At the height of its post-WWII military power, the US Navy was 75% support vessels.

With that in mind, I can’t help but laugh at the nations who boast of the dozens of aircraft carriers and scores of cruisers and destroyers- but lack even a single fleet replenishment ship. The US Navy prides itself on “sustainability”. Ships need fuel, food, and ammunition, too. The US Navy sends out ships loaded with these items to accomplish what’s called “Underway Replenishment” (“UNREP”). Fuel, food, ammunition, and other supplies are transferred between ships out on the ocean, so the fighting ships have the tools to keep sailing “in harm’s way”. Without these vital (but definitely unglamorous and unromantic) ships, the sexy and glamorous aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines could not do their jobs without pulling into port every couple of days to refuel and re-arm. One aircraft carrier was continuously at sea for 7 months during the Afghanistan conflict after 9/11/01. They didn’t get to pull into port at all. Yet they continued to launch aircraft and strike targets in Afghanistan the whole time.

Now let us discuss the most glaring omission in most of these world-conqueror wannabes: Transport ships and landing craft. It’s grand to have a big army and lots of sexy weapons, but what if your enemy lies across an ocean? How are your troops and tanks going to get there? Main Battle Tanks are too large and heavy to be carried by plane, with rare exceptions. Even those exceptions require a different aircraft for each MBT. These planes require a working runway (made of concrete) to land on. If you drop an MBT out of an airplane in flight, it’ll be reduced to a large number of metal fragments after the sudden stop at ground level.

“No problem!” I hear you thinking. “I’ll just commandeer a few dozen Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) commercial ships and fill ‘em with tanks.” That will work….provided that there’s a secure port with modern piers available for your use. In WWII, the Allies landed at Normandy because the Germans weren’t nice enough to allow their enemies to land tanks and troops in any of the French ports. The Allies had to fight hard to CAPTURE Cherbourg, and even then it took months of work to get the port operational after the number the Germans did on it to prevent the Allies from using it.

So, now you’re going to need a bunch of unglamorous and unromantic small ships that will carry a few tanks and a bunch of troops each, The ships have to be small, because otherwise they wouldn’t be able to (essentially) run their bows into the beach and off-load tanks and troops. Even worse, you’re also going to need a bunch of lumbering, unsexy, and unromantic ships that carry LOTS of troops and tanks. These behemoths can’t possibly get close enough to off-load onto a beach, so each one will have to carry a bunch of landing craft- small boats (or hovercraft) that can carry around 50 troops or one tank each. You’re going to need a LOT of these landing craft, and a lot of ships to carry them.

So now we come to General Rule #3: Only ¼ of your Navy ships will be combatants. ½ of the ships will be transports and fleet replenishment ships, and the remaining ¼ will be landing ships and assault ships.

Now let’s take a look at a reasonable breakdown of a military force: Use the very well-designed military calculator to determine how many personnel are in your military and make your distribution accordingly.

RULE 1- 50% of any Army unit (or Marines) will be support/logistics personnel. This will reduce your “effectives” (Combat-Effective personnel) quite a bit, since tanks (for example) require 3 or 4 personnel each. If your Army is 100,000 personnel, then 50,000 of them will be noncombatants- supply clerks, truck drivers, mechanics, etc.

That leaves you with 50,000 personnel who are “effectives”. Let’s say that you want a large mechanized force. Call it 2,000 Main Battle Tanks. That takes 6,000 men, leaving you with 44,000. Organize your Army how you want it, legions, divisions, forces, groups, whatever you want.

RULE #2- 75% of any Air Force unit will be support/logistics personnel. If you have 100,000 men in your Air Force, 75,000 of them are going to be ground crews, supply clerks, truck drivers, etc.

Again, each aircraft has a different manning requirement. You have 25,000 men left. Say you want a large fighter force- 2,000 F-15E’s. Each one requires a crew of 2, meaning 4,000 men. Bomber usually require a crew of at least 3, AWACS 6-12 men, and so on. Make your own decisions on the organization and assign personnel accordingly. DO NOT FORGET to get refueling planes, transport planes, etc.

RULE #3- 75% of your navy ship will be support, transport, or landing/assault ships. Your manpower situation is a bit different for the Navy. Due to the fact that each individual unit (ship) will have a lot of people on board, your actual manpower will be closer to 2/3 shore personnel (supply clerks, drivers, administrators, etc. So- if you have the standard 100,000 men- 66,000 of them will not be on ships. The remaining 34,000 men will need to be assigned to the various ships (called “platforms”) as follows:

NOTE: These numbers are all variables depending on ship design and the individual shipbuilder.
Carriers= 5,000-7,000 each
Cruisers= 300 – 500 each
Destroyers= 250 - 400 each
Frigates= 175 – 300 each
Attack Subs= 90 –125 each
Missile subs= 120 – 180 each
RO/RO ship= 75 - 150 each
Tanker= 50 – 110 each
Troop ship= 120 - 250 each
Landing ship= 150 – 225 each
Assault ship= 230 – 600 each (depending on capacity)
Landing craft= 5 – 12 each
Supply ship= 250 – 400 each
Repair ship= 600 – 1000 each

That’s more than enough to get you all started. As I’ve repeated several times throughout this long message, logistics is not sexy, glamorous, or romantic- but it wins wars.

Start paying attention to it.

bump

You do realise most people do this for fun, and not neccessarily for realism or as a giant 'logistical wank-fest'. You also probably realise that most people aren't even close to qualified to deal with logisitics or have the knowledge of military technology neccessary to field 'actual' units.

As such, why not simply assume they have certain items and leave it at that. There's a reason most D&D players don't use the encumberance rules. The post was certainly interesting and informative, but shit dude, why can't we just assume that people are only listing their combat units and they're leaving the non-combat logistic units off the list and under a assumed level.

THANK YOU.

That's a great deal of why I scrapped together this (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?p=924751#924751) effort.

It looks really great. My only note is that armored/mechanized forces require much more support than infantrymen, since the shells are larger and the fuel reqs are simply tremendous. It requires 3-4 times as many tanker and support vehicles as there are tanks. That's part of the reason why I have limited myself to deploying 6,000 combat troops at any one conflict, with a number being involved in vehicles, and with more than twice as many in support.


One thing to note is that a single supply flight of a C17 from the US to Iraq costs in the range of $200,000. Yes, another important factor to all of this is cost. It is extremely expensive to run aircraft (they often require 8-20 times as much time on the "ground" as they have in the air, and that's without any enemy-inflicted damanges). It costs millions of dollars to deploy most ships.

More later on costs, but GREAT job.

That was wonderful. (Applauds)

Very nice indeed. People tend to get pissed at me when I ask how they're going to provide 2 liters of water EVERY day to EACH of their 1 million soldiers that they supposedly landed on an enemy beach..oh well.

A note: People can make logistics easier for them but no easier for their enemy if they can use the enemy's ammunition, etc. but the enemy can't use theirs. For example, you could use the same ammunition as a potential enemy with some slight changes in the cartridge. Your guns fire the enemy's and your ammunition, but the enemy's guns only fire his ammunition. There's a RL submachine gun that fires ammunition of different lengths. I don't know if this could be done for rifles, too :?, but if it could, and the range of usable lengths of cartridge was the same, you could have a gun firing ammunition that has been used by the RL USSR, USA, Czechoslovakia, and Japan.
Very nice indeed. People tend to get pissed at me when I ask how they're going to provide 2 liters of water EVERY day to EACH of their 1 million soldiers that they supposedly landed on an enemy beach..oh well.If each soldier has a hand-pump ROWPU that can purify sea water, it's no problem.

Nianacio,
Yes, there is a Stoner rifle (M16/Colt-style weapons for special forces) that has been made specifically to accept both the 5.56 NATO round and the 7.62 AK-type round (and both magazine types).

Many weapons nowadays are designed to hold several types of magazines--the Israeli Tavor is made to both hold the M16 magazine and the 5.56-version Galil magazines (military, civilian arms are specifically made with a limited ability to do so, especially in the USA).

As a general rule, however, soldiers tend to not seek out enemy weapons unless there is a clear use or unless they are not part of an active drive. In Vietnam, the US infantrymen collected and used many of the AKs, RPGs, and other weapons that were available since the original M16 models were known for their unreliability (since tremendously improved)...but during the World Wars, the main items sought in enemy areas were food supplies--always in short supply.

Also, Nianacio, that idea expects that the player's forces will consistantly be driving their enemy back far enough to capture enemy ammunition dumps of sufficient size to supply his needs. In modern warfare, a few ammunition trucks or dumps might be found, but they'd only really be 2 days worth of ammunition for the company or brigade that found it....not enough for the entire force.

Western Asia, I'm talking about a submachine gun (the Gepard) that without any modifications (unlike the Stoner) can fire 9mm ammunition of various lengths (18 to 30 millimeters). If that feature could be carried over to an assault rifle firing more powerful ammunition, then your soldiers would have a nice advantage.

So changing calibers instead of size.....The stoner rifle that does that supposedly requires no change (I'm not sure how) of barrelling.

So changing calibers instead of size.....No, no change in caliber.
The stoner rifle that does that supposedly requires no change (I'm not sure how) of barrelling.Everything I've read says it does need changes.

Perhaps I was mistaken. As for caliber, didn't you mention that the gun was able to accept rounds ranging from 9mm X 18 to 9mm X 30? The second number is a change in caliber (length multiple of round diameter)?

Ahem...

Evil Overlord, you have my utmost gratitude - finally someone has codified what is required to realistically fight wars. Obviously its too much of a pain in the butt to worry about it a lot during RP wars, but you do need to keep it in mind and not claim to have 3 million troops with 500,000 MBTs invading a country.

Anytime you want someone to RP with, let me know. I'd be happy to do some realistic stuff instead of godmoddish nukefests.

Since I’m getting tired of posting essentially the same message over and over, I’m going to try posting this as an Aid to Roleplaying thread. Maybe this will help the legions of Napoleon or Genghis Khan wannabes out there to build a realistic military.

Far too many people trying to roleplay military adventures of one sort or another are missing the point. Weapons do NOT win wars. Logistics does. No matter how tough your troops are, if they run out of ammo and food, they’re just cold meat.

Ever hear this one? “For want of a nail, a horseshoe was lost. For want of a horseshoe, a horse was lost. For want of a horse, a rider was lost….” This little thing goes on and on until we discover that a war was lost because one horse didn’t get the proper number of nails in its shoe. That’s logistics.

A modern infantryman carries a load of around 50 kilograms (a little over 100 pounds). This includes a couple of day’s worth of food and water, first aid kit, body armor, ammunition, mess kit, and shelter. Even if the soldier is careful with his ammunition, he will need more ammo by the end of the first or second day of fighting- otherwise his assault rifle becomes a club. By the end of the second or third day, he will need food and water as well.

Let us assume that these consumable items are about 2/3 of the total weight of the soldier’s gear. That’s 66 pounds of ammunition, food, and water per soldier. If you have a unit of 100 soldiers, that’s 6600 pounds of supplies required for that unit.

Every day. These items will have to be delivered to the unit every day. How this is accomplished is through the science of logistics. Food, water, fuel, and ammunition have to be transported from the places where they are assembled or stored to where the soldiers are fighting. Large trucks and trains will get the goods part of the way- most likely to a Supply Depot not too far from the fighting.

Now all of these goods need to be distributed to the combat commands still closer to the fighting. That means the large loads carried by a few trucks and train cars have to be broken down into lots small enough to fit into 5-ton trucks, transport helicopters, and Humvees. Small convoys of trucks move toward the forward supply areas carrying these essential warfighting materials.

Combat commanders have to insure that the supplies that arrive in the rear of the fighting area are protected from enemy attack and also are distributed to the soldiers who are actually doing the fighting. This means either rotating combat units back from the fighting for resupply or sending vehicles with fuel, food, and ammunition up to the fighting. Most military units try to do both.

If the fuel, food, and ammunition do NOT get to the troops where the actual shooting is going on, those troops will be killed, forced to retreat, or captured. Every day. These items will have to be delivered to the soldier every day. Oh, and let us not forget that the people transporting these vital materials will ALSO be using fuel, food, water, and ammunition. Does your head hurt yet? Imagine what kind of headache a Combat Commander gets during a major engagement.

The Combat Commander’s job is far tougher than merely figuring out where to move the troops and what they should do, it is at least as important to get the tools of the trade (fuel, food, ammunition, and REPLACEMENTS) up to where the fighting is. And- just to make the Commander get ulcers and grey hairs before nightfall- the enemy knows all of this and will make energetic efforts to disrupt this entire evolution. Whichever side does the best job of disrupting the enemy’s logistics will have the advantage.

This means that every military force will have a large portion of its resources dedicated solely to supplying the combat trooper with the means of doing his job- Food, fuel, water, ammunition, and spare parts. Along with all of this, there has to be some means of getting the wounded away from the battlefield and back to the medical units behind the lines. For every combat unit involved in the fighting, there will be a long chain of people responsible for getting supplies to that unit. There will be still more people involved in protecting the people getting supplies to that unit, and yet more people getting supplies to the people protecting the suppliers.

Anybody getting the idea about logistics yet?

Having a massive mechanized unit with 300 tanks is LESS THAN USELESS unless the tanks get food, fuel, water, ammunition, spare parts, etc. Each of those tanks will carry a set amount of fuel and ammunition. These will be used up as fighting continues. Pretty soon, each tank is nothing more than an uncomfortable armored box because there’s no fuel for the engine or ammo for the guns. Vehicles will need to carry these items up to where the tanks are fighting, and these vehicles will themselves need fuel and ammunition. The supply depots where the fuel and ammo are stored will need to be protected, and the units protecting the supplies will need fuel and ammo.

Let us issue General Rule #1: We’ll be generous and say that 50% of any Army unit’s resources (manpower and material) will be part of the logistics chain. So, if you have 300 tanks, you’ll need 300 tankers and supply trucks to keep those tanks going.

The same situation is true for Air Forces, perhaps worse. For ever aircraft in use, there will be dozens of people who do nothing except make sure that the plane is in good repair and has all the spare part, fuel, and ammunition to do its job. On top of that, we still need the rest of the logistics chain I described above.

Let us issue General Rule #2: We’ll be generous again and say that 3/4 of any Air Force unit’s assets (manpower and material) will be part of the logistics chain. In other words, you’ll need a minimum of 3 people on the ground supporting every aircraft in the air. You’ll also need support aircraft. In-flight refueling planes, electronic warfare planes, command and control planes. Take a look at how the US Air Force is organized.

Now let’s look at Navies. Back in the 1980’s, the US Navy had 600 ships. 12 of those were aircraft carriers. There were approximately 30 submarines. Toss in two classes of destroyers, three classes of cruisers, three (count ‘em- 3) battleships from World War II, two classes of frigates, for a grand total of around 150 combat ships. Yep, you read that right. At the height of its post-WWII military power, the US Navy was 75% support vessels.

With that in mind, I can’t help but laugh at the nations who boast of the dozens of aircraft carriers and scores of cruisers and destroyers- but lack even a single fleet replenishment ship. The US Navy prides itself on “sustainability”. Ships need fuel, food, and ammunition, too. The US Navy sends out ships loaded with these items to accomplish what’s called “Underway Replenishment” (“UNREP”). Fuel, food, ammunition, and other supplies are transferred between ships out on the ocean, so the fighting ships have the tools to keep sailing “in harm’s way”. Without these vital (but definitely unglamorous and unromantic) ships, the sexy and glamorous aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines could not do their jobs without pulling into port every couple of days to refuel and re-arm. One aircraft carrier was continuously at sea for 7 months during the Afghanistan conflict after 9/11/01. They didn’t get to pull into port at all. Yet they continued to launch aircraft and strike targets in Afghanistan the whole time.

Now let us discuss the most glaring omission in most of these world-conqueror wannabes: Transport ships and landing craft. It’s grand to have a big army and lots of sexy weapons, but what if your enemy lies across an ocean? How are your troops and tanks going to get there? Main Battle Tanks are too large and heavy to be carried by plane, with rare exceptions. Even those exceptions require a different aircraft for each MBT. These planes require a working runway (made of concrete) to land on. If you drop an MBT out of an airplane in flight, it’ll be reduced to a large number of metal fragments after the sudden stop at ground level.

“No problem!” I hear you thinking. “I’ll just commandeer a few dozen Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) commercial ships and fill ‘em with tanks.” That will work….provided that there’s a secure port with modern piers available for your use. In WWII, the Allies landed at Normandy because the Germans weren’t nice enough to allow their enemies to land tanks and troops in any of the French ports. The Allies had to fight hard to CAPTURE Cherbourg, and even then it took months of work to get the port operational after the number the Germans did on it to prevent the Allies from using it.

So, now you’re going to need a bunch of unglamorous and unromantic small ships that will carry a few tanks and a bunch of troops each, The ships have to be small, because otherwise they wouldn’t be able to (essentially) run their bows into the beach and off-load tanks and troops. Even worse, you’re also going to need a bunch of lumbering, unsexy, and unromantic ships that carry LOTS of troops and tanks. These behemoths can’t possibly get close enough to off-load onto a beach, so each one will have to carry a bunch of landing craft- small boats (or hovercraft) that can carry around 50 troops or one tank each. You’re going to need a LOT of these landing craft, and a lot of ships to carry them.

So now we come to General Rule #3: Only ¼ of your Navy ships will be combatants. ½ of the ships will be transports and fleet replenishment ships, and the remaining ¼ will be landing ships and assault ships.

Now let’s take a look at a reasonable breakdown of a military force: Use the very well-designed military calculator to determine how many personnel are in your military and make your distribution accordingly.

RULE 1- 50% of any Army unit (or Marines) will be support/logistics personnel. This will reduce your “effectives” (Combat-Effective personnel) quite a bit, since tanks (for example) require 3 or 4 personnel each. If your Army is 100,000 personnel, then 50,000 of them will be noncombatants- supply clerks, truck drivers, mechanics, etc.

That leaves you with 50,000 personnel who are “effectives”. Let’s say that you want a large mechanized force. Call it 2,000 Main Battle Tanks. That takes 6,000 men, leaving you with 44,000. Organize your Army how you want it, legions, divisions, forces, groups, whatever you want.

RULE #2- 75% of any Air Force unit will be support/logistics personnel. If you have 100,000 men in your Air Force, 75,000 of them are going to be ground crews, supply clerks, truck drivers, etc.

Again, each aircraft has a different manning requirement. You have 25,000 men left. Say you want a large fighter force- 2,000 F-15E’s. Each one requires a crew of 2, meaning 4,000 men. Bomber usually require a crew of at least 3, AWACS 6-12 men, and so on. Make your own decisions on the organization and assign personnel accordingly. DO NOT FORGET to get refueling planes, transport planes, etc.

RULE #3- 75% of your navy ship will be support, transport, or landing/assault ships. Your manpower situation is a bit different for the Navy. Due to the fact that each individual unit (ship) will have a lot of people on board, your actual manpower will be closer to 2/3 shore personnel (supply clerks, drivers, administrators, etc. So- if you have the standard 100,000 men- 66,000 of them will not be on ships. The remaining 34,000 men will need to be assigned to the various ships (called “platforms”) as follows:

NOTE: These numbers are all variables depending on ship design and the individual shipbuilder.
Carriers= 5,000-7,000 each
Cruisers= 300 – 500 each
Destroyers= 250 - 400 each
Frigates= 175 – 300 each
Attack Subs= 90 –125 each
Missile subs= 120 – 180 each
RO/RO ship= 75 - 150 each
Tanker= 50 – 110 each
Troop ship= 120 - 250 each
Landing ship= 150 – 225 each
Assault ship= 230 – 600 each (depending on capacity)
Landing craft= 5 – 12 each
Supply ship= 250 – 400 each
Repair ship= 600 – 1000 each

That’s more than enough to get you all started. As I’ve repeated several times throughout this long message, logistics is not sexy, glamorous, or romantic- but it wins wars.

Start paying attention to it.

Duh every single person who knows military strategim and tactics know that :roll:,but then again there are a lot of amatures here who've never tasted war

Excellent work, I tip my hat to you.
*tips hat :wink: *
Hopefully this will get linked to by a sticky.

The post was certainly interesting and informative, but shit dude, why can't we just assume that people are only listing their combat units and they're leaving the non-combat logistic units off the list and under a assumed level.

The reason I mention this (at great length) is the fact that most real warfare involves tearing up the enemy's supply lines and lines of communications. Witness the strenuous efforts the Germans put into isolating Britain during WW I and II. Read any of the histories about modern warfare and you'll realize that it's a lot easier to destroy the supplies- causing the entire war effort to stall- that it is to kill the men and destroy the tanks. Why do you think the Allies in WW II spent so many lives in bombing raids on Nazi Germany. Why di the US Navy throw squadrons of submarines at the Japanese Sea Lines Of Communication (where they incidentally strangled the Japanese economy by sinking more tonnage than all other weapons systems combined).

If you want to wage war, pay attention to the details. Otherwise, you might as well fall back on the God-Mode roleplaying (I land 200 squintillin troops with blasters on top of your castle...you're dead).

Make the minimal effort required to allow for the logistics. You'll have a lot more realistic war.

A note: People can make logistics easier for them but no easier for their enemy if they can use the enemy's ammunition, etc. but the enemy can't use theirs. For example, you could use the same ammunition as a potential enemy with some slight changes in the cartridge. Your guns fire the enemy's and your ammunition, but the enemy's guns only fire his ammunition. There's a RL submachine gun that fires ammunition of different lengths. I don't know if this could be done for rifles, too :?, but if it could, and the range of usable lengths of cartridge was the same, you could have a gun firing ammunition that has been used by the RL USSR, USA, Czechoslovakia, and Japan.
Very nice indeed. People tend to get pissed at me when I ask how they're going to provide 2 liters of water EVERY day to EACH of their 1 million soldiers that they supposedly landed on an enemy beach..oh well.If each soldier has a hand-pump ROWPU that can purify sea water, it's no problem.

Precisely the reason that EOE military uses the 11.5mm standard ammunition. No one else uses this cartridge.

You can simplify your logistics in this manner only if the enemy doesn't employ "Scorched Earth" tactics (witness the Russians and Germans using this tactic during the Eastern Front campaigns in WW II). You can't count on enemy supplies being available. All it would take is one soldier with a grenade in an ammo dump to ruin your supply situation. You have to have your own supplies coming to your troops on a regular basis, or your troops risk running out of ammo. Soldiers using their assault rifles as clubs are meat on the table for troops with functional weapons.

Duh every single person who knows military strategim and tactics know that :roll:,but then again there are a lot of amatures here who've never tasted war

Amateurs study tactics. Generals study logistics.

I've made shorter versions of this post far too often to believe that most of the Napoleon wannabes in the game even have the first clue about the subject.

Consider the post a long rant against God-Moding

The handpump is actually a very good idea. Particularly for smaller deployments of troops*, knowing how to scrounge up or purify food and water on site helps a lot. Ammunition, fuel, and replacement treads still need to be crated in though.

I'm adding a link to this thread in the announcement about godmoddery up top; most people could stand to take a look at this. I've seen entirely too many people claim to deploy millions of troops... all at once... without giving the slightest consideration to how they will feed and supply them.

*Being able to scrounge edibles on site isn't that helpful for larger deployments. Really.

TJ: Indeed. Imagine; a scout sees an undefended farm in enemy territory. "A farm! Tell the batallion!" By the time the rest of the guys turn up, there's only a few guys who've made off with all the chickens and bits of cow ... so the foodless guys frag them for the meat. When the commander shows up, they say "Sir! I regret to inform you that the Third Forward Scouting Party was killed by concealed enemy fire!" (wink) "But we managed to liberate these chickens!"
"Very good, Privates." (munch)

Evil Overlord; I've been looking for a good thing on logistics, since I know I'm not so good at it. Thanks.

Sorry about the shameless plug, but if people use this:
http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=49266&highlight=
it takes care of most of the numbers.
Sorry EO, had to do it. :oops:

And it was very well written, good job! :D

You can simplify your logistics in this manner only if the enemy doesn't employ "Scorched Earth" tactics (witness the Russians and Germans using this tactic during the Eastern Front campaigns in WW II). You can't count on enemy supplies being available. All it would take is one soldier with a grenade in an ammo dump to ruin your supply situation. You have to have your own supplies coming to your troops on a regular basis, or your troops risk running out of ammo. Soldiers using their assault rifles as clubs are meat on the table for troops with functional weapons.Maybe I didn't write very well. Of course you have to issue ammunition, but if your soldiers can get to the enemies they killed, they can get themselves some extra ammunition.

Here's some facts and numbers and statistics. I agree with EO of course, but also I realize most people are not going for realism, and in fact most people seem to ignore realism at all costs. Nevertheless...

Your average US Armor division will require 1135 TONS of ammunitions per DAY. It will also require 467 tons of fuel and 73 tons of food, not to mention 74 tons of spare parts and replacements. Per day.

US Infantry division will require 1309 tons of ammo, 461 tons of fuel, 79 tons of food, and 65 tons of spare parts, daily.

On average, every American soldier operating outside the US requires 100 pounds of supply per day. Thats 100 pounds/soldier/day. A sailor requires 400-600 pounds per day, and airmen require up to 1000 pounds of supply per day.

These numbers can be cut to soldier: 50 pounds, sailors 300 pounds if they're just sitting there and not fighting or doing much except maintaining unit strength.

To move a ton of material 100 km by train requires 14 ounces of fuel, while a large ship takes about half that. Compare these with your average truck, which uses 1% of the weight of supply for fuel for each 100 km traveled. Aircraft take about 2-5%. Helicopters, the preferred all purpose cargoe carriers in war, take up to 10% of their cargo weight for each 100 km. Even using animals or manpower has the same cost as aircraft due to the food.

In a land combat situation in foreign territory where supply is key, on average 10 tons of supply per each man is kept on hand as 30-90 days of reserves. To make it all worse, ammunition and fuel are both perishable. To say nothing of what the enemy does to your gigantic supply lines.

One sortie (flight by any one aircraft on a mission) requires 10-20 tons of supply, and usually about half a million dollars if its a combat mission.

Also, cost. Jeez. A ton of conventional ammunition costs about $8500. A ton of missile munitions costs over $600,000. Consuming at least 1000 tons a day, and with your average ton of munitions in general costing $40,000+, a US division costs at least $50 million per day just for munitions. Intensive combat, of course, can up daily munitions expenditure to 5000 tons. Fuel costs about $1000 per ton.

Currently, aircraft cost an average of $1200 a pound, armored vehicles average $25/pound, and ships $70/pound. Not to mention 2-4 times their initial cost for maintanance during their 10 or 20 year peacetime life. Missiles cost something like $12000 per pound. Satellites (and most space ships, I'd guess) cost $10,000 per pound to build and $3000/pound to lift into orbit.

To raise a mechanized infantry division, the total cost if hardware, weapons, equipment (not including recruiting and training): $4,519,000,000. Thats four and a half billion dollars.

So there's a reason we're all giving these numbers, its not just to be realistic, but to show that most nations cant AFFORD their stated military numbers. I often see things like divisions with 2000 tanks, too, which is silly and would bankrupt their nation shortly after war breaks out, if not before. Same with spaceships.... even assuming a country has the technology and manufacturing ability. No WAY can giant space ships exist in large numbers, even if you have a Frightening economy, 100% tax rate, and every bit of your budget goes to defense. Period.

Same with huge fleets of huge aircraft carriers. While you're spending all your money on giant floating targets, I'm building advanced anti-ship missiles that can be launched from land based aircraft or cheap missile boats.

Anyway, I'd just like to say in defense of any future military actions I (my nation is Santa Barbara) might take that according to the UN, I spend more on the military than all but 12 nations in the entire world. That means I am free to have, for example, a Space Division with huge operational and purchase costs, vast amounts of military manpower, etc. But to actually use my entire military in combat would quickly bankrupt me. There just isn't enough money, even with 1 billion people. So I don't want to see people fighting me with like 50 million troops, because I could destroy just a few of your supply ships or aircraft or hit your supply line and STARVE about half of them very quickly. So think about that :)


By the way, these numbers were gotten from "How to Make War" by James F. Dunnigan. Third edition. The numbers are slightly out of date, about ten years. However, don't expect things to be easier now, in fact at the rate things are going in the real world, costs and logistics problems are only going to get MUCH harder as time goes on. Smaller militaries are the norm anill pretty much have to be from now on.

STICKY

Wooooooooooooo-Hoooooooooo!
*Bows down and worships the Evil Overlord*
As a man who has studied logistics, I have to say this is an amazingly well prepared thread. STICKY - o - RAMA!

Lets see what we can add to this... oh yes, finite amunition capacities was mentioned, I can add some figures to that:

MBTs carry about 25 (yes, only 25) rounds for the main gun. Divide that between HEAT, HE and APFSDS and you suddenly find out that you can run out of the _right kind_ of ammo long before the magazine is dry. 100 rounds in the COAX chaingun and maybe 200 rounds spare under armour... doesn't last as long as you'd think.

This gets worse with planes. Fighters will be carrying a maximum of between 6 and 8 convensional missiles, bombs or torpedos. And these are set up before take-off... so you get mission loadings depending on what you want them to do. Thus a plane flying CAP (Combat Air Patrol) will be unable to do squat to a sub... and that's why a carrier will never send its full compliment alloft at once.

Did I mention Submarines? At take-off is nothing: these babies can't reload out of port which may be months of travel away. So they're loaded for bear, right? Wrong. The average attack sub comes with 6 torpedo tubes (4 fore, 2 rear) and a mere 18 torpedoes divided between two mazanines (ar either end). And they you have anti-sub torps, anti-ship torps and all sorts of interesting ones like wake-following torpedoes or Skvall supercavitating torpedos (for the guys who have to have all things Russian).

Just because its there, doesn't mean it has an incredible amount to fire... and even if it does fire everything its got: it may well not be firing again any time soon. A tank with no ammo is a wonderfully utilitarian as the affforementioned empty assault rifle.

Since Evil Overlord has taken his time to create an excellent post on logistics, I will simply add my two cents to things he said. Realistically, for every plane you will have many more than just two people.

Your average fighter... we'll use an F-15 in this case, has all kinds of technicians.
- You will have a master crew chief and one or two apprentice crew chiefs.
- You will have a master avionics technician and one or two apprentices.

So already we have six people per plane. Let's do the rest of the squadron:
Orderly Room: Do all the squadron paperwork for Temp Duty Assignments, incoming personnel, outgoing personnel, military pay for the squadron, orders, medals, etc...
1x OIC
1x AOIC
1x NCOIC
2x NCO
4-6x Airmen
Scheduling: Schedule training ranges, work with ground FACs, etc
1x OIC
1x AOIC
1x NCOIC
1x NCO
2-4x Airmen
Standards & Evaluation: These people ensure that everyone is trained, current in evaluations and of appropriate quality to fight a war.
1x OIC
1x AOIC
1x NCOIC
2-4x NCO evaluators/trainers
Weapons & Tactics: These people are the ones who schedule live ammunition use, procurement etc
1x OIC
1x AOIC
1x NCOIC
1-2x NCO
Maintenance Flight:
1x OIC
1x NCOIC
-Radio Maintenance Section - deals with repair and maintenance of all squadron communication devices. usually cleared to highest levels and only people allowed to work with aircraft electronics
1x NCOIC
1-4x NCO
4-12x Airmen depending on unit size
-Supply Section - deals with squadron budget and issue of all items required for service within the squadron ie. flightsuits, nomex gloves, camelbaks, flying helmets, rebreather gear, G-suits, pencils, paper, squadron vehciles etc.
1x NCOIC
1-4x NCO
2-8x Airmen
-Propulsion - deals with the engine and the engine of the aircraft alone
1x NCOIC
1-4x NCO
4-16x Airmen
Commander's Support Staff: These are the people who help run the squadron smoothly
1x DO - second ranking officer in squadron and assumes command duties when commander is absent
1x ADO - third ranking officer
1x Squadron Superintendent - highest ranking enlisted person - ensures the smooth running of the squadron, deals with other squadrons and finances, etc.
1x Operations Superintendent - second highest ranking enlisted - handles all matters pertaining to the enlisted personnel within the squadron such as medical waivers, supervision of all NCOs
1x 1Sgt - the First Sergeant takes care of all personal (officer and enlisted) issues within the squadron and assists in squadron morale events, acts a liason between squadron and other squadrons, deals with disciplinary actions and legal actions.

Ok, so where are we in terms of numbers for a 15-jet squadron? I know I have left a few people out but even so, we are looking at a bare minimum of 137 people (and that means everyone has additional duties out of the wazzoo) up to at least 180 personnel. That's for ONE F-15 Squadron.

Take that into account for every plane you have. Squadrons are usually 12 planes plus up to three replacements. Some squadrons are as many as 20 aircraft. What I didn't even add on were the support squadrons.

Let's do that.
We'll call our fighters the 1st Fighter Squadron. The 1st has to have support at their base.

First off, to fly we need fuel and parts.
1st Supply Squadron: provides supply to all units on base and can actually be anywhere from this size to 4 times this size or greater depending on the base. We are assuming no more than four supported squadrons at the base we're thinking of
Commander's Support Staff
Commander/Chief of Supply
DO (deputy commander)
DDO (3rd in command)
Squadron Superintendent
Operations Superintendent
First Sergeant
Combat Ops Flt Aircraft Parts
OIC
AOIC
NCOIC
2-4 NCOs
4-10 Airmen
Fuels Management Flt
OIC
AOIC
NCOIC
Bulk Storage-
NCOIC
1-2 NCO
2-4 Airmen
Distribution-
OIC
NCOIC
2-10 NCO
20+ Airmen
-Drivers
-Hydrant Operators for GOVs
etc
Training-
OIC
NCOIC
1-2 NCO
Management Flt orderly room people dealing with computers, scheduling, etc.
OIC
AOIC
NCOIC
2-4 NCO
10 Airmen

1st Comptroller Squadron: - handle all military pay, payment for TDY travel, correct pay rates, etc
Commander
DO
DDO
1st Sergeant
Squadron Sup/Operations SUp
NCOIC
4-8 NCO
4-16 Airmen

1st Military Personnel Flight (Squadron) - people here deal with formal training of all personnel, schedule official Air Force testing, continuing education (college), ID cards, re-enlistments, military records, dog tags, promotions, etc.
Commander
DO
DDO
1st Sergeant
Orderly Room
NCOIC
2x NCO
2-4x Airmen
Promotions
OIC or NCOIC
2x NCO
2-4x Airmen
Military Testing for promotions or career advancement due to higher proficiency training or more advanced training for supervisors
OIC
NCOIC
1-2 NCO
2-4 Airmen
Identification
OIC
NCOIC
2-4x NCO
2-8 Airmen
Re-enlistments
OIC
NCOIC
1-2 NCO
2-4 Airmen
Awards & Decorations
OIC
NCOIC
1-2 NCO
2-8 Airmen
Records Maintenance
OIC
NCOIC
NCO
1-4 Airmen
Education Center
OIC
1-4 Officers as education counselors
NCO
1-2 Airmen
or
OIC
4-8 Civilian Contractors

1st Medical Squadron
Commander
DO
DDO
1st Sergeant
Squadron Sup/Ops Sup
3-15 Officers - general practitioner doctors
Radiology
OIC
NCOIC
NCO
1-4 Airmen
Pharmacy
OIC
AOIC
NCOIC
2-4 NCO
2-4 Airmen
Lab - urine tests, blood testing, etc
OIC
AOIC
NCOIC
1-2 NCO
2-8 Airmen
Audio Lab
NCOIC
NCO
1-4 Airmen
Vision Center
OIC
NCOIC
1-4 Airmen
Virology
OIC
NCOIC
NCO
2-6 Airmen
EMS
OIC
AOIC
1-3 Officers - surgeons
NCOIC
1-3 NCO (EMT)
4-16 Airmen (EMT/ambulance drivers)

1st Flight Medicine Squadron - deals only with those personnel on flight/jump status. Some duties such as lab and audio lab go to the normal medical squadron
Commander
DO
DDO
1st Sergeant
Squadron Sup/Ops Sup
3-15 Officers - general practitioner doctors
Vision Center
OIC
NCOIC
1-4 Airmen
EMS
OIC
NCOIC
1-3 NCO (EMT)
2-8 Airmen (EMT/ambulance drivers)

Ok, I haven't even gotten to the transportation, services, contracting, security forces or flight records squadrons and already we are well over 500 people. Like I said, this also assumes a 4 squadron base, but even then you are looking at 800 people for a maximum of 60 aircraft in the flying squadrons alone. Add in another good 2,000 to 5,000 people and you have the entirety of logistics and why they call it a logistical nightmare. In addition, i haven't used any figures for ammunition procurement, cost of using ranges to train on, etc.

For those of you who say you have nukes... you have no idea how many people it requires to run a nuclear weapons launch facility. You are looking at a similar number of people for 100 nukes or so.

Take this all into account when saying you have 10,000 airplanes. So be it... just be prepared to have 833,000 people on your bases alone, providing for those aircraft. That is ignoring your simple logistic bases where they figure out pay, training bases, bases where there are only ground operations, bases where they conduct research, special operations bases, etc. Oh... and money wise... assume that every person gets at least $25,000/year in total benefits between pay, medical coverage, housing and so forth. so your 833,000 people cost you a base price of 20.825 billion dollars. And then you have upkeep of the weapons systems and weapons themselves etc...

Your annual military budget for your Air Force is now 21 billion dollars and you aren't even paying for equipment and facility upkeep yet.

Think about it...

This thread should be stickied... :D

I agree, and another shameless plug:

http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=38804&highlight=

Thanks to all of you for your input. I tried to keep the post as basic as possible and still adequately cover the topic.

I never knew that there were this many people would understand what I was talking about. Far too many of the people I run into on the forum are practical illiterates, and I fear their constant God-Moding warped my perceptions.

One of the things I've been doing with the EOE military is keeping it small (by comparison, that is. I have nearly a billion people with compulsory military service) and mobile. There are far more transports than warplanes, for example, and simply scads of Assault ships and landing craft). My military budget per annum is somewhere in excess of 1.5 TRILLION dollars (thanks for the calculator, BTW), a large portion of which goes to maintaining the equipment and troops.

Nearly 1/3 of my military budget goes to R&D and new weapon procurement (EOE just replaced the Tamerlane MBT with the Zhukov, for one example), which is another subject I didn't bother touching on for obvious reasons.

I'm glad someone got something out of the post.

I, for one am thankful that you put it up, Evil Overlord. There is always something to be gained from a post like this and I actually agree that it should be stickied. I know that may not hav ebeen your goal but every newbie needs to have this information. As for those who think that military is all about having hte weapons, those of us in the military in r/l actually know how little of the actual force is a frontline unit. (except navy where the majority of people are on ships actively involved in the conflict though with little or no power to do anything about it).

btw, The Evil Overlord, I have your military budget around 4.486 Trillion dollars according to this link http://www.pipian.com/stuffforchat/gdpcalc.php?nation=the%20evil%20overlord&defenseprovided=1&defense=50&militarybudget=1

Due to a *wee* bit of military knowledge, I think my force structure and set up is reasonable and realistic. While not being perfect, as no force ever is, it should be a good example for those newer to military logs.

Military (http://home.comcast.net/~American_Alliance/military1.html)

You can click on the Branch names for more detailed information..

btw, The Evil Overlord, I have your military budget around 4.486 Trillion dollars according to this link.

http://www.pipian.com/stuffforchat/gdpcalc.php?nation=the%20evil%20overlord&defenseprovided=1&defense=50&militarybudget=1
OOC:
That has his %age devoted to military at 50% ("defense=50")....That's how I accidentally thought that I had a 6 trillion dollar military budget 4 days after I had a 2 trillion dollar budget (20-15%)....

BTW, Agnosticum and Trostia...thanks for the tremendous specs. I'm stunned at the detailing...just tremendous.

Generally speaking, most military budgets don't run into the trillions. Most people I see calculating their military budget:

1.) Assume the discretionary budget for their government is a much larger percentage of their GDP than it should be.

2.) Assume an unrealistically high percentage of military spending in their discretionary budget.

Generally speaking, most military budgets don't run into the trillions. Most people I see calculating their military budget:

1.) Assume the discretionary budget for their government is a much larger percentage of their GDP than it should be.

2.) Assume an unrealistically high percentage of military spending in their discretionary budget.

I was running a high budget (18%) for the military to upgrade my forces. It has since been reduced (the better to fund new space assets) to 7%.

I justify this by my nation description ("the government concentrates mostly on Defense"), because Tahar Joblis is absolutely right about the budgets.

a worthy companion to my bit on high % armies; the problem is getting people to PLAY those weaknesses. you'll find a short list of players willing to admit they're supply lines have been reamed and that their troops have to surrender because they're out of bullets. but well done nonetheless, may sense and intelligence prevail against all odds.

Yeah, my descriptor makes it seem like I should have 15-25% of my budget on defense but I only use 10-15%% because my tax rates are so high I have to pay for lots of things like daycare.

For those of you wondering, the planned military budget for a nation such as the United States is only about 400 billion (379 billion according to most official tables) dollars. Granted we look at that budget and I wasn't paying attention to the percentage of the budget... 50% is just a tad much don't ya think? :D My bad.

In any case, I cite the US budget for 2003 (or requested sum) because US military spending is on an increase so it shows that real world budgets are relatively low. of course take into consideration that the US is a population of around 291,529,537 and quite a few NS nations are well above that. Even so, the US still only spent 17% of its budget in 2002 on defense.

Realistically, any nation in Nation States should be looking at 10-20% (20 being the upper limit) of their budget on defense. Nations planning on spending more should be working in insurrections, riots, attempted coups and/or a complete dictatorship style government like that of North Korea. Your economy will be largely imploded and inefficient, unable to provide the required services to keep your nation stable and its people happy. You may spent a good amount of your budget on defense and you could even spend a couple of days (NS years) on excess for procurement, but then it's all about maintenance.

It's not like 15% of one trillion dollars is a paltry sum. That's still 150 billion dollars. For me, 15% of my federal budget is 825 billion dollars... way more than is needed to keep my nation of 360 million safe.

not my post but it needs to be BUMPed nonetheless

I believe my defense spending, according to that calculator, is 3.8 trillion.

But thats assuming like 20 or 25% of the budget on defense. SB is very heavily militarized and has been throughout its entire history. Actually, I figured it'd be MORE spent on defense, I mean why not? Is there some rule that says a country HAS to spend at least 80% of its budget on infrastructure, health, welfare, education, etc etc? What if it chooses not to?

And my countries are owned by a single, massive multinational corporation. I assume they actually make a bit more profits than the national budget given their omnipresence and influence. I mean, its nice to limit things to examples of the US budget for realism, but then this is NS, its corporate empire world, its not precisely limited to 20th century political-economics is it? Especially since, if one day is one year, its already several centuries in the future now.

MBTs carry about 25 (yes, only 25) rounds for the main gun. Divide that between HEAT, HE and APFSDS and you suddenly find out that you can run out of the _right kind_ of ammo long before the magazine is dry. 100 rounds in the COAX chaingun and maybe 200 rounds spare under armour... doesn't last as long as you'd think.

A tank on average carries 35-50 rounds, more if it has a smaller gun. This is usually a standardized round(either HEAT or APFSDS[-T]). Each .303 machine gun will have about 100 rounds loaded with about 2000 spare rounds. .50 cal machine guns will have 100 or so loaded, with about 200 extra. Small cannons, like my Merkava Mk. V has, have(this is the stats for the Merkava V) 65 loaded, 100 spare.

For those of you wondering, the planned military budget for a nation such as the United States is only about 400 billion (379 billion according to most official tables) dollars. Granted we look at that budget and I wasn't paying attention to the percentage of the budget... 50% is just a tad much don't ya think? :D My bad.

In any case, I cite the US budget for 2003 (or requested sum) because US military spending is on an increase so it shows that real world budgets are relatively low. of course take into consideration that the US is a population of around 291,529,537 and quite a few NS nations are well above that. Even so, the US still only spent 17% of its budget in 2002 on defense.

Realistically, any nation in Nation States should be looking at 10-20% (20 being the upper limit) of their budget on defense. Nations planning on spending more should be working in insurrections, riots, attempted coups and/or a complete dictatorship style government like that of North Korea. Your economy will be largely imploded and inefficient, unable to provide the required services to keep your nation stable and its people happy. You may spent a good amount of your budget on defense and you could even spend a couple of days (NS years) on excess for procurement, but then it's all about maintenance.

It's not like 15% of one trillion dollars is a paltry sum. That's still 150 billion dollars. For me, 15% of my federal budget is 825 billion dollars... way more than is needed to keep my nation of 360 million safe.

In real life the US spends 4.4% of GDP on it's armed forces. During the Cold War as much as 9% was spent. Due to the instability of the NS world it is perfectly feasible for a nation to spend as much as(and certainly no more then, unless at war) 10% on your armed forces. I currently spend 4.5%, but I have a big population and avoid war when possible.

[ooc: Absolutely brilliant post. All that logistics is why I steer clear of war RPs, and even if I do fight I prefer to stick to spec ops.]

For those of you wondering, the planned military budget for a nation such as the United States is only about 400 billion (379 billion according to most official tables) dollars. Granted we look at that budget and I wasn't paying attention to the percentage of the budget... 50% is just a tad much don't ya think? :D My bad.

In any case, I cite the US budget for 2003 (or requested sum) because US military spending is on an increase so it shows that real world budgets are relatively low. of course take into consideration that the US is a population of around 291,529,537 and quite a few NS nations are well above that. Even so, the US still only spent 17% of its budget in 2002 on defense.

Realistically, any nation in Nation States should be looking at 10-20% (20 being the upper limit) of their budget on defense. Nations planning on spending more should be working in insurrections, riots, attempted coups and/or a complete dictatorship style government like that of North Korea. Your economy will be largely imploded and inefficient, unable to provide the required services to keep your nation stable and its people happy. You may spent a good amount of your budget on defense and you could even spend a couple of days (NS years) on excess for procurement, but then it's all about maintenance.

It's not like 15% of one trillion dollars is a paltry sum. That's still 150 billion dollars. For me, 15% of my federal budget is 825 billion dollars... way more than is needed to keep my nation of 360 million safe.

In real life the US spends 4.4% of GDP on it's armed forces. During the Cold War as much as 9% was spent. Due to the instability of the NS world it is perfectly feasible for a nation to spend as much as(and certainly no more then, unless at war) 10% on your armed forces. I currently spend 4.5%, but I have a big population and avoid war when possible.


Just as a word of note, I did not say 17% of the US GDP. I said the budget. There is a difference. The GDP is the entirety of income for the government. The Budget is the amount used for military spending, social programs, foreign aid, etc. The rest of the GDP is what is used for upkeep of social programs, tax returns, and things along those lines. That 17% is equivalent to the 4.4% of the US GDP. I went to the US government budget page for this information as well as three separate sources.

As for the amount of rounds a tank can hold...
Global Security (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1-specs.htm) and the FAS (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m1.htm) say 40 for the M1 Abrams.

While the FAS (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/challenger2.htm) cites 50 for the Challenger II.

And finally FAS (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/leopard2.htm) says 42 for the Leopard II... 15 ready and 27 stowed.

So you should be looking around 40 rounds per tank depending on turret rear armor, length and auxilliary systems.

[ooc: Absolutely brilliant post. All that logistics is why I steer clear of war RPs, and even if I do fight I prefer to stick to spec ops.]

Spec ops is actually even more of a nightmare... for a unit of 4 operatives you are looking at a supporting unit of about 50 people at the very least. usually separate self-sufficient compounds, specialized equipment, etc.

For every spec ops section you will usually have a separate 18-36 month school with phases such as scuba, demo, EMT training, weapons & tactics, vehicle operation, airborne and freefall training, etc. You wil have a separate guard force to secure the compound, specialized trainers, specialized mechanics and electronics techs. All in all, I guess I'm jsut saying logistics are a total pain in the ass but even the smallest fighting unit has some logistics.

Afghanis have camels and donkeys, feeders and groomers, weapons suppliers, food suppliers, ammo dumps and distributors.

All in all, I guess I'm jsut saying logistics are a total pain in the ass but even the smallest fighting unit has some logistics.

Quite so.

The real reason for this thread to begin with is to try and infuse a tiny bit of realism to the way people RP here. An unintended side benefit was encountering those of you who understood the issue already.

Having said all of that, is there a Nationstates-standard time equivalence? How much realtime is equivalent to how much gametime? I've seen several people announcing different time scales while they're roleplaying. This may seem distantly related to the main topic (logistics- for those of you lacking a scorecard), but is in fact quite important.

If nation #1 is operating as if each realtime day is one NS year, he or she will have a nearly insurmountable advantage over someone with a slower ratio. It will allow a player without a job- for example- to bury his opponent under a flurry of attacks and logistical buildups with little or no chance for response.

I have a suggestion:
have a loosely agreed-to ratio of 10 realtime days to 1 NS year- except during actual combat. This will allow players to develop new resources, make allies, establish diplomatic ties, etc.

However, when the shooting actually starts (or when war is declared), the time frame would be by postings. Two sets of posts- from the attacker(s) and any allies and from the defender(s) and allies will be one NS day. In other words, Nation #1 attacks Nation #2. #2 responds to the attack and calls on his allies to help. #1 responds to the defender's post and calls on his own allies. #2's allies post that they are helping (or not), and #2 makes another post in response to #1. That would be one day (NS time).

This sort of general rule would help those of us with jobs and/or lives outside of Nationstates, and will allow allies and other interested parties to put in their two cents (or equivalent) without disrupting the flow of events, and will enable people in Estonia (for example) to roleplay a war with someone in Indonesia (as another example picked solely for its time difference from Estonia) without unfair advantage due to the time difference.

This would also allow for troop movements, reorganization of governments (I haven't said a bloody word about political actions as part of logistics, because it would take too long), and other logistical actions- as well as slowing down the pace of action enough to allow more in-depth postings.

These are just suggestions, of course, and everyone is entitled to their own opinions on whether or not they're a good idea. I think that this idea- in broad outline, at least- would enhance everyone's roleplaying tremendously.

I usually assume a 1 RL day = 1 NS month timeframe. A lot of the more militaristic nations like to go by the day/year bit, because even they have to admit they wouldn't be able to function otherwise. Frankly, once combat starts, I run it on a reply based system... it may take six posts from each player to resolve a rather critical 15 minutes, but the next month may require a single post from each as they entrench and move supplies.

I usually assume a 1 RL day = 1 NS month timeframe. A lot of the more militaristic nations like to go by the day/year bit, because even they have to admit they wouldn't be able to function otherwise. Frankly, once combat starts, I run it on a reply based system... it may take six posts from each player to resolve a rather critical 15 minutes, but the next month may require a single post from each as they entrench and move supplies.

Provided that one is dealing with reasonable people, this is eminently reasonable. I prefer a less rigid method than the one I just propounded myself.

The best means of resolving the various problems is still- to my mind- discussions between the would-be combatants about the rules of engagement (so to speak).

A brief discussion of location, geography, technology, time scales, allies, etc would resolve most of the issues BEFORE the war starts. It is time concuming, but it would be useful if the warring parties would familiarize themselves with their opponent's previous posts to determine what sort of equipment each side has (this will help limit the inevitable accusations of "God-moding").

Getting back to logistics, the subjects listed above should help determine the actual logistics involved in any conflict (and incidentally obviate the need for this entire thread).

Provided that all parties involved are relatively reasonable

Damn, damn, damn, damn, DAMN good post right here. ^_^

THIS is what I like to see, people: making freaking sense!

HOWEVER.

Since this is an OOC post, it needs moved to the NationStates forum...

Mind if I add this to the "View these great threads!" list?

Damn, damn, damn, damn, DAMN good post right here. ^_^

THIS is what I like to see, people: making freaking sense!

HOWEVER.

Since this is an OOC post, it needs moved to the NationStates forum...

Mind if I add this to the "View these great threads!" list?

"Do what thou wilt" shall be the whole of the Law.

Sorry about the OOC ranting, but I really needed to get this off my chest....at great length, apparently. I was just reading a thread about somebody (doesn't matter who) declaring war on someone else (ditto) and then every one-month-old Nation on the board sending 2 or 3 million troops to help out. Horribly bad Roleplaying on everyone's part, there.

Ah well, I'm apparently preaching to the choir here, anyway. You are the Game Moderator, move it where you think it belongs. I posted this in International Incidents because most of the people there seemed to need the information desperately, but it IS Out-Of-Character.

"Do what thou wilt" shall be the whole of the Law.

Sorry about the OOC ranting, but I really needed to get this off my chest....at great length, apparently. I was just reading a thread about somebody (doesn't matter who) declaring war on someone else (ditto) and then every one-month-old Nation on the board sending 2 or 3 million troops to help out. Horribly bad Roleplaying on everyone's part, there.

Ah well, I'm apparently preaching to the choir here, anyway. You are the Game Moderator, move it where you think it belongs.

I have no problem with a good OOC rant, and really, this is something that needs to be addressed here. It may even be a solution to a big problem I have on NationStates: the biggest nation always wins.

In nearly all other forms of roleplay, your performance is relative to the skill of your roleplaying. While in a table-top RPG like D&D or Shadowrun, the die can make or break your chances to win, a large portion of your own success comes from how well you are able to play your character. If you always have him run head-on into the fray waving his ax like a jackass, you stand a good chance of dying. If, however, you roleplay intelligently, you may win.

NationStates, on the other hand, is nearly always a numbers game. If a nation with a population of 100 million goes against a nation with a population of 99 million, you can bet your bottom dollar that the 100 million population nation will be HEAVILY favored, no matter how intelligent a roleplayer the 99 million population nation may be. Strategy and intrigue are typically thrown out the window in favor of sending wave after wave of troops to the slaughter.

What I'd like to see in the wars on NationStates is a bit more of a reward for clever roleplay. This was one thing that really came into play in the Automagfreek Civil War, an excellent (and highly overlooked) RP. The war was won not by marching millions of troops into Automagfreek, but by appealing to the masses via propaganda and speech. That's how to win a war without firing a shot, kids.

In short... I hope a lot of people pay attention to this thread, because I think it's very, very important.

What I'd like to see in the wars on NationStates is a bit more of a reward for clever roleplay. This was one thing that really came into play in the Automagfreek Civil War, an excellent (and highly overlooked) RP. The war was won not by marching millions of troops into Automagfreek, but by appealing to the masses via propaganda and speech. That's how to win a war without firing a shot, kids.


No kidding. That was one of the better RPs seen on NS, yet it casually gets overlooked.

I agree that all RPs should have the basic plan and description of timeframe in the initial post. It will reduce confusion as well as missed posts, pre-emptive strikes out the wazoo, etc.

Also, even though this isn't my post, I'd like to also thank everyone who has contributed to this thread so far. Personally, I think this is one of those READ THIS OR DON'T RP kind of threads :D . Ok, that's a little extreme, but everyone should take a look at the vast information that all contributors have added to this post from Evil Overlord.

Also, I think that an RP should be limited in who can join in. Not to be exclusive, but so that everyone can keep up with the players. Maybe that just means sending the thread starter a telegram, but it would go a long way to not having so many 400-nation wars which we all know are highly unlikely. True there are what? 100,000 nations? But how many RP and how many still exist? Guess this is just another gripe of mine, sorry to burden everyone with my complaints :)

OOC: I will only add to what The Evil Overlord wrote by quoting an essay regarding logistics:

By William S. Frisbee Jr.

One factor most authors tend to overlook is logistics. This is more important than fancy weapons and equipment. Logistics is supply, if troops don't have food or bullets, they can't fight, if the troops are a psychological wreck they won't fight well.

Logistics involves Food, Water, Ammunition, medical supplies, enemy prisoners of war, mail, medical treatment, communication, transportation, information, rest and recuperation, replacements, and more.

Consider, a man can eat three MRE's (Meal Ready to Eat) a day. If each MRE is two pounds and there are forty men in a platoon, that is two hundred and forty pounds a day. A company of men (around two hundred) requires one thousand, two hundred pounds of food a day. That is just food. Frequently water must also be transported because in most areas troops cannot drink the water in streams or lakes for health reasons. Then there is ammunition, spare parts, replacement weapons, gas for the vehicles, spare batteries for the radios, mines, and more. All these things may be needed on a daily basis.

Despite the best precautions, people also get sick or get injured and must be evacuated.
This is all important to military units for without them they quickly fall apart and cease to be an effective fighting force. Logistics is the key to successful military operations.
Lets look at long range patrols for a second, say a month. With three meals a day each person must carry ninety MRE's. At two pounds an MRE that is one hundred and eighty pounds. That is an awfully heavy backpack. A person can survive on one MRE a day (but it leaves him very hungry). It still adds sixty pounds to his pack. Add in radio batteries, and water. Before you know it that patrol that will be gone for a month is so overloaded they can't move.

If they are going to remain motionless in a site then they will have to carry camouflage netting, digging tools and the like. Living off the land is usually possible, if the fighters have the skills, however, living off the land is also much more likely to reveal the presence of that patrol and that is not a good thing. Sometimes it can be fatal.

Then the psychological factor must be considered. If a person spends too much time in a battlezone without a break then they will start to crack under the pressure. Battle Fatigue or Shell Shock well set in and make the person unstable and dangerous. Rest and Recreation must be scheduled so the troops don't stress out too badly.

Another point of logistics is mail, everybody wants mail from home and nobody likes delays. Mail is important to people and can have a direct impact on their morale. Care packages from home are also great morale boosters.

It has been said that for every fighter there are five to twenty rear echelon non-combatants that support him and the other rear echelon non-combatants. Cooks, finance clerks, lawyers, chaplains, doctors, dentists, military intelligence specialist, cargo plane and helicopter pilots, military police, technicians, mechanics and more.

Logistics is the life blood of a military. If logistics is poor or nonexistent than the fighters will be severely vulnerable and unable to fight effectively.


http://web.qx.net/warcat/milsf/logistics.htm

Who is Mr. Frisbee?

I was US Marine Non-Commisioned Officer and a squad leader. I served in Desert Storm and Desert Shield. While I was in the Marines my hobby was small unit tactics. I enjoyed learning about all manner of small unit fighting from guerrilla wars to large scale conflicts. I was an NCO, not an officer so my viewpoints are that of a small unit leader who loved his job and strove for excellence.

http://web.qx.net/warcat/milsf/index.htm

put it in the "***sticky***new to NS, look at these threads"

Vrak brings up a good point about battle fatigue and combat rest. True, the US Army has declared that 4 hours is long enough for a combatant to sleep each night an remain effective but there is a limit to that of 30 days. Air crews, in the US military, in combat require crew rest. That means that following a mission, they cannot execute any combat duties other than let's say base defense in an emergency, they have 12 hours before they can fly again. This is because flying, especially for combat pilots, is exceptionally draining. Having been in familiarization rides in an F-15E and F-16D 2-seat trainer, i can attest that it's an ass-kicker and all we were doing was attacking ground targets. After 2 hours in the air, i got back to my billeting room and slept for like 10 hours.

In addition, official studies have found that at 90 days, a soldier reaches his/her peak moral and performance. Starting day 91, the morale and combat effectiveness drop. I find it entertaining that US Army and Marine deployments are expected to be 180 days or longer. In the USAF, we are expected 90 days before our replacements arrive.

Starting tommorow I am going to run a a mainly S-RP with possible other nations involvement by request and my approval only.

Other nations are invited to comment both IC and OOC, as long as it is kept reasonable.

This will involve my recently bought nation The Armed Republic of Dill Row, vs The United Socialist States of Haaregradia. Haaregradia being the name of my nation after it's two halves re-combined. Please watch it and tell me if I am RPing well.

Having been in familiarization rides in an F-15E and F-16D 2-seat trainer

I thought the F-15D was used for familiarization/conversion training. :?

OOC: Thank you Agnosticium. But the thanks belong to Mr. Frisbee.

As well, I think that these comments regarding logistics can be applied to any nation, regardless of technological level. Even if your warriors are robots and your ships are AI, you still need time to maintain equipment, replenish necessary supplies, etc…

And a quick real-life article about US troops in Iraq since we are talking about logistical concerns. From the onset, I just want to say that I’m reposting key paragraphs from the article for information purposes. Anything emphasized is by me. As well, I also think the article points out how difficult it really is when you “take over a region”.

http://middleeastinfo.org/article2787.html

How Much Is Enough? - US Troops in Iraq

May 30, 2003
By MICHAEL R. GORDON (New York Times)

BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 30 — Nearly two months after American tanks rolled into Baghdad, the Bush administration is learning a simple if unwelcome lesson: it will take more troops to police and secure Iraq than it did to destroy the Saddam Hussein regime.

The toppling of Mr. Hussein's government was essentially carried out by two to three divisions' worth of troops backed up by punishing air attacks. But the number of troops trying to provide security in postwar Iraq is far greater and includes almost half the divisions in the American Army.

In February, the Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, estimated that it could take several hundred thousand troops to pacify the country after Mr. Hussein was removed from power, an assessment that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld dismissed as grossly inflated. The Army chief, civilian Defense Department officials suggested, did not understand the Bush administration's plan for Iraq and was ill-informed.

…

If the Pentagon considers only how many troops were used to defeat Mr. Hussein's forces, it seems that the United States has more than enough soldiers. The main attack on Baghdad was led by a single mechanized division, the Third Infantry Division. That seems to support Mr. Rumsfeld's notion that the Army has sufficient manpower and can be cut so that funds can be freed up to develop high-tech weapons and reconnaissance systems.

But if the Army's postwar effort to stabilize Iraq is taken into account, it would seem that the service needs more troops not less.

Certainly, the Army does not seem to have many forces to spare. Of the Army's 10 divisions, more than 4 are deployed in Iraq. The Army's forces deployed in Iraq include the Third Infantry Division, Fourth Infantry Division, First Armored Division, 101st Airborne Division and a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. Other forces in Iraq include the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Of the remaining Army divisions, the Second Infantry Division is in South Korea, the 10th Mountain Division is headed to Afghanistan and a brigade of the First Infantry Division is in Kosovo.

Only two divisions, the First Cavalry Division, which is based in Texas, and the 25th Infantry Division, which is stationed in Hawaii, are not spoken for at this time. As one Army officer put, they are the only "action figures" left.

….

When it comes to the Army it is not just combat operations that should determine how many soldiers are enough. The Pentagon also needs to consider how many troops are required to uphold the peace that follows.

The F-15E was used in thsi instance because of my job. i will work with F-15Es more than any other type of F-15 as a Ground FAC. Simple reason is that F-16C/D, A-10 and F-15E Etrike Eagles are the aircraft i will be talking to most to call in air support. The goal was to familiarize us with the aircraft we are most likely to interact with.

The F-15E was used in thsi instance because of my job. i will work with F-15Es more than any other type of F-15 as a Ground FAC. Simple reason is that F-16C/D, A-10 and F-15E Etrike Eagles are the aircraft i will be talking to most to call in air support. The goal was to familiarize us with the aircraft we are most likely to interact with.

Oh, I see, good luck working for the USAF. :)

That's how I was able to give the numbers I did on my initial post on populating an airbase :D . At my base we have 2 squadrons of A-10s and two of C-130s and the base population is somewhere around 6,000-7,000. Plus I forgot civilian contractors, the BX/PX, library, base theater, bank or two, all-ranks club, etc.

That's how I was able to give the numbers I did on my initial post on populating an airbase :D . At my base we have 2 squadrons of A-10s and two of C-130s and the base population is somewhere around 6,000-7,000. Plus I forgot civilian contractors, the BX/PX, library, base theater, bank or two, all-ranks club, etc.

That was really indepth. I think I've got my levels about right, for TAC I have around 4 800 aircraft, total. The service has 1 350 000 members.

I recently got a telegram from someone asking about what numbers constituded an Infantry division and so after replying I thought I would post the same info for everyone to see. These are not entirely acurate numbers and come from two different sources, I have also not broken them down like I could but it should still give you a good idea of how many people actually compose divisons and such.

Base US Army Figures - these numbers are the general numbers which are tweaked in each command
Light Infantry Division: Personnel 10,813; Vehicles 1,650; Anti-Armor Tow/Javelin 44/162; OH58 Kiowa Helicoters 40; Howitzer 60; Avenger 36

Airborne Division: Personnel 13,149; Vehicles 2,573; Anti-Armor Tow/Javelin 188/162; OH58 Kiowa 48; Howitzer 60; Avenger 48

Air Assualt Division: Personnel 15,739; Vehicles 3,350; Anti-Armor Tow/Javelin 180/162; AH-64 Apache 72; OH58 Kiowa 32; Howitzer 54; Avenger 48

Mechanized Infantry Division: Personnel 17,776; Vehicles 5,535; M1 Abrams 259; M2 Bradley 331; Anti-Armor Tow/Javelin 120/180; AH-64 24; OH-58 Kiowa 48; Howitzer 54; MLRS 9; Avenger 48

Armor Division: Personnel 17,538; Vehicles 5,908; Anti-Armor Tow/Javelin 96/144; AH-64 24; OH-58 Kiowa 48; Howitzer 54; MLRS 9; Avenger 48

The following is good for force organization:
Squad - 9 to 10 soldiers. Typically commanded by a sergeant or staff sergeant, a squad or section is the smallest element in the Army structure, and its size is dependent on its function.

Platoon - 16 to 44 soldiers. A platoon is led by a lieutenant with an NCO as second in command, and consists of two to four squads or sections.

Company - 62 to 190 soldiers. Three to five platoons form a company, which is commanded by a captain with a first sergeant as the commander's principle NCO assistant. An artillery unit of equivalent size is called a battery, and a comparable armored or air cavalry unit is called a troop.

Battalion - 300 to 1,000 soldiers. Four to six companies make up a battalion, which is normally commanded by a lieutenant colonel with a command sergeant major as principle NCO assistant. A battalion is capable of independent operations of limited duration and scope. An armored or air cavalry unit of equivalent size is called a squadron.

Brigade - 3,000 to 5,000 solders. A brigade headquarters commands the tactical operation of two to five organic or attached combat battalions. Normally commanded by a colonel with a command sergeant major as senior NCO, brigades are employed on independent or semi-independent operations. Armored cavalry, ranger and special forces units this size are categorized as regiments or groups.

Division - 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers. Usually consisting of three brigade-sized elements and commanded by a major general, divisions are numbered and assigned missions based on their structures. The division performs major tactical operations for the corps and can conduct sustained battles and engagements.

Corps - 20,000 to 45,000 soldiers. Two to five divisions constitute a corps, which is typically commanded by a lieutenant general. As the deployable level of command required to synchronize and sustain combat operations, the corps provides the framework for multi-national operations.

Army - 50,000 + soliders. Typically commanded by a lieutenant general or higher, an army combines two or more corps. A theater army is the ranking Army component in a unified command, and it has operational and support responsibilities that are assigned by the theater commander in chief. The commander in chief and theater army commander may order formation of a field army to direct operations of assigned corps and divisions. An army group plans and directs campaigns in a theater, and is composed of two or more field armies under a designated commander. Army groups have not been employed by the Army since World War II.

1 platoon = 3-4 squads
1 company = 3-4 companies
1 battalion = 3-4 platoons
1 brigade = 3-4 battalions
1 division = 3-5 brigades
1 corps = 2-5 divisions
1 army = 2-5 corps
1 army group = 3-5 armies

A good example of logistics is this... Ft Bragg is home to the 82nd Airborne Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps. Well the XVIII Corps pretty much is only the 82nd Airborne. As these numbers show, there are what... 10-15,000 soldiers in a division and 20-45,000 in a corps. And this is a largely vehicle-free outfit. There are helos, but no tanks as this is a light infantry/airborne infantry base. Who fights? A fraction of the 35,000 people stationed here. Maybe 40% and that's pushing it. Even if that many people are engaged, the national guard and reserves are called up to fill the vacant desks to support the war effort... logisitics... woohoo! gotta love em.

:shock:

Agnosticum...please...keep writing! This is great stuff and while I've been able to gather a lot of it this is certainly the most straight-forward presentation I've seen.

For simplicity's sake (since it isn't entirely accurate), I've been using Heinlein's numbers from "Starship Troopers" (the excellent novel- NOT the horrible travesty of a movie).

During a discussion of the MI in the novel, Heinlein's protagonist said that armies in the 20th century needed 10000 men to enable 1000 men to fight. In my opinion, it isn't really that bad for the Army and Marine Corps (disregarding the fact that Marines need Navy ships and crews to get them to where they can fight), and is actually worse for the Navy.

Combat troops call themselves "the tip of the spear", but a moon rocket might be a better analogy. It took several hundred tons of fuel, metal and electronics to get THREE men to the Moon. The Saturn V rocket is the size of a nuclear attack submarine, but the Lunar Lander and the return vehicle were about the size of a broom closet- or a standard apartment bathroom.

I would again like to thank everyone who's contributing to this thread. I no longer feel like a voice in the wilderness.

Thanks for this, I will follow the general rules to make up for the terrible logistics involved in defending another nation recently (Rave Shentavo… I sent 1.4 million men to protect it, though I did claim I was shipping in supplies, it still was highly un-likely).

So I will from now on report as much of my logistical support along with any troop movements. However, I will not change my troops seeing as all the numbers I have in each section include support personnel, I’m not going to use all 16 million infantry men at once, because most of them (like you said) will be supporting the other half. I will never use more then a couple million troops at anyone time seeing as moving a million troops is one hell of a job.

I will keep this thread in mind if I help out other nations (I don’t do wars) and will include logistics in my troop movements so that others may RP attacking them.

However, I will enjoy using fast units to do hit and run operations against other supply lines. Now I’m going to look at my military again… especially my navy.

These are the basic numbers for one Marine Expedtionary Unit (15th MEU) that I was able to procure. it's another good bite to swallow but it will give you an idea or the diret support and I will fill in the rest of the support at the end.

The MEU’s major elements are the Command Element (CE), the Ground Combat Element (GCE), the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE).

The CE is comprised of the commanding officer and supporting staff -- about 200 Marines and Sailors. It provides the command and coordination essential for effective planning and execution of operations. In addition, the MEU CE is reinforced with specialized detachments, such as reconnaissance and surveillance elements, radio reconnaissance and electronic countermeasure teams, intelligence and counterintelligence assets, and advanced communications.

The GCE for the 15th MEU is Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/1. About 1,200 strong, it is based on the infantry battalion. It is reinforced with an artillery battery, amphibious assault vehicle platoon, combat engineer platoon, light armored reconnaissance company, an M1A1 Main Battle Tank platoon and a reconnaissance platoon.

Roughly 350 Marines and Sailors of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 163 (Rein) provide air support for the 15th MEU. The composition of the ACE is based on the tactical situation, the MAGTF’s mission and size, and space limitations within the ARG. HMM-163 (Rein) is comprised of CH-53E Super Stallion, CH-46E Sea Knight, UH-1N Huey and AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters, and AV-8B Harrier jets. The ACE also has two KC-130 transport planes on standby at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, Calif. The ACE includes air traffic control, air defense, aircraft maintenance/support and aviation logistics/supply capabilities.

The final major element of the MEU is MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) 15, the CSSE. About 300 Marines and Sailors of the MSSG provide combat support, specifically supply; maintenance; transportation; explosive ordnance disposal; military police; water production and distribution; engineering; medical and dental services; fuel storage and distribution; and other services to the deployed MEU. The MSSG gives the MEU the ability to support itself for 15 days in austere expeditionary environments.

Deployed during the second half of 2000, the Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) consisted of USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), USS DENVER (LPD-9), USS PEARL HARBOR (LSD-52) and the Fifteenth Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)). Embarked onboard were Commander, Amphibious Squadron THREE and Staff, Helicopter Support Squadron ELEVEN and Assault Craft Unit FIVE. During the millennium Westpac, the Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) was involved in many vital operations and exercises, including support to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations of the international forces in East Timor.

Ground Systems
16 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
8 81mm Mortars
8 Tube-launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-guided missile systems (TOW)
8 Javelin Anti-armor Missile Launchers
15 Assault Amphibian Vehicles (AAV)
6 155mm Howitzers
4 M-1A1 Main Battle Tanks
Aircraft
12 CH-46E Medium Lift Assault Helicopters
4 CH-53E Heavy Lift Assault Transport Helicopters
3 UH-1N Utility Helicopters
4 AH-1W Attack Helicopter
6 AV-8B Harrier Jets
2 KC-130 Refueler/transport Aircraft (On call in CONUS)
Support Equipment
2 Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units
1 LMT 3000 Water Purification Unit
1 Sea Tractor
4 TRAMs (10,000 lb. Capacity Forklifts)
2 Four Thousand lb. Capacity Forklifts
3 D-7 Bulldozers
30 Five-ton Trucks
1 Dump Truck
4 Logistical Vehicle Systems (LVS)
7 Five-hundred gallon Water Containers
63 High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)


So, for 1200 troops you have:
the command element of 200
helicopter support squadron of 350
service support of 300

And those are simply fellow marines and this is an expeditionary unit. They stay on a boat the entire time to be worldwide deployable and so have been streamlined and tailored to give a quick reaction force. note the limited armor and air support capacity. Oh wait... silly me, I forgot to put the ships in there as supporting... I'll do that now:
LHD-6 Amphibious Carrier - 1,108 personnel (104 officer, 1,004 enlisted)
LPD-9 Amphibious assault ship - 420 personnel (24 officer, 396 enlisted)
LSD-52 Landing Ship - 352 personnel (24 officer, 328 enlisted)
Once again, we are up to 1,900 personnel on three ships. add our 850 and you have 2,700 supporting 1,200 actual combattants.

Then you'll have the ammo ships and fleet replenishment vessels that go out to support these ships. Each of those has a complement of 400-1000. As you also saw, the MEU can only support itself for 15 days, MAX. That's not very long. And of course, I never mentioned the Navy personnel in Pacific Headquarters at Pearl Harbor, San Diego and the other bases who get to do all the paperwork, repair and refit of ships, ammunition supply, etc.

So for the eight or so MEUs in the Pacific you have probably about...oh... 90,000 people (and that's a very very very conservative number) to support 9,600 fighting men. That's assuming there are only three bases which we know there are more of and that they are only 30,000 people each. Well Pearl and San Diego are much larger. I'll have those numbers soon :D

So for the eight or so MEUs in the Pacific you have probably about...oh... 90,000 people (and that's a very very very conservative number) to support 9,600 fighting men.

Day-yum! I guess old REH wasn't as far off as I thought.

BTW, my military is huge (nearly 1 Billion population with compulsory military service) but more than 90% are assigned to support or other non-combat operations (like internal security troops- I AM a ruthless, tyrannical dictator, after all). The crews of the Navy ships are NOT included in this support percentage, either- even the transports, oilers, and other support ships.

I also funnel off large numbers of personnel to "special projects" (my compulsory military service is more like compulsory GOVERNMENT service). All of this means that my actual striking forces are comparatively small. But they are mobile and very well supplied.

If you would like to read a good book that deals with logistics, I would recommend Red Storm Rising by Tom Clancy. The entire book is based on the logistics of a modern war between the former Soviet Union and NATO. It incorporates early stealth technology when it was a vision but not yet implemented, so take that into note, but it does a really good job of showing how hard logistics is when tanks are running short of rounds on a battlefield, oil products aren't reaching front lines and supply depots are blown to hell as well as what would happen if the Atlantic got shut down (quite an easy feat actually).

BTW, I apologize if some of my posts are a bit lengthy but I guess it's the only way to really get a point of this magnitude across as there is so much to explain.

Trostia, Vrak, Agnosticium and everyone else who has posted this information, you guys are all on crack. This stuff absolutely rocks. Thanks to everyone who has had input in this thread and Evil Overlord for writing it in the first place.

Trostia, Vrak, Agnosticium and everyone else who has posted this information, you guys are all on crack. This stuff absolutely rocks. Thanks to everyone who has had input in this thread and Evil Overlord for writing it in the first place.

Speaking for all of us, I'm glad you think it's useful.

Agnosticium,


your dead on. I am also glad you took the time that I didn't have to break it down, now the information is out there for them to use. 12 years, logistics man... logistics. I didn't love them for what they did, but I was happy when it worked out. :lol:

ooc: I'm glad i found this thread. someone told me to come look it up via telegram and this information is boss! Thanks guys. Why hasn't anyone stickied this? This is like... must-know information for anyone who wants to realistically RP in NS. Good job guys, I hope you all keep posting.

It is linked in the "New to Nationstates? (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=29774)" Thread.

I read the post and may have missed this, but what is the crew and support needed for ICBMs? I have about 800 (some are used for space missions) - both Proton and Titan IVs.

Thanks.

I read the post and may have missed this, but what is the crew and support needed for ICBMs? I have about 800 (some are used for space missions) - both Proton and Titan IVs.

Thanks.

Each ICBM silo will require a series of full-time crews (3 crews of 4-6 personnel/crew is a good bet) in the control room, plus a full-time crew of technicians (3-5 missile technicians, 7-10 general maintenance technicians), and 10-15 security personnel....BARE MINIMUM, per missile.

You'll also need Command staff for the missile unit (usually grouped into squadrons of 10-15 missile sites), security for the Command unit. Add in a completely separate organization for early-warning and detection.

You can reduce the technical personnel by grouping the missile silos together, but this will add additional security personnel, administrative support personnel, Base support personnel, etc.

The numbers quoted above are what I use for my country. I have few land-based ICBMs, and I chose to split them into a few widely scattered bases with a central Command base (this was easier for my organizational philosophy).

Thanks - here is how I worked it out. I have 400 ICBMs, with 8,000 operators (including command structure). These forces are supported by 20,000 support, security and maintanance personnel. That should allow me the flexibility to spread out the silos.

You should consider a Logistical Seal of Approval for NS forces. I think mine would pass muster.

The real difficulty for me was in my naval forces - say you have a Nimitz - it holds about 3200 sailors (not airwing). But some of those ARE logistical support so how do you figure out the 1/3 active to 2/3 support?

Anyway - great thread. Thanks.

The real difficulty for me was in my naval forces - say you have a Nimitz - it holds about 3200 sailors (not airwing). But some of those ARE logistical support so how do you figure out the 1/3 active to 2/3 support?

I simply consider any personnel assigned to a ship to be IN ADDITION to the regular support personnel. If they're on a ship, then they count as crew- no matter that they are really support troops.

TEO

Crew cannot be considered in the "support" of a ship. The air wing is another matter, but the ship itself is supported by replenishment vessels and shore-based naval personnel. The crew simply runs the ship. The reason you have so many people is because you usually have three watches and people to make up for those that get sick, hurt, attritted, etc. Once that ship makes port and your crew goes on shore leave, the shore crew comes aboard and performs all maintenance tasks.

Also, most vessels have two crews. You have the deployed crew and the home crew. When the vessel makes port after being out at sea for 3-6 months, the crews switch over. Furthermore, your air wing does not simply comprise of the members aboard your ship. On shore, they too have replacements, although not a full crew. The squadron usually leaves about 1/3 of its personnel at whichever airfield it is based out of. No carrier keeps the same aircraft on it all of the time. Squadrons rotate carrier duty with maritime patrol and training duties. It is not unusual for two to three squadrons to share these duties. Thus for each carrier, you have 6 squadrons aboard and 6-12 on terra firma.

Logistics for your navy comes from the supply depots, admin buldings and security personnel. Base cooks, transportation personnel, dock operators, heavy machinery specialists, etc.

Think of it this way. For every person you have at sea, about nine people support them.
Current US Navy numbers are about:
382,000 Active Duty
36,000 of which are deployed
150,000 Ready Reserve
184,000 Civilian Employees

US NAVY Around the World Counter (http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/.www/status.html)

Also, in terms of crew size for aircraft carriers, the Nimitz is a fairly old design (really based heavily on the Enterprise and all) and it's almost used up its "additional weight allowance" just being upgraded.

According to a report or two that I've seen (unclassified, PDF from online), the crew can be streamlined fairly well by using modern or near (within 3-5yrs) technologies and ship architecture to improve the function with fewer crewmembers...as much as half as many as there are now. The same has already been done on several modern ships...an example is Israel's Saar 5 corvette, which has a very small crew for its power and size...thanks to automated systems (the Saar-class (recently, at least) is Israeli-designed but produced by a US-based shipyard...at least one commentator has called for the US navy to adopt the efficient and powerful Saar 5 to fill some roles instead of making new ship designs.

According to a report or two that I've seen (unclassified, PDF from online), the crew can be streamlined fairly well by using modern or near (within 3-5yrs) technologies and ship architecture to improve the function with fewer crewmembers...as much as half as many as there are now. The same has already been done on several modern ships...an example is Israel's Saar 5 corvette, which has a very small crew for its power and size...thanks to automated systems (the Saar-class (recently, at least) is Israeli-designed but produced by a US-based shipyard...at least one commentator has called for the US navy to adopt the efficient and powerful Saar 5 to fill some roles instead of making new ship designs.

The Navy has been playing around with the "Smart Ship" idea for a couple of decades. The newer warships (Arleigh Burke-class DDGs, for example) were supposed to have smaller crews to take advantage of improvements in monitoring and remote operator technologies (the largest departments in a ship's crew are DECK and ENGINEERING, and the number of engineers is supposed to be reduced).

Your average engine room (steam plant) requires 6 people per watch section, plus three or four roving watchstanders. Most ships have at least TWO engine rooms, requiring 16-20 people EVERY WATCH. Gas-turbine ships are supposed to reduce the number of watchstanders, since most of the equipment can be monitored from Central Control Station. You'll need 3 people in CCS, plus two roving watches, for a total of 5 engineering watchstanders.

Sadly, technological improvements once again fell prey to the blind arrogance and stupidity of "old-school" Admirals. These Admirals started out before gas-turbine ships existed, and they don't believe that you can run a ship without 20 people per watch section. So it is that a brand-new Navy warship, designed in the 1980's and built in the 90's to operate with a smaller crew is forced to operate with 3-4 times as many engineers as are needed.

A brand-new DDG SHOULD be ableto operate with only 200-250 crew, instead of the 325+ that currently crew those ships.

How do I know?

I am a Navy Engineer.

Also, in terms of crew size for aircraft carriers, the Nimitz is a fairly old design (really based heavily on the Enterprise and all) and it's almost used up its "additional weight allowance" just being upgraded.

According to a report or two that I've seen (unclassified, PDF from online), the crew can be streamlined fairly well by using modern or near (within 3-5yrs) technologies and ship architecture to improve the function with fewer crewmembers...as much as half as many as there are now. The same has already been done on several modern ships...an example is Israel's Saar 5 corvette, which has a very small crew for its power and size...thanks to automated systems (the Saar-class (recently, at least) is Israeli-designed but produced by a US-based shipyard...at least one commentator has called for the US navy to adopt the efficient and powerful Saar 5 to fill some roles instead of making new ship designs.

Actually as far a I know the Nimitz is based on the Forrestal class carrier, to reach back as far as the family line goes.

The Forrestal was followed by the Advanced Forrestal(Kittyhawk, which were designated as their own class later) then the Nimitz were basically a nuclear Kittyhawk.

THANK YOU EVIL OVERLORD! Sadly, I don't think many nations will follow this :cry:

OK, I'm wondering if we can extend info on this page to include space.

A lot of nations are entering a rather futuristic era and I'm wondering if we can make guesses based loosely on today's stuff. I say loosely because, for example, it costs $5000/kilogram sent into orbit by the Space Shuttle. But most nations in the space age have progressed beyond space shuttle and its huge overhead. Air-breathing space capable engines are already being developed, and would be considerably cheaper.

Neverminding surface-to-orbit costs, however (lets assume space -based manufacturing, which is a big assumption but then again, most people right now have assumptions that spaceships cost about the same per ton as pig iron. Er, nevermind that again. Assuming a spacecraft is constructed in space, how much do you suppose it would cost per ton of mass? On average, of course?

How many pounds of supply do you think a military space craft's crew would require, including oxygen, food, water, etc? How about a cost/man/day in space?

Also, in terms of crew size for aircraft carriers, the Nimitz is a fairly old design (really based heavily on the Enterprise and all) and it's almost used up its "additional weight allowance" just being upgraded.

According to a report or two that I've seen (unclassified, PDF from online), the crew can be streamlined fairly well by using modern or near (within 3-5yrs) technologies and ship architecture to improve the function with fewer crewmembers...as much as half as many as there are now. The same has already been done on several modern ships...an example is Israel's Saar 5 corvette, which has a very small crew for its power and size...thanks to automated systems (the Saar-class (recently, at least) is Israeli-designed but produced by a US-based shipyard...at least one commentator has called for the US navy to adopt the efficient and powerful Saar 5 to fill some roles instead of making new ship designs.

Actually as far a I know the Nimitz is based on the Forrestal class carrier, to reach back as far as the family line goes.

The Forrestal was followed by the Advanced Forrestal(Kittyhawk, which were designated as their own class later) then the Nimitz were basically a nuclear Kittyhawk.

Yea, basically the deal is that the Nimitz is a design half as old as the concept of an AC carrier for the US (time between the first carrier and the Nimitz-ancestor design and between that design and now are the same...). So, surely enough, as much as you try to integrate electrical systems and advanced powerplants, you're limited by the pre-existing design...which is much larger, much less comfortable, a much clearer target, and much less efficient than it could be if built from scrap today (not counting on the Nimitz-building shipyard's (Newport News) lobbyists in the Pentagon, who would strive to make the design as much like a Nimitz as possible so that it takes so many years instead of so many months to build (if using modular sub-units and section-by-section construction based on automated machining...the Vespyr-Thornecroft trimaran demonstrator is based on these principles and the ships can be put out in a much shorter amount of time with a much greater flexability than the older style of things).

Too bad that the Pentagon is as tangled as some of the worst bureacracies in existence and that pet projects to update a 2-year old cannon system for 4 years from now takes precidence over improving a navy that is, for all intensive purposes, based on 30-40 year-old ship designs with new weapons and detectors (but not the newest or best, which don't work well with the older designs)....

OOC: For the sake of easy access, there are some good discussions that should be seen.

"You Can't Launch Missiles From Tank Guns (or can you?)" (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=57553&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=0)

"Why Do People Undersell So Often?" (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=57359&highlight=) (Author and major commentator is Agnosticium)

Some OK discussions of note:
"How Does Acceleration Work in Space?" (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?p=1078328&highlight=#1078328)

"FYI: Everything About War" (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?p=1063267&highlight=#1063267) (or, as I like to call it, "Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About War (But Were Too Afraid to Ask)")


EDIT: Glad to see this alive again, I've got some more links:

"Some Thoughts on NS Military Doctrine" (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=60145&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=0) (About troop numbers and support)

"OOC: More About Space Nations" (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=59839&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=0) (Title says most of it. Addresses facts and myths about space tech)

EDIT2:
"Some Thoughts on Space Warfare" (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=60450) (by Dyelli Beybi)

You know a lareg portion of the crews for the Navys resupply ships are Merchant marines not naval personel the container ships that carry the supplys to the Combat vessels normaly have about 25-30 military personel aboard the rest are merchant marines basicly civilians.

what a wonderful thread. I salute you!
You'll need less logistical train if you've got more infantry in your army though as a single truck can carry a lot of food and ammunition.

what a wonderful thread. I salute you!
You'll need less logistical train if you've got more infantry in your army though as a single truck can carry a lot of food and ammunition.


That's the common misconception, however. You're still going to need to provide gas, repair facilities for that truck, personnel who know how to operate and repair to go with it in case it breaks down. Let's call this an 18-wheeler (which it will never be in a battlefield environment simply due to accessibility). That 18-wheeler is still only going to provide enough ammo, food, water and medical supplies for about a week of actual combat for a company-sized element. Your average company is composed of 3-6 platoons of 20-40 each so you are looking at no less than 60, but closer to 200 people.

In fact, because of the fluidity of the battlelines, it can actually be harder to support infantry than armor or mechanized infantry. You can't always get a truck where you have to get supplies and then you run the costs of the helicopter or airlift squadron who is going to deliver the goods and we've already talked about how many it takes to support your aerial forces.

Having been attatched to ground-pounders before as an ETAC, I can assure you that our logistical train was no less. In fact, it was probably longer. Sanitation and so many other factors come into play with infantry that you really do not benefit from the lack of vehicles to support. By nature, you are going to be more sanitary with vehicles to move around in and have less possibility to injure yourself versus walking/hiking.

The two even out and you still end up with a substantial supply chain.

You know a lareg portion of the crews for the Navys resupply ships are Merchant marines not naval personel the container ships that carry the supplys to the Combat vessels normaly have about 25-30 military personel aboard the rest are merchant marines basicly civilians.

Yes, the merchant marine provides most of the support for the Navy, but submarine tenders, ammunition ships, refuelers and recovery ships are all Navy-manned. Merchant Marine supplies the majority of the sealift component, not the supply component. While it may only take 25-50 people to run a Sealift vessel, the actual naval vessels require 200 plus fo the various tasks and workshops aboard. And even if a vessel only has a crew of 25 people, the shore people supporting that vessel are numerous.

All of these multiple-hundred foot long ships require dozens of maintenance techs, refuelers themselves, people to operate the docks where they berth, tugboat crews who have support crews. It's a never-ending cycle and all of that was figured into our earlier numbers for the Navy. if you look at one of my earlier posts, I have included a site that has the current Navy numbers and that doesn't include Merchant Marine (best friend went to the academy). That alone shows the amount of support for just the US Navy ships, not the Merchant Marine fleet.

More costs. It costs about 4.5 billion dollars to raise a US division, that is munitions and fuel and supplies and equipment and everything else. But, it costs anywhere from 40 million (normal) and 250 million (combat) dollars per division PER DAY. Thats for munitions. This places a SEVERE limit on how many divisions a player can field!

And remember, a US division will have about a couple hundred APCs, a couple hundred tanks, and thousands of vehicles such as trucks and jeeps and loaders and stuff. And up to 18000 personnel total, which are obviously not all combatants.

Manpower wise, I think I can raise something like 500 divisions normally. But money wise, I could only support 400 or so. Both cases are if I were buying NOTHING but ground divisions (mechanized infantry and armored divisions). I've also decided that my divisions cost between 50 and 280 million per day, and 5 billion to raise.

Which means I'm not going to have millions of tanks out there. Etc. Logistics, in summary, is a very real economic limit on how big armies can be. Almost everyone tends to overestimate how much they can get, and underestimate costs for everything, assuming that technology and time or whatever will decrease costs. They won't. Unrealistic giant armies get ignored by me, especially if they are transported unrealistically at FTL speeds with unrealistic space ships in unrealistic numbers at unrealistic costs!

what a wonderful thread. I salute you!
You'll need less logistical train if you've got more infantry in your army though as a single truck can carry a lot of food and ammunition.


That's the common misconception, however. You're still going to need to provide gas, repair facilities for that truck, personnel who know how to operate and repair to go with it in case it breaks down. Let's call this an 18-wheeler (which it will never be in a battlefield environment simply due to accessibility). That 18-wheeler is still only going to provide enough ammo, food, water and medical supplies for about a week of actual combat for a company-sized element. Your average company is composed of 3-6 platoons of 20-40 each so you are looking at no less than 60, but closer to 200 people.

In fact, because of the fluidity of the battlelines, it can actually be harder to support infantry than armor or mechanized infantry. You can't always get a truck where you have to get supplies and then you run the costs of the helicopter or airlift squadron who is going to deliver the goods and we've already talked about how many it takes to support your aerial forces.

Having been attatched to ground-pounders before as an ETAC, I can assure you that our logistical train was no less. In fact, it was probably longer. Sanitation and so many other factors come into play with infantry that you really do not benefit from the lack of vehicles to support. By nature, you are going to be more sanitary with vehicles to move around in and have less possibility to injure yourself versus walking/hiking.

The two even out and you still end up with a substantial supply chain.

Yes I know. I'm saying you won't need one as long for a company of foot sloggers as for an armoured company.

POWER PROJECTION
A Logistical Analysis

Okay, you’ve taken the time to build up a military force that is easily capable of defending you against all likely enemies. Now, you have set your eyes on your neighbors’ lands. Maybe they have some strategic assets that you need/want. Maybe they’ve been smuggling drugs into your country and they won’t stop. Maybe you’re just tired of justifying your massive military to the voters. In any event, you have decided to go to war.

This brings us to Power Projection. You have to have the means of delivering your military power to your enemy. If your enemy shares a land border with you, this job is much easier- just line all of your troops up on the border and swarm across at H-Hour.

But wait! Why would ANY country blithely let you build up on their border without making energetic preparations? What are the enemy’s troops going to do while you are storming across the border?

It is entirely likely that the enemy will be pouring troops into YOUR country while you’re doing the same thing to him. Perhaps we should re-think this idea.

Okay, let's create an example: You have a 1 million-man military. Only 100,000 of those troops are “combat effectives”- that is, the guys what does the shootin’ and the dyin’. The rest of the troops are admin/supply/rear-echelon types that make it possible for the combat troops to do their jobs. If you send ALL of your combat forces into the enemy’s country, there will be roughly … NOTHING keeping the enemy from devastating your country and disrupting the work of all those non-combatant military guys that make it possible for your war to go on.

So the answer is to leave most of your troops behind- to protect your country from the inevitable reprisals from your enemy, and to make sure that no one ELSE gets the bright idea of taking YOU over while you’re distracted elsewhere. This is gonna require a lot of thought. You only have 100,000 combat effectives to begin with, and now you’re going to be forced to attack with less than that.

Relax. The situation isn’t hopeless. A lot of the Home Defense duties can be taken over by mobilized Reservists. But here is where Logistics plays a role:

What are the Reservists going to fight with? Mobilize a million Reservists to get another 100,000 combat troops and support for them, and there had better be equipment for these Reservists to fight with- Tanks, planes, ships, guns, ammo, uniforms, EVERYTHING. You have just tripled your military budget, and you haven’t even gone to war, yet.

Now you have to project your power (the previously-discussed 100,000 man military force) into the neighboring country. Tanks can travel at around 75 KPH on good roads. Trucks can travel even faster. Aircraft are faster still. Going strictly by the slowest vehicles, you figure that your tank units ought to be arriving at the enemy capital (300 kilometers away) in about 4 hours. We’ll assume that you anticipate some moderate resistance and double the time needed. Your timetable calls for “liberating” the enemy capital in 8 hours.

This is where the fecal matter encounters the oscillating air-recirculation device. Tanks can drive on roads. Tanks can even go off-road. But they have a hard time crossing rivers- especially rivers with steep banks that are also lined with large trees. Bridges are a pretty necessary item for these behemoths. Bridges are even more important for trucks. Your enemy ought to be aware of this, so they’ll do the logical thing: They’ll blow up all the bridges (We’re assuming at this point that the enemy has been surprised by the invasion and does little to nothing to slow down your advance until you hit the bridges).

Now you have to find another way across. Either go around (we’re talking about days- not hours- of driving through hostile territory), or build a new bridge (at least one day, probably several) while the enemy is making energetic efforts to disrupt the work. At this point, the enemy has lost a little territory and not much else, but YOU have most of your striking forces bottled up behind some rivers while the enemy is only now bring his forces to bear on yours. A tank’s mobility is one of the keys to its survival. The enemy can launch surface-to-surface missiles, artillery barrages, and air attacks against your troops while they can’t maneuver effectively.

So now, you have to have dedicated Air-superiority aircraft and SAMs to protect your units while the bridges are being built. Counter-battery artillery to duel with the enemy guns, helicopters and trucks to evacuate the dead and wounded, and tactical air strikes against the enemy air and artillery positions across the rivers. Far from a lightning strike to capture the enemy’s capital, you’ve now become embroiled in an old-fashioned ground campaign. Military officers are always dreaming about the lightning battle. A daring thrust, a dashing charge, the enemy’s troops crack, and a final push blazes the way to victory.

That sort of battle DOES happen … about as often as three-headed goats are born. You can’t count on your enemy being a stupid as Saddam Hussein. Most military engagements have a certain brutal simplicity about them. Fix the enemy in one position with part of your forces, while you hit him where he isn’t expecting it with the rest. This takes a while to set up- and more time to execute- and time is always against you. Every day means more dead and wounded, more ammunition expended, more fuel burned.

So now you have to produce food, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies for the troops at the front. Your economy is quickly falling behind the demand because you’ve mobilized a million people who would otherwise be working. You need to transport these items to the folks at the front, and protect the supply convoys from the enemy’s inevitable counterstrikes. You have those additional 100,000 combat effectives, so it is possible- but it will never be easy.

So, you think you’ve got it all handled, eh? Bridges are being built, units are sweeping into the enemy’s territory by going around the rivers, your air forces are doing a pretty good job of keeping the enemy’s air forces away from your troops and supply lines. Life is good. The timeline is shot to hell, but you’re still on top of things.

Two terms: “Supply lines” and “Timelines”.

Every time a tank needs to refuel and re-arm, it must turn away from the battle and drive back to the nearest Forward Supply Depot. This will likely take a great deal of time. It will take more time to get the fuel and ammo loaded. Then the vehicle has to drive back into combat. It’s safe (by combat standards) but slow (you will find this “Speed vs Safety” issue throughout military life. In combat, speed usually wins). A better way would be to have trucks going toward the front lines CONSTANTLY, each vehicle carrying fuel, ammo, and other supplies. This cuts the “down time” of the process considerably, but increases the risk of losing the fuel and ammo to enemy attacks.

To make things even worse, you also have to contend with the fact that is will take longer and longer to get supplies to the guys at the sharp end the farther they travel into enemy territory. Every kilometer deeper into enemy territory means more time required for refueling and rearming, and even greater risk of losing the fuel and supplies to enemy attack.

These are not insurmountable problems. NATO’s plan for defending Europe from the USSR was essentially the same as what your enemy is using in this long-winded message: Blunt the enemy’s attack. Slow him down. Destroy his supplies (which are usually in unarmored trucks and are therefore easier to destroy) to further slow the attack. In the meantime, NATO troops would be retreating through their supply lines (which would get shorter and faster). I’m sure that the Red Army commanders who faced NATO across the Fulda Gap were aware of the NATO strategy and had made plans to deal with the issue- most likely by simply doubling and re-doubling the supplies and trucks to carry them.

All of the above assumes a basic NATO/Warsaw Pact-style battle with a shared border. It gets even more complicated when you add in the troubles associated with projecting power across an ocean. Re-supply and rearming is even slower, each successful counterstrike at the supply lines is far more effective, and the entire issue is far more in doubt. But it CAN still be done.

The purpose of this message is to remind people that killing the enemy’s troops may not be the best solution. Destroy his supplies, and the troops are ineffective. Napoloen said that an army marches on its stomach. This is even more true now than then. Secure your supply lines. Projecting your power against any enemy will be useless if the troops don’t have ammo.

And this is also something to look at if you AREN’T planning to invade. Thinking about logistics and power projection will help you defend yourself against an invader.

Thank GOD! Someone else that stresses the use of logistics!

A good day indeed.

Once I have a little more time on my hands, I have a few tidbits to add to Overlord's last post as well that fully supports that argment. Suffice it to say that waging a war is ridiculously expensive and always has been. It's really only been a matter of upon who the burden falls.

It has been forever since I last posted here, and for that I'm sorry. This is a thread that people need to look at and the only way we're really doing that is by continually posting. My last post said that I would get the costs for financing a war and so I've done some research and this is what I gathered about the Gulf War.

Total costs of the Gulf War for the US were about $61 billion. That is in 1990 dollars, so we're talking about $85.69 billion. That was spread over 43 days. It includes deployment, build-up and operations. That's 500,000 troops and thousands of vehicles and hundreds of aircraft. now think about stretching that over months... even years. Today's wars may last for a few months, but with denial of airspace over freindly forces, the ground war is going to be long and ugly.

There aren't many numbers saying how much deployment cost, so I'll figure in about 10 billion for that, leaving 75.69 billion for build-up and operations. Probably another 10 went to build-up and construction, leaving us with 65.69 billion. That's 1.5 billion dollars a day to maintain operations. Forty-five billion for a month... ninety for two... that's 540 billion dollars for a year of war. and that means no reinforcements. If you include reinforcements, drafting or training of new recruits, their deployment costs the food they will also consume, water, fuel, rising prices on stuff, you're talking easily into the 1 trillion dollar range to wage a war for a year. Some people can afford that in NS, many cannot.

[tag] good stuff evil :wink:

TEO, just re-read the Power Projection bit up there. Great work I must say, and a must-read as it explains things on the tactical level, useful for RPing. (By the way, my supply trucks are armed and armored. :D )

Ag, as always, wonderful work.

Some info I recently found: How does the Department of Defense split up its funding?

FIGURE 1.
MAKEUP OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2000
Like this (http://www.cbo.gov/docimages/298201.gif)

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.
a. "Military Personnel" includes spending on salaries and benefits.
b. "Procurement" includes purchases of new equipment and paying for major modifications of existing systems.
c. "Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation" covers the costs of developing and testing new systems and subsystems.
d. "Operation and Maintenance" (O&M) includes spending on fuel, spare parts, and overhauls of military equipment. O&M also includes spending on such items as health care, management (by, for example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and service staffs at headquarters), environmental programs (for example, pollution prevention and environmental restoration), real property maintenance (for example, the maintenance and repair of buildings, roadways, and runways), base operating support (for example, child care and family support), and communications (for example, telephone systems and computer infrastructure).
e. "Military Construction" pays for building new facilities and support structures for military installations.
f. "Other" includes spending on family housing and management of working capital revolving funds.

Source Page: http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2982&sequence=0



As part of my research into Logistics: Force Transport, I recently found a report (http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=2982&sequence=0) on the effect of aging on equipment maintenance and operations costs. The report is certainly a bit long, but worth the read for those who care.


Other info from the report:

Just how much does it take to operate that force of 8,000 uber-tanks you recently deployed?
CBO's review of the Army's O&M data from 1993 to 1999 shows that the costs of consumables and repair parts per mile for the two most expensive ground systems to operate--the Abrams Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle--declined by 7 percent over that period, going from an average of $102 per mile to $95 per mile (see Figure 12).(15)

------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIGURE 12.
SPENDING ON CONSUMABLES AND REPARABLES PER MILE FOR THE ARMY'S ABRAMS TANK AND THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE, 1993-1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Graph (http://www.cbo.gov/docimages/298212.gif)

------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Army's Operating and Support Management Information System database.
NOTE: Spending includes expenses for consumables (for example, items such as washers, filters, and gaskets) and depot-level reparables (for example, spare parts and engine components).

Well, assuming that your massive tank only costs as much as an Abrams to operate (actual costs are likely to be more than twice that of the abrams per mile for many of the super-large tanks), then you're spending almost $150/mile/tank...or $1.2 million per mile travelled for a force of 8,000.

If your force is travelling at 30mph then you're burning through $36million/hour of movement for that massive tank force. And none of these costs include major repair issues, ammunition, or unit loss/replacement costs.


Now, for those helicopters:

CBO's review of the Army's O&M data from 1993 to 1999 shows that the costs of consumables and repair parts per flying hour for the three most expensive helicopter systems to operate--the Black Hawk, Chinook, and Apache helicopters--increased by 13 percent over that period.(16) However, closer examination reveals that the costs per flying hour for the Chinook helicopters, which increased by more than 40 percent between 1993 and 1999, accounted for most of that growth (see Figure 13). The Black Hawk's and Apache's costs per flying hour remained relatively steady, with the former decreasing by 4 percent and the latter increasing by 3 percent.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIGURE 13.
SPENDING ON CONSUMABLES AND REPARABLES PER HOUR FOR THE ARMY'S APACHE, CHINOOK, AND BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS, 1993-1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Graph (http://www.cbo.gov/docimages/298213.gif)

------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Army's Operating and Support Management Information System database.
NOTE: Spending includes expenses for consumables (for example, items such as washers, filters, and gaskets) and depot-level reparables (for example, spare parts, avionics, and engine components).
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Just some FYIs.

bumpfrizzle

[great thread, btw]

Much as I hate to admit it, this thread seems to have failed in its original purpose.

Those of you who have posted the most here (and incidentally contributed better information than I had available- thanks to you all) are the folks who least needed to read it. So much for good intentions.

However, thanks mostly to the spirited debate and research submitted by the usual suspects (you know who you are), this thread has become something more than the original primal scream against n00bity.

Understanding the costs- economic, political, and human- of military operations is essential for making informed decisions about whether or not to go to war. Wars are expensive. War is probably the most expensive activity humans get involved with on a regular basis. War is ugly, brutal, totally devoid of glamour and glory, and the most unpleasant thing about the human exeprience. "It is well that war is so terrible, lest we grow too fond of it."

But sometimes it is cheaper than the alternative. This is a value judgement that the individual citizen of each nation must make. The cold, hard equations of life and liberty. All too often, the population as a whole abdicates this responsibility to others- who may or may not have an agenda of their own. The political, economic, or human cost of reaching that decision has to be objectively weighed against the cost of not taking action.

Thus endeth the sermon.

Thanks for all the help, and please keep posting.

Amen.

Although I'm not sure about failing the original purpose. A lot of people have found this thread very helpful, not just compulsively obsessive fictional military designers like me.

A lot of people have found this thread very helpful, not just compulsively obsessive fictional military designers like me.

Glad to hear it.

Thanks for all your input, BTW.

Logistics Made Simple(r...for MEU/MEF landing forces and amphibious assault planning):
The MEF Planner's Reference Manual (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/usmc/docs/mef99/mef_planner.htm)

A guide that lays out (in fair depth) the basics and specifics of deploying Marine Expeditionary (read: amphibious landing and assault) forces based on modern technology. I've found sections 1 and 2 to be very heavily packed with useful information about troop and equipment numbers as well as organization. Included are logistical support information resources (how much fuel can be carried by a 5-ton truck, the ranges and demands of most Marine Corps vehicles, and much more.


Sample MEU (The 13th (SOC)) layout: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/13meuguide.pdf


Urban Combat Guides (small-unit and coordinated arms basics, from the US Army Rangers):
Ranger Urban Operations (http://www.benning.army.mil/rtb/RANGER/hdbook/Chapter14.htm)

More from the Ranger manual: http://www.benning.army.mil/rtb/ranger/HDBOOK/TABLEOFCONTENTS.htm

(Note: Chapter 5 has a guide to launching ambushes of convoys)

0000000000000000000000000000000

TEO, I've learned so much from this. Thanks to you and to everyone else who has written so much for all of the info.

Damn!

That's good stuff. Thanks.

TAG so I can find this in the future...

Great thread!

A great thread!

Clears out the use of airforce to un-blalance a whole war by attacking important targets (June 5th, 1967).
Also I actually went to my military-stats page and changed it.

Hope for more like this one. 8) :wink:

It's been a while, so I'll

BUMP

for the hell of it

Okay. What about.... Logistics In Space!?

:D

As with all other future tech scenarios, it seems everything gets thrown out the window regarding space and logistics. No ships need fuel, nothing has mass or volume (just length), and the concept of a non-warship in a future tech war is seemingly so rare it's laughable.

I'm starting to think the whole future thing is just completely unworkable, and that in order to effectively do space RP you have to beat yourself in the head eighteen times with a brick in order for it to make sense. I'm hoping I'm wrong though. Any thoughts?

[This sounds like a Dear Abby letter. My apologies in advance.]

Only 18 times Santa? I think you should go back and do it a few more times, it obviously hasn't worked yet :wink:

The Evil Overlord,

I don't think this thread has necessarily failed but perhaps just not as noticed. I believe it comes down to how much effort coupled with how much time a person has available to devout themselves to their military. Also, a certain level of enthusiasm plays a role here.

Finally, for dudes like me who have a tough time adding, well, that also compounds the problem. :P

Okay. What about.... Logistics In Space!?

:D

As with all other future tech scenarios, it seems everything gets thrown out the window regarding space and logistics. No ships need fuel, nothing has mass or volume (just length), and the concept of a non-warship in a future tech war is seemingly so rare it's laughable.

I'm starting to think the whole future thing is just completely unworkable, and that in order to effectively do space RP you have to beat yourself in the head eighteen times with a brick in order for it to make sense. I'm hoping I'm wrong though. Any thoughts?

[This sounds like a Dear Abby letter. My apologies in advance.]

Hmmmm ...

Damned good idea.

Back in the depths of time, I posted a long rant called "Orbital Mechanics". Somewhere in that thread is a comment from me about just such a topic.

I obviously never got around to it. I will work on the post tomorrow and get it on the forum ASAP.

Thanks for the reminder.

TEO

Hey, I do my best, and my previous puppets did too.

Hmm... here's a hint:
Free-form RP is not to make the history of a fictitious war. It is not to make a totally realistic alternate universe. Rather, it's used to have fun. That's right. To have fun. So if people want to be like Star Wars instead of like something by Baxter or Bear, so be it.

Hey, I do my best, and my previous puppets did too.

Hmm... here's a hint:
Free-form RP is not to make the history of a fictitious war. It is not to make a totally realistic alternate universe. Rather, it's used to have fun. That's right. To have fun. So if people want to be like Star Wars instead of like something by Baxter or Bear, so be it.


OOC:

Roseway, I think I see what you're drving at, but some folks think it's no fun when the number of troops they are fighting against replendish themselves overnight and 12345678909 aircraft carriers suddenly appear in their harbour. In other words, the rules keep changing which results in frustration. After all, how can anyone really win a "godmode" war? Quite simply, you can't.

Let me put it another way. Everyone knows that this is the NS universe, but there are still certain "laws" that apply. Soldiers still need to eat, sleep, and use ammunition. Things break down and need to be serviced - even future tech robots and gravships.

Yes, free form RP gives you the priviledge of interacting those you feel comfortable with, and no one is forcing you to adopt these guidelines provided by TEO and others. I like to view it as "food for thought".

Hey, I do my best, and my previous puppets did too.

Hmm... here's a hint:
Free-form RP is not to make the history of a fictitious war. It is not to make a totally realistic alternate universe. Rather, it's used to have fun. That's right. To have fun. So if people want to be like Star Wars instead of like something by Baxter or Bear, so be it.
Yes, this is freeform RP. Aside from what Vrak side, if you go into teh strictly modern-tech or the general war arena, it is the rule for many to RP logisitics. If you don't follow the guidelines -- in which you could reject it -- many people are going to avoid RPing (that is most times, ignore) you in wars.

Yes, even "I fire 100,000,000 nuclear missiles at [country]" can be considered as free-form RP (although IMO, poor taste/unacceptable, plus very "rough"), but not only that's simply going to stupid, most people will not agree with you. Surely, you could just by yourself and spawn 100 aircraft carrier, but as said before, it is simply rejected by many people's roleplay "policies" or customs.

In a strictly modern-tech RP (or to the extent of land battles) however, in most cases, it will be enforced.

In a strictly modern-tech RP (or to the extent of land battles) however, in most cases, it will be enforced.

OOC: Well, it should be enforced in any time period actually. But then again, many view "nanotech" as the future tech version of the philosopher's stone.

It is believed that the concept of the philosopher's stone (called also by many other names, including the elixir and the grand magistery) may have originated in Alexandria; this was an imaginary substance thought to be capable of transmuting the less noble metals into gold and also of restoring youth to the aged.

http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/a1/alchemy.asp

Hey, I do my best, and my previous puppets did too.

Hmm... here's a hint:
Free-form RP is not to make the history of a fictitious war. It is not to make a totally realistic alternate universe. Rather, it's used to have fun. That's right. To have fun. So if people want to be like Star Wars instead of like something by Baxter or Bear, so be it.

Not the point of the thread at all. The purpose here (beyond the therapeutic effects of essentially screaming in rage via the medium of the keyboard) is to enhance the roleplaying by giving people more than this sort of RP:

N1- I'm invading you. 20,000 troops land on your western beaches.

N2- OK. My tank divisions roll up to the coast and start shootig your soldiers.

N1- I shoot at your tanks.

N2- The tanks shoot back.

... and so on.

If there were no logistical concerns, then there would be no effective defense against an invader. Why did it take the US and UK nearly 4 years to open the European front against Hitler? Because the Germans were creating 86 different types of Hell in the Allied supply lines in the North Atlantic.

Therein lies the underlying theme of this thread. Using consistent, realistic logistics can make your war roleplaying far more intense and complicated than the basic (but all too common) example I listed above. Including logistics into the equation transforms war in the game from a tedious exchange of units and casualty lists to an intricate, multilayered battle of move and countermove. You know .... like the real thing.

Including logistics also rewards the player with a better grasp of the potentials. Take our example: Note that the invading troops magically appeared on the shoreline. In most NS war scenarios, the troops never run out of ammo- even when they're 10,000 kilometers from home. Tanks and airplanes never run out of fuel. Airbases never get attacked whether or not there are aircraft in them. Doing it this way is missing most of the realistic thrust-parry-riposte duelling that takes place in war.

Why do players roleplay so many wars? Because war in real life is exciting and glamorous (when you're not part of it. If you're in a war, it varies constantly between deadly and dull- with a 100% chance of constant discomfort). In real life, logistical concerns dominate miltary thinking.

As I've said many times in this thread, the purpose here is to bring a new area of roleplaying into the war scenario- not to get involved in non-stop numberwanking. Logistics should be a major factor in NS warfare- because it benefits the knowledgeable player at the expense of the dilletante.

TEO

In a strictly modern-tech RP (or to the extent of land battles) however, in most cases, it will be enforced.

OOC: Well, it should be enforced in any time period actually. But then again, many view "nanotech" as the future tech version of the philosopher's stone.

Well, I have thought about that. But I know next to nothing about "Far-future" tech (i.e. plasma cannons, ion cannons, etc. etc.) :P

In a strictly modern-tech RP (or to the extent of land battles) however, in most cases, it will be enforced.

OOC: Well, it should be enforced in any time period actually. But then again, many view "nanotech" as the future tech version of the philosopher's stone.

Well, I have thought about that. But I know next to nothing about "Far-future" tech (i.e. plasma cannons, ion cannons, etc. etc.) :P

OOC: Well, still. It doesn't erase the fact that plasma cannons, etc... require some kind of logistical train to keep them running.

Logistics is also nice to know because it can save your country. If you have warships protecting your coast that have a 1000mi attack range (with cruise missiles) or long-range attack aircraft, then why wait for the enemy fleet of 200 vessels to arrive on your shores?

The safety of Ell in the Arda-aligned responses to the UTP/Arda war was that the defenders of Ell knew the enemy fleet was coming so we didn't wait for it...and most of it was sunk or disabled several hundred miles from Ell. Logistics is in part support, but it is also very much a part of the strategy of assault. This is why you attack airfields, rail lines, and supply depots; this is why strategic bombing even exists. Respect that, at least.

Part of wars is not only fighting when your enemy is ready, but being willing and able to strike when (and where, and how) they are not ready. Learn your Sun Tzu.

--------

EDIT:
New References! SOCOM budgetary issues, equipment, and organization:
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/sof/sof1998/

(Several PDFs, hunt-and-pick stuff...but a lot of great information (especially in the appendicies). I've tried to find more recent versions, but I have been unable to do so and they have a closed index so chopping off sof1998/ doesn't work).

I was sort of thinking about having that, but not telling people... like, in Star Wars. I didn't see any support vessels (except the Medical Frigate I heard mentioned once) but it was still a great movie. Have logistics, I wasn't dissing this thread or anything, but have it as a given.

Another month, another wonderful g2mil issue.

Army Logistics Lessons Learned in Vietnam:
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/logistic/chapter11.htm

Operation: Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oif-lessons-learned.htm

Also suggested: this month's main article, available at:
http://www.g2mil.com/Jan2004.htm

...for consideration in operating a modern military force.


LOGISTICAL EFFORTS, PROBLEMS, and SOLUTIONS

January 23, 2004: Over the last half century, air forces have proved to be the model for what the armies and navies will eventually look like in terms of personnel and education. The U.S. Air Force is the smallest of the three services (the Marine Corps is smaller, but is actually part of the navy), with 372,000 personnel. Yet the air force also gets the most defense money, per capita and (in most years) absolute terms. Some 20 percent of all air force personnel are officers, and 25 percent of the officers are pilots or navigators. Pilots alone comprise four percent of all air force manpower (although about 500 air force pilots are women). All officers are college grads, and half of them have advanced degrees (most of these are masters degrees, but there are a lot of professional degrees and PhDs). Five percent of the enlisted force have a college degree, and another 13 percent have a two year degree. Some 73 percent of all enlisted personnel have some college credits. The air force has always been unique in that a small number of personnel (the crews of warplanes) do most of the fighting. In reality, a larger number of air force people are exposed to danger. There are commandoes and security personnel armed and ready to go into harms way. They have been doing just that in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus about ten percent of air force personnel can be classified as "warriors." The percentage of warriors has been shrinking in the army for a century (it's down to about 15 percent), and the navy is starting to shrink the crew size of it's combat ships. But the future is pretty clear; fewer fighters, fewer people overall and the ones that are in uniform will be much better educated and lavishly equipped with high tech weapons and equipment.
Source: StrategyPage (http://www.strategypage.com//fyeo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target=HTMURPH.HTM).
My emphasis has been added in bolded letters.

I can't emphasize enough the note about the ratio of frontline (combat) to support and C&C personnel. For those with 50 million man armies, you might now realize that only a small portion of your total number can be fielded to any conflict zone.



LOGISTICS: Dealing With a Surplus of Speed

January 16, 2004: The U.S. Army is taking a hard look at how it supplies troops going to war. There were unexpected problems in the Iraq war, and the army thinks it knows the reason. The 1991 Gulf War logistical effort, while it had some problems, was run according to the script developed during decades of Cold War planning. The masses of equipment, munitions, fuel and other equipment were available, and were transported to ports and loaded on ships pretty much according to plan. There were glitches, and these were noted and, to a large extent, fixed by 2003. In addition, the army supply people were transforming their logistical operations to take advantage of the Internet and "just in time" delivery of parts and lean (small stocks of spares and other stuff) inventory techniques that had been well established in the civilian sector by the 1990s. Huge Cold War era stocks of supplies were sold off or used up and, because of the faster re-ordering and transportation systems, much smaller (and much cheaper) stocks resulted.*

There was one problem, however, no one in the logistics business had run accurate simulations of future types of wars. It was expected that, if there were another war, it would either be like the 1991 Gulf War (except, perhaps, that it would occur in Korea), or more peacekeeping operations. The 2003 Iraq war, as it turned out,* was very different, especially for the logistics people. First, the Iraq operation proceeded at higher speed. Units where shipped over to Kuwait more rapidly than the logistics people expected. When asked if they could keep up, the supply folks said they could. But they knew it would be a scramble, and it might get ugly. It did.

Another complicating factor was how units different units were organized into temporary outfits, and moved quickly from one part of the battlefield to another. That old Cold War mentality thought of divisions and corps rearranging themselves much less frequently. The rapid reorganizations drove the supply people nuts as they were not equipped to redirect needed supplies to new locations. The supply system was getting bent out of shape with all this high speed warfare. What went down in Iraq was blitzkrieg on methamphetamines. The combat commanders were ready for it, but somehow the warriors and logisticians had never sat down and sorted out what all this high speed combat would do to the supply system. While the supplies did get through, there were local shortages, things got lose and, when it was all over, more than a billion dollars worth of stuff was missing.*

The army supply experts are now revising their systems to deal with what happened in Iraq. Some of the logistical experts are also paying closer attention to what new tactics the combat generals are cooking up. Just in case.

December 29, 2003: An examination of the American logistical effort in Iraq revealed some embarrassing shortcomings. There were a lot of shortages and confusion in keeping track of supplies. It was expected that lessons learned from the 1990-91 Desert Storm operation, and new technology, would have eliminated most of these problems. But because the 2003 campaign was a lot different than the earlier one, such was not the case. In 1991, the United States had use of larger port and base facilities in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had invested billions of dollars in these facilities, in case it might have to call on American military assistance when threatened by a stronger neighbor (Iraq and Iran being the most feared.) Kuwait had nothing like the Saudi facilities, and this made the American logistical effort much more difficult. But the biggest problem was that the fighting in 2003 was much more intense and fast moving than what took place in 1991. In 2003, most divisions marched, and often fought, nearly over 600 kilometers in 23 days. That's a remarkable campaign by any standard compared to other operations in the past century. In 1941, some German divisions advanced 700 kilometers into Russia in 29 days, and in 1944, some Allied divisions largely pursued retreating Germans 880 kilometers across France in 32 days, but both of these were seen as very exceptional cases. While the divisions in 1991 had about 30 days worth of supplies available to them in Saudi bases, the 2003 units only had 5-6 days worth. Worse, the 2003 Iraq advance was led by hundreds of M-1 tanks, that require about three gallons of fuel for each kilometer they move. But the biggest problem was the unexpected speed of the advance. The original plan called for it taking about 125 days to advance on Baghdad and take it. Good military planning always starts with the worst case, and 125 days of fighting was as bad as anyone thought it could get. The coalition force was well trained, professional and well led, and prepared to take advantage of enemy mistakes and weaknesses. Thus the ability to quickly turn the 125 day plan into a 23 day one. But this caused most of the logistical problems encountered. There simply were not enough trucks, supply dumps and support troops to support the 23 day campaign in as timely and sufficient manner as the original 125 day plan.*

None of the shortages and delayed resupply efforts got any American troops killed. Anything like that would have been picked up by one of the 700 embedded journalists and turned into screaming headlines. But the troops were not happy with the shortages of fuel, food, spare parts and even ammunition. These problems slowed some units down and caused discomfort among the troops and lots of headaches for their officers. Congress and the media will make much about the problems encountered.

Fixing the problems is another matter. Logistics is a business of large numbers. For each soldier sent to a combat zone, you have to send at least a few tons of stuff along with him just to get him started. It's a lot more stuff it a heavy force (armored vehicles) in involved. Here we're talking over a hundred tons per trooper. And to keep each soldier fighting, it's going to take up to half a ton of newly delivered stuff per day. The air force does not have the transports to do it by air, unless you are fighting an Afghanistan style battle where your total ground force is less than 300 guys (the number of Special Forces and CIA paramilitaries in Afghanistan during the time it took to overthrow the Taliban.) So you have to move material by ship. That takes time, and you need ports to unload it quickly, places to park it, trucks to carry it to the troops and roads to move over. This is where the old military saying, "amateurs talk about tactics, professionals talk about logistics," comes from. There are no easy solutions.


December 22, 2003: The U.S. Army's M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle has proved to be the workhorse of the Iraq campaign. But that came at a cost that was not anticipated. Like most armored vehicles, the Bradley runs on metal tracks that have rubber pads attached to save wear and tear on roads and give better traction. Naturally, the rubber pads, as well as the entire track, wears out. Normally, a heavily used Bradley might need a new set of tracks once a year. There are nearly 700 Bradley's in Iraq, and many are in need of new tracks every few months. A set of tracks is normally good for 1,300-1,600 kilometers of travel. To keep the Bradley's in Iraq supplied with replacement tracks, the army's only depot that refurbishes worn tracks (about 80 percent of the track is reused) has had to go from one shift a day, five days a week, to 24/7 production. Even at that, stocks world wide are being depleted. That's one reason for the rush to get more armored Humvees over to Iraq. These don't have tracks, and are nearly as resistant to Iraqi attacks as the Bradley's are. Actually, in many cases, the Bradley's are used in low risk situations because they are the only combat vehicle available. But unless Bradley use in Iraq can be reduced, the availability of the other 5,500 Bradleys in US service will be severely affected. With all of the replacement tracks going to Iraq, there will be none for Bradley's anywhere else.



November 17, 2003: What do the US Army and Wal-Mart have in common?
Radio-Frequency ID tags (RFID). These are small radio transmitter-receivers that are attached to shipping containers and contain remotely accessible information about exactly what is in a given box. Wal-Mart and other commercial enterprises recently began requiring these tags be used by all their vendors to allow them to better track inventories and guarantee that their shelves were adequately stocked.*

Traditionally, military logisticians have practiced a "push" method that flooded the theater with equipment to prevent shortages. Inevitably, needed items were lost amid stacks of redundant equipment. Obsolete gear shipped anyway, mislabeled containers, and units ordering parts repeatedly until the right item arrived were all routine occurrences. A brute force approach of throwing in extra equipment and manpower was viewed as the easy solution. Supply soldiers spent their days searching through shipping containers one by one.*



The war in Iraq saw the first major use of RFID tags by Central Command logisticians charged with feeding and supplying American forces in the Middle East. Every shipping container arriving in the theater was required to have an RFID tag. The tags allowed CentCom to know where critical equipment and urgent spare parts were located without having to dig through the crates the old-fashioned way. RFID tags and better databases on supply consumption and movement enabled a just-in-time philosophy similar to that used in industry. When you know where things are precisely, can track where they are going, and can get to them quickly, redundancy can be reduced with minimal risk to the soldiers in the field.


For the Iraq campaign, the US supported one third as many troops as Desert Storm, but shipped ninety percent fewer shipping containers. Some of the troops not sent to the Middle East were the folks who would have had the task of opening those extra containers and searching for lost equipment. With the increased chances of rear area chemical, biological, or terrorist attack, the virtues of having a smaller logistics crew are self-evident.*

Ninety percent accurate, RFID tags still aren't as reliable as UPC (bar codes) symbols (99 percent accurate) and can't be used for bulk items because their scanners cannot read through dense items like liquids, sand, or concrete, but they have tremendous potential. The next generation will be able to record the humidity and temperature a container has been exposed to in order to predict the shelf life of food or other items stored inside.*

RFID tags for individual packages will be required for all Department of Defense procured items by 2005. These smaller tags cost $.20 to $.30, but as volumes go up they are expected to drop to about $.05. The tags currently used for shipping containers and pallets cost about $150, but should drop to the $7 to $1 range. The initial purchase was for a five-month supply worth $5.87-million. Knowing better what is in the inventory could allow the DoD to reduce redundancies in its warehouses by $34-billion. --AJ Wagner




November 15, 2003: The Iraq campaign has proved a bonanza for logistical and maintenance troops. Now they have practical experience to back their claims that the army has been shortchanging them when it comes to equipment, training and personnel. Field exercises are expensive, but putting all the troops into the field, at once and under combat conditions is the only way to see what works and what doesn't. But these exercises rarely last longer than a week, and are conducted mainly to give the combat troops a chance to move around, run through some of their tactical maneuvers and, well, "exercise" the unit (usually a battalion, brigade or division). The support (logistics and maintenance) troops don't get that much of a work out. When the support officers point out that more intense operations (like those during the advance on Baghdad) would find the unit without sufficient support resources to keep them going, they are generally ignored. No more. What support officers have been warning about for decades proved all too true during the Iraq campaign. First, there was the shortage of trucks to move the fuel and ammunition needed to keep the fuel, munitions and other stuff coming. This was foreseen, and it was thought that civilian truck companies from Kuwait could pick up the slack. But then the Iraqi irregulars began shooting at the supply convoys, and the Kuwaiti truckers pointed out that they were civilians and wound not provide target practice for trigger happy Iraqis. That's when it was discovered that decades of slacking off on combat training for support troops made it difficult for these supply convoys to defend themselves. Combat troops had to be diverted from the fighting to help with security, and provide on-the-spot refresher combat training. At this point, the support troops were eager to learn.*

But trucks weren't the only problem. Maintenance troops were not up to maintaining armored vehicles traveling so far in such a short time. Armored vehicles are complex beasts with lots of components that are prone to failure. The result was maintenance troops worked to the point of exhaustion, and lots of armored vehicles operating with broken gadgets (usually communications, navigation or one of the many computers carried.) Even the support units found the tempo of operations more than their equipment could handle. Often truck convoys and support units were out of range of each others radios. The support units had never operated so far from each other before. Now everyone realized that new radio equipment was needed, along with a lot of other new stuff.*

Why hadn't these problems been seen in advance? Call it tradition. Logistics is not sexy. Support officers are considered a bunch of geeky drones and the combat arms officers who populate the upper ranks generally ignore them. This is nothing new, it's been going on for centuries. It's not a uniquely American problem either. In fact, the United States is regarded as having one of the better attitudes towards logistics. But even with all that, things got messy on the road to Baghdad. Lessons were learned, but it remains to be seen if the lessons will turn into solutions.

November 14, 2003: There are daily news reports of American soldiers getting shot at in Iraq. Most of these are troops in trucks moving supplies. There is a 350 kilometer long MSR (Main Supply Route) going from Kuwait to Baghdad, plus hundreds of kilometers of branch supply routes going off to various U.S. bases. About 300 convoys a day roll up the highway from Kuwait. Hundreds of smaller convoys move troops and equipment around. About twenty convoys a day are attacked. The weapons used are AK-47s, RPG rockets and remotely controlled bombs on the side of the roads. On dirt roads, anti-vehicle mines will be used as well. Some two or three troops are killed or wounded each day. Most of the attacks fail. This is largely because the attackers are hired by Baath Party leaders with more cash than courage (to do it themselves.) Bonuses are paid when the attackers actually wound or kill someone. But the hired Iraqis are content to fire on a convoy and get away alive to collect they pay (from a few hundred to a thousand dollars or more). Some are paid to set up road side bombs. The troops running these convoys have had to get additional training to deal with these combat operations they never thought they would be involved in. The transportation, logistics and maintenance troops had to get religious about cleaning their weapons and taking turns standing up in the truck with a machine-gun (on a mount), looking for potential attackers. Some of the troops are clamoring for rifle range built so they can get some training using a machine-gun from a moving truck (it does take some practice get good at this.) The attackers are taking heavier casualties than the American troops, which is not much consolation to the stressed out GI truck drivers and machine-gunners. American troops have also been changing their tactics, moving convoys at high speed (80-100 kilometers an hour) up the middle of roads and having combat troops or helicopters in the area to chase after attackers. The relatively low incidence of attacks actually makes it worse, because it is harder to stay on alert all the time when you might go weeks without getting shot at. More of the supplies are being moved by civilian truckers, who get attacked rarely. But purely military equipment is moved by soldiers, to make sure nothing is stolen. Moreover, if there were no military convoys, the attackers would turn their attacks on civilian truckers.*

November 9, 2003: While most of the logistics and maintenance support for American troops in Iraq is still located in Kuwait, a lot of it has moved to two new bases inside Iraq. One, Camp Victory, is five kilometers from Baghdad International Airport (which is itself a rather large military facility, but run mostly by the U.S. Air Force.) The other one is Anaconda, a new base 70 kilometers north of Baghdad. Although a lot of supplies are obtained locally, much stuff is either in short supply or very expensive. So support units moving to the Victory or Anaconda are warned to bring large quantities of certain stuff with them. Currently this means office supplies (staplers, staples, pens, pencils, tape and the like.) A two month supply of certain petroleum supplies (vehicle grease, 15W40 and 10W oil, plus brake fluid) is suggested. Some computer supplies are also on the list, mainly 3.5 inch computer disks and 512MB memory sticks. You also need plastic zip lock bags for the 3.5 inch disks (to keep the dust out). This is why the 512MB (or smaller) memory sticks are preferred. But not all computers can handle memory sticks. These two items are needed because it’s often easier, and more secure, to move large amounts of information from one base, or unit, to another via disk or memory stick. While the internet is all over the place, a lot of it still operates via satellite links, which means there is not a lot of capacity and throughput is slow. Logistical units have to move around a lot, so units headed for Iraq are advised to try and get new tires on all their hummers, and make sure they all have gun mounts and Kevlar (armor) blankets for protection against enemy attacks.



October 11, 2003: For over half a century, the largest overseas concentration of American military force was in Germany. This is changing. There are still some 500 American bases and facilities in Germany (most of them quite small). Some 80 percent of the American troops still stationed in Europe are in Germany. This has been changing for over a decade. First came the end of the Cold War, and the withdrawal of over a third of the U.S. troops in Europe and the closure of nearly as many bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been heavily using new locations, like Graf Ignatievo airbase in Bulgaria, and other airbases and ports in the Persian Gulf. Diego Garcia has also become a major air base, even though it is a small island in the middle of the Indian Ocean. The billion dollar Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo is turning into a key location from which to monitor Islamic radical activity in the Balkans. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are eager to host American troops. And the United States is eager to leave bases in Germany. No so much because of the growing anti-American sentiment in Germany, but because the German bases are often in densely populated areas, where the are many restrictions on troops training. In East Europe, they have more space, fewer restrictions and a lot of enthusiasm for having American troops around. The reason for this; to insure that ancient invaders like Germany and Russia stay out, is widely admitted, but rarely said openly. It is also thought that the presence of U.S. soldiers will make it less likely that wars will break out with neighbors over ancient territorial claims. There are plenty of these in Eastern Europe. The cost of building the new bases farther east would be largely offset by cheaper operating costs. Some bases in Germany would always remain, particularly the military airbase at Ramstein.*

Many of the new bases are not, like in the past, home for lots of American troops. Today, it's more likely that equipment and weapons will be stationed overseas, often in ships, but usually in climate controlled warehouses. A small force of Americans supervise local civilians to maintain the equipment. American troops are flown in if there is a crises. Thus air bases are important, not large training areas or lots of housing for troops and dependents. Increasingly, the troops are kept at home. Partly, this is because more than half of them are married. But there's also the cost factor. Keeping troops overseas is expensive, and provides more targets for terrorists or political activists. For over half a century after World War II, hundreds of thousands of American troops stayed overseas. Now, finally, most of them are coming home.*


Source: StrategyPage (http://www.strategypage.com//fyeo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target=htlog).

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MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

Official military guides:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06/index.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06-11/toc.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-10-1/default.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-10/toc.htm

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Small arms and aircraft armaments, pretty full specs
http://tri.army.mil/LC/CS/sma.htm

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MANPADS intro and primer (Globalsecurity)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/manpads.htm

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A special treat on the psychology of warriors
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/MayJun99/Pierson.htm

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G2mil for Feb 2004
http://www.g2mil.com/Feb2004.htm
(main article includes a lot of good information about cheap surface-to-orbit launch methods (many of which are included in WA's space program already) Mr. Meyer has posted a quite large articles section this month.

have fun, and remember your supply lines.

Good post. I've read a lot of that already, and Wolfish sent me a link to a Brittanica entry (which I unfortunately couldn't get into).

One of my sources noted that small things like AA batteries were always in short supply over in Iraq. There are adaptors available to charge batteries from the vehicles, but these, too, were in short supply.

A further problem with the US logistics effort for the Iraq war is ammunition. All ammunition is getting very scarce, but especially small arms ammo. This is due in large part to the fact that the US has exactly one authorized manufacturer for small arms ammunition. This ammo has to fire everywhere, in any weather conditions, and has to remain viable for a set amount of time on the shelf. Few manufacturers are willing to undergo the quality assurance process to meet military standards, so the US Military is running out of bullets- even though the one plant is running three shifts, 7 days a week.

With the critical shortage of supplies mentioned in WA's post (5-6 days), prolonged firefights would have rapidly drained military stocks in-country. With only one available factory for ammo, our troops might have found themselves in a modern-day version of Xenophon's Ten Thousand- outnumbered and alone in hostile territory.

It would take a day to load a C-5 or C-17 with all the ammo the plane could carry. Another day getting to Iraq. At least one more day getting the ammo from the airfield to the troops who need it. That is half the supply margin. I'm pretty sure that the number of 5-6 days of supplies was dreamed up by people in DC who aren't aware of field conditions and therefore make up "reasonable" numbers for ammo expenditure. In a firefight, you use everything you have available. The safety margin for the logiustics train is razor thin, and US troops would end up paying the price- in blood- for the 'reasonable' ammo expenditure numbers some REMF dreamed up.

If the US and British troops had not been as professional and skillfull as they were , the Iraq war could have turned into a bloody disaster. The primary reason it did not was the fact that the Iraqi logistics train- while shorter- was in such disarry that many troops would have been out of ammo after one firefight. What little logistical infrastructure the Iraqis had was woefully vulnerable to US and British air power.

<Tag, for continued reference>

Much gratitude to all who've contributed to this, especially EO.

hey EO what about a space nation that only devoted it's self towards just space ships like I do. I am a single (extremely large and growing) space station so I don't have to deal with navies/ airforces/ large marine corps (excluding boarding parties) and I salvage anything I can.

now I don't know much about logistic except for common sense. my ships (only 3 currently) stock up on required supplies for X (9) months all staying relativity close to the station except for salvage missions which can take it farther away. anyways after X (say 7-8.5) months the ship returns for restocking and such.

anyways does that sound good to you or too..."iff-ish"?

<TAG>

You know, people laughed when I decided that a full 1/6 of my population would be dedicated to agriculture and related activities.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

Official military guides:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06/index.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06-11/toc.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-10-1/default.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-10/toc.htm



Great links. I'd also recommend Urban Operations: An Historical Casebook (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/urbanoperationsintro.htm). Another excellent piece of work.

what about a space nation that only devoted it's self towards just space ships like I do. I am a single (extremely large and growing) space station so I don't have to deal with navies/ airforces/ large marine corps (excluding boarding parties) and I salvage anything I can.

now I don't know much about logistic except for common sense. my ships (only 3 currently) stock up on required supplies for X (9) months all staying relativity close to the station except for salvage missions which can take it farther away. anyways after X (say 7-8.5) months the ship returns for restocking and such.

anyways does that sound good to you or too..."iff-ish"?

You know, I keep getting sidetracked from writing that "Logistics in Space" post. I really ought to get that done.

Independent space stations actually ought to have a larger logistics train- assuming that current physics are in force. I will assume that you have some means of generating gravity or the appearance of gravity, because other wise all bets are off.

I'll assume that you aren't using Star Trek style food synthesizers or similar technology. This means that your space station must either import all of its food from planetary sources (which would be potentially suicidal if you didn't control those sources) or grow it on the station. I'll take those one at a time.

If you import most of your food, you'll need a large infrastructure to deal with it. Two basic options: Friendly (or at least non-hostile) planetary neighbors who produce and sell most of the foodstuffs, or dirtside colonies planted by your main station for the sole purpose of producing food for you. In either case, you will need fleets of surface-to-space transports to haul the food (which is inevitably bulk cargo) and corresponding hangar/docking facilities for the transports. Within the station, you will need bulk storage areas (which will have to be climate-controlled and shielded from radiation) and a sophisticated delivery system to get the food from storage to the food preparation areas. Most of this stuff on the station itself can be safely ignored in most RP situations, except for the purpose of setting scenes and adding to the overall "science-fiction" effect on the readers.

In space, space is expensive. Internal space on any sort of spacecraft or station is hard to create. All of the infrastructure I just described will take up vast amounts of internal space. Your space station is growing larger by leaps and bounds with every character I type. Most of the station should be storage facilities for all manner of consumables.

If most of your foods come from planetary sources, you'll also need a large military and intelligence network to keep the food sources protected. All a wise enemy needs to do is successfully contaminate the crops with any of a variety of diseases, and your station will be in dire straits. If this proves impossible, merely shooting down a few transports would do just as well.

Aside from food, you'll also need oxygen. We'll assume such standard items as airscrubbers and some vats of blue-green algae to help replenish oxygen volume, but these are also vulnerable. Regular re-supply of fresh air will be needed, unless even more of the station's internal volume is given over to air production. Your station is now probably blocking out the sun over large swaths of the planet you orbit.

Now let us look at the other option. You grow most of the food you eat onboard, and only raw materials for construction and soil replenishment are needed. This is the way to go for a space station. You've essentially built an artificial world. A self-contained ecology.

Once more, huge sections your station will be devoted solely to food production and storage. The farming areas will probably be hydroponics or something similar, and wastes can be treated and re-used multiple times. This will cut down on the amount of resupply you'll need dramatically. Atmosphere replenishment will be done in the standard carbon dioxide to plants to oxygen cycle, with only relatively small amounts of fesh oxygen input needed at regular intervals.

People living in such an environment would necessarily be utterly paranoid about the farm sections' health and maintenance. Enormous resources would have to be devoted to redundant safety and engineering controls to prevent the possible contamination of the food/air supply. I won't comment on the type of society that would require, since that is beyond the scope of this post. I'm pretty sure that I wouldn't want to live there, though.

Whichever solution to your food supply problem you come up with, a lot of logistical train is involved, Furthermore, you will need nupplies of raw materials at regular intervals for construction and maintenance. You can't dig a hole in the ground and mine some silicon or iron on a space station. Space stations are by definition particularly vulnerable to a wide variety of hazards that wouldn't affect planet dwellers, so large amounts of time and effort would have to be devoted to dealing with those as well. A lot of this logistics train can be glossed over lightly in the interest of roleplaying, unless there's a war.

In a war, your enemy is going to expend a lot of energy trying to destroy your logistics train. Unless the enemy wanted to merely destroy the station outright, it would be better for an enemy to ruin or reduce your food supply and force you to surrender. Preventing this will take up huge amounts of your available resources.

This is far from an exhaustive listing of the logistical problems ofan independent space station, but it does cover some of the more important considerations.

TEO

Actualy I think you are being FAR to generous. While a 50% - 75% support structure may be all good on paper the reality is the modern equipment that makes such great footage on CNN requires a huge amout of support.

Each weapon system needs a complete support/repair chain. By weapon system I mean every bomb, gun, radar, jammer, tactical radio needs a horde of support people to make sure; there are spares, can be repaired, fielding the next generation and maintaining the last generation with obsolete parts until the new stuff is available.

The US military has a tooth the tail ratio of 30-1. For every man that holds a rifle, mans a ship, or flys a plane there are 30 guys fixing tanks, delivering the mail, arming the bombers. Most of the work is done by civilian employees or contractors but it still needs to be done.

The more complex your weapons the more people you need in support. If your army is just armed with one kind of tank and one type of rifle you could get by with a 50% ratio. If you want smart bombs, cruise missiles and aircraft carriers you better figure at least 95% support.

Actualy I think you are being FAR to generous.

Very likely. However, in the interests of playability, I usually opt for the 10:1 ratio across the board. If you make calculating the logistics tail too complicated, everyone will ignore it.

The more complex your weapons the more people you need in support. If your army is just armed with one kind of tank and one type of rifle you could get by with a 50% ratio. If you want smart bombs, cruise missiles and aircraft carriers you better figure at least 95% support.

I doubt that any modern military could really get by with only 50% support personnel- even under the conditions you listed. Some branches of service- and some units- require far more than the 10:1 general rule, and others less. With my military, I automatically assume that only 10% of the force will be actual combatants.


TEO

OOC: Oh TEO, I could kiss you... :wink:

I've been looking for this thread for ages so I can link it when pissed off at others transporting millions of men overnight... (IC) now I'm going to put the URL in my "link" txt file.


*cough* oh and... errr... forget the whole kiss thing...

Edit: Another question, do you have the URL for the GDP thread you (I think) did a while back... the one that covers the cost of the military and how invasions should be done (i.e by securing your support lines first).

do you have the URL for the GDP thread you (I think) did a while back... the one that covers the cost of the military and how invasions should be done (i.e by securing your support lines first).[/size]

I don't remember that thread. I doubt I wrote it, but I might have contributed to it.

TEO

Quick Note: I recently attended a lecture by a professor at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU, which designs and builds a number of prototype robotic systems for the US military and NASA and which has strong ties to the DoD) where he mentioned that it currently takes 3 logistics personnel for each (1) soldier deployed in the field. I am not sure if this includes logistics personnel deployed in-theater or if it includes C&C personnel in charge of regional command, but it's a good bet that pretty much every soldier deployed (no matter if they are the "real" front-line combatants or "just support") will need at least 3 people at home (on average) or involved in transport to make sure that everything is working smoothly.

I was treated in that same lecture to a presentation on current Robotic/Autonomous Ground Vehicle systems, their limitations, and their abilities. Currently, the best uses seem to be the following: Scouting, Support, Safety.

Scouting
It was reported that the USMC's DragonRunner (a hand-tossable easily man-portable device that looks (and acts) like a RC car on steroids) is performing excellently in testing and has received high marks from the testing crews and US Marine personnel that have worked with it. This system is not autonomous but it seems that it is an effective, tough, and simple tool.

Robots flown to Afghanistan and used to clear caves of potential booby-traps received rave reviews (reported by the officer that was sent to test-deploy them after having suggested their possible use) from the soldiers who were involved in the test-deployments. These special-use scouts were able to minimize the risk to personnel in cave-clearing operations while still only in a fairly basic prototype stage of testing. Improved vehicles of this sort (a bit larger than the USMC's DragonRunner) should be capable of performing such dangerous area clearing missions very well...these remotely operated vehicles also clearly fall into the "safety" category.

Lightly (or un)armed, electric battery powered scout vehicles of a larger size (near-HMMWV) seem to be capable of performing far-ranging scouting missions while minimizing risk to personnel and reducing the likelihood of detection. The "spinner" system (which allows the vehicle to 'flip' it's wheels and sensor payload if the vehicle is flipped) is especially adept for this role as a major problems faced by Autonomous Ground Vehicles is that they tend to misjudge edges and are easily flipped...so a vehicle that works just as well "upside-down" is a great platform. The ability of such a light/fast scout vehicle to carry more powerful sensor payloads and even to (theoretically) set up autonomous sensor stations makes such a concept worthy of consideration at the very least.

Support
Current "autonomous" robotic vehicles tend to have an issue mainly with minor miscalculations and misinterpretations of sensory data at a fairly regular interval when taken off-road. One system demonstrated by the professor (via video clips) is based on a HMMWV-sized chassis but runs very well cross-country--except for the necessity for the operators to guide the machine out of tricky situations every few minutes. The necessity of this operator intervention makes completely autonomous vehicles a problematic concept...but there is a possible use for them as they follow fairly regular roads very well.

A supply convoy could become much less of a risk to personnel (ie, minimize risk and the necessity to provide armed security for the convoy) if only a small portion of the convoy involved manned vehicles, with autonomous vehicles located between manned vehicles. A convoy of 12 vehicles (only, say, 3 of which would include military personnel) could transport a great deal of cargo to front line forces without demanding a huge number of personnel to drive, manage, and guard the goods. The loss of one Semiautonomous Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV) in a convoy is of no great concern and the rest of the convoy could simply continue on its way...no injured or dead personnel need be watched, and fought, over and the vehicles could be recovered later when proper security equipment and manpower is available.

In addition to reducing the dangers of small convoys, SUSVs could be designed so that a single- or double-column of vehicles are guided with only a foot or two of space between the autonomous vehicles. A Bluetooth-type wireless network maintained by a couple of personnel in one of the manned vehicles coordinates the vehicles to mimic (with safeguards) the breaking and acceleration patterns of the lead vehicle to prevent accidents. A convoy of 50+ such vehicles (~25 vehicles long, 2 vehicles wide) could speed along to reduce the risk ambushes while transporting a tremendous amount of vital support equipment. Even if the lead manned vehicle is destroyed, the SUSVs could follow the road until they are out of the ‘danger zone’, thus clearing the area for the entrance of friendly security teams and reducing the impact of the ambush. The technology for such vehicles exists already today and could easily be implemented if enough interest (and decent funding) is provided.

Safety
The main direction of current DoD robotic ground vehicle efforts seems to be the clearance of mines. Simple, proven anti-mine systems are attached to autonomous or semi-autonomous vehicles to reduce the possibility of personal injury to personnel due to mine clearance efforts. If the general extent of a mine field is known and the situation doesn’t demand a lightning-fast breach (which a line charge might be used for) then the dull but dangerous work could be left to these autonomous mine clearing robots.

Enough for tonight, I think, please add your opinion.

Good points. Good post.

I think that the Automated convoy idea is probably the way to go, with a few modifications. Remove all of the drivers (this obviously will only apply to established road networks), and have the vehicles controlled remotely- both en masse and individually. Accompany each convoy with a bunch of manned guard vehicles. Automated convoys will lower human losses, but would make easy pickings for a loosely-organized resistance group if not adequately guarded. Losing one vehicle per convoy might be considered acceptable, but losing entire convoys would not.

By and large, the robots on the future battlefields will have to be nearly idiot-proof, and tailored to the "end user"- the frontline soldier. Mine-clearing is an obvious good case for this concept, but only when there is plenty of leisure time to clear the minefield. The military will still have to use the standard BFMI methods (Brute Force and Massive Ignorance) to do the job fast and dirty when speed is of the essence.

Sadly, the use of robots will not decrease the logistical tail much- if at all. For a while, the logistical tail will increase as robots become more common. Furthermore, there will never be an effective replacement for the PBI (Poor Bloody Infantry). No robot is as flexible and adaptible as a trained human. Sooner or later, you absolutely have to send a human in to take and hold the ground. Robots may fight alongside them, but the man with the gun will always be the final arbiter of who does and does not hold the ground.

Damn good thread. Perhaps take note, however, that certain armies have larger logistical tails than others; take for contrast the Soviet and US armies. The Soviets had more combat power per division than the US, but much less logistics; this was, as I'm sure you're all aware, since their policy (at least in open literature) was to simply replace a battered division with a new one. So if you're organising your army on THAT model, you operational logistical requirements are reduced, though your strategic ones probably remain much the same, especially for a tank division/tank army/anything heavy an AFVs. Anyway, back to my cave.

*tag*

Brilliant thread. One I'll definitely be re-reading over time. Even those of us in International Supply Chain Management could use some logistics information like this from time to time.

Good points. Good post.

I think that the Automated convoy idea is probably the way to go, with a few modifications. Remove all of the drivers (this obviously will only apply to established road networks), and have the vehicles controlled remotely- both en masse and individually. Accompany each convoy with a bunch of manned guard vehicles. Automated convoys will lower human losses, but would make easy pickings for a loosely-organized resistance group if not adequately guarded. Losing one vehicle per convoy might be considered acceptable, but losing entire convoys would not.

Indeed, manned escourts are important for providing security, but from what I understood of the professor's presentation, even established road routes can cause random errors which basically demand that on-site human controllers be present to save on the bandwith that would be required to remotely perform these duties and to allow for varying routes. The random disorientation that the guidance programs encounter (which are easily dealt with by most adult human beings who are not at the same time suffering from extreme exhaustion and/or intoxication) show up too often to run a convoy without an on-site control station that can update at least the lead vehicle.

These semi-autonomous convoys, as all convoys are, will suffer in the face of concentrated behind-the-lines resistance (a constant of the battlefield that no supply chain can really hope to overcome) but by using such automation to increase the speed, ability to vary routes, coordination, and discipline of the convoy 'member' vehicles. Manned vehicles (or at least robotic vehicles that support manned defensive posts) are a necessity both to guide the convoy and to provide sufficient protection against such random raids. Vehicles that are (completely) controlled by humans would not have the reaction time necessary to maintain the speed, close formation, and control in the midst of the convoy so some manned "substations" within the convoy could contain human drivers that would remain 'on standby' until their skills are required (allowing the computer guidance system to 'autopilot' for the majority of the time).

In this vein, if the trucks were all designed to alternate function as 'normal' (100% human-dependant) 2.5 or 5 (or heavier) ton trucks and as "convoy drones" [thus appearing capable of manned operation] then guerilla warfare participants might find it difficult to differentiate between a manned "protected" truck in a convoy and a dumb "empty vessel"...causing hesitancy about what trucks to attack. A strict rule about varying the location of the lead manned truck would force guerillas hoping to destroy an entire convoy by 'cutting off the head' to take out as many as the first half-dozen vehicles (as a short-range WiFi/Bluetooth transmitter could sent video images to the control vehicle for guidance and navigation down through the chain)...something that most guerilla forces can't afford to try if they risk facing a heavily-armed contingent of trained soldiers in the 7th truck. The use of clearly different vehicles (such as the US Army MPs' Armored Security Vehicle) would diminish this effect and might cause coordination problems unless those vehicles are also coordinated...but mass production of one unit is simpler than of 2 units in much smaller numbers (and there are maintenance and training issues).

An additional feature to aid in this process might be to account for special training for "Convoy Escourts" within the normal military forces or perhaps the Military Police (depending on the military structure) who would be rigorously trained to engage enemy targets at such high speeds and to provide security for these "superconvoys."

By and large, the robots on the future battlefields will have to be nearly idiot-proof, and tailored to the "end user"- the frontline soldier. Mine-clearing is an obvious good case for this concept, but only when there is plenty of leisure time to clear the minefield. The military will still have to use the standard BFMI methods (Brute Force and Massive Ignorance) to do the job fast and dirty when speed is of the essence.

Indeed, the mineclearing robots are not for 'lightning warfare' scenarios so much as for the use of rearguard and supply or advancing C4I resources...the 'tip of the spear' would continue to use line charges and other 'fast through' mine clearing means. The robots would be controlled by Army Corps of Engineers-type units that would follow on the primary forces to clear the way for those following on routes of primary importance. Rural or nonstrategic sectors and unimportant zones being dealt with as the battleline advances to more distant ranges and the engineers are left at leisure. Robots would cover this "dirty and dangerous" job while personnel are focused in other sectors.

Sadly, the use of robots will not decrease the logistical tail much- if at all. For a while, the logistical tail will increase as robots become more common. Furthermore, there will never be an effective replacement for the PBI (Poor Bloody Infantry). No robot is as flexible and adaptible as a trained human. Sooner or later, you absolutely have to send a human in to take and hold the ground. Robots may fight alongside them, but the man with the gun will always be the final arbiter of who does and does not hold the ground.

I must personally doubt, as you do, the claims of those who would like to see robots replacing 'organic' battle units. Robots will work fine for increasing the abilities of humans and for replacing them in high danger/low intelligence/annoying jobs but never for doing combat in place of huans. I must completely agree with this.

As for logistical tails, these suggestions are only attempts to mitigate the negative effects of these long trains of supplies and to allow rare resources to be better spent elsewhere.

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Damn good thread. Perhaps take note, however, that certain armies have larger logistical tails than others; take for contrast the Soviet and US armies. The Soviets had more combat power per division than the US, but much less logistics; this was, as I'm sure you're all aware, since their policy (at least in open literature) was to simply replace a battered division with a new one. So if you're organising your army on THAT model, you operational logistical requirements are reduced, though your strategic ones probably remain much the same, especially for a tank division/tank army/anything heavy an AFVs. Anyway, back to my cave.

The Soviets also expected that the vast majority of their tanks, aircraft, and initial infantry units would be destroyed in nuclear exchanges...so they never planned many food supplies into their supply chain plans for units, hoping that the soldiers could just hunt-and-gather the majority of their food supplies. Their expectations of high losses also caused them to build "disposable" aircraft and tanks that turned out to be a bit too easily disposed-of by Western Forces (note: tank battles in the ME during the Arab-Israeli wars where the largest threats tended to be from US units in the hands of Arab powers, American and British tanks in Israeli hands, or soviet units upgraded to Western standards by the Israelis). I can't think of a modern armored conflict where Soviet-styled tanks came out seriously ahead of their Western counterparts.

The Soviets didn't so much have a more efficient supply chain as an anemic supply chain that couldn't have properly equipped its forces in a serious conflict, IMHO. Also, if you're anything but a totalitarian government it's basically impossible to run that kind of military (where entire divisions of soldiers are considered "expendables") without finding yourself in the middle of a civil war. This thought process worked during WWII but also meant that the USSR had the highest combat casualties of any power involved.

Oh, I wasn't saying it was an efficient supply system, merely one that was tailored to a different need. As you say, they were anticipating that so much of their available forces would be wrecked in punching through the NATO defences to allow the OMGs to perform (I love this expression) the "daring thrust" into the enemy's rear that it wouldn't matter.

As for the matter of Soviet equipment, I beg to differ. The US-equipped armies have never fought, to my knowledge, significant numbers (indeed any) Soviet equipment operated by Soviet/Russian troops. The tanks the Arabs used in the Mideast were aging T-54s and 55s, don't forget, with T-62s. Not only were these tanks known to be less effective than those pitted against them (Centurion, M60A1 and later Merkava) but they were crewed by less effective crews, and usually had inferior ammunition and general quality of vehicles. This is especially true of the first Gulf War - the Iraqis were using the inferior Iraqi knock-off of the (downgraded from the original) export version a 20-year-old tank, with poor optics, fire-control, guns, ammunition, armour and even engines compared to the T-72A. They were also fighting without the benefit of air and/or artillery support.

Soviet and American machines have never met on equal terms.

Also, as an example of what happens when the other side gets to pick how the battle is fought (since it was usually the Israelis who got that luxury), take the Yom Kippur war. The Egyptians crossed the Bar-Lev line, then just set themselves up with their tanks dug in. The Israelis, meanwhile, couldn't break through the Egyptians, because the latter had an effective air-defence umbrella and anti-tank defence. It was not until the Egyptians attempted a manoeuvre battle (and heavens, wasn't that a good idea :roll: ) that the Israelis retook the initiative.

I think that the Soviet Army, in conclusion, would have been more effective than the Arabs it equipped (no offence to any Arabs here), in a war; and thus making comparisons between the Western and Soviet Armies based upon the performance of their clients is perhaps erronious.

Ahhh, logistics...

Personally, I'm not a soldier and I've only read about wars and watched movies and TV stuff about them, so I've been doing a lot of research about military stuff. :)

Now, one day I was thinking of the belief of several military forces (the USMC among them) that "every man is an infantryman" and how can that relate to the fact that a ton of the military's support. Then it occured to me: it's the function that's different, not the (relative) capability. Your support crews and stuff can be trained to be soldiers, it's just that their job is with the gear. If they need to, they can fight like soldiers, because that is what they are.

Another thing, if you've seen me RP my wars (at least my recent ones), you'll notice I list my forces by units (ususally divisions), not by number (i.e. I send 300 tanks, 5,00 troops, etc.) Personally, I just assume the logistics people are in my divisions and they supply stuff.

(On that note, does anybody know the number of logistics units and/or vehicles (including types) in a US Army mechanized/armor division? FAS has a great table of organization and equipment (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/toe/index.html) but, as they say "this display is simplified through the elimination of numerous headquarters, maintenance and other support units which are normally attached to or associated with the listed combat units [despite the well known fact that amateurs talks tactics while professionals talk logistics]." I've got some ideas on logistics and logistics vehicles, but I don't know how many there are per division.)

On a similar note, I'm mostly organized on the division level- I haven't a clue as to how my army is organized on the Corps and Army levels. :D

You read g2mil too, WA? Good magazine (though I disagree with the editor about Bush in Iraq) - I've gotten some ideas from them, most notably the M1A3, the scrapping of my Comanches and the layout of my infantry squad (not to mention my adaptation of a certain round.)

True, I have an enormous army, but that's mainly due to the fact that I have compulsory military service (we've got a tradition of well-trained citizen-soldiers in my country) and massive military reserves. My reserves, in fact, are organized by locality (province, city/county, village, etc.) so mobilization, I think, would be like that of a National Guard unit. What do you think?

My §.02 for now. ;)

God bless,

The Republic of Syskeyia

Actually, some of my points:

The Soviets actually had enough supplies stored to last them for months, especially those in hardened fuel and storages depots across the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. But from what I've read, it's that not that they have difficulties in obtaining the supplies later in a possible war, but also the depots are just too prone to attacks. Something also to think about.

Soviet equipments of course, mostly are less effective with crews who have lower trainings and morales. But the Soviet Union itself fight by number. While the US could deal with a few newer T-72s with its M1s sometimes painlessly, but as an US F-15 pilot puts it, it's no big deal for them to deal with a few MiG-23 Floggers, but it would be a great difficulty when the Soviets actually got tens or even hundreds of them. True, Soviet equipments were also rushed and in many times fail (it has been reported that the AS-4 and AS-6 missiles were so poorly assembled that not only one in 12 actually hitted their targets in mid-80es testings, but in many times they also fell apart after being launched! And that's why they only decided to carry nuclear versions of it on the Tu-22/16s when on patrol). Soviet equipments, IMO, are much designed for their own operations in their own environments, instead of much being exported to somewhere else.

Aye, that's true, hence the rather unpleasant ventilation problems with the T-54,55,62 and 72 in the deserts. Also, it has to be said that though Soviet equipments were usually pretty effective, it apparently took 10 or moreyears on some systems to iron out all the faults. Not good.

As to their logistics, I'd reckon that the biggest problem for the Soviets would have been transporting the supplies. Their big depots were probably well-defended enough that any attack was gonna be of minimal effectiveness (I certainly wouldn't like to ride an F-16 into about 12 SA-6 launchers and three dozen ZSU-23-4s), the convoys'd be much harder to protect; added to which a ZIL-131 or Ural-275 truck is a much easier thing to kill than a concreted bunker/fuel tank/whatever.

Interestingly enough, those people who were in the forces at the time with whom I have spoken have expressed the almost universal sentiment that we (NATO) hadn't a chance of stopping the Soviets. :?

As to their logistics, I'd reckon that the biggest problem for the Soviets would have been transporting the supplies. Their big depots were probably well-defended enough that any attack was gonna be of minimal effectiveness (I certainly wouldn't like to ride an F-16 into about 12 SA-6 launchers and three dozen ZSU-23-4s), the convoys'd be much harder to protect; added to which a ZIL-131 or Ural-275 truck is a much easier thing to kill than a concreted bunker/fuel tank/whatever.

That was, in fact, NATO doctrine for a possible attack by Warsaw Pact units: Stall the leading units as much as possible with ground units while the NATO air units wreaked havoc on the supply chain. The doctrine was also predicated on the fact that NATO expected to be retreating through their own logistics chain, and would therefore suffer fewer supply problems than the Soviets- whose supply chain would grow increasingly longer.

Interestingly enough, those people who were in the forces at the time with whom I have spoken have expressed the almost universal sentiment that we (NATO) hadn't a chance of stopping the Soviets. :?

Oddly enough, the NATO staff people with whom I have spoken say the same thing in reverse. To a man, they all claimed that a Soviet attack on western Europe would result in the defeat of the Warsaw Pact.

There is a disconnect between the western and eastern viewpoints that bears mentioning. Both sides were arming for a defensive war. The USSR made plans for invading the west, sure. But they also made plans for invading Alaska, India, China, and probably Santa's workshop at the North Pole. The Socviet doctrine was simply to protect the Soviet Union. Since the Great Patriotic War (what the Russians call WW II) cost them 20 million people, the leaders of the USSR decided that the next war would be on someone else's real estate. They calculated how many troops and equipment it would take to destroy a NATO attack, then doubled it. Later on, they doubled it again. This meant that the USSR would be able to resist a western invasion and be able to counterattack- while still leaving enough troops behind to protect the USSR in the event their counterinvasion failed.

This was all done at the Politburo level. The front-line troops- all the way up to Staff grade- were never told this. They were all told that they had to prepare to invade western Europe- with or without tactical nuclear strikes for preparation.

The reason the USSR was afraid of being invaded by the major nations of NATO was that it had already happened. Before WW II, both the UK and the US had landed troops on Russian soil in a failed bid to keep the Soviets from gobbling up Finland. After the invasion of Poland, the British drew up plans for an invasion of the Murmansk area to punish the Soviets for their particpation in that international gang-rape. During the immediate post-war years, the US and the UK governments were outspoken about the USSR and its stranglehold on eastern Europe. Only when the Soviets detonated their own nuclear weaponry did public discussion of liberating the captive nations quiet to a murmur.

The leaders of the USSR- who shared the traditional Russian deeply-held inferiority complex regarding the west- grew understandably more paranoid, until it became institutionally ingrained in every Soviet official to be suspiscious of the west- and the US in particular. The fact that neither side really understood the other only contributed to the tensions.

The fact remained that the NATO forces were ill-equipped for any offensive acts across the Fulda Gap. The Soviets were massively equipped for offensive operations- but essentially bankrupted themsleves trying to maintain the 5-1 advantage their war plans required (and some military textbooks still mandate). Since even the Red Army had to have logistics to keep operating, the problem grew by a factor of at least 3. Soviet logistics were so traditionally bad that the country routinely let food rot in the fields because they couldn't organize enough to harvest, preserve, and transport the food. Even the far more disciplined military units had troubles, forcing many officers to falsify training reports because they couldn't get enough ammunition for live-fire exercises, or lacked the transportation to get troops to the firing range.

This is not to say that the Red Army didn't study logistics. Many Soviet documents make note of clever plans for decoy convoys and supply dumps- all designed to keep the real logistical tail safe from NATO air power. Several noncombatant units were assigned to each armored division for the purposes of traffic control, to keep the supplies moving forward with the Red Army spearhead. Command and Control officers were relentlessly drilled in logistics. The Russians know better than anyone what logistics is.

TEO

Ahhh, logistics...

Personally, I'm not a soldier and I've only read about wars and watched movies and TV stuff about them, so I've been doing a lot of research about military stuff. :)

Now, one day I was thinking of the belief of several military forces (the USMC among them) that "every man is an infantryman" and how can that relate to the fact that a ton of the military's support. Then it occured to me: it's the function that's different, not the (relative) capability. Your support crews and stuff can be trained to be soldiers, it's just that their job is with the gear. If they need to, they can fight like soldiers, because that is what they are.

Another thing, if you've seen me RP my wars (at least my recent ones), you'll notice I list my forces by units (ususally divisions), not by number (i.e. I send 300 tanks, 5,00 troops, etc.) Personally, I just assume the logistics people are in my divisions and they supply stuff.

(On that note, does anybody know the number of logistics units and/or vehicles (including types) in a US Army mechanized/armor division? FAS has a great table of organization and equipment (http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/toe/index.html) but, as they say "this display is simplified through the elimination of numerous headquarters, maintenance and other support units which are normally attached to or associated with the listed combat units [despite the well known fact that amateurs talks tactics while professionals talk logistics]." I've got some ideas on logistics and logistics vehicles, but I don't know how many there are per division.)

On a similar note, I'm mostly organized on the division level- I haven't a clue as to how my army is organized on the Corps and Army levels. :D

You read g2mil too, WA? Good magazine (though I disagree with the editor about Bush in Iraq) - I've gotten some ideas from them, most notably the M1A3, the scrapping of my Comanches and the layout of my infantry squad (not to mention my adaptation of a certain round.)

True, I have an enormous army, but that's mainly due to the fact that I have compulsory military service (we've got a tradition of well-trained citizen-soldiers in my country) and massive military reserves. My reserves, in fact, are organized by locality (province, city/county, village, etc.) so mobilization, I think, would be like that of a National Guard unit. What do you think?

My §.02 for now. ;)

God bless,

The Republic of Syskeyia

Sys,
I've got just what you want in terms of logistics info for the USMC...namely their entire order of battle as well as some detailed documents on their equipment and organization at lower levels.

MEU Guide: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/13meuguide.pdf

"How the Marines are Organized": http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2003/PDF/Appendix%20A%20C&P%2003.pdf

I have two other PDFs designed to help a Marine commander organize and plan his forces' deployments (with weapons ranges, specs, and the sort along with the hard numbers of "x # of this type of units" with the 1st MEF...but I don't have the website URL for those so if you TM me I can email you copies. I think that I might've gotten them from here: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/usmc/docs/mef99/mef_planner.htm

---

Other info:

Comparison of almost all major mechanized units:
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/ground.pdf

Estimates of Israel's numerical military power (by weapons system and type):
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Israel.pdf

Estimates of Western military power:
http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/WestMB012302.pdf

Another Western Military power PDF:
http://www.csis.org/military/bwcfcompsummary.pdf

Collection of data regaurding the composition of the US armed forces (all numbers on US mil you could want):
http://www.stewarts.net/zac/almanac.pdf

Some general organization guidelines:

type of unit----compositon-----led by
section / squad*--8 to 12 troops--sergeant‡
platoon--3 to 4 sections--lieutenant
company--3 to 4 platoons--captain or major
battalion--3 to 4 companies--major
regiment--2 or more battalions--lt colonel or colonel
brigade--equivalent to 2 or more--regiments brigadier
division--several brigades--general†
corps--several divisions--general†

* = American variation.
† = Potentially any rank of general.
‡ = Not a commissioned officer.

The global security versions of the FAS mil org. sheet is much better. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/intro.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/intro.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/index.html

------

Now, as for G2mil, he has some really good ideas about new systems and the use of existing systems...but what he says should always be taken with a grain of salt as he sometimes recommends a number of different systems for the same role in different articles.

P.S. Sorry for not responding to your TMs...I've been hectically busy for too damn long.

Wow! Thanks very much for all that suff there matey! :D

TEO: It's sad isn't it? Paranoia and mistrust, rolled into one ball of dislike and sprinkled liberally with nuclear weapons. :(

Here's a very good article on the subject I found on the web. The author- Major Frederick V. Godfrey- is the Brigade S-4 Observer-Controller at the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. He is a graduate of the Quartermaster Basic and Advanced Courses and the Air Command and Staff College. He has a Bachelor's degree in Geography from Montana State University and a Master's in Military History from Louisiana State University.

I don't agree with all of his arguments, but there is a lot of useful material here.

TEO

***************

LOGISTICS

Although not as popular or as widely studied as tactics, logistics has been the key to every major conflict since the dawn of modern warfare. World War II provided the backdrop for the biggest logistics operation ever attempted. The D-Day landing and force buildup alone involved millions of tons of supplies, thousands of ships, and hundreds of thousands of personnel. To carry out this massive logistics operation, planners used supply point and throughput resupply operations, which involve stockpiling supplies at depots in the rear, transporting them to forward depots, and moving them to the units.

The logistics buildup in Kuwait before the invasion of Iraq this spring was reminiscent of the logistics techniques used by First U.S. Army in World War II and repeated in the Korean War and the Gulf War of 1991. This article will look at the First Army's logistics buildup and sustainment operation from D-Day through its race across France into Germany and at current and future battlefield logistics. It also will examine the validity of moving from a supply-based logistics operation to the real-time logistics operation proposed in the Army Transformation.

Gearing Up for War

Preparations for the World War II invasion of France began 2 years before the actual operation. From January 1942 to June 1944, the United States shipped over 17 million tons of cargo to the United Kingdom. Included in the shipments was everything from general supplies and equipment to 800,000 pints of blood plasma, 125 million maps, prefabricated harbors (known as Mulberries), a replacement rail network, cigarettes, and toothbrushes.

The invasion operation divided the Allied forces into five task forces--three British and two American. The invasion forces landed on 6 June 1944 at five beaches in Normandy: Omaha, Utah, Gold, Juno, and Sword. At Omaha and Utah, the two American beaches, only 6,614 of the planned 24,850 tons of cargo were discharged in the first 3 days, which is indicative of the difficulties the Americans experienced in beach resupply operations.

The 12 quartermaster units that arrived with the assault forces provided everything from general supplies to transportation to graves registration. Although the Americans took several days to link up with the British forces, it was quite apparent by 7 June that the invasion was a success. Once the landing forces secured the beaches of Normandy, they had to organize to receive the supplies, equipment, and troops needed to sustain the invasion forces.

Port Discharge Problems

Shipments of supplies to the United Kingdom for the Normandy invasion not only had to compete with other combat operations in the European theater but also were restricted by the amount of supplies British ports could handle. By December 1943, steady shipments of supplies were flowing into the United Kingdom. By July 1944, more than two million tons had been shipped to the United Kingdom, which taxed the capability of the port facilities to hold and process the supplies. Supplies and equipment bound for France could not be discharged quickly enough to accommodate the new supplies, so a logjam developed.

Docking facilities were critical to the quick discharge of supplies and equipment in France. Mulberries were used to receive the tons of supplies and equipment needed to keep the invasion force moving forward. When the quantity of supplies coming in exceeded the number of Mulberries available, the remaining supplies were offloaded using logistics over-the-shore operations.

As the supply operation matured, 56,200 tons of supplies, 20,000 vehicles, and 180,000 troops were discharged each day at Omaha and Utah beaches. That was slightly less than half of the supplies, nearly two-thirds of the vehicles, and all of the troops that had been projected for offload each day. Performance on the American beaches improved rapidly as a more favorable tactical situation developed and, by 11 June 1944, all of the area up to the Aure River was under V Corps control. Until the securing of fixed port facilities at Cherbourg, Le Havre, Rouen, and Antwerp, Belgium, resupply and staging operations consisted entirely of Mulberries and logistics over-the-shore operations.

By the end of June, over 289,827 tons of supplies had been offloaded onto the Normandy beaches. However, shortages still occurred because supplies could not be discharged from British ports quickly enough and ships could not be turned around fast enough to keep up with the requirements of the landing forces. Therefore, by 15 June, supplies were being shipped directly to Normandy from the United States. At Normandy, supplies were stockpiled on the docks and beaches and then moved to forward units by truck.

The longer it took U.S. forces to secure the port of Cherbourg, the more supplies, equipment, and troops piled up on the beaches waiting to be trucked forward. In early August, the port at Cherbourg was cleared and opened so large quantities of supplies and equipment (more than 20,000 tons a day) could be loaded and moved forward by truck and rail. General William Whipple, Jr., USA (Ret.), former Chief of the Logistics Branch, G-4, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, wrote in a 16 May 1967 letter to Brigadier General Eugene A. Salet, Commandant of the Army War College--
Up to September, U.S. forces were supported largely across the beaches, but the U.S. beaches were known to be substantially unusable after 1 October on account of the weather. U.S. had the port of Cherbourg, which could handle about 20,000 tons a day; but this was inadequate, and was a long way from the front. Ports of Le Havre, Rouen, etc.... were so damaged as to be largely unusable, and such channel ports as were available had to be reserved with first priority for British use.

Port discharge problems led the way for the second major logistics problem in the logistics of invasion--moving supplies from the port to the front-line troops.

Logistics on the Move

Once U.S. and British forces broke out of the hedgerow country and began to race across open terrain, supply lines lengthened and resupply became more difficult. Allied commanders were frustrated because logistics transportation constraints prevented them from taking advantage of a favorable tactical situation. In August and September of 1944, supply forces set up a ground and air logistics express system to move food, fuel, ammunition, barrier materials, medical supplies, and equipment to forward units quickly by air, rail, and roads. Petroleum and ammunition accounted for half of the daily supply requirements.

Aerial resupply was useful for supporting airborne operations and emergency resupply operations, but most supplies were moved by truck and rail. As the war progressed, aerial resupply improved remarkably, as did road and rail transportation. However, resupply by air dropped off dramatically following the emergency missions to supply the 500,000 Americans participating in the Ardennes counteroffensive. After February and March 1945, air transport was used mainly for medical and petroleum resupply.

In both First and Third Armies, the resupply requirements far exceeded the ability of the transportation network to move supplies forward. In fact, by the end of August 1944, 90 to 95 percent of all supplies were still in Normandy beach depots nearly 300 miles from the forward units. To deal with these operational supply shortfalls, logisticians set up a priority system based on the amount of supplies that could be hauled by truck and rail instead of which army had priority.

Fuel Shortages

Petroleum is the lifeblood of a mechanized army. By mid-September 1944, First and Third Armies were experiencing critical fuel problems, not because of a lack of fuel at the ports and beachheads but because of a shortage of transportation to move the fuel. To help solve the problem, the Allies built a pipeline to move the petroleum 140 miles forward from the beachhead and port of Cherbourg. Once fuel reached the end of the pipeline, trucks moved it to forward supply bases. However, by 9 September, daily consumption outstripped daily receipts as Allied forces moved forward. Planned consumption was significantly underestimated, and units consumed the fuel as soon as it got to the front line. The increase in consumption rates and the lack of truck transportation were the largest contributors to the petroleum shortages. Nevertheless, fuel shortages accounted for only half of the critical shortages in the European theater. Ammunition was the other half.

Ammunition Shortfalls

Ammunition is the hardest supply to push on the battlefield because of its various types and different configurations. Ammunition arrives in theater in bulk and is broken down and loaded on trucks in configurations that maximize the space available. Problems such as a shortage of trucks, disputes over consumption rates, artillery round shortages, and production rates in the United States that couldn't keep up with demand, compounded the usual challenges of ammunition resupply.

By mid-September, Allied forces faced serious shortages and began rationing 155-millimeter howitzer and 81-millimeter mortar ammunition to the combat forces. As the war progressed, artillery expenditure rates changed from one army to the next and from one battle to the next. This made it difficult to predict the required supply rate. The Army eventually solved this problem by establishing a required supply rate and a combat supply rate. The required supply rate was the amount of ammunition a commander expected to need for a particular combat operation, while the combat supply rate was the amount of ammunition the supply system could support.

Other Supply Deficits

Although providing food, water, construction materials, and clothing to forward troops was less difficult in World War II than providing petroleum and ammunition, logisticians still faced some challenges with sustainment. Providing hot "chow" to forward units was time consuming, and it was difficult to serve units on the move. However, hot food was as big a morale boost for combat forces then as it is now.

Limited transportation made it difficult to move barrier materials to the front. It was hard to justify moving construction materials when there was not enough transportation available to move ammunition or fuel.
Clothing challenges involved everything from design and development to production problems to transportation shortages. Distribution of winter uniforms to the troops was delayed because line units did not provide the right requisitioning numbers. Winter uniforms were a very low requisitioning priority until October. By then, it was too late for every soldier to receive enough winter gear for the cold weather in December and January. Blanket requisitions did not include the needs of the civilian population, prisoners of war, and French free forces. There was a deficit of almost a million blankets by the winter of 1944.

World War II logistics was a continuous process of initiatives and experimentation to try to fit the right logistics system with the right circumstances. When logisticians found roadblocks at the strategic level, they overcame them as quickly as their communication systems could respond. At the operational level, logistics initiatives included Mulberries to serve as expedient piers, pipelines to move fuel, and the "Red Ball Express" to push logistics to the front lines. A beach-head was established to accumulate supplies, a series of supply bases was set up along a 300-mile main supply route, and, simultaneously, air, truck, rail, and pipeline transportation was used to move supplies across the battlefield.

"Red Ball Express" was the Army code name for a truck convoy system that stretched from St. Lo in Normandy to Paris and eventually to the front along France's northeastern borderland. The route was marked with red balls. The Army Transportation Corps created the huge trucking
operation on 21 August 1944. Supply trucks started rolling on 26 August and continued for 82 days. On an average day, 900 fully loaded vehicles were on the Red Ball route around the clock, with drivers ordered to observe 60-yard intervals and a top speed of 25 miles per hour. When the
program ended in mid-November 1944, Red Ball Express truckers had delivered 412,193 tons of food, gasoline, oil, lubricants, ammunition and other essential supplies.

Timeless Logistics Lessons

Military logistics operations in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War employed much of the same methodology: secure a port of debarkation, build up a supply base, and then push supplies forward by whatever means available. Even today, the commander's first strategy is typically to build up supplies and combat power over months in a theater of operations, conduct tactical operations, and then hope that supply lines remain open and capable of keeping up with the combat forces. However, as any good planner knows, "hope is not a method."

Transformation of the logistics structure must begin with the renovation of its systems, including changes in transportation and maintenance, as well as in the supply of food, water, fuel, ammunition, and barrier materials. The bottom line is: The military needs to lighten its equipment and supply loads in order to reduce its logistics tall, cut lift requirements, and, at the same time, increase force sustainability.

More Multipurpose Vehicles

The Army has already begun to reduce the weight of its combat systems by using the light armored vehicle (LAV) to increase the survivability of the light forces and increase the maneuverability of the heavy forces with a decrease in fuel consumption. Industry can take the LAV chassis one step further by using it for logistics vehicles that will replace the wide variety of cargo- and liquid-carrying vehicles now used. A LAV chassis, enhanced with a 5-ton cargo bed and a crane for loading and unloading 463L pallets and redesigned to be C-130 transportable, is essential.
Today's family of cargo transportation vehicles consists of four distinct types: dry cargo, wet cargo, perishable cargo, and ammunition. None of these vehicles are very fuel-efficient. The newest versions are complicated to maintain, and several different types of mechanics are required to maintain them. They do not all have the same load capabilities, and they are not survivable on the modern battlefield.

If the same medium-weight chassis were used for both cargo vehicles and combat vehicles, the number of mechanics needed to repair them would be reduced. Such vehicles could keep up with the combat forces while maintaining a small degree of self-protection. A LAV equipped with a cargo bed or a pallet-mounted 3,000-gallon fuel or water tank could move cargo, fuel, or water anywhere on the battlefield. This system also could be equipped with a crew-served weapon that would provide high-volume direct fire from within the vehicle's cab.

Subsistence Transformation

Transformation of rations and the way rations and water are provided would reduce the number of personnel required to support combat forces, decrease the number of cargo vehicles needed, and reduce the overall logistics footprint on the battlefield.

The way to redesign field rations is to combine meals, ready to eat (MREs), tray rations, and unitized group rations into a "super MRE." The super MRE would be packaged, heated, and prepared much like the current MREs but would have the nutritional value, variety, and taste of fresh A rations.

The super MREs would eliminate the need for cooks, provide forward combat units with hot meals, and reduce the need for transporting large quantities of rations across the battlefield. At the same time, super MREs would ensure that even the soldiers on the most remote part of the battlefield receive a hot meal.

Water is another challenge for logisticians. Water purification and bulk water transportation across the battlefield are difficult and time consuming. Also, it is difficult to get water to soldiers in the most remote areas of the theater.

Three concepts for future water production and transportation could reduce the problems inherent in water resupply. The first is a water-production system already in concept development that extracts water from a vehicle's fuel system, purifies it, and stores it in a separate tank. This not only will increase the fuel efficiency of combat vehicles by removing wastewater but also will provide forward combat soldiers with water systems in their individual vehicles.

The second method of providing water to forward combat units is to equip each squad with a small, vehicle-mounted reverse-osmosis water purification unit with a 100- to 200-gallon storage tank.

The third method is to purchase more hard-wall bulk water tanks that mount on 463L pallets. Currently, bulk water distribution is limited to 3,000-gallon water bags hauled on trailers. These bags have to be either full or empty when hauled and cannot be easily dismounted and recovered. The hard-wall tanks could be filled with any quantity of water, dropped off anywhere on the battlefield, and picked up when empty. These tanks, which would be similar to the new "Hippo" water tank rack system, would provide more flexible water distribution. Modern technology could replace the metal tanks with composite plastic tanks, which would reduce the weight of the tank, minimize mildew buildup, and eliminate rust in the tank.

Other potential water innovations range from a personal hydration system to a solar-powered water chiller-heater that would fit inside a flak jacket. The device's solar-powered motor would chill water in hot climates and warm water in cold climates to add to the wearer's comfort and safety.

Liquid Logistics

Petroleum is the other "liquid logistics" commodity that puts a huge strain on both combat forces and logistics forces trying to move it. Until technology can provide a viable hydrogen-powered engine, petroleum will continue to be the primary fuel for powering military vehicles. Therefore, military vehicles must be lighter weight and more fuel efficient. Industry can assist with meeting these goals by equipping the new generation of combat and combat support vehicles with a simple-to-maintain battery-fuel combination engine or one that operates on fuel cells.

Another innovation for moving fuel on the battlefield is the Load-Handling System (LHS) Modular Fuel Farm (LMFF). It consists of ten 2,500-gallon tank racks and one pump rack. Like the Hippos, the LMFF tanks can be transported when full, partially filled, or empty. By using two tank racks--one on the truck and one on the trailer--a palletized load system and LHS can transport up to 5,000 gallons of bulk petroleum per trip.

Bulky Cargo

Barrier materials such as lumber, sandbags, and barbed wire are a strain on transportation systems because they are bulky, oversized, and difficult to load. The biggest problem with this type of cargo is that it comes in many different shapes and sizes, which makes it difficult to establish a standard load for a cargo vehicle.

The first step to more efficient resupply of barrier materials is the development of standard packages that would be used Army-wide. Barrier materials could be broken down and configured into lettered and numbered sets much like they are in most active-duty combat units. All packages would be assembled and configured for specific purposes, such as platoon defense, roadblock, or mine emplacement.

These configured and labeled packages would be shipped from the United States to a theater of operations, where forward combat forces could order them by citing the appropriate letter and number of the configuration they need. Preassembled, preconfigured barrier materials could be brought into the theater quickly.

Building Better Bullets

The last class of supply needing transformation is ammunition. The first of two big problems is the many different kinds of ammunition that are required on the battlefield. Having so many different kinds of ammunition makes it difficult to provide the correct ammunition during combat. The second problem is determining how much ammunition to move onto the battlefield without moving too much or too little. Too much would tie up transportation assets, and downloading unneeded ammunition would be an added burden. A shortage of ammunition would pose a serious threat to combat units during a fight.

There are many different sizes and types of ammunition in the U.S. military's inventory. To reduce the overall signature of large-caliber ammunition (above .50 caliber), for example, technology must combine similar caliber ammunition into a few interchangeable types. For example, artillery ammunition could be interchangeable with tank and large mortar ammunition, reducing at least six types of ammunition to one. Missile, rocket, and smaller mortar ammunition could be combined into another type. A standard conversion kit could accompany the two types of ammunition so they could be used quickly for whatever purpose necessary.

The biggest advantage to a revolution in ammunition development is the reduced need to carry multiple types of ammunition across the battlefield. Only high-use ammunition would flow on resupply trucks, and it would stay uploaded until it was needed by combat forces. This would help keep the combat forces supplied and allow them to stay mobile on the battlefield. The only necessary reconfiguration of the ammunition would take place at the firing point.

Effective logistics capabilities provide the foundation that combat operators need to be persistent and decisive. Therefore, a transformation of combat operations cannot be carried out without first transforming logistics operations.

As the current U.S. military moves from a platform-based force to a capabilities-based force, logistics will play a key role in determining the success or failure of that transformation. A real logistics transformation will require new equipment, new planning techniques, and a logistics information architecture that supports the combat force.

Real-time information that enables supply requisitioning and tracking from the factory to the battlefield is critical to the success of any equipment innovations. Without such a system to complement the capabilities-based equipment, the logistics system will remain a cumbersome supply-based operation. Real-time information would eliminate many of the problems experienced during World War II, when it took months to respond to requisition changes from the front.

As recent transformations initiatives have stressed, successful capabilities-based logistics systems must be "sense-and-respond" systems that comprise two key ingredients: information and capability. Unfortunately, both the information architecture and the capabilities-based logistics equipment and systems needed for logistics transformation are still in the developmental stages. Without both ingredients, combat commanders soon will lose confidence in the ability of logisticians to provide "just-in-time" logistics and resort again to building an "Iron Mountain" of materiel as in previous conflicts. Until a global information network and a capabilities-based logistics system are implemented and validated, logistics sustainment will remain a "just-in-case" operation.

COPYRIGHT 2003 ALMC
COPYRIGHT 2003 Gale Group

TEO, that's an amazing article. Thanks for sharing it...I'm now about to reconfigure parts of WA's military structure (and to configure other previously unconfigured parts as well).

hey great i only read the first page but it makes a ton of sense and i try to stick to logistics as best i can so i dont go all gay and say i have all this when i didnt even buy it at a storefront

hey great i only read the first page but it makes a ton of sense and i try to stick to logistics as best i can so i dont go all gay and say i have all this when i didnt even buy it at a storefront

Storefronts aren't necessary. A lot of people like them, because they do create a lot of roleplay opportunities, but you don't need a storefront.

I have never bought anything from any storefront, nor do I have one of my own. I make posts from time to time detailing what my military is building and deploying, and those stand as my notification to all and sundry what sort of equipment I use. Evil Overlord Enterprises military equipment is not for sale- except for deactivated/mothballed equipment surplus to current needs.

Be creative and build your own stuff, or buy it from a storefront, or simply use NATO or Soviet equipment as your own.


TEO

I got this from the Straight Dope website, and copied it for your use here:

TEO

*****

What you want is World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), published by the U.S. Department of State (formerly by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and available online. The 28th edition, published in 2003, covers expenditures from 1989 through 1999. A sample:

Top ten military budgets. The U.S. spends the most by far, but matters aren't as lopsided as some suggest. The WMEAT list (in billions): 1) U.S., $281.0; 2) mainland China, $88.9; 3) Japan, $43.2; 4) France, $38.9; 5) UK, $36.5; 6) Russia, $35.0; 7) Germany, $32.6; 8 ) Italy, $23.7; 9) Saudi Arabia, $21.2; 10) Taiwan, $15.2.
The U.S. military, therefore, spends as much as the next six countries combined, with just about enough change to cover Greece ($6 billion). To put it another way, the U.S. accounted for 33 percent of world military expenditures in 1999, a modest increase since Cold War days (28 percent in 1986). Sorry, no breakdown on percentage of the military budget used to suppress dissidents or otherwise deal with internal security.

Five largest armed services.

Soldiers (in millions): (1) mainland China, 2.4; (2) U.S., 1.5; (3) India, 1.3; (4) North Korea, 1.0; (5) Russia, 0.9.

Arms exports.

Here's where it starts to get interesting. According to WMEAT, the U.S. exports far more arms than the rest of the world combined--$33 billion versus $18.6 billion. The biggest arms importer? Saudi Arabia, $7.7 billion.

Top three in gross national product.

Think you know this one, eh? We'll see. The first two are easy: (1) U.S., $9.3 trillion; (2) Japan, $4.4 trillion. Now guess the third. Time's up: it's mainland China, at $3.9 trillion. According to the CIA World Factbook, China's economy grew 8 percent in 2002, whereas Japan's grew 0.2 percent, so it's fair to say China will soon have the second largest economy in the world. In fact, on a "purchasing power parity" basis (don't ask), it already does.

Military expenditures as a percentage of gross national product.

The U.S. spends a lot on its military but has a lot to spend. Some other countries don't have much but spend it on the military anyway. World leader: Eritrea, which spends 27.4 percent of its $757 million GNP (world rank: 155) on the armed services, most of it presumably to fight its archenemy, Ethiopia. The balance of the top ten, with percentages ranging between 21.2 and 8.8: Angola, North Korea, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Congo, Qatar, Jordan, Ethiopia, and Israel. U.S. rank: 52nd, at 3 percent.

Military expenditures per soldier.

The U.S. ranks first, spending $189,000 per soldier--Lord knows crack prison guards don't come cheap. Japan (number two) and the UK (number three) aren't far behind, spending $180,000 and $167,000, respectively. Who's at the bottom of the list? Why, Iceland, where annual military expenditure per soldier is $0, owing to the fact that the country has no regular military and thus no military budget. How can that be in our wicked world? Easy. The country is protected by the Icelandic Defense Force, maintained by--you guessed it--the United States.

outstanding thread, my new bible. This will be put to good use.

I've kept my military at a steady level untill now, im just expanding but this should help tons.

On the subject of automated convoys i will persue this and it has one security advantage aswell. If you take all the personell who would otherwise be operating the convoy but are now void and turn them inot security you have large well guarded convoys that mean your troops can be better supplied. Once again a most excellent thread

outstanding thread, my new bible. This will be put to good use.

I've kept my military at a steady level untill now, im just expanding but this should help tons.

On the subject of automated convoys i will persue this and it has one security advantage aswell. If you take all the personell who would otherwise be operating the convoy but are now void and turn them inot security you have large well guarded convoys that mean your troops can be better supplied. Once again a most excellent thread

Very true, but also, depending on the type of nation you run, it might be easier to accept large logistical issues rather than risk personnel. The US has lost what, in other eras or other nations in even this modern era of warfare, might be considered a piddling sum...a single US assault during the 2nd Gulf War on an Iraqi tank column probably killed almost 600 or more men in a few minutes...but for the US army to loose that many is a serious political issue back home. I am generally opposed to the war, but a loss of 600 personnel with over 130,000 deployed in the field is...to say the least...an amazing feat.

Now, the numbers of wounded US personnel are quite large, but since those people are shuttled off to hospitals and then emerge with shiny new prosthetics we hardly notice the fact that the US Military has used these people, crippled them in the process, and they've now been discared because that crippling renders them unable to perform their duties (fighting and risking death or injury)...and the Military has paid them little to compensate for that.

In this case, it would be preferable to limit the risk to personnel (or rather to personnel actually dying of injuries) rather than limit risks to convoy trucks, which are relatively easily replaced. "12 Logistical Trucks lost" rings a much mellower tone than "12 Logistical Personnel lost" in any country...and if your country has the military-industrial complex of a modern, capitalist democracy of some sort then there are almost political benefits for 'equipment attrition' but I'm not here to talk about realities of the boardroom.

Indeed, on some convoys that bear expensive or limited resources (oil, spare parts, ammunition, etc.) then heavier guards might be posted but for cheap materials (more comprehensive bedding, luxuries, extra water and food, etc.) might be better sacrificed than invested in.

But those are just some annexes to my original post on the subject.

A post made in my regional board about the types of Logistics Trucks that might be used (for Western Asia in RPs):
LOGISTICS VEHICLES.

I currently have 3 types of logistics vehicles prepared for (different systems are optimized for different types of operations)

Type I: Classic
2.5 and 5 ton trucks to the main lift and shift duties. This is good for transport in protected areas and along safe routes (such as within WA or a friendly country) where guerilla forces are unlikely to be operating in large numbers. These vehicles are also relatively cheap to purchase and operate so their employment is not a great load upon the logistics or acquisitions chains. Should be updated with modern mine-resistant systems to protect not only against planted AP and AT mines but also IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) such as roadside bombs.

Type II: Armored.
Modified LAV-like vehicles with 5ton cargo bed and a crane for loading 463L pallets (Part of the Palletized Load System (PLS (http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/pls.htm))) or with a pallet-mounted 3k gallon liquids (fuel or water) transportation tank (plastic hard-wall or soft-wall, depending upon use and need). C130 transportable without extensive prep (allowing for rapid deployment even in support of combat raid operations). Operated by 1-2 crew members with a single defensive weapon (Negev LMG, M2BH .50 cal, 25mm OCSW or 40mm GMG) for limited protective purposes. Might employ variations of the SEP. The ideal would seem to be a wheeled platform mostly although tracked vehicles might be optimal for beach landing and cross-country operations. Would be called Light Armored Logistics Vehicles (LALVs) or Light Armored Support Vehicles (LASVs). Armoring defends against minor weapons attacks but priority in armoring is given to anti-mine/anti-IED systems as with the Type I logistics systems.

Type III: Advanced.
Of the type that I mentioned in my
Logistics Thread (http://www.nationstates.net/forum/viewtopic.php?p=3021502#3021502) post, under the name "SUSVs." Would be either slightly armored but highly computerized versions of the Type Is or simply highly computerized versions of the Type IIs that have been updated...a sort of "Block II" version of the LALVs/LASVs. Also included would be larger support vehicles such as the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT (http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/hmett.htm)), Heavy Equipment Transporter System (HETS (http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/hets.htm)), and the MK48 Logistics Vehicle System (LVS (http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/mk48.htm)). This should provide a highly dependable ground-based logistical system.

Western Asia's ULA (Ultra Large Airlifters) are semirigid airlifter-type airships that carry between 20 and 1000 tonnes. They are used for long-range interregional transports as well as shorter range intraregional transports and intratheater point logistics. They are good for this role since they can land in almost any terrain but are somewhat expensive and in short supply.

The idea I was getting at is that some duties will inevitably demand a 'full' crewing of vehicles (such as troop transport by open-back or open-top truck, although an armored vehicle would be preferred, of course...) and so for those units that are commonly assigned to such duties (ie, a Marine Expeditionary Unit personnel transport group) a cheaper 'classic' or 'armored' type of logistics vehicle might be preferable to the costly (and it will be costly) automated or semi-automated units.

I'm not sure where the ULA comment comes in, but I love using them because they can land anywhere (literally) and carry as little as a large truck or as much as an ocean-going ship over what may be rough terrain or areas with poor road quality...and it's a nice way to drop heavy forces quickly onto a beachhead or foothold without placing a large number of transport helicopters, other heavy VTOL units*, or amphibious assault vessels in danger...and while placing many more personnel/much more equipment with every load. The speed is limited to just over 100mph, which makes it significantly slower than jet or turboprop transport aircraft or helicopters, but the higher capacity makes it great for longer-term, continued-support operations due to the low-cost, dependability, and high volume of transport.


And now, for some treats: Break down of military organizations and structures...for those of us too lazy to organize our militaries 'a priori.'

http://www.geocities.com/mindef123/Structure.html
http://www-solar.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/~aaron/MODORG/is67.html
http://www-solar.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/~aaron/MODORG/usmc90.html
http://www-solar.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/~aaron/MODORG/is80.html

Other stuff is stuck on my favorites list..I'll have to organize it when my computer cooperates with the concept of "more than one IE window open at one time."

EDIT: Here are the resources:

JED (Journal of Electronic Defense) Online: http://www.jedonline.com/default.asp?func=cover
You can just register in a few minutes to your email account, it's free and the journal (with back issues available) provides a tremendous amount of tutorial information on threats and countermeasures as well as (indirectly) a primer on what some of the best technologies are for attacking ships, aircraft, and troops. Note: I got this link from someone on NS, possibly Omz. Note 2: Can get VERY technical and scientific.

Pointer (Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces):
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/index.htm
A very good review of current tactics, naval vessels, naval aircraft, and technologies. Very well thought-out reviews and papers in GOOD english. No subscription required. Back issues to 1998 available in full.

Just brilliant and informative, even to my relatively peaceful and non-militaristic government.

Consider this to be begging for a sticky for this. The more people who read and understand, the fewer godmoders we'll have. Not that we'll ever be completely rid of them.

Sorry for the delay. Took me a while to get around to digging this up after the forum change.


TEO

What is 2% of 512,000,000 anyway? I suck at math >.> <.<

I am glad I ain't the only one who understands how much support works is needed just to field *1* Soldier. And imagine the supply lines of the people that say " I sent in 200k sodliers, 50k tanks and 5k Nuclear Subs to Blow ur Nation to hell ". Talk about overcrowing. The way they set it, a soldier would have about 5 bullets, and heck, only some would even have a fricken Rifle, teh rest would be stuck with pistols, or worse... A tank would have 1 maybe 2 shells and like 20 rounds for the Coax..... The subs.... 1 torp, max, and don't even think about missiles.....

That is why I keep my army small 2500 - 6000 ish combat personell,(Including officers and otehr milatary desk jockeys)


All this is only applicable if they don't have a GIANT ecomeny entirely focused on building weapons and ammo. And then they would still haev food and water problems.

What is 2% of 512,000,000 anyway?10,240,000
I suck at mathhttp://www.math.com/students/calculators/source/basic.htm

Wow thanks :D

Here's my second question, is this acceptable for a nation of my size? I'm going to bring it from the thread I created, maybe I'll get more response here.

Ground Forces:

Each Division contains:
50,000 Infantrymen
2,000 BMP-3s
1,000 RCH-1s (Chinooks)
5,000 Support Staff
4,000 Humvees
3,000 ROH-1s (Blackhawk)
3,000 T-90s
700 Priests for Religious Purposes
1,000 RLAH-1s (Cobra Attack Helicopter)
300 RAH-1s (Hind)
Note that the Aircraft belong to the Army and not the Air Force

In Total 70,000 Personnel per Division

1st Division=1st Corp=1st Army Group
3rd Division=1st Corp=1st Army Group
5th Division=1st Corp=1st Army Group
7th Division=1st Corp=1st Army Group
10th Division=2nd Corp=2nd Army Group
103rd Division=2nd Corp=2nd Army Group
70th Division=2nd Corp=2nd Army Group
72nd Division=2nd Corp=2nd Army Group
67th Division=3rd Corp=3rd Army Group
21st Division=3rd Corp=3rd Army Group
75th Division=3rd Corp=3rd Army Group
81st Division=3rd Corp=3rd Army Group

30,000 Special Forces:
45th Rosktai Division
101st Rosktai Division

15 ,000 Per Special Forces Division.

Navy:
The RADF contains 20 Battle Fleets, each fleet contains 25 ships.

Each Fleet contains:

1 Nimitz Class Carriers (Carries 85 Aircraft)
8 United States Class Carriers (Carries 50 Aircraft)
2 Iowa Class Battleships
3 Los Angeles Class Submarines
5 Arleigh Burke Guided Missile AEGIS Destroyers
2 Kilauea Class Ammunition Ships
1 Kaiser Class Oiler Ship
2 Safeguard Class Rescue and Salvage Ships
1 Mercy Class Hospital Ships

Each Nimitz Carrier contains:
45 RF-1s (F-18)
20 RB-1s (F-15E)
2 E2-C Hawkeyes
5 EA-6s
8 RCH-1s (Chinook)
5 RCP-1s (C-17)

Each United States Carrier contains:
28 RF-1s
10 RB-1s
2 E2-c Hawkeyes
3 EA-6s
5 RCH-1s
2 RCP-1s

Air Force:
10,000 RF-1s (F-18)
7,000 RB-1s (F-15E)
3,000 RAH-1s (Hind)
5,000 RLAH-1s (Cobra Attack Helicopter)
2,000 RCP-1s (C-17)
4,000 ROH-1s (Blackhawk)
1,000 RSH-1s (Little Bird)
3,000 RHB-1s (B-52)
1,000 ROP-1s (Refueling Plane thing)

Is that good for a nation my size?

What is 2% of 512,000,000 anyway? I suck at math >.> <.<


10,240,000

With the demise of the "super thread" (all links broken, author gone), I figured this should be stuck. Lord knows people need to think about it more often.

Use the very well-designed military calculator to determine how many personnel are in your military and make your distribution accordingly.

Where is this calculator?

is this acceptable for a nation of my size?

I think your organization needs work, and you don't seem to have accounted for support personnel for your forces.

For example: Using rough approximations of crew sizes for the various aircraft in your Air Force inventory, I get a total flight crew size as 116,000. Every aircraft will need a dedicated group of ground crewmen to keep it operating, plus all of the base facilities personnel needed to keep the ground crews supplied, etc. The usual estimate I encourage others to use is 10 support personnel for each combat soldier or flight crewman. Using that number, there would have to be 1,160,000 Air Force personnel in addition to your flight crews, for an Air Force total manning of 1,276,000 personnel.

If you're going to organize your military, you should concentrate on unit organization. A US Army division is between 12-16 thousand. A brigade/regiment is roughly 4-5 thousand. A battalion is about 1,000-1,200. A company is between 200-300. A platoon is between 40-60.

Start with the smaller unit sizes, and remember your rank structures. Each platoon needs a junior officer, a senior NCO, and 4 or 5 junior NCOs. A company would require 4-6 times as many for the individual units, plus the company staff- consisting of the Company commander (a senior lieutenant or captain), his/her senior NCO, and several officers and NCOs for organizational staff structure. Many of these personnel can do double-duty for some of the staff jobs, but the platoon officers don't really have time to do anything except run their units.

Multiply the company organization by 4 or 5 to get the Battalion organization, plus the Battalion staff. Units of this size will usually have different types of units included within them (armored units, artillery batteries, etc), and each specific type command will require a specialist officer in the Battalion staff.

Brigade/regiment organization gets even more complicated, because you'll need liaison officers for air/naval support, specialist communications/detection technician units, engineers, etc- in addition to the individual unit commanders, Battalion staffs, and Brigade/regimental staff.

Group several divisions together to form a Corps- with its own staff requirements. Several Corps together form an Army. Notice that each successively larger unit requires a larger staff, meaning that Corps and Army commanders are traveling with dozens of staff personnel who manage the myriad details of moving thousands of troops and vehicles around the battle theater.

The point of this seeming digression into unit organization is to highlight the fact that your military will have far fewer combat personnel than total strength. Assuming that you use one of the many calculators for military strength available, take the total numbers generated for each service and assume that roughly 10% of that number will be available for combat operations. This will help you figure out how many tanks, trucks, ships, and aircraft you will have.


TEO

Excellent thread. I've been beating my head against my monitor from dealing with the logistically impaired for some time, and I even made a detailed (and very similar to TEO's initial post) post about the place and importance of logistics in FWS's guide to creating an army.

In several cases not only have people ignored logistics (SOMEONE will take care of it..............right?) but they have refused to allow their logistics to be targetted. I can think of a prime example where one of my armies (80,000 men, 2,000 tanks, 2,000 LAV's and assorted air cover) supported by my logistics army (The Fists of Vaad, they are 80,000 men devoted entirely to logistics) faced off against a 400,000 man army supported by 4,000 APC's. I immediately pointed out what a logistical nightmare this was and the began asking relevant questions like, how may tanker trucks do you have, mechanics, etc........I was very anxious to target logistics as my enemy had no air support. I was informed by opponent that he had ' enough'tanker trucks and supply trucks and they were well behind lines and well protected. I then asked how many of the 400,000 are guarding these support trucks and equipment , needless to say no answer was forthcoming.

If you are going to RP a realistic and involved military campaign you must not forget logistics. You must remember that you have logistics and you must remember that they are targets. I generally post my logistical forces, but I do not elaborate on them unless my adversary asks (no one has yet to ask) I often make posts about how my 'Fists of Vaad' are clearing runways, laying in supplies, setting resupply and refueling bases etc.....no one ever attacks them or asks for anymore detail other than where they are and how many men are there.

I'm glad this topic is a sticky, there at least a dozen nations that I know that should read this. How about just once, someone rp's running out of ammo?

Nice thread, good job.

Times like these I'm glad I don't have any Air or Sea combat vehicles. Or Tanks, theres a lot to be said for self sufficency, even if there are limits.

How about just once, someone rp's running out of ammo?

Or at the very least roleplaying the difficulties in re-supplying the forward units.


TEO

It warms my cold black heart to know that this thread has been stickied and is up at the top of the page, and that there are always nations out there who do concern themselves with logistics and would be fun to make war against. Ahh, if only more of them were future tech too.

Way I see it, future tech logistics is more nightmarish, in terms of scale and supply needs, but also somewhat easier since some things (like gasoline, or even projectile weapons if you're foolish) can be done away with.

I figure about a 25 to 1 support ratio for the future space force and navy and airforce. Or more. Possibly a similar rate for the ground forces too. At least, maintaining the level of quality comparable with modern forces.

It warms my cold black heart to know that this thread has been stickied and is up at the top of the page, and that there are always nations out there who do concern themselves with logistics and would be fun to make war against. Ahh, if only more of them were future tech too.

Way I see it, future tech logistics is more nightmarish, in terms of scale and supply needs, but also somewhat easier since some things (like gasoline, or even projectile weapons if you're foolish) can be done away with.

I figure about a 25 to 1 support ratio for the future space force and navy and airforce. Or more. Possibly a similar rate for the ground forces too. At least, maintaining the level of quality comparable with modern forces.

Indeed. One wonders what the support ratio is now for, say, a single US modern day shuttle.

Come join our nation!!!
The lush Pastures of fat!
We want more people and more firepower!!!!

I am glad I ain't the only one who understands how much support works is needed just to field *1* Soldier. And imagine the supply lines of the people that say " I sent in 200k sodliers, 50k tanks and 5k Nuclear Subs to Blow ur Nation to hell ". Talk about overcrowing. The way they set it, a soldier would have about 5 bullets, and heck, only some would even have a fricken Rifle, teh rest would be stuck with pistols, or worse
The Soviets sent soldiers into Stalingrad with about as much equipment. Two soldiers would be paired together. One had a gun with 1 clip of ammunition loaded, the second had 2 clips of ammo, but no gun. The second soldier was expected to pick up the gun of his partner when (not if) the partner was shot. The officers stood with pistols to ensure that nobody turned around to try to flee.

good Reference To The Chaos Theory. :)

And may I ask...what is the point? I do not really do war RPs, but roleplay is roleplay for a reason. Roleplay is meant to be for fun, for generalized enjoyment. Most of us do not know the complex bureaucracy necessary to run a nation, we are doing this with a general idea as in people who write novels. What good is doing all the logistics if your opponent is not using logistics? I would stick to the standard of whatever everyone else is doing.

I mean, if you really want true war, go to an hyper-realistic RTS.

And may I ask...what is the point?
It's interesting?

I do not really do war RPs, but roleplay is roleplay for a reason. Roleplay is meant to be for fun, for generalized enjoyment. Most of us do not know the complex bureaucracy necessary to run a nation, we are doing this with a general idea as in people who write novels. What good is doing all the logistics if your opponent is not using logistics? I would stick to the standard of whatever everyone else is doing.

I mean, if you really want true war, go to an hyper-realistic RTS.

The truth is that while this thread is more of an amusing academic exploration nowadays, but when this thread was started, it was not uncommon to see claims of 100 million soldiers involved in massed landings to start a war that, in real life, might involve 10,000 soldiers on the high end. There was a fair bit of outrage on the part of some players (myself included) about the claims that some nations were seemingly able to make 30million troops, 20,000 aircraft and 40,000 tanks appear in the middle of a battlefield without any explaination about transport, landing, placement, or organization. This was eventually limited to where nations would bother landing the men, but would then claim that about 1million men were landed every 15minutes...in any case, TEO decided to start this thread to explain and collect advice on Logistics, the complications of Logistics, and the limits of Logistics. Things are now somewhat more undercontrol (although godmodded equipment, troop transport, and provisions remains) but this thread has carried on anyways...even if the pressures are less excessive than in previous times.

Does that answer your question?

First off, let me apologize, but I did not want to fend through 16 pages of posting, but I wanted to congradulate TEO on this, and add something. If this has been mentioned, go ahead and bludgeon me with, "Read page 7, moron!", but there are some very important "big gun" ponts in logistics that are often ignored on NS:

1.)Artillery. Artillery is one of the greatest time and space consuming forces in warfare. You want field guns? Be prepared for more head ache than tanks bring. You have gun that cannot move on its own, requires a tremendous amount of ammunition, and a large crew. You have to move them and their train into position for a battle, predicting where the battle will occur, or attempting to get into a battle. Artillery will also need its defensive force, because it is defensless. That means Infantry jsut for it, plus Anti-Aircraft and its support crews.

2.)MLRS and self-propelled guns. These are nice and flashy, and faster than normal field guns, but they still need insane supplies. They will chew through ammunition faster than their immobile cousins, and will need special care and concern to keep their automated systems functioning.

(The Crusader, cancelled by SecDef Rumsfeld, had an entire ammunition carrier that rolled along and connected via umbillical. It was the cost, supply, and transport issues of the Crusader that led to its demise. It was simply too big, complex, and draining to be of any practical use in a dynamic battlefield. In NS, of course, it may see usage, but please, remember that these types of weapons do not just *poof* into a nation, much less the battlefield.)

3.)Rail Gun Arty (God save us). I'm not talking of magnetic weapons, but the old style railroad guns. Yes, I know you get quivers thinking about firing multi-hundred millimeter shells onto your opponents from miles away, but consider this. The rail gun Dora (or Big Gustav, there is contention on which it was), used by the Nazis in WWII, fired an 800mm shell. It required five trains of equipment, 5000 men, and a month... just to set up and fire once. It was so overburdening that the Germans used it only once, against a town they had already overrun with Armored and Infantry. They had to encircle the town and haul up Dora, keeping the town isolated while they pushed past into Russia, for an entire month, just so they could test the gun. It worked, and fifteen shells broke the town, but they could have taken it months earlier with normal means. Dora was so impractical it was never used again. Please remember this the next time you feel the urge to haul along 400mm or greater weapons.



As I said, if this was discussed, please tell me, but the overuse of "OMGZ HUGE GUNZ!" in NS is bothersome.

The truth is that while this thread is more of an amusing academic exploration nowadays, but when this thread was started, it was not uncommon to see claims of 100 million soldiers involved in massed landings to start a war that, in real life, might involve 10,000 soldiers on the high end. There was a fair bit of outrage on the part of some players (myself included) about the claims that some nations were seemingly able to make 30million troops, 20,000 aircraft and 40,000 tanks appear in the middle of a battlefield without any explaination about transport, landing, placement, or organization. This was eventually limited to where nations would bother landing the men, but would then claim that about 1million men were landed every 15minutes...in any case, TEO decided to start this thread to explain and collect advice on Logistics, the complications of Logistics, and the limits of Logistics. Things are now somewhat more undercontrol (although godmodded equipment, troop transport, and provisions remains) but this thread has carried on anyways...even if the pressures are less excessive than in previous times.

Does that answer your question?

Actually, I just got through reading about the Ottoman Empire/Soviet Bloc war, and my impression of the whole was "If I was the arabs, I'd wipe out their supply lines and let them dehydrate and die in the desert". Consider the difference in location - Arab units are used to desert travel, Soviets are not. Soviets are using gas, Arabs are using camels and camel-towed artillery. It's really not that hard to sever desert supply lines (see WWII). You don't need to fight the enemy, just blow up his ability to feed the soldiers and see what happens next.

Actually, I just got through reading about the Ottoman Empire/Soviet Bloc war, and my impression of the whole was "If I was the arabs, I'd wipe out their supply lines and let them dehydrate and die in the desert". Consider the difference in location - Arab units are used to desert travel, Soviets are not. Soviets are using gas, Arabs are using camels and camel-towed artillery. It's really not that hard to sever desert supply lines (see WWII). You don't need to fight the enemy, just blow up his ability to feed the soldiers and see what happens next.

I hate to break it to you, but the ottomans are not Arabs. Additionally, most Arabs are not used to the type of life that you refer to...those would be the Bedouin. Bedouin tribes are the real desert roamers while the Arabs have traditionally focused on the cities and relatively well watered areas (the ME is not /completely/ sand and dunes, although southern Iraq and central northwestern Saudi Arabia mostly are). Lebanon was traditionally known for its trees and mountains and Syria and Iran are very hilly and dry, but not sandy terrain. Anatolia is more hilly and green, although a bit dry, than a wasteland.

As far as "Arabs are used to desert travel," the Israelis came across the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Desert during the 1967 War...and defeated them handily (with some lessons learned about the Sinai's geography from the 1956 war)...and many of the Egyptian units were basically soldiers just returned from the Yemen war who were sent into the desert with few supplies. In that case, the Arabs proved that they were not desert wanderers.

Camels are difficult animals and would likely not tow a cannon very well (horses have been made to do so, but are a much more accomodating species)...they are also quite slow and would be easily outflanked and taken out by even heavy tracked vehicles towing a supply line. You have quite a few assumptions here that aren't even close to reality.

--------------

Kaukolastan,
I have a few responses and comments on what you've said and claimed above, but thanks in advance for adding to the thread.

1.)Artillery. Artillery is one of the greatest time and space consuming forces in warfare. You want field guns? Be prepared for more head ache than tanks bring. You have gun that cannot move on its own, requires a tremendous amount of ammunition, and a large crew. You have to move them and their train into position for a battle, predicting where the battle will occur, or attempting to get into a battle. Artillery will also need its defensive force, because it is defensless. That means Infantry jsut for it, plus Anti-Aircraft and its support crews.

Luckily, things aren't as extreme as they are painted here. A 2.5 or 5 ton truck (sometimes even a HMMWV or old JEEP) can both bring along a significant amount of ammunition, bear a full artillery crew (who can be armed to guard the vehicle), and tow the cannon itself. With a range of 10-50km based on the style, caliber, and technology level, the Cannons (which can often be set up in about 5-10 minutes with a well-practiced crew) can be deployed to the rear of a moving line and be providing fire support for hours of intense combat (if there is little or no resistance to the advance then they can just ride along).

As for the crew requirements, Cannons can require as few as four men (ie the Israeli ATHOS 155mm towed gun (http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/artillery/towed_guns/athos/ATHOS.html) and T78/90 Howitzers (http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/artillery/towed_guns/tn78-90/TN78-90.html)) although it is more common to see crew assignments of 6-9 men (as is the case with the USMC's M198 155mm (http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m198.htm) Howitzer and the Israeli (ex-US) M114 155mm (http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/artillery/towed_guns/m-114s/M-114S.html) Howitzer. Depending upon the type of battle being waged, artillery can be a useless trailing limb or the heart and soul of one's drive.

In Vietnam, artillery "bases" consisting of 2-6 Batteries of 155mm guns were arranged on cleared hilltops. These units could then provide fire support for soldiers landed by helicopter far away. The lack of advanced artillery among the viet cong and NVA in the southern parts meant that the guerillas would have to overrun the base. This was certainly attempted, but with only a few platoons stationed about the cannons along with Claymores and planted mine fields...these bases were relatively safe. In Afghanistan, the hilly terrain hase made the airliftable 155mm Howitzers and invaluable resource since a running battle can be covered for days by the artillery crews on their high base. Antiaircraft support is not always needed, although it might be for battles with well-equipped forces...but in any case artillery units are often based near the company or battalion or higher-level unit command center, which would have SHORAD and other AD systems already in place.

2.)MLRS and self-propelled guns. These are nice and flashy, and faster than normal field guns, but they still need insane supplies. They will chew through ammunition faster than their immobile cousins, and will need special care and concern to keep their automated systems functioning.

This is all, of course, to be taken in context of the abilities of SP and Rocket artillery units...namely the ability of one MLRS battery to devastate an entire brigade or division of armored or unarmored or infantry forces in a few minutes. The care and concern that most systems need (the Crusader not being included) is "field ground conditions standard" or "until it breaks, don't fix it." They will, of course, run through ammunition...but isn't that their job, in a way? The big benefit is that they can fire virtually on a moment's notice and provide a nice protected environment for their crew members...while bringing all of the benefits of their in-place cousins (the extra costs, however, are enough to keep their immobile cousins in demand and in use...and the towed ones weigh a good bit less than their SP cousins). Special care? Yea, sure, but not much more than the towed variants demand (if the towing vehicle is included).

(The Crusader, cancelled by SecDef Rumsfeld, had an entire ammunition carrier that rolled along and connected via umbillical. It was the cost, supply, and transport issues of the Crusader that led to its demise. It was simply too big, complex, and draining to be of any practical use in a dynamic battlefield. In NS, of course, it may see usage, but please, remember that these types of weapons do not just *poof* into a nation, much less the battlefield.)

The Crusader was mainly discarded for good reasons...like the fact that it didn't provide a tangible improvement over the M109A6 Paladin in spite of exhorbitant costs and still had all of it's drawbacks (and more).

As far as the follow-on vehicle goes, most SP artillery vehicles require an additional unit to follow, but these units (such as the M992 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle (FAASV) (http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m992.htm)) can carry a significant ammunition capacity (93-96 shells plus 4 copperhead rounds on top of the 37 conventional and 2 copperhead round capacity of the M109A6 unit). The crew for the Paladin-FAASV combination is 9 personnel (4 in the Paladin, 5 in the FAASV..although the FAASV stats report a crew of 2 with 6 passengers (there's your infantry support squad)). The ammunition capacity of the artillery section (a section being the Paladin-FAASV couple, 3 of which are in a platoon/battery). During combat operations, one of the 3 CATVs (another name for the FAASV class of vehicles) can run back to a resupply point while the other two provide ammunition for the SPA/SPH units...if fighting is especially heavy then the commander might order resupply units to run to the deployed artillery batteries, saving the FAASV crews some time.

Indeed, SPA units are as heavy or heavier than MBTs and, travelling at about the same top speed, are better oriented towards the support of armored mechanized units while lighter forces use the towed or truck-based alternatives.

3.)Rail Gun Arty (God save us). I'm not talking of magnetic weapons, but the old style railroad guns. Yes, I know you get quivers thinking about firing multi-hundred millimeter shells onto your opponents from miles away, but consider this. The rail gun Dora (or Big Gustav, there is contention on which it was), used by the Nazis in WWII, fired an 800mm shell. It required five trains of equipment, 5000 men, and a month... just to set up and fire once. It was so overburdening that the Germans used it only once, against a town they had already overrun with Armored and Infantry. They had to encircle the town and haul up Dora, keeping the town isolated while they pushed past into Russia, for an entire month, just so they could test the gun. It worked, and fifteen shells broke the town, but they could have taken it months earlier with normal means. Dora was so impractical it was never used again. Please remember this the next time you feel the urge to haul along 400mm or greater weapons.
Rail guns were actually used more than once, althought the Dora/Gustav was only operational once in WWII. The town in question, however, was Stevaspol...and the gun reduced entire forts to ruins with only a handful of shots...but certainly not at a rate that was worth the costs.

One successful railroad gun was the 280mm K5 (http://users.belgacom.net/artillery/artillerie/1927.html) that had a 40-54mi range although a 310mm variant was reportedly endowed with up to a 96mi range! This gun, however, "only" required a dedicated train (which fit on one rail) and could be fired independently of the track direction.

The 210-240mm "Paris Gun (http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/P/Paris_Gun.html)" of WWI was used as a psychological weapon in the bombardment of Paris (351 shells were fired)...although it yielded relatively few casualties, was highly inaccurate, and had to have each round be larger than the previous to account for wear of the barrel (hence the 210mm starting bore and 240mm ending bore after 65 shells). The gun did, however, have a 130km range with a 40km peak round altitude.

Some rail road cannons are decently useful...for WWI and WWII, but are such large targets that even "ancient" air-to-surface armaments would be able to destroy one...not to mention the modern stand-off ranged weaponry that exists. Indeed, anything in the 400mm+ range is all but useless for practical purposes.

One more comment about artillery:

Artillery dominates the battlefield. Granted that the logistical "tail" for an artillery unit is larger than most others, artillery causes more casualties in modern war than any other source.

The US military still uses the firebase concept for forward artillery operations (already described by WA), but they aren't the only ones. The Red Army had vast amounts of artillery, and developed a fire-and-movement doctrine to use the guns effectively. Battalion-sized batteries were attached to Armored and mechanized units, broken up into smaller units which "leap-frogged" each other either on advance or retreat.

Western Asia is also correct in his assertion that the situation is not as dire as your post claims. Granted that each battery of artillery will require a security element in addition to the normal crew, the big guns are still the most militarily effective weapons available. The logistical requirements are significant- ammo haulers deployed with the hogs, and continuous need for re-supply- but it is actually easier to re-supply artillery units in action than to do so for an infantry unit on the front lines.

Another problem with artillery is counter-battery fire. Once the guns start firing, forward observers, aircraft, and satellites can relay the firing battery's location to the enemy, who will probably start shooting back. This sort of artillery duel was extremely common during WW II, but is less so today. Most commanders prefer to site their guns far enough behind their lines that they can still savage the enemy, but counterbattery fire can't reach. This forces the enemy commanders to order tacair and cruise missile strikes against the artillery position- which are easier to defend against. Furthermore, unless the enemy's command-and-control network is exceptionally quick to act, the guns would probably have been moved before the strike arrived.

Artillery crews don't get to wear white scarves like fighter pilots, and they'll probably never even see an enemy soldier, but they'll win more battles than tanks or aircraft.

Actually, I just got through reading about the Ottoman Empire/Soviet Bloc war, and my impression of the whole was "If I was the arabs, I'd wipe out their supply lines and let them dehydrate and die in the desert". Consider the difference in location - Arab units are used to desert travel, Soviets are not. Soviets are using gas, Arabs are using camels and camel-towed artillery. It's really not that hard to sever desert supply lines (see WWII). You don't need to fight the enemy, just blow up his ability to feed the soldiers and see what happens next.


Western Asia is correct in stating that the Ottoman Turks were not Arabs. However, the Ottoman Empire did control huge swaths of Arab territory, and many Arabs were in the Ottoman military.

However, I am assuming that you're referring to a war in NS. In those terms, what you describe is a sound tactic. The Allies in WW II used more or less this doctrine to cut the throats of the Afrika Corps during the North African campaigns- although the supplies they were destroying were largely carried by ships across the Mediterranean.

It has been said repeatedly (in this thread and others) that one of the most effective tactics in war is to destroy the enemy's supplies. At worst, this will cause delays and force the enemy to divert combat units to protecting the supply chain. At best, the enemy will be rendered completely ineffective when his ammunition, food, or even batteries run out.

That is one reason we're still nattering on this subject. Too many people get the idea that the only important thing is the number of men, tanks, planes, etc, on the battlefield. Granted that these things are important, but they won't mean a thing if there isn't any ammo, fuel, etc, for them to fight with. It also helps with reducing the number of wars that start with some variation of 3 divisions of Marines land on your beaches. It makes for far better roleplaying to game through the duelling attacks and counterattacks as the defender tries to disrupt and destroy the invaders before they arrive (always a good idea, by the way) and the attacker works to protect his invasion force.


TEO

In most modern forces while artillery is still used artillery is increasingly being replaced by ship launched cruise missles. In kossovo for example, where NATO had no ground forces and thus no artillery Tomahawk cruise missles were armed with cluster bomb warheads and use to engage Serbian troop formations in exactly the same was as artillery. Tanks formations and hardened formations were hit by the conventional Tomahawk missles. With missle guidance and targetting becoming more and more advanced, missles are increasingly able to track and hit even fast moving ground targets, something which static artillery is still unable to do.

Static artillery may be on the way out, but my guess is that it will be on the way out just as infantry and armor is, i.e. built in a smaller, faster less expensive form, but not absent from the field by any means.

In the 80's it was assumed that artillery would be gone by the 90's, tanks such as the soviet T-80 and the British Challenger had sufficently large guns to also fill a support role in place of artillery, the Soviet tanks did just that in Afghanistan, but the cost and training involved in building the number of tanks units to effectively fill the gaps left by the disappearance of artillery was staggering.

The fact remains that artillery is effective for most armies because a.) it can be built to pack a decent punch b.) it can be produced cheaply c.) it can be produced quickly (especially compared to armor and missles) d.) it is easy to use. Rich powerful countries may someday be able to afford the alternatives, but for most countries artillery in it's current form will be around for some time.

TEO, the original ottoman empire did have many Arabs in its ranks...but they were equally likely to join the enemies of their "state" (vis. "laurence of arabia" in WWI and attempted collaboration with the Nazis in WWII) as to support the state...whichever offered the best deal. And in any case, they were hardly the desert dwellers that is seemingly indicated. (and he is referring to the NS Ottoman Empire...which I mostly haven't crushed becuase I've ignored it).

The "cut the lines" approach, however, is certainly possible and a good idea (it always is) and even if they're not Arabs in the desert, guerillas in the hills and mountains can be just as devastating (vis. Soviets in Afghanistan and Chechnya).



Also, in terms of counterbattery fire, there is a real risk to artillery operating within the range of enemy guns, but then again if one side has counterbattery radars and the other lacks them or has a less-well honed artillery delivery system then operation within enemy range is not a great danger for the more advanced force. This was witnessed in OIF/GWII when (I believe it was USMC) artillery units engaged in an "artillery duel" that usually ended as the american soldiers were able to launch 2 shots in a minute, with good accuracy, while the Iraqi units could barely launch one every minute. Additionally, since the american forces had counterbattery radars, the Iraqis would find American rounds landing right on their artillery pieces soon after firing their own rounds (and so took to the unconventional "shoot and flee" tactic)...and the Americans could be notified to take cover if Iraqi artillery was even close to striking near them (it never really was).

The Shoot-and-Scoot (set up, take 2-4 shots/gun at pre-determined target locations, then move before enemy fire can land) tactic has also been employed by even towed units recently and certainly does provide additional protection to the crews from counterfire. The 'layered' artillery advance technique that you speak of

In most modern forces while artillery is still used artillery is increasingly being replaced by ship launched cruise missles. In kossovo for example, where NATO had no ground forces and thus no artillery Tomahawk cruise missles were armed with cluster bomb warheads and use to engage Serbian troop formations in exactly the same was as artillery. Tanks formations and hardened formations were hit by the conventional Tomahawk missles. With missle guidance and targetting becoming more and more advanced, missles are increasingly able to track and hit even fast moving ground targets, something which static artillery is still unable to do.

This is very true, but Tomahawks still cost about $1.1-1.5M a shot (although "Tactical Tomahawks" are supposed to cost significantly less, about $600-800,000) and take a long time to arrive on target (even hours). Airstrikes are also particularly effective in striking some targets...but the price difference between a 155mm HE (~$460 for the M795) or cargo ($1,290 for the M483 DPICM, $1,207 for the M864 DPICM) round and a guided bomb are significant ($484,167 for the AGM-154B JSOW anti-armor variant, which can precisely kill ~24 armored vehicles). Unguided cluster munitions are often cheaper per pound of ordinance. The CBU-97/105, which has 10 of the BLU108 submunitions that the JSOW has 6 of (and so can kill =< 40 vehicles in one run), costs about $354,837. The CBU-52/B, which drops 220 APAM bomblets (the DPICM bearing shells carry <90), costs about $1,700 ((Source (http://www.danshistory.com/cluster.shtml))). But these "dumb" munitions need aircraft in the air to deliver the loads...which are expensive investments that require expensive services (fuel, maintenance, support crews, additional aircraft for air-to-air cover)...which significantly degrades the cost-effectiveness.

Static artillery may be on the way out, but my guess is that it will be on the way out just as infantry and armor is, i.e. built in a smaller, faster less expensive form, but not absent from the field by any means.

OIF has pretty much proven that the "lightweight" wheeled LAVs are ineffective in battle and do not protect their crews enough while they also fail to maintain their 'benefits' (weight, size, transportability without modification). Lightweight towed artillery, however, is definitely beginning to arrive as is a new generation of lightweight, mobile (SP) artillery units such as Soltam systems is delivering with the ATHOS, Rascal, and ATMOS pieces.

Rocket artillery mounted on towed or SP platforms is also becoming increasingly popular for the large DPICM capacity of the rounds and the fairly long range (45km for the LAR-160, 90km for the MAR-350, 32km for the M270, 50km for new M270 rockets) and short transit period (thanks to the powered flight). Another significant benefit comes in the ability to fire as many as 26 rockets (LAR-160. 12 for the M270, 4 for the MAR) at pre-programmed targets in a couple of minutes from a single unit, which then relocates before counterbattery fire can arrive and rearms from a safe place. Rearming can be done inside of half an hour with a crew of only the 3-4 men in the MRL unit and a crane attached to the resupply vehicle (LAR and MAR) or to the unit itself (M270) while the 1-3 crewmen on the resupply vehicle need to do very little and can leave once the exchange has been made.

In the 80's it was assumed that artillery would be gone by the 90's, tanks such as the soviet T-80 and the British Challenger had sufficently large guns to also fill a support role in place of artillery, the Soviet tanks did just that in Afghanistan, but the cost and training involved in building the number of tanks units to effectively fill the gaps left by the disappearance of artillery was staggering.

The M270 MLRS proved that idea wrong in GWI/ODS, when the MLRS rockets became a powerful weapon (both psychologically and tactically)...and the lack of barrel elevation possible with such vehicles (while retaining the systems optimized for direct-fire) would seem to doom such idea from the start.

The fact remains that artillery is effective for most armies because a.) it can be built to pack a decent punch b.) it can be produced cheaply c.) it can be produced quickly (especially compared to armor and missles) d.) it is easy to use.

I agree wholeheartedly with these points.

OOC:

This is a cool thread. I'm someone who prides himself in knowing tactics, but I must admit I'm ignorant when coming to logistics.

Would a 666-ship nave with 13 carriers (included) be too much?

Remember, though, Realism only has to be met halfway.

OOC:

This is a cool thread. I'm someone who prides himself in knowing tactics, but I must admit I'm ignorant when coming to logistics.

Would a 666-ship nave with 13 carriers (included) be too much?

Remember, though, Realism only has to be met halfway.


Not too much at all. The USN numbered 600 ships during the height of the Reagan Administration, and I believe that there were 14 carriers in service at the time (although two of them were so-called "training carriers").

The current USN inventory has 12 carriers, but far fewer total ships (the last number I remember is roughly 250), so 13 carriers is somewhat restrained- especially in NS.

Make sure that your fleet has plenty of supply and support ships, as well as lots of amphibious assault ships- unless your navy is mostly a glorified coastal defense force.


TEO

That all depends, my navy is well over a thousand ships (Coast Guard are part of Ilek-Vaad's Naval Guard), but then again my nation is three times the size of China and has twice the coastal area of the USA to patrol and defend.

The size of your coastline to defend, the size of your military budget and so forth should be determined first and then work from there.

There is a thread for a GDP calculator that also breaks down theoretical military spending , if I can find it, I'll let you know.

Awesome.

I don't need a costal defense force -- reasoning is top secret ;) :D

Hmm.... *grabs ship list* Hmm... I lied, I have 14 carriers

R13:1 – SUPERFLEET
Four Major Carriers
Fifty-four Support Craft
One Hundred Three Other Craft
DNF1 – FLEET ONE
Two Major Carriers
Thirty-three Support Craft
Sixty-six other Craft
DNF2 – FLEET TWO
Two Major Carriers
Thirty-three Support Craft
Sixty-six other Craft
DNF3 – FLEET THREE
Two Major Carriers
Thirty-three Support Craft
Sixty-six other Craft
DNF4 – FLEET FOUR
Two Major Carriers
Thirty-three Support Craft
Sixty-six other Craft
DNF5 – FLEET FIVE
Two Major Carriers
Thirty-three Support Craft
Sixty-six other Craft

You think this would be reasonable?

(NOTE: This info is OOC, and henceforth cannot be used against me)

OOC:

This is a cool thread. I'm someone who prides himself in knowing tactics, but I must admit I'm ignorant when coming to logistics.

Would a 666-ship nave with 13 carriers (included) be too much?

Remember, though, Realism only has to be met halfway.

Not at all. If you said 100 carriers for 666 ships, or even 50 for 666 ships then I might call foul, but this seems to be a perhaps under-carriered navy (if Amphibious Assault carriers are included in that 13 and not including the possibility that most of those ships are littoral vessels dedicated to defensive operations).

For reference, the USN maintains 12 Carrier Strike Groups/Carrrier Battle Groups(including 9 Nimitz-class Carriers, soon to be 10, with CVN 77 George H. W. Bush, as the of the older Kittyhawk-class carriers are replaced), which each have one conventional carrier, and 12 Amphibious Ready Groups, each focused around one Helicopter/Amphibious Assault Carrier (LHA (5) and LHD (7, 8th in works) types). This provides the USN (~300M Population base, top economic and technological strengths, largest military expenditures in RL world) with 24 carrier groups. This is the product of a 296 ship battle force, but the USN could easily be much larger and numbered almost 600 ships at the height of the Cold War under Reagan. In 2003 alone, 20 ships were decomm'd while only 4 were added to the fleet.

A combination of super expensive ships, prolonged development periods, a too-cozy Military-Industrial complex, and a changing view of the Navy's role. The USN is not necessarily weaker than the ~600 ship navy of previous years...since a single modern aircraft carrier holds more firepower than the combined power of the USN's WWII carriers and a cruise-missile laden cruiser has a tremendous striking power that its predecessors lacked.

Additionally, only US allies (Britain, Japan, Italy, and Australia) have fleets anywhere near the quality, size, and strength of the USN (the former USSR can't even keep its BBs or Carriers afloat, let alone armed, crewed, and sailing; France and Germany are limited to missile boats and a few medium-range ships; China's navy is small and weak; and other nations like Norway and Israel mostly have littoral combat ships like Missile Boats, Corvettes, and patrol boats).

Another issue is that many of the older, larger vessels are being decomissioned in anticipation of the introduction of smaller, cheaper, and faster ships oriented towards littoral (AKA "brown water", near shore, against shore, upriver) combat than the old "Blue Water" navy is. On NS, however, few nations that want to be major powers can survive with so small a naval force. The USN's forces are almost dedicatedly focused on the Carriers while a more mixed force might include "Battleship Strike Groups" that focus more on gun and missile power than aircraft and "Littoral Strike Groups" that have many, smaller ships centered around maybe a Destroyer or Frigate.

The WA Navy maintains 21 Grand Fleets and Amphibious Assault Ready Groups (http://s6.invisionfree.com/Greater_Israel/index.php?showtopic=3&st=0&) that include 81 major deployable teams or groups. This is a superscale navy (perhaps a bit much and I am considering restructuring to reduce the vessel numbers of this bloated force), with 135 carriers (none the size of a Nimitz). This fleet of ~135 carriers is 5.6x the size of the USN's carrier fleet, but then again WA is 10x the population size of the US. Additionally, relatively little is spent on the air force or army, which are dedicated to home defense (excepting long-range bombing missions), and the IDF Marine Corps is the main assualt force...and a 0.58% military for WA (the percentage of the US pop in the military) would mean a 17.4M man military for WA.

for reference (I think it's been seen here earlier):
Here are the per capita ratios (percentage of troops versus total population) for a few real countries in the late 90's.

USA 0.58%
China 0.23%
Japan 0.19%
Germany 0.49%
India 0.14%
France 0.87%
Italy 0.77%
UK 0.47%
Brazil 0.18%
Indonesia 0.13%
Mexico 0.19%
Russia 1.13%
Canada 0.28%
South Korea 1.64%
Turkey 1.28%

With the U.S having 283.8 million people, that only gives 1.65 million troops. Even if you consider a global war, like WW2, and multiply that percentage by ten - it's still only 5.8%, or 16 million out of a population of 283 million.

http://www.liberal-international.org/ldr/russia/schroder.html

From Parnassus


*Battle force: the Navy's fleet of front-line aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, amphibious ships and selected support vessels.

Judging by the blast of responses I triggered, I can only figure that I was misinterpretted in my post, although it was gratifying to get the onsluaght of counter-posts. Some clarification on my intent:

I was not arguing against the use of artillery, as it seemed some of you believe. Artillery kills more enemy than any other weapons system, and is an integral part of a land battle. I personally love cannon cocking and often engage in artillery whoring in NS myself, which is why I posted. It is the misuse (and overuse) of the weapons that bothers me, not their use. For instance, the confusion about what sized mortars are "light" and mobile, or the use of tank killer wheeled vehicles as a replacement of an MBT. It is the sudden deployment of Artillery, especially the railroad guns, that drives me nuts. I was simply attempting to show that these weapons require planning and forethought. It is the misuse of artillery that bothers me, be it by attempting to deploy heavy mortar at individual level , or by using high AoE tank shots as artillery (and expecting the same result), the lack of understanding that the M270 needs a reload, the offensive use of rail guns in enemy territory, or the incredibly bothersome idea that self-propelled guns can be used as tanks.

(And yes, I know that Dora/Gustav was not the only railgun. Others included the Paris Gun, Bertha, and Greta. The smaller (comparitively) guns were used repeatedly, but the larger weapons were hardly effective enough to justify. My example of Dora was designed to show the folly of the "bigger is better" syndrome that plagues NS.)

The whole thing is all about using the right weapons, and knowing the limitations and costs of those systems. This, which crosses tactics, strategy, and logistics, tends to annoy me. It can be evidenced in the artillery misuse, the battleship armadas, the nations with eleventy-billion supercarriers, conventional ICBMs (!!!), and the all to familiar "bigger means better" phallic compensation.

[I'm actually not angry, I just like writing sarcastically, because I hope it's more fun to read.]

Actaully , historically, DISEASE has killed more enemy than any other , uhm, weapon.

Actaully , historically, DISEASE has killed more enemy than any other , uhm, weapon.

Off topic, but disease used as a weapon is WMD in modern war. Yes, they used to toss bodies from catapults, but germ warfare is not used anymore without SERIOUS reprocussions. And disease caused by another wound (infected gunshot, etc) is not a weapon unto itself. Disease caused by expansion (AKA, Europeans bringing it to the Native Americans) was not a weapon of war. Perhaps to some sick people, it was a tool, but not a battlefield system.

Back on topic, as this is a very good topic that I don't want a part in derailing...

i dont know if i verified my account yet...is this posting

Yes, it is.

One more comment about artillery:

Artillery dominates the battlefield. Granted that the logistical "tail" for an artillery unit is larger than most others, artillery causes more casualties in modern war than any other source.

The US military still uses the firebase concept for forward artillery operations (already described by WA), but they aren't the only ones. The Red Army had vast amounts of artillery, and developed a fire-and-movement doctrine to use the guns effectively. Battalion-sized batteries were attached to Armored and mechanized units, broken up into smaller units which "leap-frogged" each other either on advance or retreat.

Western Asia is also correct in his assertion that the situation is not as dire as your post claims. Granted that each battery of artillery will require a security element in addition to the normal crew, the big guns are still the most militarily effective weapons available. The logistical requirements are significant- ammo haulers deployed with the hogs, and continuous need for re-supply- but it is actually easier to re-supply artillery units in action than to do so for an infantry unit on the front lines.

Another problem with artillery is counter-battery fire. Once the guns start firing, forward observers, aircraft, and satellites can relay the firing battery's location to the enemy, who will probably start shooting back. This sort of artillery duel was extremely common during WW II, but is less so today. Most commanders prefer to site their guns far enough behind their lines that they can still savage the enemy, but counterbattery fire can't reach. This forces the enemy commanders to order tacair and cruise missile strikes against the artillery position- which are easier to defend against. Furthermore, unless the enemy's command-and-control network is exceptionally quick to act, the guns would probably have been moved before the strike arrived.

Artillery crews don't get to wear white scarves like fighter pilots, and they'll probably never even see an enemy soldier, but they'll win more battles than tanks or aircraft.


Given the events of Gulf War II, there is a question here about artillery v aircraft. American air bombed out entire regiments using better munitions, better targeting, and more efficient loads. If you can hold air superiority, you can blow up things far more efficiently then with artillery - but there's the rub. So it becomes a question of mission and efficiency, plus acceptable losses.

Western Asia is correct in stating that the Ottoman Turks were not Arabs. However, the Ottoman Empire did control huge swaths of Arab territory, and many Arabs were in the Ottoman military.

However, I am assuming that you're referring to a war in NS. In those terms, what you describe is a sound tactic. The Allies in WW II used more or less this doctrine to cut the throats of the Afrika Corps during the North African campaigns- although the supplies they were destroying were largely carried by ships across the Mediterranean.

It has been said repeatedly (in this thread and others) that one of the most effective tactics in war is to destroy the enemy's supplies. At worst, this will cause delays and force the enemy to divert combat units to protecting the supply chain. At best, the enemy will be rendered completely ineffective when his ammunition, food, or even batteries run out.

That is one reason we're still nattering on this subject. Too many people get the idea that the only important thing is the number of men, tanks, planes, etc, on the battlefield. Granted that these things are important, but they won't mean a thing if there isn't any ammo, fuel, etc, for them to fight with. It also helps with reducing the number of wars that start with some variation of 3 divisions of Marines land on your beaches. It makes for far better roleplaying to game through the duelling attacks and counterattacks as the defender tries to disrupt and destroy the invaders before they arrive (always a good idea, by the way) and the attacker works to protect his invasion force.
TEO

Actually I like "three divisions of Marines arrive on your beaches". My reply would be "Wonderful. My sixteen SSGNs are blowing up all your supply ships. I guess your Marines can throw rocks...". Now the attacker becomes the defender as their immediate impulse is thrown into disarray... and my tank divisions with relatively short supply lines can concentrate on wiping out the Marines on the (unprotected) beach.

*grins* Gotta love Logistics.

TEO - THANK YOU for writing these!

In most modern forces while artillery is still used artillery is increasingly being replaced by ship launched cruise missles. In kossovo for example, where NATO had no ground forces and thus no artillery Tomahawk cruise missles were armed with cluster bomb warheads and use to engage Serbian troop formations in exactly the same was as artillery. Tanks formations and hardened formations were hit by the conventional Tomahawk missles. With missle guidance and targetting becoming more and more advanced, missles are increasingly able to track and hit even fast moving ground targets, something which static artillery is still unable to do.

Static artillery may be on the way out, but my guess is that it will be on the way out just as infantry and armor is, i.e. built in a smaller, faster less expensive form, but not absent from the field by any means.

In the 80's it was assumed that artillery would be gone by the 90's, tanks such as the soviet T-80 and the British Challenger had sufficently large guns to also fill a support role in place of artillery, the Soviet tanks did just that in Afghanistan, but the cost and training involved in building the number of tanks units to effectively fill the gaps left by the disappearance of artillery was staggering.

The fact remains that artillery is effective for most armies because a.) it can be built to pack a decent punch b.) it can be produced cheaply c.) it can be produced quickly (especially compared to armor and missles) d.) it is easy to use. Rich powerful countries may someday be able to afford the alternatives, but for most countries artillery in it's current form will be around for some time.


You missed "e) it can be deployed quickly". A good company of mortars can ruin infantry movement - particularly advance. Mortars are cheap to make, cheap to supply, quick to emplace, and a pain in the ass to the average grunt on the other side.

As for towed artillery and the self-mobile versions - as cruise missiles become more accurate and guidance becomes easier, couldn't you see "smart artillery" as a less expensive alternative to cruise missiles?

Actually I like "three divisions of Marines arrive on your beaches". My reply would be "Wonderful. My sixteen SSGNs are blowing up all your supply ships. I guess your Marines can throw rocks...". Now the attacker becomes the defender as their immediate impulse is thrown into disarray... and my tank divisions with relatively short supply lines can concentrate on wiping out the Marines on the (unprotected) beach.

*grins* Gotta love Logistics.

TEO - THANK YOU for writing these!

That's actually what I pulled on GDODAD...I just ran one group of ships in a feint to force the main naval group to pull in to protect itself while another group attacked the transport ships with ASMs and gunfire and a third just launched MLRS rockets and NavArty, which destroyed most of the armored units of a secondary landing group (while the support ships were too far back to provide cover) while the survivors fled into the hills to be taken out by local forces. The main landing group, or what was able to be landed, was wiped out by an allied suicide mission (one APC holding one nuke + a few self-sacrificing mechinf scouts + a few million massed enemy troops= one helluva BBQ).

The nice thing to realize is that most amphibious landings rush men first to clear out the enemy beach to make it safe to land the akwardly loaded and heavy vehicles...so if you land a few MLRS rounds in their formations just as the armored units are landing you'll force the men to take cover or be killed while the landing vehicles are crippled on the shore (which means they have to be removed, esp. if they're hovercrafts like LCACs, HLCACs, or Zubrs to clear the access routes and LCUs/LSTs/LCMs to clear the shores). That way their beachhead is broken without risking your men...and FASCAM-deploying bombs and artillery shells will do a lot to make it hard to reestablish the beachhead while under fire.

Anyways...away from tactics, back to logistics!

Very good and nothing to add except the affect climate has on logistics, demands for certain commodities go up in certain climates such as water in arid climates. In fact demands for everything in a hot climate go up, then again cold climates have their own unique hazards such as increased metal fatigue and cases of exposure for individuals.
So depanding on the climate of a nation your forces are operating in you're going to have to re-think your logistics substantially, deploying to arid climates means your supply demands are going to rise sharply.

Very good and nothing to add except the affect climate has on logistics, demands for certain commodities go up in certain climates such as water in arid climates. In fact demands for everything in a hot climate go up, then again cold climates have their own unique hazards such as increased metal fatigue and cases of exposure for individuals.
So depanding on the climate of a nation your forces are operating in you're going to have to re-think your logistics substantially, deploying to arid climates means your supply demands are going to rise sharply.

Heat:
Demand goes up for cool clothes, sunblock, water, fans, air conditioners, light sun-protecting hats.
Demand goes down for coats, heavy clothing, heating oil, gloves, warm hats.

Cold:
Reverse of Heat.


Not everything goes up in a hot climate. The demands tend to be about the same, but different. Instead of heating oil you'll be transporting water. Instead of heavy jackets and snow suits you'll be transporting sunblock or mosquito repellant, sunglasses, extra pairs of BDUs and underwear (if you wear warm and sweaty underwear the result is not fun...and would probably reduce combat effectiveness somewhat). The logistics are different and the means of transportation is affected by the environment (which can be tropical, desert, mountainous, hilly, steppes, savannah, or moderate forest...among others) and sometimes this affects what materials you need (they need more helicopters and helicopter parts in Afghanistan because that's the prime means of local transportation and the high altitude and harsh conditions that affect how the helicopter engines perform. They need more armored HMMWVs and trucks in Iraq because those are the main means of operating as heavier armored vehicles are vulnerable in the cities and there is little open combat...and trucks are cheaper than planes or helicopters if a bit slower and aren't effecient for transporting water).

Agreed, however batteries are less efficient at higher temperatures, fuel useage is increased, water consumption goes up; If a soldier is doing eight hours of hard work, creeping & crawling with equipment on, when the average temperature is 50C then water requirements for one day will be about twenty-five litres. Even at rest in the shade at those temperatures you're looking at about fifteen litres, of course that's just suggested amounts and so probably best to regard them as minimum requirements by troops.
Like you said, replacement parts are needed more frequently due to certain climates because certain climates are incredibly corrosive thus increasing wear & tear upon components, including soldiers.

Source:E-P118 Southwest Asia: Environemtn & its relationship to Military Activities. July 1959 Old and not specifically for arid climates however its relevance as a building block shouldn't be ignored on either basis really.

As for towed artillery and the self-mobile versions - as cruise missiles become more accurate and guidance becomes easier, couldn't you see "smart artillery" as a less expensive alternative to cruise missiles?

This is essentially the direction the US military is going with artillery. There are already teleguided munitions for some of the larger guns available, and engineers are already working on self-guided munitions for specialized uses.

In my uninformed opinion, Hammer's Slammers-style precision artillery munitions are less than 10 years away. The science problems have been solved, all that remains are the engineering hurdles to overcome.


TEO

OR Cruise missle technology becomes more refined, cheaper and easier to build and totally replaces artillery. Imagine what will happen when the patent for the various guidance systems and such expire..........................

OR Cruise missle technology becomes more refined, cheaper and easier to build and totally replaces artillery.

Unlikely.

Any cost reduction and new technologies would also benefit the development of precision artillery munitions. Furthermore, cruise missiles can be shot down by a wide variety of weapons systems, while no one claims to be able to shoot artillery shells out of the sky.

Cruise missiles will become cheaper and more commonplace, and they will still be effective in a wide range of battlefield conditions, but simpler is almost always better. Cruise missiles are extremely complicated weapons. There are a large number of useful countermeasures to a cruise missile attack. Artillery shells have been in more or less their present form since the 1890s, and the only practical defenses involve being elsewhere when they hit or hiding behind/beneath something large and solid.


TEO

In my uninformed opinion, Hammer's Slammers-style precision artillery munitions are less than 10 years away. The science problems have been solved, all that remains are the engineering hurdles to overcome.I don't know how accurate Hammer's Slammers artillery is, but there's already 155mm artillery with accuracy of 10m at 80km.
no one claims to be able to shoot artillery shells out of the skyI do.
http://www.capitol.northgrum.com/programs/mthel.html

I do.
http://www.capitol.northgrum.com/programs/mthel.html

Ditto about the MTHEL.

As far as the cruise missile vs. shell debate goes, it seems more and more like artillery will retain its place, although it might do it by adopting the systems of the missiles.

Another long-range, rocket-assisted guided projectile under development is the Autonomous Naval Support Round (ANSR).* The following is taken from an Alliant Techsystems (ATK) press release of 03 October 2003:

"On Sept. 24, at the White Sands Missile Range (WMSR) in New Mexico, two Autonomous Naval Support Rounds (ANSR) flew more than 61 miles (54 nautical miles) in less than three minutes.* Using inputs from up to nine GPS satellites, the projectiles guided to within 20 meters of their designated targets."

ANSR was described in a February 2003 Navy League of the United States article by Daniel Goure as follows:

"Range is not ANSR's only distinguishing feature, though.* Unlike most competitors, ANSR flies a purely ballistic trajectory that helps to simplify system design and reduces its susceptibility to countermeasures.* And it uses a global positioning system and other high-tech systems to provide exceptional accuracy.* ANSR is compatible with both 5-inch/54 and 5-inch/62 caliber naval guns.* This means it can be deployed both on existing Navy ships -- providing an immediate fire-support capability of some 150 guns -- and on the new DD(X)."

"Precision munitions tend to be quite costly.* The ANSR may have solved that problem.* Its warhead -- a derivative of that in the HARM anti-radar missile -- weighs approximately 25 pounds, including ten pounds of explosive, and is fitted in a tungsten case that will fragment on detonation.* The fragmenting warhead, coupled to a precision-guidance system, provides four times the lethality of a steel-cased warhead of equivalent size.* ANSR thus would be a low-cost solution, permitting volume as well as precision fires."

ATK announced in a press release dated 11 May 2004 that their "Ballistic Trajectory Extended Range Munition (BTERM) II, an extension of the earlier Autonomous Naval Support Round (ANSR), captured the highly competitive award for development of the Navy five-inch Extended Range Munition (ERM).* With a value of $30 million, the contract calls for ATK to perform a 16-month demonstration of an innovative extended range, low cost, gun launched projectile capable of operation in the Mk 45 Mod 4 and Mod 2 naval gun systems."

An April 2003 briefing paper by Admiral Vern Clark to the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee stated that ANSR and ERGM would be "headed for a “shoot off” in FY05 to determine which round will provide greater range, lethality, and accuracy and ultimately be incorporated into the Navy’s arsenal." Source, 1/4 of the way down (http://www.warships1.com/Weapons/WNUS_5-62_mk45.htm)

Other sources:
https://www.onr.navy.mil/media/article.asp?ID=6

It is reported that the ANSR can be fired at a ROF of 10 rpm for the first minute (the loading crew are responsible for the rate after the first minute), as it is for the proposed ERGM. But, while the hotter burning propellants for the ERGM reduce the barrel life of the 5"/62 Mark 45 Mod 4 gun from ~7,000-8,000 rounds to 1,500 rounds, but the "boost to range" ANSR can use the same "NACO" propellants as normal ballistic rounds and so will not adversely affect the barrel life. The 54nm range of the ANSR round (96km) should be compared to the normal range of ~25.9km or 38.4km using a proposed/experimental special propellant charge.

WOOT!

Way cool! I hadn't realized that operational tests had been completed against artillery shells.

In David Drake's Hammer's Slammers series of books (set in the distant future), artillery can fire a wide variety of munitions, including self-guided anti-tank submunitions in carrier shells.

I use a far less sophisticated version of this system for my nation, avoiding the rapid-barrel-erosion problem through use of LNG propellant. This increases the logisitcs load for the towed artiilery units slightly (the actual weight is less, but LNG containers are bulkier). Rate of fire suffers somewhat, but the LNG system allows autoloading- reducing the manning requirements.

My mobile artillery units require a much larger logistical effort than the towed units. Ammunition and LNG tanks accompany the guns in specialized armored vehicles, and re-supply is accomplished by transport helicopter and armored trucks from forward supply depots.

Now that there is a RL functional anti-artillery defense, I will add my own version to the Overlord's arsenal. Like all such devices, it will not be perfect (I doubt that any defensive system will be capable of dealing with a massive time-on-target barrage, for example). It will also add to the logistical requirements of the units so equipped- techs to operate the system and the sensors and computers that actually shoot it; protection and support for those personnel; spare parts and power for the equipment (and techs, fuel, and other support for all that); etc, etc, etc.

This sort of technological duel is a lot of fun- when you're only dealing with it in a fantasy world. If you were a real-life government, you'd have to actually pay for all of this stuff- including the ideas that turn out not to work at all. That, too, is part of logistics.


TEO

The only 'guided' artillery munitions that Ilek-Vaad uses are currently Battleship mounted. The Revenge Battleship mounts a fore and aft battery of 28" naval guns that fire a rocket-assisted high velocity round. To counter damage to the bore and barrel the rockets only fire when the shell begins descending, and does not add to velocity, the only function is to correct the satellite guided trajectory of moving targets. Against static defenses a normal round is loaded.

I like Battleships and Carriers soley because they are mostly self contained as far as logistics go, both are floating cities and are designed to be away from logistic bases for months. In my future tech world the Revenge battleships are fusion powered , but still equipped with bio-diesal tanks, giving them the ability to re-fuel their escorts, very handy.

The space and size of battleships is the perfect place to test and refine new missle and artillery types.

WOOT!

Way cool! I hadn't realized that operational tests had been completed against artillery shells.
TEO

Tests were actually conducted well over a year ago (before when WA showed up on NS, so the MTHEL was one of WA's first developmental projects and is now in the 3rd and 4th generation models) and right now it's mostly a matter of their trying to shrink it to fit on the back of individual heavy and medium weight trucks.

The only issue is that it might not work head-on against a larger ship artillery shell (it might not burn through the cap of a 16in shell) and shells without explosive fills aren't really bothered (since the MTHEL burns through the shell or rocket until it hits the fuel or warhead and causes that to burn) but it works against missiles, rockets, most shells, and, theoretically, could be used against aircraft.

Off topic: was it my imagination or did this thread used to be stickied in NS?

yea what happened to it's stickied-ness?

I don't have the dedication to read the entire topic and see what others have said but in response to the first post:

Amazing. The Evil Overlord, you have opened my eyes. I now have so much more RPing material to work with the sanity of it must be questioned. Long story short, thank you for creating this topic.

I'm glad you find it useful. My original intent was to help others with their roleplaying, to make it more ... realistic ... for want of a better term. Many of the contributors to this thread have added more detailed information, and quite a lot of new data as well. I'm happy to see that I am not the only player who prefers a solid grounding in RL issues for my roleplaying.


TEO

I'm glad you find it useful. My original intent was to help others with their roleplaying, to make it more ... realistic ... for want of a better term. Many of the contributors to this thread have added more detailed information, and quite a lot of new data as well. I'm happy to see that I am not the only player who prefers a solid grounding in RL issues for my roleplaying.


TEO

Well, I don't know about a solid ground of realisticness, but surely a base of it. :)

bump
too good to let fade

BUMP

If this thread is dead, I hope it's placed in the archive. It's that good.

Not quite dead yet ...


I'm currently doing research on another article for the thread. I'll post it when I get it into a presentable format. Since I'm writing a paper for my OSH class at the same time, it's taking me a while.


TEO

For the benefit of those who might not have read the whole thread, I will re-iterate that this thread is not designed to reduce NS wars to numberwanking. The point is to increase the level of role-play by including information about how RL wars are run.

Next on the agenda:

Information Logistics

One item usually not considered by players in NS is Information Logistics- the art of getting tactical information to the soldiers in combat.

We'll talk about the grosser aspects of this first.

Scenario: A fire team from a platoon is approaching a derelict building. They've been hearing gunfire all around them at various times, but have not yet seen an enemy soldier or fired a shot themselves. They have no idea whether or not the building is occupied. If it is occupied, they don't know whether the occupants are enemy soldiers, friendly soldiers taking a break from the fighting, cowering civilians, enemy partisans pretending to be cowering civilians.

Now imagine that a friendly plane flying overhead a few minutes earlier had seen enemy movement around the building. How would the pilot get the word to the troops on the ground?

Aircraft radios are designed for different purposes than squad radios for the infantry, and rarely (if ever) operate on the same frequencies. The pilot has to contact the air-traffic controller for his sector. He has to identify the location, his observations, and the fact that a friendly unit was probably walking into a trap. The ATC has to take the information and relay it up the chain of command to his superiors. Those superiors will relay the data to the air force liaison with the infantry command staff. They in turn would have to identify the location from the pilot's message, identify which units were in that general area, and get the data to the officers in charge of that unit. The officers of that unit would have to get the word to the fire team (and the rest of the unit) by radio or by runner.

In the movies, this sort of thing happens just in time for the Good Guys to fall back without getting slaughtered. In RL, that sort of communications chain would likely result in the fire team getting ambushed.

The information was available, it just couldn't get to the folks that needed it in time to do any good.

A better communications organization can help reduce a lot of this information time lag. Giving every aircraft the ability to speak to every nameless grunt on the ground is extremely impractical, and probably wouldn't work anyway.

Back to our scenario, only now we've given the aircraft the same radio frequencies used by the infantry.
PILOT: Hey! There are Bad Guys lurking around that building! I had better let the infantrymen know.

<click. buzz. hum>

PILOT: "Hey guys! There's a bunch of Bad Guys near that building!"

SOLDIER: "Who is this?"

PILOT: "I'm in the airplane overhead."

SOLDIER: "I don't see any airplane."

PILOT: "Uh ... are you approaching a ruined building?"

SOLDIER: "Bub, there a lots of ruined buildings. Which one are you talking about?"

PILOT: "The one near grid section 614, 320.

SOLDIER: "You got the wrong grunt, flyboy. That's five klicks from here."

SOLDIER2: "Hey, I'm at grid section 614,320, and I don't see any buildings."

PILOT: "Look, is there anyone approaching a ruined building near grid 614, 320? There are enemy troops there."

SOLDIER3: "Did you hear that? There are enemy troops at grid 614, 320."

SOLDIER4: "What was that grid number again?"

SOLDIER5: "I think it was 614, 320."

SOLDIER6: "Able One, Able Six, Fire mission. Battery three on 614, 320."

SOLDIER2: "Wait a damned minute! I'm at 614, 320. There's no enemy here, and no damned buildings, either!"

SOLDIER7: "Able Six, Able One. Battery Three on 614, 320. Shot."

SOLDIER2: "Oh my God!"

SOLDIER7: "Splash."

SOLDIER2: "AAAAAAAAGGGHHH!!!"

SOLDIER8: "Hey, could you send some of that arty our way? There's a bunch of enemy troops holed up in a ruined building over here ..."


You get the idea.

Part of the problem results from the fact that you must have a coherent chain of communications- for security, if for no other reason. The shorter the communications links, the more vulnerable they are to enemy countermeasures. Imagine what would happen if the enemy commander had managed to get his own messages into your communications traffic.

There are several ways to help get the right information down to the guys on the sharp end. It's never going to be immediate, but you can streamline the process somewhat. Improved communications security is one way. If all of your transmissions are encrypted and broadcasting on certain frequencies only at certain times, it's a lot easier to trust the message traffic. Messages that are not broadcast but are carried over secure fiber-optic lines also has a higher level of trust. With a more secure commo net, the verification process is shorter, and the brass can get information down to the troops in the mud more quickly.

It would be lovely to equip every soldier with a field radio, but the resulting overabundance of message traffic could create its own logistical problems- not to mention the problems of adding more weight to the already overloaded combat troopie.

Another solution would be to equip the troops with sophisticated equipment to help them detect threats on their own. Aside from the problem of weight, there's a problem of data overload. If your soldiers are busy trying to read a vernier on their electronic whatchamacallit, somebody more reasonably equipped- say, with a stone axe- will walk right up and whomp your soldier on the head while he's distracted.

The problem is not just getting data down to the soldiers on the sharp end, the data has to flow up to the generals and planners as well. And the data has to be transmitted accurately and completely. Changing the order of a grid pattern in a fire mission order could result in your artillery shelling a nearby friendly town instead of an enemy tank column, for example.

Granted that most of the time you can take the time to verify reports and get them down to the lowest level of the communications chain in time for it to do some good. Sometimes you can't, and in combat, change that sometimes to most of the time.

In the past, Generals used to fight on foot with their troops. As battles grew larger and more complicated, the generals had to move back from the actual fighting to be able to see the battlefield. Modern generals are often removed several miles from the fighting, to a place where they have access to satellite data, secure phones, and powerful radios. They can get information from halfway around the planet in seconds ... but it might take half a day to get that information sorted, verified, and sent out to the people who need it. This sometimes causes needless casualties (so-called friendly fire is part of the problem).

The US Army and Marines are working hard on this problem. Advanced technology can reduce the problem, but I doubt it will go away anytime soon.

As a role-player, take the time to figure out what your characters know and when (and how) they know it. It makes for a better RP. There's no need to numberwank this to death, but communications security is part of logistics. Ask any fighter pilot: Seeing- and seeing first- is the difference between life and death. Getting the information to the troops at the front lines is just as important as getting ammo to them. They're going to need both.


TEO

Haha. I liked that post , funny and relevant it was. I personally find it pretty hard to figure out exactly how all of my units relate and relay information to one another, but I've generally chosen to accept it as another horrible failing of the crushingly gigantic Unified People's Army. It is unfortunate for UPA soldiers, but happy for me, that Dra-pol's sham communism promotes individual sacrifice for the mass line. We've to put up with added problems such as having a bajillion soldiers to each piece of electronic communications gear, and then to have that split between terribly clever and secure frequency hopping radios, and patched up sets captured from the Japanese fifty years ago, with which the former can't communicate.
In the recent War For Korean Unification we lost an entire assault division that'd gone further south than anyone else was aware... and I do mean [i]lost. It ended up abandoned and cut to pieces, of course, but do you see me changing things? Heh, no.

I suppose my only worthwhile point, other than that I liked that post, is that sometimes one doesn't have to play making the right decisions, so long as it's accepted that choosing to RP the wrong ones is both valid and bound to end in disaster. Isn' it?

Well, good post. Indeed, information are as important as "material" logistics, especially down to the tactical level. Not only the loss of communication on a "tactical" level means a possible defeat in a firefight, and would make the battle much harder to fight - the loss of communication at a strategic level (such as in the case of the Japanese often completely losing communication with the military headquarters in the battle of various islands with the US as a result of bombardment) can be considered one factor to the defeat in a battle, since if you have that you have some major confusion for both parties.

About information overload, it is indeed an interesting problem. I've read an article on military.com regarding future infantry combat systems planned by the US, the writer of the article did come up with an interesting point - what's the use if a soldier is concentrating on a video from an Apache helicopter from up above when an enemy soldier is right front of you and is firing at you? But I do think that instead of issuing this level of communications to each front-line infantry soldier for them to receive, such level of communications would be a bit more important for some other personnels -- for example, scouts, artillerymen, and other people who actually doesn't need to focus on enemy soldiers too often with their bare eyes.

I think Drapol's way of giving different communication geats and all that, while perhaps making the enemy a bit confused, does somehow increase troubles of "material" logistics by giving all that different gear (I surely don't want my soldiers to be equipped with different M16s chambered with 5.56mm, 6.8mm, and 7.62mm ammunition to be issued to a squad of men, since supplying that and make sure it's given to the right person would be a problem and would waste a lot of time). Another thing to remember is that soldiers (especially SOF ones) shouldn't really decide to abandon all that expensive communications gear, since the enemy even without the frequency informations in their first look, would still dig in and examine your system. One big hole in your whatever-Secure Communication System now.

Well, that's some of my points. Communications is very important and should be treated with the same importance as you would treat what type of tank you get and how to arm your troops. What's the use when you got excellently-trained special ops personnel with good Mk.1 eye balls, only to have your F-15Es (manned by the best pilots, fire control system, and bombs that you can get) strike on the wrong targets a result of poor communication?

(I was implying that the radio diversity in our case is a bad thing, and my vague point was that it's okay to RP bad military decisions if they make IC sense... people widely ignore the political realities of their nations when stomping about with their militaries, and that annoys me when I have to fight them.)

Well, this is my obviously future-tech "solution" to the problem, a completely integrated battlefield force.

Single Post from Story-RP (http://forums2.jolt.co.uk/showpost.php?p=6562398&postcount=11)

Obviously, it's wankish, but it's a different take on Informational Logistics, by removing the human controls in favor of a technological solution. In a typical military-sci-fi move, it goes horribly wrong later, and the system goes bonkers.

(And yes, OMGZ HACKERZ, which I use as a battlefield force multiplier.)

Infowar is still a developing discipline. In recent RL conflicts, several groups have attempted to derail or damage US information systems with hacker attacks. All of the unclassified reports I've seen on the subject indicate that the enemy hackers were not terribly effective, and the US infowar counterstrikes were not discussed at all.

In my opinion, most infowar attacks will be largely strategic in nature for some time to come. It's pretty tough to screw with tactical communications in a militarily meaningful manner, but strategic communications lines are comparitively easy to target. Witness the US Navy's long-term penetration of Soviet communications lines during the cold war.

This could have some interesting RP effects as well. If you read William Gibson, several characters in his stories had particpated in infowar attacks on enemy communications. This involved so-called "standard" military operations whose sole purpose was to get personnel into enemy communications nodes in order to damage communications and information logistics.

This could make for some excellent writing ... and add several levels of complexity to roleplaying combat. If you wanted to screw around with this concept, you'd have to describe your communications setup as well as the number of tanks, aircraft, troops, etc. Few players are willing to get that involved.

TEO

Makes for interesting possibliities -

*resend orders with a different timetable
*slow the sending of orders
*speed up the sending of orders
*garble transmissions
*falsify satellite information (see London Blitz)

All sorts of ideas come to mind. The more fleets depend on GPS and the like, the easier it is to beach said ships in a storm - or cause ramming, or friendly fire.

Heh

Top stuff as usual, though for the serious grognard you'll want to have a copy of the

STAFF OFFICERS’ FIELD MANUAL
ORGANIZATIONAL, TECHNICAL, AND LOGISTICAL
DATA PLANNING FACTORS
(VOLUME 2)

It contains lots of specific information which will provide you with more than enough information, water consumption by different classess of hospitals, per person consumption in lbs per day.

This manual is not for those who seek to simply make others aware of their supply chain in an RP, this is for those who like to keep detailed records. The sort of people who create service records for major characters, plan out their entire lives and then scream in frustration, commit the dead to the afterlife with full military honours and forever after remember the day.

*Cough*

I didn't read to the end of this but there is another area of logistics that seems to be missed. You must have sufficent population to suppot the armed forces you claim to possess. In WWII for example. The US had a total, TOTAL military of about 11 million. The population was about 120 million. They couldn't go beyond that because a certain percentage of the population is going to be too old, too young, unfit for service or exempt for other reason. If you have a military of bigger than about 1.5 out of 200 people then your nation collapses because you can't pay the troops and you can't produce the goods to keep the nation running.

Sorry about the sudden cut off my wife called me

Let me use an example of a country that could almost be an exception to this rule. Singapore population about 5 million has an active army of about 30,000 - 35,000 men and a total reserve of about 150,000 HOWEVER, and this is a big HOWEVER, it is a geographically small nation and the army is designed to defend the border against a much larger nation (Malaysia) Thus they can can have a bit more actual troops than a normal nation because they don't have to worry about supply lines in a nation that is only 35 to 50 miles across. But think about that a minute. Here is a nation that is an Island that maintains a near total deployment on close to a wartime footing and and they could not field more than 150,000 troops and most of those are 30+ year old reservist called in from their day job. :mp5:

Taiwan is another example of a small nation with large military, once again they expect to repel the PRC on the beaches of Taiwan not take the fight to Shanghai. Taiwan has, I think not quite 30 million people (I am doing this from memory so don't yell too loud if my numbers are slightly off) maintains a very professional well equiped army and it numbers just over 300,000 total men. That is the total, maxed out deployment for a a nation with that population in a Defensive, not offensive posture.

If you don't have the people to run the county you can't fight the war. You can't have sufficent military readiness with militias

These things should be taken into account. At least on a general basis when roleplaying.

To use the Evil Overlords generous figures If you are a nation with 5 million people then your total maximum supportable size is ((5000000/200)*1.5) or 37500 personel. divid this number in half and you get 18750 personel that are actually combat ready. This is your maximum muster if all you build are infantry units.

A question of support troops.

The US Army maintains at about 1:10 - that is, 10 noncombatant troops to 1 combatant.

There is a claim that this is because the US is inefficient, and a "real army" could make do with 1:3.

Personally, I can't find anything beneath 1:5, and that was Rome, and that was with SIGNIFICANT civillian aid and huge sums being spent by the Senators who owned the armies.

Thoughts? And yes, you can tell me that less then 1:6 is "silly", that was my belief.

Tagged, in case it falls further. Very nice thread.

tag, I may need to start linking this again.

"strategic communications lines are comparitively easy to target. Witness the US Navy's long-term penetration of Soviet communications lines during the cold war."

I find that especially funny given that the Soviets were so much cheekier about their spying at the same time. "Here, Mr.President, have a hand-carved... piece of shit. Put it up in the oval office, do!"

And for how many years did Moscow hear every single word uttered in the oval office? The Americans only found the bug quite recently, having accepted the gift decades ago. Russia, Britain, Israel, and France absolutely obliterate other nations like the US when it comes to really important intel warfare, but rare US triumphs get trumped-up like nobody's business. If Britain hadn't chosen to reveal it, London would still to this day have been reading every message in to or out of Washington and the Americans would never have had a clue. Of course, that assumes that we can belive official announcements to the effect that London actually trusts Washington all of a sudden, which is clearly bull, and London is probably still a step ahead, inspite of what appears to be the case.

I do sometimes wonder about alliances on NS. Who the heck trusts their allies? Nobody! Don't be silly... other nations won't follow you to war no matter what intel you give them, unless they decide it is best for their ruling elite.

Of course, in BG's case we haven't got a ruling elite, which just makes things all the more confusing. So, logistics, eh? Those are great.

My comments were more directed toward information warfare, of which espionage is a necessary component. However, espionage was not the focus of the post. The US has never been very good at the standard espionage game. The Poles, Israelis, Chinese, and British have always had the top-notch espionage services.

Counter-espionage is a slightly different matter. There is no fool-proof way of protecting your secrets from your own people who mange and protect those secrets. Even coded messages can be broken easily if the enemy has a copy of your codebook. This can have a deleterious effect on your espionage operations if used too much, however. For a great deal more on this subject, I recommend you read "Cryptonomicon" by Neil Stephenson.

I specifically mentioned strategic communications as opposed to tactical communications links. The point of my post was information logistics and information warfare. Intercepting strategic communications used to be fairly simple. Everyone used radio to send messages. Radio waves are easy to intercept. Once people realized this, they began encrypting and encoding their messages, and relying on other means of transmitting data.

As I stated earlier, land lines are one of the most secure means of transmitting information. In order to intercept messages on a phone line or cable, an enemy would have to physically find and monitor the cable. The problem- going back to the core message about information logistics- is getting the phone lines/cables to where they are needed. It is fairly easy to string cables between military installations in friendly territory. These lines would most likely carry strategic communication. Since these cables are in fixed locations, enemy spies and saboteurs can get to them without much difficulty.

The current solution for most nations involves routing tactical and strategic communications through satellites in orbit. Once more, the problem of intercepting the messages raises its ugly head. A satellite in a similar orbit can easily receive the same message as your own satellite. Even worse, the transmission from your satellite to the ground can also be picked up by the enemy as well as your troops.

One possible solution is to encrypt/encode every communication on every level. The drawback to this solution goes back to the original post about information logistics. Every unit will be forced to carry decryption/decoding gear- which can be captured or otherwise delivered into enemy hands. It also adds to the combat load of the soldier at the front. Furthermore, the soldier in combat does not have time to sit down and decrypt/decode every message on his radio.

For obvious reasons, the US military- and presumably most other modern militaries- are working hard on this problem. Many nations in the game have come up with potential solutions to the problems I have listed. The point of all of my blathering on the subject is this:

Players willing to pay attention to this sort of detail may therefore have an advantage over opponents who do not. Whole RPs can be run on this subject- for players who are willing to deal with the issues in a realistic manner- in advance of an actual war RP, or perhaps even during one. Here is a quote from a recent RP between me and one of my friends that illustrates some of the problems.

The senior officers exchanged glances again, and Pors wondered what was going on. Deciding to worry about that later, he continued. "Radio transceiver is built into the back of the helmet, along with a surprisingly sophisticated microcomputer for handling message traffic."

Oln arched an eyebrow. "You report indicated that the Dominion radio communications encryption was unbreakable. It took our technicians only three days to decipher the taped messages you sent back."

Pors stood his ground. "Sir, my report said that the Overlord's communications were not practically decipherable. The Dominion's communications systems employ sophisticated encryption techniques, combined with multiple frequencies and computer synchronization. I had no doubt that our technicians could decrypt the Dominion radio messages. However, deciphering tactical message traffic three days after intercepting it is not useful to anybody. How practical is it to understand what the enemy is saying during a battle days after the battle is over?"

"Point well taken, young man. Go on."

In the past, Generals used to fight on foot with their troops. As battles grew larger and more complicated, the generals had to move back from the actual fighting to be able to see the battlefield. Modern generals are often removed several miles from the fighting, to a place where they have access to satellite data, secure phones, and powerful radios. They can get information from halfway around the planet in seconds ... but it might take half a day to get that information sorted, verified, and sent out to the people who need it. This sometimes causes needless casualties (so-called friendly fire is part of the problem).

Thinking about this...

Reading The "O'Reilly Report (http://www.cochraneinstitute.com/Reports/preventdeaths43a.pdf), and it mentioned a style of leadership known as "command-feedback," which is used by the marines. It seems like a modern-day "general-at-the-front" kind of thing. I wonder how you RP that, what that command style means. Just some wondering. :)

As someone with only the faintest understanding of logistics, I think this is an invaluable thread to put to use toward a realistic war RP. I have next to no army RP experience (the only times I've fought on the ground were my civil war and my current rebellion by one of my colonies). I've had little air RP experience and two of the times I did an air RP ended up with my opponent Godmoding in my favor.

Naval is a different matter, at least for RPs. Granted, I usually just enumerate the warships I send over, but I usually add a "plus various support ships." I didn't realize the margin was 3 support/non-combat ships to one combat ship in the U.S. Navy in the height of the Cold War, but I realized that refueling and underway replenishments were necessary.

I think the biggest thing about going into detail about logistics is that a lot of players, including non-newbs or non-n00bs don't want to spend whole, long posts just going over sending a convoy of armored vehicles and Humvees to send fuel or liters of water to the front line troops. They'd rather get to the actual shooting. You also see it in conference threads where people want to skip the departure and landing and greeting aspects and get straight to the negotiations. Sure, it gets to the "meat" of the thread earlier, but it also gets rid of the spices that make the thread more interesting as a story.

I guess these are just the insane ramblings of a RPer and would-be writer with little better to do.

I think the biggest thing about going into detail about logistics is that a lot of players, including non-newbs or non-n00bs don't want to spend whole, long posts just going over sending a convoy of armored vehicles and Humvees to send fuel or liters of water to the front line troops. They'd rather get to the actual shooting. You also see it in conference threads where people want to skip the departure and landing and greeting aspects and get straight to the negotiations. Sure, it gets to the "meat" of the thread earlier, but it also gets rid of the spices that make the thread more interesting as a story.

I guess these are just the insane ramblings of a RPer and would-be writer with little better to do.

This is a valid point, which I've addressed several times throughout this thread. Whenever somebody claims to be invading something in my "sphere of interest", the first thing I ask is where the home nation is, followed by where the ships came from and what route did they take to get there. These are the basic questions that should be worked out beforehand by the players involved- mainly because the most effective way to repel invaders is before they got onto your turf.


TEO

I find it best to be vague, BUT to be reasonable with your troop numbers. If you are mobilising and deploying a few soldiers then it can probably just have a little mention... but if you are using hundreds of thousands of soldiers in a nation which doesn't support you (so you have to supply youself) then logistics become important and should me mentions a fair bit... not to mention they become a vital part of your posts because you need to take objectives to supply your forces goals (i.e deepwater ports and so on).

But meh, I never actually get to the fighting parts anyways.

Let me reiterate that the purpose of this thread is not to bog every RP down in minutiae, but rather to enhance the roleplaying experience. I have found that posting the build-up of forces and their transit to the battle zone has several good effects from a gaming point of view:

1) Since posting the mobilization and transportation of forces usually involves several posts over a couple of days, it gives all and sundry a chance to see what is going on and possibly get involved.

2) From a writing standpoint, posting a thread with some of the logistics details adds a level of complexity to the storyline. If the players involved have a good grasp of the fundamentals, the story is more interesting to those who read but don't participate.

3) Strategic concerns suddenly creep into the storyline. In one thread I was involved with, I RPed building and staffing a forward logistics base months before the actual invasion. This can be another means of getting other players involved. Imagine a Desert Storm RP, where the invading player has to convince a nation near the target to allow a bunch of foreign soldiers to stage out of his/her country. Much like real life, a host of diplomatic activity will precede the fighting in many cases, as the invader tries to establish a beachhead nearby and the invadee tries to avoid it.

These are some of the reasons I created this thread. In RL, practically no one simply invades another country out of the blue. There's usually a lot of preliminary activity beforehand that can make for good roleplaying if done well. In my opinion, taking the time to understand the logistics of strategy and tactics is worth it if it helps make a better RP.


TEO

Im a newb and i would like to know about weapon procurement, how much does it cost to develop and manufacture domestic weapons/ how much can a nation expect to spend buying arms? In NS terms what can i expect when building a military. I read posts where people say they bought ubertech X from nation Y and i want to be realistic about building my military. ~yes this is a bit inarticulate and i appologize.

Im a newb and i would like to know about weapon procurement, how much does it cost to develop and manufacture domestic weapons/ how much can a nation expect to spend buying arms? In NS terms what can i expect when building a military. I read posts where people say they bought ubertech X from nation Y and i want to be realistic about building my military. ~yes this is a bit inarticulate and i appologize.

After you read this thread, read over

http://forums2.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?p...d=1#post7291187

and you should have an idea of things. I'm sure theres more, but its early and I'm pre-coffee.

Vastiva, your link doesn't work. Perhaps you should hurry up with that coffee? ;)

Vastiva, your link doesn't work.I think this is what it's supposed to be:
http://forums2.jolt.co.uk/showthread.php?t=297064&page=2&pp=40#post7291187

Im going to take this into account for now on. Having a population of 2.5 billion I always set my military at 10 million. I never really tried to organize it because Ive really never had much information on logistics, I always assumed a good 50% of the Armed forces total would be taken up but it.

This should get a sticky.

Yeah, what Nianacio said....

*fumbles through fourth cup before he realizes he's drinking tea*

Here is a link to a Rand corporation document about a possible future military doctrine for the US military:

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1100/MR1100.chap5.pdf

I'm not sure if I completely agree with the author's conclusions, although they do fit neatly with the "System Administration Force" evisioned by Thomas Barnett in his excellent work, The Pentagon's New map.

The "Information Logistics" load of maneuver warfare is already a major obstacle for military commanders. Coordinating large units which are completely out of touch with each other into a time-on-target attack is several nightmares rolled into one, particularly if the security of the command and control links are compromised. Such attacks invite destruction in detail by a forewarned and mobile enemy force.

Imagine a mechanized division attempting a "swarm attack" against a near-peer military force. "Near-peer" in this instance refers to a military which is not directly equivalent to the attacker in terms of equipment or training, but is fairly close in absolute terms. One good example might be a mechanized division of the (highly professional and well-equipped) British Army against a mechanized division of the (equally-professional but massively over-equipped) US Army, but there are several other plausible examples.

For purposes of this argument, we will assume that the battlefield airspace is effectively neutral (SAMs and aircraft keep opposing tactical air intervention by both sides to a minimum). In this essentially high-tech WW I scenario (a long-time favorite of NS war roleplayers), the attacking division would probably be unable to achieve sufficient tactical surprise to destroy the defending unit- despite a distinct high-tech advantage.

Such "swarm attacks" rely almost entirely upon surprise to succeed (Third Law of Combat: Surprise is an event that takes place in the mind of the enemy commander). The control of information is absolutely critical to achieve surprise. In order to prevent the target unit in my scenario from discovering a "swarm attack" in progress, the swarming units would have to travel considerable distances (out of contact with other friendly units) outside the observation range of the target. Unit coordination must be fairly precise to prevent detached battallion-sized units from arriving at the battlefield too late or too early to succeed.

A single battallion that assaults a full division is going to get seriously mauled. Coordinated attacks by several battallions would probably have the opposite effect. If the attacks by separated battallions are not fairly close together in time, the effect of the swarm attack would be lost- along with most of the swarming units.

Granted that such uncoordinated dispersed attacks have succeeded in the past, and will probably succeed again. However, all such successful attacks were usually the result of the target commander making a stupid mistake. One cannot count on the timidity or stupidity of one's enemies.

Information logistics is one of the keys to a successful swarm attack. Not just controlling widely separated units and coordinating the attack, but also denying the enemy access to his own information logistics network.


TEO

The "Information Logistics" load of maneuver warfare is already a major obstacle for military commanders. Coordinating large units which are completely out of touch with each other into a time-on-target attack is several nightmares rolled into one, particularly if the security of the command and control links are compromised. Such attacks invite destruction in detail by a forewarned and mobile enemy force.

Basically, "don't put all your eggs in one basket" and "don't count your eggs until they've hatched."

Imagine a mechanized division attempting a "swarm attack" against a near-peer military force. "Near-peer" in this instance refers to a military which is not directly equivalent to the attacker in terms of equipment or training, but is fairly close in absolute terms. One good example might be a mechanized division of the (highly professional and well-equipped) British Army against a mechanized division of the (equally-professional but massively over-equipped) US Army, but there are several other plausible examples.

Depending upon the location of the battle, the difference would be significant. Without a powerful long-haul/distance transport system for their heavy equipment, any fight outside of the UK would be mostly Warrior AFVs vs. Bradleys + LAVs + Abrams MBTs...and while the British marines and Royal Infantry units seem to have better discipline, they would be outgunned quite rapidly.

"For purposes of this argument, we will assume that the battlefield airspace is effectively neutral (SAMs and aircraft keep opposing tactical air intervention by both sides to a minimum). In this essentially high-tech WW I scenario (a long-time favorite of NS war roleplayers), the attacking division would probably be unable to achieve sufficient tactical surprise to destroy the defending unit- despite a distinct high-tech advantage."

Would airspace neutrality affect the artillery balance?

"Such "swarm attacks" rely almost entirely upon surprise to succeed"
I would disagree, but then again I also disagree with the doctrine relating to swarm attacks as it is stated in the paper (ie, that low-power systems (LAVs or isolated HMMWVs) could replace the firepower of heavier systems (Bradley AFVs and MBTs) by their swarm benefits).

"Third Law of Combat: Surprise is an event that takes place in the mind of the enemy commander"

Terror and Confusion are events that take place in the minds of the men in the line of fire. I could spend a lot of time refuting that allegation, but it's not my main point.


"The control of information is absolutely critical to achieve surprise. In order to prevent the target unit in my scenario from discovering a "swarm attack" in progress, the swarming units would have to travel considerable distances (out of contact with other friendly units) outside the observation range of the target. Unit coordination must be fairly precise to prevent detached battallion-sized units from arriving at the battlefield too late or too early to succeed.

"A single battallion that assaults a full division is going to get seriously mauled. Coordinated attacks by several battallions would probably have the opposite effect. If the attacks by separated battallions are not fairly close together in time, the effect of the swarm attack would be lost- along with most of the swarming units."

Swarming might not necessarily mean that all units arrive at the same time. A long-standing tactic (exploited repeatedly by Alexander of Macedonia, among others) is to have one force show itself to engage in normal fighting with the main force (sometimes retreating to draw in parts of the main opponent force) while additional units (cav., for Alexander the Great) drive into the holes formed or flank the positions taken in response. By driving in on the flanks, the enemy force, while larger, may be mauled in the confusion as the enemy units seek to array themselves to face two (or more) different threats. If numerous enemy units appeared on the flanks, it might be taken that a much larger enemy force exists...causing enemy soldiers to panic while commanders try to figure out how large the enemy force is...as that force wipes out their men.

"Granted that such uncoordinated dispersed attacks have succeeded in the past, and will probably succeed again. However, all such successful attacks were usually the result of the target commander making a stupid mistake. One cannot count on the timidity or stupidity of one's enemies."

The VietCong swarms of US entrenched positions often succeded due to the fear and panic of the soldiers rather than the failure of their commanders. Claymores and mines certainly have a big effect, as the author indicates, but even more basic anti-personnel weaponry (machine guns, grenade MGs, shot guns, hand grenades) can be used to scatter an enemy swarm. I've heard some people relate this "swarm" doctrine to that of certain Starcraft players who have one of the lower-tech 'species' in that game (the Zerg) rush enemy camps with the lowest-level fighters because, while those units have a low individual chance of survival and no ranged, anti-air, or especially powerful attack, they are cheap and can be made quickly.

Counters (shell artillery, mortars, mines (heavily or lightly deployed*), gun emplacements, etc.) are abundant but can be countered with a 'smart swarm' technique.

* An enemy rush (among modern nations) would likely be delayed by a lightly mined area since they couldn't know how heavily mined any particular area is (no surprise, tactical advantage lost for need of more complicated and rare units)...

If one were to use ATV-(or light strike vehicle-)mounted Recoiless Rifles and other heavy, but relatively lightweight weaponry (the weapons being dispersed in hunter-killer groups of 2-3 RR's and maybe a half-dozen men) to strike at AFVs, tanks, unarmored vehicles, troop transports, and troop formations from the sides, the enemy would be forced to search for and attack those small, mobile, and hard to locate forces with heavy resources (while taking significant losses). A Ranger-type force could be charged with this tactic (since the RR carriers could be easily air-dropped around a large enemy division, in day or at night) and they could start the attack while launching flares or sending out burst-transmissions to tell the main force to strike.

"Information logistics is one of the keys to a successful swarm attack. Not just controlling widely separated units and coordinating the attack, but also denying the enemy access to his own information logistics network."

The above 'smart swarm' scenario might defeat that need, since the main communications would be reduced to "wait, wait, wait, go." Simplified ground-unit IFF/ID devices could be attached to the hunter-killer units and only activated once the main force is signalled to enter the area (so as to prevent friendly-fire while not giving away their positions too soon). I don't believe that anything above a HMMWV should be used for such strike teams since the commanders would be tempted to make each scout/strike force (hunter-killer team) into it's own combat group, complete with a company of infantry, an AD/SHORAD unit, an artillery attachment, a supply corps, etc.. The key should be the tactics that the commander uses in placing his forces to harrass and then destroy the main enemy force (not so tight as to risk being stuck in a head-to-head fight with a larger force...not so loose as to risk having each unit wiped out individually).

Doctrine (and a push for LAVs, such as this report seems to make) will not supplant the need for local commanders to be aware of the threat and to develop innovative means of opposing the enemy (ie, if you're in a city, hide or repurpose heavy units while dispersing the men into dozens of buildings along ambush routes...if you have tanks then hide them in buildings or garages or place them under cover, so that they can fire on key intersections without being spotted from the air...so that the infantry or light forces can take advantage of the stresses of urban warfare so that, while casualties will be felt, troop losses will be minimized and will arrive with massive enemy casualties.

Depending upon the location of the battle, the difference would be significant. Without a powerful long-haul/distance transport system for their heavy equipment, any fight outside of the UK would be mostly Warrior AFVs vs. Bradleys + LAVs + Abrams MBTs...and while the British marines and Royal Infantry units seem to have better discipline, they would be outgunned quite rapidly.

In a straight-up division vs division slugging match, that's probably the case. I was referring mainly to a swarm attack by a division separated into individual battallions. My point (apparently poorly expressed) was the need for complete infospace security by the attacking units to avoid piecemeal destruction by the target division. I chose the British Army as an example, but several other military forces would do as well.


Would airspace neutrality affect the artillery balance?

No. Artillery is completely separate from the TacAir environment. I emphasized neutral airspace to simplify the infospace security requirements.

"Such "swarm attacks" rely almost entirely upon surprise to succeed"
I would disagree, but then again I also disagree with the doctrine relating to swarm attacks as it is stated in the paper (ie, that low-power systems (LAVs or isolated HMMWVs) could replace the firepower of heavier systems (Bradley AFVs and MBTs) by their swarm benefits).

I also disagree with many of the author's conclusions, but the historical examples and the proposed doctrine are largely dependent upon tactical surprise. The author's own chosen "poster child" for swarm attacks (the Mongols) refute his assertion that heavy vehicles can be supplanted by lighter vehicles with lighter weapons.

"Third Law of Combat: Surprise is an event that takes place in the mind of the enemy commander"

Terror and Confusion are events that take place in the minds of the men in the line of fire. I could spend a lot of time refuting that allegation, but it's not my main point.

Nor mine. Tactical suprise is essentially good infospace security at work.


Swarming might not necessarily mean that all units arrive at the same time.

[snip]

"Granted that such uncoordinated dispersed attacks have succeeded in the past, and will probably succeed again. However, all such successful attacks were usually the result of the target commander making a stupid mistake. One cannot count on the timidity or stupidity of one's enemies."

I'm still referring to tactical surprise and its relationship to infospace security (and therefore Information Logistics). Many of the historical examples involved some pig-headed yutz on horseback ordering his troops to do something stupid (such as Crassus leaving the re-supply corridor to chase Parthian horsemen with infantry or any of several "nobles" in eastern Europe charging after supposedly "retreating" Mongols). Poor information logistics by the victims of the swarm attacks played a role in many of the debacles described.

An enemy rush (among modern nations) would likely be delayed by a lightly mined area since they couldn't know how heavily mined any particular area is (no surprise, tactical advantage lost for need of more complicated and rare units).

This is essentially the author's position regarding defeating a swarm attack. Channelling swarming units into kill zones or pinning them against obstacles are two of the most basic means of defeating a swarm attack.

If one were to use ATV-(or light strike vehicle-)mounted Recoiless Rifles and other heavy, but relatively lightweight weaponry (the weapons being dispersed in hunter-killer groups of 2-3 RR's and maybe a half-dozen men) to strike at AFVs, tanks, unarmored vehicles, troop transports, and troop formations from the sides, the enemy would be forced to search for and attack those small, mobile, and hard to locate forces with heavy resources (while taking significant losses). A Ranger-type force could be charged with this tactic (since the RR carriers could be easily air-dropped around a large enemy division, in day or at night) and they could start the attack while launching flares or sending out burst-transmissions to tell the main force to strike.

And once again, information logistics is the point. Assuming the target has no access to real-time reconnaissance or other infospace assets, a swarm attack so described is likely to succeed (it worked against the Libyans, after all). However, a target with functional aerial or satellite reconnaissance would be far tougher to deceive for a sufficient length of time to achieve tactical surprise.

"Information logistics is one of the keys to a successful swarm attack. Not just controlling widely separated units and coordinating the attack, but also denying the enemy access to his own information logistics network."

This paragraph was rather badly written. Assuming the swarming units have no specialized infospace security protocols in place, radio communications would be dangerous to the detached units. Even encrypted messages broadcast from a swarming unit could reveal the existence of a flanking operation, at the very least. Merely revealing the existence of any such maneuvers could doom the maneuvering units.

Doctrine (and a push for LAVs, such as this report seems to make) will not supplant the need for local commanders to be aware of the threat and to develop innovative means of opposing the enemy.

Which was the point of the whole (poorly-expressed) post.


Thanks for your input, BYW.

TEO

Wait, you mean logistics isn't a type of math done by logs? Oh, man, I've been doing it all wrong!

I find this shouldn't be a problem for me. At all. If anyone has questions of how I do it, ask. After all, I may be doing it wrong.

Why hasn't this been stickied? I don't know...

So how about "rushers" or nations who sends a group of soldiers to destroy a developing nation I highly doubt logistics will be need since they will mostly use food from the land to survive

So how about "rushers" or nations who sends a group of soldiers to destroy a developing nation I highly doubt logistics will be need since they will mostly use food from the land to survive

Showe me an RP where invaders lived off the land? The defender could easilly counter that by burning fields and forests. Then the non-logistic forces would be easilly defeated.

If anyone wants to see a historical example of logistics.

From my memory of 'The long march' it is a VERY relevant topic in this respect, look at it .... NOW!

Showe me an RP where invaders lived off the land? The defender could easilly counter that by burning fields and forests. Then the non-logistic forces would be easilly defeated.


"General Winter", Napoleonic invasion of Russia, scorched earth policy.

The invader could take supplies from routed enemy troops, from towns and villages (mainly food, clothing, possibly fuel). Furthermore, a scorched earth policy would severely affect post-war conditions ... uh oh your nation is now screwed in agriculture (starving people), infrastructure (1/4 of your nation is homeless) (and yes the troops would need shelter possibly; thus its inclusion in scorched earth policy) ,etc. and will be screwed for some time.

When you're being invaded the devestating effect of having your country looted & destroyed is going to be so devestating that destroying anything you can't carry away seems a pretty attractive idea.

Napoleans troops were also forced to reatreat & suffered horrific casulties, primarily from causes other than enemy action. Scorched earth will rob an invader of materials, demoralise troops because they know there will not even be a building in which to shelter & of course the drawback is you leave locals suffering in a similar way because it's their homes.